Hogan v. City of Corpus Christi, Texas et al
Filing
45
ORDER granting in part and denying in part [42-4] Motion for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Judge Janis Graham Jack) Parties notified.(mserpa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JOHN MICHAEL HOGAN,
§
§
Plaintiff,
§
VS.
§
§
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS, et al, §
§
Defendants.
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. C-10-360
ORDER
On this day came on to be considered Defendants Robert Cunningham’s and Chris
Potter’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Immunity from Suit. (D.E. 42-4.) For the reasons
stated herein, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
Jurisdiction
The Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 because Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff John Michael Hogan filed this action on November 12, 2010, and filed an
Amended Complaint on January 4, 2011. (D.E. 1; D.E. 19.) On April 12, 2010, Plaintiff
received a telephone call from his minor son, who was residing with Plaintiff’s ex-wife in
Portland, Texas. (D.E. 19 at 2.) Plaintiff’s son asked him to come and pick him up because his
mother was acting strangely. (Id.) When he arrived at his ex-wife’s home, officers of the
Portland Police Department informed Plaintiff that his ex-wife was going to be arrested. (Id. at
2-3.) After confirming that Plaintiff shared custody of his son with his ex-wife, the officers
released him into his care. (Id. at 3.)
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On April 15, 2010, Plaintiff was startled by a loud banging on his front door. (Id.) His
roommate opened the door, whereupon Defendants Cunningham and Potter, officers in the
Corpus Christi Police Department, asked for Plaintiff and demanded entry into the residence to
enforce a divorce decree. (Id.) Plaintiff’s roommate informed Defendants that he was not the
man they were looking for and indicated that the officers did not have permission to enter. (Id.)
Plaintiff then approached the front door and advised the officers that he was the individual they
sought; told the officers that they did not have permission to enter and subsequently closed the
door. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that both the Corpus Christi and Portland Police Departments, as
well as a judge’s secretary, told him that he did not have to answer the door. (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at
65; 67-69; 97.)
Plaintiff alleges that after he told Defendants Cunningham and Potter they could not
enter, the officers “busted through the door and threw and tackled [Plaintiff] to the floor of his
residence.” (D.E. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff, a lung cancer survivor, claims that when the officers landed
on top of him, “he felt excruciating pain in his torso.” (Id.) He avers that the officers kept their
weight on top of him while they handcuffed him. (Id.) Defendants Potter and Cunningham
arrested Plaintiff for assault on a peace officer and transported him to jail. (Id.) The charge was
never pursued. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that as a result of Defendants Cunningham’s and Potter’s
actions he sustained serious injuries in including two broken ribs and development of
pneumonia. (Id.)
Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Defendants Cunningham, Potter,
and the City of Corpus Christi of (1) excessive force, (2) unlawful arrest, and (3) malicious
prosecution. (D.E. 19 at 5-9.) He also brought claims under Texas state law for assault and
battery and malicious prosecution against Defendants Cunningham and Potter only and a failure
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to train and supervise claim against the City of Corpus Christi. (Id. at 6, 10-11.) Plaintiff seeks
damages for physical and emotional injury, punitive damages, and other relief. (Id. at 11-12.)
Defendants Robert Cunningham and Chris Potter moved for summary judgment on
August 12, 2011. (D.E. 34.)1 Pursuant to an Unopposed Stipulation of Dismissal, (D.E. 37),
Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Corpus Christi were dismissed on September 7, 2011. (D.E.
40.) Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants Cunningham’s and Potter’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 8, 2011. (D.E. 41.) Although untimely, the Court will nonetheless
consider Plaintiff’s response. (D.E. 41.) On September 15, 2011, Defendants filed a Reply to
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 44.)
III.
Discussion
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate if “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” The substantive law identifies which facts are material. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc.,
85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1996). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Judwin Props., Inc., v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir.
1992).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
1
Defendants original Motion for Summary Judgment contained indentifying information regarding Plaintiff’s minor
son. (D.E. 34.) On September 15, 2011, the Court ordered that Docket Entry 34 be placed under seal, and now
deems Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Immunity from Suit (D.E. 42-4) as Defendants’ operative
Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 43.)
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together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Lynch Properties, Inc. v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). If the moving party meets this burden, “the
non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting forth specific
facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.”
Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003). The nonmovant’s
burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory
allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Willis v. Roche
Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Brown v. Houston, 337 F.3d
539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that “improbable inferences and unsupported speculation are not
sufficient to defeat summary judgment”). It is well-established that “[t]he moving party need not
produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact, but need only point out the absence of
evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d
299, 301 (5th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for
that party. Rubinstein v. Admrs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000).
B.
Qualified Immunity Standard
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The
plaintiff bears the burden of negating a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Bennett v. City
of Grand Prairie, Texas, 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1989).
The qualified immunity
determination involves a two-step analysis. First, “‘whether the facts alleged, taken in the light
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most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right.’” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001)). Second, “whether the right was clearly
established – that is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 624 (internal quotations omitted). The objective
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is generally a matter of law. Wooley v. City of Baton
Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2000). If however, there exists a dispute as to the underlying
facts, and those facts are material to the question of whether the defendant acted in an objectively
reasonable manner, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. In examining the underlying
facts, courts are permitted to consider competent summary judgment evidence such as
depositions and affidavits. See Mace, 333 F.3d at 624 n.7. The Supreme Court recently
revisited the qualified immunity analysis and determined that the two-step structure is no longer
mandatory. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Thus, a court may first determine
whether an officer’s conduct violated clearly established law. If the answer is no, qualified
immunity will shield the officer from suit. Id.
C.
Analysis
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Cunningham and Potter violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they unlawfully arrested him without probable cause and used
excessive force against him. (D.E. 19 at 5-6.) Defendants Cunningham and Potter submit that
they acted reasonably and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (D.E. 42-4.)
1. Section 1983 – Unlawful Arrest
The right to be free from arrest without warrant or probable cause is a clearly established
constitutional right. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). A warrantless arrest that occurs
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inside an individual’s home is unconstitutional unless the arresting officers demonstrate the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716,
719 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981)). Probable cause
exists if at the time of the arrest, facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to persuade a prudent officer
that a crime had been committed. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). See also Glenn
v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748
(1984) (“It is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”) (quotation and citation omitted). In Payton, the
Supreme Court made clear that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment “has drawn a
line at the entrance to the house.” 445 U.S. at 589-90; see also Kirkpatrick v. Butler, 870 F.2d
276, 281 (5th Cir. 1989). Thus, any warrantless invasion of an individual’s home even if only by
“a fraction of an inch” violates the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37
(2001); see also Hanie v. City of Woodstock, No. 1:06-cv-889-RWS, 2008 WL 476123 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 19, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that the placement of an officer’s foot beyond the
threshold of the doorway constituted a warrantless entry).
There are, however, two important exceptions to the warrant requirement: consensual
searches and searches made under exigent circumstances supported by probable cause. The Fifth
Circuit has stated “[a] warrantless intrusion into an individual’s home is presumptively
unreasonable unless the person consents [to the intrusion] or [both] probable cause and exigent
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circumstances justify the encroachment.” Jones, 239 F.3d at 719. In fact, this is a two-fold
requirement: “if [officers] have no warrant and no consent, even if they have probable cause and
statutory authority to arrest a suspect, they must also have exigent circumstances.” United States
v. Richard, 994 F.3d 244, 240 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-28
(1987)).
Exigent circumstances include the pursuit of a suspect, immediate safety risks to police
officers and others, the possibility that evidence may be destroyed. Jones, 239 F.3d at 720;
United States v. Shannon, 21 F.3d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1994).
Determining whether exigent
circumstances exist is a factual determination. United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th
Cir. 1997). When proving exigent circumstances, Defendants must show that the officers did not
create or manufacture the exigency. See Jones, 239 F.3d at 719.
The Fifth Circuit recognizes the “knock and talk” approach as a “reasonable investigative
tool when officers seek to gain an occupant’s consent to search or when officers reasonably
suspect criminal activity.” Jones, 239 F.3d at 720. The purpose of a “knock and talk” is not
however, “to create a show of force, nor to make demands on occupants, nor to raid a residence.”
United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2007). While reasonable suspicion
can justify a “knock and talk” approach, it cannot justify the warrantless search of a house. See
Jones, 239 F.3d at 720 (citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991).
a.
Assault on an Officer
Defendants argue that they had probable cause to enter Plaintiff’s residence and arrest
Plaintiff when he shut the door to his apartment, hitting Officer Cunningham on the head. (D.E.
42-4 at 10-11.)
In Texas, a person commits assault against a public servant when he
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to someone he knows is a public
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servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2011).
Defendant Cunningham testified in his deposition that on the night of the incident he was
dispatched to assist with a child custody matter. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 19.) According to
Cunningham, dispatch instructed him to meet Plaintiff’s ex-wife, a municipal court prosecutor, at
a convenience store. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 19-20.) Defendant Cunningham testified that by the
time he arrived at the store Officer Potter was already speaking to Plaintiff’s ex-wife and
examining some paperwork. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 21.) In his deposition Defendant Cunningham
explained:
Officer Potter walked to my unit and let me know where we were going to, and
explained to me that [Plaintiff’s ex-wife] had court paperwork, child custody
paperwork and appeared to be in order for what we looked for, and that we were
going to go ahead and follow her over to the apartment.
(D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 22.). Defendant Cunningham testified that he and Officer Potter were going
to “try and resolve the issue of the child custody.” (Id.)
Defendant Cunningham’s deposition testimony indicates that when Officers Cunningham
and Potter arrived at Plaintiff’s residence and knocked on his door they did not receive an
answer. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 29.) After confirming that they were at the correct apartment,
Defendants resumed knocking and the door was subsequently opened by Plaintiff’s roommate.
(Id.) When the door opened, Defendant Cunningham placed his foot in the doorway so as to get
a better view of the inside of the apartment. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 30-31.) Plaintiff subsequently
came to the door and identified himself as Mr. Hogan. (Id.) Defendant Cunningham testified
that when Plaintiff approached the door of the apartment, the officers “explained to [Plaintiff]
that we were there in reference to his son.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 36.) According to Defendant
Cunningham, Plaintiff told the officers that his son was in the apartment. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at
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36-37.) Defendants then explained that Plaintiff’s ex-wife was there and wanted to enforce the
custody arrangement contained in the divorce decree. (Id.)
Defendant Cunningham asserts that as soon as he explained to Plaintiff that he and
Officer Potter were at the apartment to pick up Plaintiff’s son “the door was forcefully trying to
be closed.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 37.) Defendant Cunningham alleges that the door first hit him
in the leg. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6, at 39.) He testified that once the door hit him on the leg, “I put my
hands up to try and stop the door, and at that point a – just a sudden burst of force pushed me
back with the door, and at that point the door hit me in the forehead.” (Id.) Defendants
subsequently entered Plaintiff’s apartment and arrested him for assault on a peace officer. (D.E.
42-4, Ex. 6 at 42.) Defendant Potter’s version of the events comports with that of Defendant
Cunningham’s. Defendant Potter’s affidavit alleges that as he and Defendant Cunningham
questioned Plaintiff, “[Plaintiff] grabbed the door and attempted to slam it shut on us. While
slamming the door [Plaintiff] hit Officer Cunningham in the head with the door.” (D.E. 42-4,
Ex. 4 at 2.)
Plaintiff’s version of the story is markedly different. Plaintiff testified in his deposition
that when he approached the door, he told Defendants that they could not come inside the
apartment. (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at 70.) Plaintiff does not remember if Defendants said anything to
him before he attempted to close the door. (Id.) When questioned about whether the door hit
Defendant Cunningham, Plaintiff testified, in relevant part, as follows:
Q: When you attempted to close the door, did it hit one of the officers?
A: Like I said, I don’t remember because I got tackled immediately as soon as I
tried to close it.
Q: Okay. It is possible that it hit one of the officers before they tried to tackle
you?
A: I don’t know.
(Id. at 71.)
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Here, Plaintiff testified that he did not know whether the door hit the officers. (D.E. 41,
Ex. 3 at 71.) Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff did in fact hit
Officer Cunningham with the door, and whether he did so intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. Given this dispute, there is a question as to whether Defendants could reasonably
believe that Plaintiff had the necessary intent to find that he had committed an assault on a public
servant. The resolution of these disputes is a task for the fact finder and not the Court.
Defendants cite United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) and Jones for their
contention that they acted reasonably in entering Plaintiff’s apartment to arrest him for assault.
(Id.) In Santana, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless entry into the home of a defendant
because the police initiated an arrest while the defendant was standing in the open doorway of
her home—a “public place”—but retreated inside before the police could apprehend her.
Santana, 417 U.S. 42-43. Unlike Santana, the Plaintiff in this case did not commit a crime in a
public place and then attempt to flee. See Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.
2005). The facts in Jones are also distinguishable from the present case. In Jones, the Fifth
Circuit found exigent circumstances existed when the officer reasonably approached suspect’s
apartment to investigate complaints of criminal activity and observed a gun resting on the table.
239 F.3d at 721-22. In this case, there is no evidence of any such “safety risk to the officers.”
Id. at 722.
In Cummings, a case very similar to the one at bar, two officers went to the home of
Cummings to investigate a domestic disturbance dispute. Id. at 679. During a conversation with
Cummings, one of the officers placed his foot in the doorway. Id. Cummings denied the officers
entry into the home and attempted to shut the door.
Id.
The officers argued that when
Cummings shut the door on the officer’s foot he committed assault thus justifying entry into his
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home under the “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 68586. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Cummings did not commit a crime in a
public place and then attempt to flee into his house. Id. at 686. Here too, Plaintiff was inside his
home when he shut the door on Defendants, who in this case, put themselves in harm’s way of
the door when they crossed the threshold of Plaintiff’s home without a warrant. Thus, there are
fact issues as to whether there was even an underlying felony justifying “the hot pursuit”
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless entry.
b.
Interference with Child Custody
Defendants also argue that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for interference with
child custody. (D.E. 42-4 at 12.) An individual commits the offense of interfering with child
custody if he “knows that the person’s taking or retention violates the express terms of a
judgment or order…of a court disposing of the child’s custody.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
25.03(a)(1) (West 2011).
However, it is not clear from the record whether the officers had probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff had committed the offense of interference with child custody. Plaintiff
testified in his deposition that he took custody of his son at the direction of the Portland Police
Department. (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at 90-91). He also testified that he kept possession of his son in
order to keep him safe. (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at 91; 95.) The day before the incident, Plaintiff reported
his ex-wife for breaking down his door and stealing his son’s dog. (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at 65-67.)
When Plaintiff reported the break-in to the Corpus Christi Police Department, he claims that he
was told if he was in fear of his son’s well-being “then if the police came, they can’t take him
away or something so you don’t have – or you don’t have to answer the door.” (D.E. 41, Ex. 3 at
68.) Thus, there is a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff knew that he was in violation of the
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custody order or whether he believed that he was excused from its terms. Here, a reasonable jury
could find that the circumstances were not urgent enough to justify a warrantless entry into
Plaintiff’s home. See Wooley, 211 F.3d at 919 (existence of a dispute as to the underlying
material facts of whether defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner precludes
summary judgment).
Moreover, even if the officers were not privy to the events of the preceding days and
reasonably believed that Plaintiff had committed the offense, they did not have a warrant or
consent allowing them entrance into Plaintiff’s home. A “knock and talk” strategy serves to
make an “investigatory inquiry” or obtain consent to search. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d at 355.
The purpose is not to “invade a residence.” Id. Without Plaintiff’s consent, the appropriate
response to a failed “knock and talk” is to obtain a warrant. See Moreno v. City of Brownsville,
No. B-08-504, 2011 WL 3813105, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011). As discussed above, absent
a warrant, and consent to search, police can only enter an individual’s home if probable cause
and exigent circumstances justify the intrusion.
Plaintiff clearly did not consent to the officers entering his home. Rather, he attempted to
end the conversation by closing the door, thus “communicat[ing] his lack of consent to any
further intrusion by the officers.” Cummings, 418 F.3d at 685. Consequently, it is Defendants’
burden to show that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry into Plaintiff’s
apartment. See United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 504 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court finds that
Defendants have not met this burden. Officer Cunningham testified that he placed his foot in the
doorway so as to “view the apartment.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6 at 31.) Moreover, he wanted to know
“what was coming from the other side or from inside the apartment.” (Id.) He did not however,
have any knowledge or cause to believe that Plaintiff ever used any violence against his son or
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possessed any weapons. (Id.) Defendants in this case have not demonstrated the existence of
exigent circumstances that would justify a warrantless entry.
Fourth Amendment principles announced in Payton, Welsh, and Kyllo place any
reasonable officer on fair notice that even the slightest warrantless intrusion into a person’s home
without arguable consent or arguable exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, Defendant Cunningham was on fair notice that he could not place his foot in the doorway
of Plaintiff’s home. Defendants were also on notice that they could not enter Plaintiff’s home
and arrest him without probable cause and without a warrant. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91; Jones,
239 F.3d at 719; Richard, 994 F.3d at 240.
c.
Enforcement of a Child Custody Order
To the extent Defendants are arguing that they were entitled to enter plaintiff’s home to
enforce a child custody order, they are mistaken. Pursuant to § 152.315 of the Texas Family
Code, prosecutors or other public officials can obtain the return of a child or enforce a child
custody determination if there is:
(1) an existing child custody determination;
(2) a request to do so from a court in a pending child custody proceeding;
(3) a reasonable belief that a criminal statute has been violated; or
(4) a reasonable belief that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained in
violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.315(a). However, law enforcement officers can only act at the
direction of a prosecutor or other public official and even then may only take “lawful actions” to
assist the prosecutor or official in obtaining the return of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
152.316. There is no evidence in this case that the officers had a request from a prosecutor or
other official enforce the existing child custody order and, as discussed above, even if they
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believed plaintiff was in violation of the order, they still needed either a warrant, his consent, or
the presence of exigent circumstances to enter his apartment.
Given the dearth of support for the existence of exigent circumstances that might justify
Defendants’ entry into Plaintiff’s home, and the presence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendants could reasonably believe Plaintiff intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
assaulted a peace office or knowingly interfered with a child custody order, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim.
2. Section 1983 – Excessive Force
To make out a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, “a plaintiff must
allege (1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable.” United
States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Allegations
of excessive force by police officers during arrest are analyzed for “objective reasonableness,”
viewed from the on-scene perspective of a reasonable officer “often forced to make split second
judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation” without the
benefit of hindsight.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
The “objective-
reasonableness inquiry” is fact-intensive, requiring consideration of circumstances such as “the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. at 396.
The parties do not contest that Plaintiff suffered an injury. Therefore, the court turns to
the question of whether the force used by Defendants was objectively excessive and
unreasonable. The parties dispute the series of events underlying Plaintiff’s claim. For his part,
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Defendant Cunningham asserts that he attempted a “controlled take-down” of Plaintiff.
Defendant Cunningham testified in his deposition that after the door hit him on the leg and the
forehead, he “pushed the door back to get it open to attempt to arrest [Plaintiff].” (D.E. 42-4, Ex.
6, at 42.) Defendant Cunningham claims that Plaintiff then “started stepping backwards into his
apartment.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6, at 42-43.) Cunningham asserts that he instructed Plaintiff to
“turn around, put his hands behind his back because he was being placed under arrest.” (D.E.
42-4, Ex. 6, at 43.) According to Cunningham, Plaintiff rejected these instructions, prompting
Cunningham to “perform a controlled take-down with [Plaintiff.]” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6, at 43-45.)
Cunningham testified that as he attempted the controlled take-down, Plaintiff lost his balance,
grabbed onto Cunningham’s arms, causing Cunningham to lose his balance and land on top of
Plaintiff. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6, at 46.) As a result, Plaintiff suffered two broken ribs. (D.E. 41, Ex.
3 at 85-86.)
Plaintiff testified that when he came to the door he told the officers that they could not
come in and attempted to close the door. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 2 at 70.) As he recalled it, “as soon as
I attempted to close the door I got tackled.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 2 at 71.) According to Plaintiff, two
officers tackled him, causing him to fall on his back. (Id.) When asked whether both officers
landed on top of Plaintiff, he responded “[t]o the best of my knowledge. I mean, I don’t know
for sure.” (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 2 at 72.) Plaintiff also testified that he did not remember how long the
officers were on top of him. (Id.)
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find that
Defendants used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff, especially in light of Plaintiff’s assertion
that Defendants made no effort to ask him to cooperate or ascertain whether he posed a risk to
their safety. Whether Plaintiff’s testimony is to be believed is an issue of credibility for the
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finder of fact, not for the Court. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. 530 U.S. 133,
150 (2000); Coons v. Lain, 277 Fed. App’x. 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(summary judgment inappropriate where plaintiff’s and officer’s factual accounts differed as to
whether plaintiff ignored officer’s instructions before being tackled by officer); Thomas v.
Zakharia, No. H-07-3251, 2009 WL 3837092, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2009) (unpublished)
(finding a fact issue existed as to reasonableness of force where non-movant claimed that he did
not attempt to flee, resist arrest, or otherwise provoke the defendants’ use of force); Schelsteder
v. Montgomery Cnty., Texas, No. H-05-0941, 2006 WL 1117883, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21,
2006) (unpublished) (refusing to grant summary judgment where fact issue existed as to
plaintiff’s behavior towards officers prior to their use of force). See also Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty.,
246 F.3d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a case involving a material dispute about a
witness’s credibility should not be resolved on summary judgment).
Defendants argue that under that Supreme Court’s decision in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194 (2004), the relevant inquiry is whether at the time of the alleged violation, it was clearly
established in a particularized sense that Defendants were violating Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. (D.E. 44.) In addition to the cases cited above, existing case law provides Defendants
with notice that under circumstances similar to those alleged by Plaintiff – namely where the
claimant does not pose a significant risk to the safety of the officers – tackling rises to the level
of excessive force. See e.g., Brown v. Long Beach Police Dep’t, 105 F. App’x 549, 550 (5th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
dismiss where officer tackled a fleeing 100-pound teenage girl who posed no threat to his
safety); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (where plaintiff was objecting to
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a search warrant, it was objectively unreasonable for officer to grab plaintiff, throw her to the
ground, and twist her arm while handcuffing her).
A reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ actions, as described by Plaintiff,
constituted a use of force that was “clearly excessive to the need,” the excessiveness of which
was “objectively unreasonable.” See Brugman, 364 F.3d at 616; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at
396-97. Because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ actions
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, the legal question of whether they are entitled to
qualified immunity cannot be resolved until the substantial differences in the parties’ factual
accounts are resolved.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force.
3. Section 1983 – Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff additionally pleads a cause of action for malicious prosecution under Section
1983. (D.E. 19 at 9.) In Castellano v. Fragozo, the Fifth Circuit held that no “freestanding
constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists.” 352 F.3d 939, 942, 945 (5th
Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 808 (2004); see also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d
156, 169 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Instead, it must be shown that the officials violated
specific constitutional rights in connection with a “malicious prosecution.” Deville, 567 F.3d at
169. Where a plaintiff’s complaint is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claim “must rest upon a
denial of rights secured under federal and not state law.” Castellano, 352 F.3d at 942. The Fifth
Circuit in Castellano explained that allegations of malicious prosecution, on their own, do not
implicate the Constitution or violate federal law:
[C]ausing charges to be filed without probable cause will not without more violate
the Constitution. So defined, the assertion of malicious prosecution states no
constitutional claim. It is equally apparent that additional government acts that
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may attend the initiation of a criminal charge could give rise to claims of
constitutional deprivation.
The initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events
that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection--Fourth Amendment if the
accused is seized and arrested, for example, or other constitutionally secured
rights if a case is further pursued. Such claims of lost constitutional rights are for
violation of rights specifically locatable in constitutional text, and some such
claims may be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Regardless, they are not claims for
malicious prosecution and labeling them as such only invites confusion.
Id. at 953-54. Here, Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights by filing charges against him without probable cause does not support a claim of malicious
prosecution under Section 1983 and labeling it as such “only invites confusion.”
Id.
Alternatively, as discussed below, Plaintiff is unable to satisfy several of the elements necessary
to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution under Texas law.
Therefore Defendants are
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution under
Section 1983.2
4. Assault and Battery Under Texas Law
Under Texas law, to establish a prima facie case for civil assault, the plaintiff must plead
and prove the same elements required for criminal assault. See Johnson v. Davis, 178 S.W.3d
230, 240 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005); McCracken v. Hardberger, No. SA–06–CV–
988–XR, 2008 WL 219576, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2008 (unpublished). A person commits an
assault if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury; or (3) intentionally
or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably
2
Plaintiff argues that Courts of Appeals are split in their approach to claims of malicious prosecution brought under
Section 1983. (D.E. 41 at 8-9). While the Supreme Court’s decision in Albright v. Oliver, noted that “there is an
embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” on whether a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under Section
1983, the plurality decision expressed no view on whether a claim for malicious prosecution would succeed under
the Fourth Amendment. 510 U.S. 266 (1994). As such, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castellano is controlling
authority on this Court.
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believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. Tex. Penal. Code Ann.
§ 22.01(a) (West 2011).
Under Texas law, the elements required to sufficiently plead civil battery are (1) a
harmful or offensive contact; (2) with a plaintiff's person. Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 687
(Tex. App. Dallas 1996); Doe v. Beaumont I.S.D., 8 F. Supp. 2d 596, 616 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
“Battery requires only an offensive touching, not an intent to injure.” Price, 931 S.W.2d at 687.
Although criminal law seems to have merged both assault and battery into assault, such is not the
case in the civil context as a battery does not require an assault. Id.
The Texas Penal Code allows a “civil privilege defense” to an assault claim. Specifically,
§ 9.51(a) provides that a peace officer “is justified in using force against another when and to the
degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in
making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if (1) the actor
reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful … and (2) before using force, the actor
manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer … unless he
reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made
known to the person to be arrested.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(a) (West 2011); see also
Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a civil defense privilege under § 9.51(a). (D.E.
42-4 at 17.) Plaintiff did not address this argument in his response. (See D.E. 41.) Nonetheless,
as discussed above, there is a factual dispute as to the lawfulness of Plaintiff’s arrest. There is
also a factual there is also a factual dispute as to whether Defendants purposefully tackled
Plaintiff or Defendant Cunningham accidentally fell on Plaintiff while attempting a controlled
take-down. Thus, whether Defendants “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” caused bodily
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injury to Plaintiff and whether they are entitled to a civil defense privilege, is a question for the
fact finder.
See Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F. Supp. 2d 678, 716 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(outstanding issues of material fact precluded a determination of the availability of immunity).
As to Plaintiff’s claim of battery, the offensive touching was done in the course of arresting
plaintiff. Thus, the statutory defense under § 9.51(a) may apply. Whether Defendants used force
only to the degree they reasonably believed was “immediately necessary” to make the arrest is
also a question for the fact finder. Id. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for assault and battery is DENIED.
5. Malicious Prosecution Under Texas Law
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under Texas state law, Plaintiff must prove
that: “(1) a criminal prosecution was commenced against [Plaintiff]; (2) [Defendants] initiated or
procured that prosecution; (3) the prosecution terminated in [Plaintiff’s] favor; (4) [Plaintiff] was
innocent of the charges; (5) [Defendants] lacked probable cause to initiate the prosecution; (6)
[Defendants] acted with malice; and (7) [Plaintiff] suffered damages.” Kroger Texas Ltd. P’ship
v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 793 n.3 (Tex. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for malicious prosecution under Texas
law because they “instituted criminal proceedings against Plaintiff with malice under color of
state law.” (D.E. 19 at 11.) After his altercation with Defendants, Plaintiff was charged with
assault on a peace officer, but the charge was never pursued. (D.E. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment fails to expand upon this claim. (See
D.E. 41.) It is well-settled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “does not impose upon the
district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s
opposition to summary judgment.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). The
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allegations contained in the Amended Complaint simply do not provide a sufficient basis from
which the Court could conclude that Defendants committed acts supporting a claim for Texas
law malicious prosecution. “Courts must be especially careful in malicious prosecution cases to
ensure that sufficient evidence supports each element of liability.” Kroger, 216 S.W.3d at 795.
Here, Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendants urged or pressured the district attorney to
prosecute Plaintiff. In fact, during his deposition, Defendant Cunningham was asked if he “ever
show[ed] up at the DA’s office to discuss any criminal case against [Plaintiff]” and he answered
in the negative. (D.E. 42-4, Ex. 6, at 57.) Further, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendants
acted with malicious intent. See e.g., Weaver v. Bell, No. 03-04-00169-CV, 2005 WL 1364046,
at *6 (Tex. App. – Austin, 2005) (unpublished) (the element of malice is satisfied “if the
defendant acted wrongfully in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights and with indifference as
to whether the plaintiff would he harmed”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s cause of action for malicious prosecution under Texas state
law is GRANTED.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution under both federal and state law.
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment in DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful
arrest, excessive force and assault and battery.
SIGNED and ORDERED this 22nd day of September, 2011.
___________________________________
Janis Graham Jack
Senior United States District Judge
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