Aguirre v. W.L. Flowers Machine & Welding Co., Inc.
Filing
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ORDER granting 4 Motion for More Definite Statement. Plaintiff granted leave to file an amended complaint by 7/14/2011.(Signed by Judge Janis Graham Jack) Parties notified.(lsmith, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
RAMIRO F. AGUIRRE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
W.L. FLOWERS MACHINE &
WELDING CO., INC.,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. C-11-158
ORDER
On this day came on to be considered Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for
Plaintiff’s Failure to State a Claim and Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite
Statement (the “Motion”). (D.E. 4.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTED (D.E. 4), but Plaintiff Ramiro Aguirre is granted leave to file an amended
complaint no later than July 14, 2011.
I.
Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331, as Plaintiff brings claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Ramiro Aguirre filed this action in this Court on May 10, 2011. He
states that he was employed as a welder by Defendant W. L. Flowers Machine &
Welding Co., Inc. for 29 years. In October 2009, he was diagnosed with “a medical
condition that affected his ability to work full-time as a welder.” (D.E. 1 at 2.) At first,
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the parties agreed that Plaintiff would not work more than 45 hours per week, and this
continued for several months. In June 2010, however, Defendant allegedly demanded
that Plaintiff work 12 hours per day, 7 days per week, or he would be discharged. Due to
his medical condition, Plaintiff could not work these hours. Plaintiff states that he was
then made to train a younger worker, and was subsequently discharged at age fifty-five.
(D.E. 1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff brings claims for age and disability discrimination, under the
ADEA and ADA respectively. (D.E. 1 at 3-4.) Specifically with respect to his disability
discrimination claim, Plaintiff claims that he “was disabled and/or that the defendant
perceived him to be disabled and that it was this perceived and/or actual disability that
was a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to discharge his employment.” (D.E.
1 at 4.) He also states that he had no limitations that would impair his ability to
reasonably perform his essential job functions, if accommodations were made only with
respect to the hours he was made to work each week. (D.E. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and exemplary damages. (D.E. 1 at 5.)
Defendant filed its Motion on June 30, 2011, seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), or, alternatively, a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). (D.E. 4.)
Plaintiff responded on July 5, 2011. (D.E. 6.)
III.
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s Complaint need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “‘[D]etailed factual allegations’ are not required.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint, however, must allege “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
court should not accept “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by
mere conclusory statements,” which “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 1949–50.
In contrast to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, a Rule 12(e) Motion is appropriate where
“a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Rule 12(e) provides, “[a] party
may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point
out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “[A]
motion for more definite statement is generally disfavored and is used to provide a
remedy only for an unintelligible pleading rather than a correction for lack of detail.”
Davenport v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
B.
Analysis
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim should be
dismissed, essentially because Plaintiff failed to identify his disability or perceived
disability, and therefore has “failed to allege facts that would establish that he has a
disability.” (D.E. 4 at 2.) In the alternative, Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s Complaint
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is too vague or ambiguous because he “fails to state facts that show his alleged disability
or perceived disability.”
(D.E. 4 at 3.)
Plaintiff strongly disagrees, arguing that
Defendant’s motion is frivolous, and that his physical disability is well known to
Defendant from the previous interactions between the parties. Plaintiff also contends that
Defendant’s alternative Rule 12(e) motion should be denied. (D.E. 6 at 1-4.)
Under the ADA, the term “disability” means “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual,” a “record of
such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1)(A)-(C).
“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A).1 The prima facie case for disability
discrimination requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: “(1) [h]e is disabled or is regarded as
disabled; (2) he is qualified for the job; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment
action on account of his disability; and (4) he was replaced by or treated less favorably
then non-disabled employees.” Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 511
(5th Cir. 2003).
In this case, Plaintiff’s reference to a “medical condition” that limited him to
working no more than forty-five hours per week does not adequately allege the existence
of a “disability” as defined by the ADA, as it neither states the nature of the impairment
nor the manner in which Plaintiff’s major life activities are substantially limited. The
possibility that Defendant is otherwise aware of Plaintiff’s impairment does not relieve
1
The Court references the amended version of the ADA, after enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, which became effective January 1, 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The relevant conduct
in this case is alleged to have occurred in 2010, after the Act’s effective date.
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Plaintiff of the applicable pleading standards.2 The Fifth Circuit has dismissed actions
for failure to state a claim when the nature of the plaintiff’s disability was not sufficiently
alleged. For example, in the context of a disability claim against the federal government,
the court noted that the plaintiff did “not state the nature of her disability or its imposed
limitations on her life,” and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit for
failure to state a claim. Dark v. Potter, 293 Fed. Appx. 254, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Sherman v. Dallas ISD, 2011 WL 477500, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2011)
(dismissing suit for failure to state a claim in part because plaintiff did “not make any
factual allegations sufficient to show that he has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment”); Swanson v. Aegis Comm’ns Group, Inc., 2010
WL 1779666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2010), adopted by 2010 WL 1779664
(“[Plaintiff’s] ADA claim fails to allege facts which are plausibly sufficient to establish
that he was under a ‘disability’ as that term is defined in the ADA and the case law
interpreting the same. Therefore, [Plaintiff’s] amended complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for relief under the ADA.”).
Without alleging the nature of his disability or level of impairment, it cannot be
determined whether Plaintiff is “disabled” as that term is defined in the ADA, and
Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim.3 Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s failure to state the
nature of his disability does not require dismissal of this action. Instead, the Court grants
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This is especially so in light of the fact that not every impairment qualifies as a “disability” under the
ADA. See Miles-Hickman v. David Powers Homes, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002)) (“Merely having an
impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. The impaired individual must further
demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”).
3
The only limitation Plaintiff alleges is “not being able to work more than 45 hours per week.” (D.E. 1 at
2.) This alone is insufficient to allege a substantial limitation of one or more major life activities.
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Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege facts necessary to establish that
he has a “disability” under the ADA. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If
the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject
of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”);
Swidriski v. City of Houston, 31 Fed. Appx. 154, 2001 WL 1748238, at *2 (5th Cir.
2001) (“The usual custom upon granting a motion to dismiss is to allow an opportunity to
replead.”); see also Pension Advisory Group, Ltd. v. Country Life Ins. Co., __ F. Supp.
2d __, 2011 WL 649350 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (ordering claims to be repled). Plaintiff shall
file an amended complaint no later than July 14, 2011.
As the Court has concluded that Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be
granted, it need not consider the alternative Rule 12(e) motion.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s
Failure to State a Claim and Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite Statement is
GRANTED (D.E. 4), but the Court grants Plaintiff Ramiro Aguirre leave to file an
amended complaint no later than July 14, 2011.
SIGNED and ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2011.
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Janis Graham Jack
Senior United States District Judge
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