Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health System Corporation et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Defendant Hill's 200 Opposed Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in part and Denied in part. Hill is Granted leave to file a motion for summary judgment as to Rodriguez' equal protection claim. (Signed by Judge John D. Rainey.) Parties notified. (yhausmann, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
SUSANNA HINOJOSA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. C-09-95
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant John Hill’s (“Hill”) Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 200), to which Plaintiff Susanna Hinojosa Rodriguez
(“Rodriguez”) has responded (Dkt. No. 201). Having considered the motion, response, record,
and applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Hill’s motion should be GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
I. Background
The original deadline to file dispositive motions in this case was October 28, 2011. (Dkt.
No. 108.) Magistrate Judge Janice Ellington extended this deadline by fourteen days on July 6,
2011. (Dkt. No. 135.) Defendants CHRISTUS Spohn Health System Corporation d/b/a
CHRISTUS Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi–Memorial (also sued as CHRISTUS Spohn Health
System Corporation) and CHRISTUS Health’s (collectively “CHRISTUS”) timely filed three
motions for partial summary judgment on all of Rodriguez’ claims (Dkt. Nos. 109, 175, 177). All
three motions were granted by this Court’s June 13, 2012 Memorandum Order and Opinion (Dkt.
No. 196), and CHRISTUS was dismissed as a defendant in this action.
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Hill did not file any dispositive motions before the November 22, 2011 deadline. Now,
almost nine months later, Hill seeks leave to file a motion for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that once a scheduling order has been
entered, it “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” FED. R. CIV. P.
16(b). “It requires a party ‘to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the
diligence of the party needing the extension.’” Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 551 F.3d
344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting S&W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d
533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003); 6A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT et al., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1522.1 (2d
ed. 1990)). The following factors are relevant to good cause: (1) the explanation for the failure to
timely move for summary judgment; (2) the importance of the motion; (3) potential prejudice in
allowing the motion; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. See Id.
(citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536).
III. Analysis
Hill offers no explanation for his failure to meet the Court’s November 22, 2011 deadline
for filing dispositive motions, but instead argues that good cause exists to grant his request for
leave to file a motion for summary judgment at this late hour because “[t]he issues addressed in
this Court’s June 13, 2012 Order apply directly to Ms. Rodriguez’ remaining claims against John
Hill.” (Dkt. No. 200 at 3.) As explained below, this statement is only half correct.
A. Due Process
Rodriguez’ Complaint alleges that both CHRISTUS and Hill violated “her substantive
due process rights of bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Pl. First Am. Compl.,
Dkt. No. 141 ¶¶ 1, 2.) In support of this claim, Rodriguez alleged that she “was voluntarily
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admitted as a patient to [CHRISTUS’] Behavioral Medicine Department for treatment of a
serious mental health condition–bi-polar disorder and other mental health conditions.” (Pl. First
Amended Pet., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 9, ¶ 10.) Rodriguez claimed that during her hospitalization, Hill—
a mental health technician employed by CHRISTUS—sexually assaulted her “by touching [her]
shoulders with his hand, telling [her] how beautiful she was and how beautiful her breasts were.
Defendant Hill further told [her] that he could find a ‘good place for a good night’ and that he
would ‘show her his big dick.’” (Id. ¶ 36.) Hill allegedly assaulted Rodriguez again that same
day after lunch, this time “by approaching [her] from behind; grabbing and fondling her breasts
and rubbing his crotch against her buttocks and lower back pressing his penis against her and
stating ‘Do you want my black dick?’” (Id. ¶ 37.) Rodriguez claimed that she reported the assault
to nursing staff, but CHRISTUS’ “fail[ure] to take any prompt and appropriate remedial action[]
left [her] scared, intimidated, and fearing for her safety,” so she asked to be discharged. (Id. ¶¶
39–40.) Rodriguez further alleged that “[i]n the aftermath of the assaults, [her] condition
significantly worsened and [she] was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder” which
“culminated in [her] having suicidal thoughts and [she] has attempted suicide as a result.” (Id. ¶¶
54, 56.)
In addressing CHRISTUS’ motion for summary judgment on Rodriguez’ due process
claims, the Court’s June 13, 2012 Order recognized that “a governmental entity may be held
liable under § 1983 only for its own unconstitutional or illegal policies and not for the tortious
acts of its employees. (Dkt. No. 196 at 6 (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). The Court then dismissed Rodriguez’ due process claims against CHRISTUS because
“the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishe[d] that CHRISTUS had a custom and
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policy of properly training its employees and did not act with deliberate indifference to
Rodriguez’ health or safety.” (Dkt. No. 196 at 19.)
However, the Court explicitly found that Rodriguez had sufficiently alleged a due process
claim against Hill:
Applying the standard set forth in Doe ex rel. Magee, and taking Rodriguez’
allegations as true—namely that Hill was aware of Rodriguez’ suicidal
tendencies and history of sexual abuse and used his position as a mental health
technician to sexually grope and proposition her while she was hospitalized and
under his watch and care—the Court finds that Rodriguez has sufficiently
alleged a constitutional violation based on the invasion of her bodily integrity.
(Dkt. No. 196 at 10.)
Hill’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment does not even
acknowledge the Court’s ruling with respect to Rodriguez’ due process claims. Because Hill has
failed to establish good cause as to why he was unable to raise his due process arguments before
the motions deadline expired roughly nine months ago, his request for leave to file a motion for
summary judgment with respect to Rodriguez’ due process claim is DENIED.
B. Equal Protection
Rodriguez’ Complaint also alleges that both CHRISTUS and Hill violated her rights
under the Equal Protection Clause “based upon gender, female, and mental disability.” (Pl. First
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2.) In support of her equal protection claim, Rodriguez’ Complaint relies upon
the same set of facts giving rise to her due process claim, namely her alleged sexual assault by
Hill. (Id. ¶¶ 58–74.)
In its June 13, 2012 Order granting CHRISTUS’ motion for summary judgment on
Rodriguez’ equal protection claims, the Court stated that it was “unable to locate any Fifth
Circuit case at the district or circuit level recognizing that a state actor’s isolated sexual assault of
an individual could constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (Dkt. No. 196 at 21.)
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The Court further stated that it was not inclined to recognize Rodriguez’ claim of gendermotivated sexual assault as constituting a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, recognizing
that “the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. Taylor ISD suggests that such a claim is more properly
brought under the Due Process Clause.” (Id. at 22–23 (citing Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15
F.3d 443, 458 (5th Cir. 1994).)
The Court’s June 13, 2011 Order did not address Rodriguez’s Equal Protection claims
against Hill. However, because Rodriguez’ First Amended Complaint alleges the same facts to
support her equal protection claims against CHRISTUS and Hill, and the Court previously held
that such allegations of isolated sexual assault do not give rise to an equal protection claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rodriguez’ equal protection claims against Hill also fail as a matter
of law.
Accordingly, Hill is GRANTED leave to file a motion for summary judgment as to
Rodriguez’ equal protection claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Hill’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. No. 200) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this 22nd day of August, 2012.
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JOHN D. RAINEY
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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