Waddleton v. Jackson et al
Filing
104
ORDER granting 84 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 100 Motion for Judgment. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE..(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lsmith, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
MARVIN WADDLETON, III,
Plaintiff,
VS.
NORRIS JACKSON, et al,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. C-10-267
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ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING MOTIONS_FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court are (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(D.E. 84), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, treated as a crossmotion for summary judgment (D.E. 100). On October 3, 2012, United States Magistrate
Judge Brian L. Owsley issued a Memorandum and Recommendation (D.E. 101),
recommending that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that
Plaintiff’s motion be denied. Plaintiff filed his Objections (D.E. 103) on October 18,
2012.
At issue is whether Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution for what he claims are unreasonable
searches in the form of strip and visual body cavity searches of prison inmates. He
claims that the searches are unreasonable because they do not have a penological
justification and because the place and manner of the searches—searches of men within
view of women officers—are arbitrary, harassing, and humiliating. The Defendants
assert that the searches are abundantly reasonable and, thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a
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claim upon which relief can be granted because sovereign immunity protects them in
their official capacities and qualified immunity protects them in their individual
capacities.
The Fifth Circuit has directed that this Court determine whether the prison
officials have satisfied their “light” burden of showing that the searches are reasonable
when balancing the need for the searches against the invasion of personal rights that they
entail. Waddleton v. Jackson, No. 11-40055 (5th Cir. October 21, 2011) (citing Elliott v.
Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1994)). Included in the analysis is the scope of the
intrusions, the manner in which they were conducted, the justification for them, and the
places in which they were conducted. Id. (citing Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep’t,
849 F.2d 195, 196-97 (5th Cir. 1988)).
The Magistrate Judge has issued his Memorandum and Recommendation
concluding that the Defendants have indeed met their burden. Plaintiff objects, debating
the truth of the Defendants’ penological justifications and suggesting that there are better,
more effective ways of running a prison so as to minimize threats to security. Plaintiff
contends that his position has been misconstrued and that his arguments are supported by
case law.
A. Plaintiff Admitted to Sufficient Cause for Search.
First, Plaintiff accuses the Magistrate Judge of “perjury” in construing Plaintiff’s
allegations as admitting to there having been a “fight” prior to the chow hall strip search.
Plaintiff argues that he never said there was a “fight” and that his whole complaint is that
the strip searches are unjustified, in part, because there was no fight. In reviewing the
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record, it is readily apparent that, in his Step 2 Grievance, Plaintiff referred to the event
that preceded the chow hall strip search as “the incident.” D.E. 1, p. 7. In his objections
to a previous memorandum and recommendation, he referred to it as an “altercation.”
D.E. 27, p. 2.
Given Defendants’ explanation that strip searches are justified by
diversions as well as other more violent acts, Plaintiff has admitted that there was an
event that triggered the chow hall strip search sufficient to support the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis. Plaintiff’s first objection is OVERRULED.
B. The Strip Searches are Reasonable.
Second, Plaintiff reasons that strip searching inmates after they have already been
searched upon entering the facility is unnecessary—that the prison administration’s
concern should be focused on the entry of jailors and others who come in from the
outside world. In other words, the threat to jail security comes more from correctional
officers smuggling in contraband than from inmates moving about the facility and
interacting. In this regard, Plaintiff cites Security & Law Enf. Emp. v. Carey, 737 F.2d
187, 201-02 (2nd Cir. 1984). That case illustrates that correctional officers can pose a
threat to prison security and, under appropriate circumstances, may properly be subjected
to searches. It does not prescribe searches of correctional officers instead of inmates.
Plaintiff goes on to suggest that, because some persons are to be searched only
upon reasonable suspicion that the particular person has done something wrong, the same
should hold true for inmates. D.E. 103, p. 4 (citing Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 675
(8th Cir. 1982)). Hunter was concerned with civilians who came to visit inmates in prison
and the opinion stands for the general proposition that an anonymous, unconfirmed, and
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non-specific tip could not support a search of any particular visitor—that such a search
should be on a person-specific suspicion. This rationale does not hold true with respect
to the types of security threats that exist within the inmate population of a prison, as
illustrated by the evidence that the Defendants submitted.
Plaintiff next complains about Defendants’ evidence, which he admits that he
cannot controvert. He cites Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th
Cir. 2008) for his argument that the Defendants have done something procedurally
improper and that the Court should disregard Defendants’ summary judgment evidence.
The rule on which Ciomber and Plaintiff rely is a Local Rule of the Northern District of
Illinois. It has no application in the Southern District of Texas. Nothing precludes this
Court from considering as proper summary judgment evidence the “Offender Searches”
policy and the Affidavit of Norris Jackson submitted by Defendants. D.E. 84-1 and 84-2.
Plaintiff complains that the privacy of one’s naked body is culturally important
and constitutionally protected from unreasonable search, citing York v. Story, 324 F.2d
450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (male police officer violated constitutional privacy rights of
female assault victim by photographing her in the nude and circulating the photos to
others). The Court does not challenge this general statement. The question, though, is
whether the searches imposed here were reasonable under the circumstances.
Plaintiff cites Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 871 (5th Cir. 1982) for the proposition
that strip searches are only reasonable if there is cause to believe that the specific prisoner
being searched is in possession of contraband. In that case, the Court enjoined the use of
strip searches as a condition to the use of the law library unless there was a particular
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reasonable cause.
There is no evidence that the strip searches at issue here were
implemented to deter any inmate from exercising constitutional rights, such as having
access to the law library. Nothing about that injunction order prohibits the use of strip
searches for a more generalized inmate population when there is a threat to security as
identified by Defendants in this case.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884
(1979) is curious. Perhaps Plaintiff relies on the appellate court’s holding, which the
Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court held that, even though strip searches had
revealed only one case of the discovery of contraband in that facility, use of those
searches was justified because of the inherent dangers of the inmate population. While
the appellate court had relied on the fact that only one instance of contraband smuggling
had been found in the facility’s short history of strip searches for indicating that the need
was not justified, the Supreme Court looked at that same fact as equally indicative that
strip searches were effective as a deterrent—a reasonable basis for the use of such an
invasion of privacy. Bell v. Wolfish supports the Defendants’ position in this case.
Plaintiff also cites Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247 (1960) for
his argument that the institution should find a better way to achieve its objectives when
the constitutional right to an expectation of privacy is jeopardized.
In Shelton,
schoolteachers filed suit to complain of a 14th Amendment violation in the form of a state
statute that required them to file an annual disclosure of all organizations to which they
belonged or to which they contributed for the five years preceding the disclosure as a
condition of employment. While the Court did recite the need to use less onerous means
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to achieve any legitimate objective, this Court has not been presented with any evidence
that the prison administration’s legitimate security goals can be achieved in a less
onerous manner.
Plaintiff suggests that existing metal detectors and pat downs are sufficient to
detect contraband and that strip searches to find notes taped to feet and other places is
“unreasonable and unrealistic,” citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S.Ct. 2254,
2262 (1987). But the Supreme Court, in Turner, approved of restrictions on inmate
correspondence despite a First Amendment challenge. In doing so, the Court emphasized
the deferential test for reviewing prison administration policies so that courts, which are
not equipped to do so, will not end up micromanaging the prisons. Notes taped to feet
obviously present a security risk through inmate correspondence that the Supreme Court
is willing to recognize. Efforts to intercept such communications cannot be summarily
termed “unreasonable and unrealistic.”
It is true that, in Hurley v. Ward, 549 F.Supp. 174 (D.C.N.Y. 1982), that court held
that routine strip searches were not warranted except after contact visits. That opinion
does not apply here for at least three reasons. First, that case involved routine strip
searches that were administered frequently and, according to the evidence, needlessly.
The strip searches at issue here were not automatic, as a matter of ordinary course, or
nearly as frequent as those in Hurley, but instead were imposed for reasons articulated by
the Defendants. Thus the case is distinguishable on its facts. Second, the opinion was
issued from the court for the District of New York and is not binding precedent on this
Court. Third, while this Hurley opinion was not directly appealed, the holding on which
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Plaintiff relies has been expressly rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction over the District of New York. Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 79 n.5 (2nd
Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Defendants’ policy on strip searches or
their application of that policy is unconstitutional as a matter of fact or as a matter of law.
Plaintiff’s second objection is OVERRULED.
C. Qualified Immunity Protects Defendants.
Plaintiff’s third objection is that, based on the demonstrated, clearly established
unconstitutionality of the strip searches, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
for conducting such searches. Because, as demonstrated above, the premise of this
argument—that the searches were unconstitutional—is erroneous, Plaintiff has not
defeated the qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff’s third objection is OVERRULED.
D. Defendants Are Not Liable in Any Capacity.
Plaintiff suggests that municipal liability may be imposed under these
circumstances. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not sued any municipality. Plaintiff
does not appear to contest sovereign immunity for Defendants in their official capacities,
but briefs the exception to that immunity for Defendants in their individual capacities.
While sovereign immunity does not protect them in their individual capacity, qualified
immunity does. As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to defeat the qualified immunity
defense. Plaintiff’s fourth objection is OVERRULED.
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E. Summary Judgment Procedure Does Not
Prohibit Judgment in Favor of Defendants.
Last, Plaintiff objects, claiming that he has raised a disputed issue of material fact
that prohibits the issuance of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. When an official
pleads qualified immunity as a defense, this alters the summary judgment burden of proof
by shifting it to the plaintiff “who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact
issue as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established
law.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 2932 (2011). Again, as demonstrated above, Plaintiff has not shown
that Defendants violated clearly established law.
Plaintiff’s fifth objection is
OVERRULED.
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as
Plaintiff’s Objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a
de novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation
to
which
objections
were
specifically
directed,
the
Court
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (D.E. 84) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,
treated as a cross-motion for summary judgment (D.E. 100) is DENIED.
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This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
ORDERED this 24th day of October, 2012.
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NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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