Cox v. Stephens et al
Filing
26
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MORRIS' MOTION TO DISMISS denying 17 Motion to Dismiss.(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
J L COX,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS, et al,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-151
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ORDER DENYING DFENDANT MORRIS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending is Defendant Clint Morris’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 17). For the reasons stated
herein, Defendant Morris’ motion is denied.
I.
Jurisdiction.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
II.
Procedural background.
Plaintiff J. L. Cox is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), and is currently confined at the McConnell
Unit in Beeville, Texas.
On May 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed his original complaint
challenging as unconstitutional certain TDCJ policies and practices that Plaintiff claims
substantially interfere with his right to practice his Native American religion in violation
of the statutory provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUPIA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, as well as in violation of the First Amendment. (D.E. 1).
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Plaintiff named as Defendants the TDCJ-CID Director, William Stephens, and the Native
American Program Analyst, Clint Morris.1 Id. at 3. He originally sued both Defendants
in their official and individual capacities for monetary damages, declaratory relief, and
prospective injunctive relief. Id.
On July 9, 2013, a Spears2 hearing was conducted to afford Plaintiff an
opportunity to better explain his claims. Plaintiff testified that he has been in TDCJ
custody since 1994, and he is serving three concurrent forty-year sentences. Plaintiff’s
ancestors were Choctaw, and eight years ago, Plaintiff began practicing the Native
American faith.3 Tenets of his faith include: pipe ceremonies in which prayers are offered
to the Creator; wearing a medicine bag or pouch at all times as protection from evil
spirits; and growing and wearing long hair, to be cut only upon mourning. Plaintiff
testified that the TDCJ’s grooming policy forbidding long hair substantially burdens his
1
In addition to the instant action, there are currently pending in this Court two other §1983
prisoner civil rights actions brought by Native American plaintiffs, also confined at the
McConnell Unit, challenging certain TDCJ policies and/or procedures as in violation of RLUIPA
and/or the First Amendment. Those cases are Davis and Goodman v. Stephens, et al., Case No.
2:12-cv-166, and Legate v. Stephens, et al., Case No. 2:13-cv-148. In the Davis/Goodman case,
the two plaintiffs allege RLUIPA violations and § 1983 free exercise claims against William
Stephens, sued in his official capacity only, and a free exercise claim against Clint Morris in his
individual capacity only. (See Case No. 2:12-cv-166, Minutes Entry for 02/22/13). In the
Legate case, the plaintiff is suing William Stephens in his official capacity, alleging RLUIPA
and free exercise claims. (See Case No. 2:13-cv-148, D.E. 9, 12).
2
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
3
The Court acknowledges that neither the term “Native American faith” nor “Native American
religion” adequately represents the defined belief system of this Plaintiff or any particular Native
American practitioner because the faith itself encompasses a wide range of beliefs from different
tribes and regions. Yet a running similarity in the Native American faith system is the central
relationship of human beings and their bodies to the land and nature. See Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988) (J. Brennan, dissenting).
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ability to practice his religious faith and is not the least restrictive means of achieving the
TDCJ’s valid penological security goals. He argues further that not being able to wear
his medicine bag at chow or at work also substantially burdens the practice of his faith,
while numerous, less restrictive measures could achieve the same penological security
objectives.
Finally, he contends that the pipe ceremonies have effectively become
meaningless because inmates are prohibited from participating in a communal pipe or
smoking their own personal pipe, but instead, must rely on the circle leader to release
their prayers to the Creator. Plaintiff argues that the TDCJ’s purported health concern in
prohibiting the pipe is not the least restrictive means of satisfying any legitimate
penological interest and points out that the pipe ceremonies used to be allowed, with no
negative incidents.
On July 15, 2013, Magistrate Judge Libby entered a Memorandum and
Recommendation recommending that: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA
claims be retained and service be ordered on William Stephens and Clint Morris in their
official capacities; (2) Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Defendants in their
official capacities be dismissed with prejudiced as barred by the Eleventh Amendment;
and (3) Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims for money damages against Defendant Morris
in his individual capacity be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (D.E. 14).
On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed objections to the recommendation. (D.E. 16). In
particular, Plaintiff argued that Defendant Morris’ job as Program Analyst was to
advocate for the religious rights of Native American prisoners, but he had personally
failed to perform his job and in doing so, had personally violated Plaintiff’s First
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Amendment rights such that money damages against Morris in his individual capacity
were warranted. Id. at 2.
On August 29, 2013, Defendant Morris filed the instant motion to dismiss. (D.E.
17).
On September 11, 2013, the Court adopted as modified the July 15, 2013
Memorandum and Recommendation. (D.E. 21). The Court retained Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
and First Amendment claims against both Defendants Stephens and Morris in their
official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief, and the Court dismissed with
prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Defendants in their official
capacities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 2-3. However, as to Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claims for money damages against Defendant Morris in his individual
capacity, the Court declined to adopt the recommendation to dismiss those claims, but
instead, found in favor of Plaintiff that he had stated cognizable § 1983 claims against
Defendant Morris in his individual capacity, and retained those claims. Id.
III.
Defendant Morris’ Motion to Dismiss.
In his Motion to Dismiss (D.E.17), Defendant Morris makes two arguments. His
first argument is that dismissal is warranted as to Plaintiff’s claims against him for
prospective and injunctive relief because Plaintiff has failed to overcome Morris’
entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and therefore, there is no “case or
controversy” to support federal court jurisdiction, rendering Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and First
Amendment claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief “jurisdictionally
barred.” (D.E. 17, p. 3). Defendant Morris’ second argument is that, to the extent
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Plaintiff can sue him in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiff
cannot prevail because Morris, as a “Program Supervisor III – Rehabilitation Programs
Analyst,” in the Rehabilitation Programs Division (RPD) of the TDCJ, has no authority
to amend or ratify any TDCJ policy or to authorize any other person to act outside of
existing policy. (D.E. 17, p. 4). Notably, Defendant Morris has not argued for dismissal
of Plaintiff’s § 1983 First Amendment claims for monetary damages against him in his
individual capacity.
IV.
Discussion.
Although Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” the district court must
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the allegations
contained therein must be taken as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). In the context of a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court’s review is
limited to the allegations in the complaint and to those documents attached to a
defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent that those documents are referred to in the
complaint and are central to the claims. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394
F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.2004). “If, based on the facts pleaded and judicially noticed, a
successful affirmative defense appears, then dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper.”
Hall v. Hodgkins, No. 08-40516, 2008 WL 5352000, *3 (5th Cir. 2008).
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Defendant Morris’ motion to dismiss is redundant, confusing, and unnecessary.
Indeed, via its § 1915A screening procedures and preliminary evaluation process, the
Court has already addressed Eleventh Amendment immunity issues and dismissed with
prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendant Morris and William
Stephens in their official capacities. (See D.E. 21).
As to Defendant Morris’ claim that he cannot be held liable in his official capacity
for prospective relief, the Fifth Circuit has clearly noted that there is no decision holding
“that RLUIPA’s ‘appropriate relief’ language fails to confer an individual right to pursue
declaratory and injunctive relief.” See Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d
316, 327 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s RLUIPA and First Amendment claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief against Defendant Morris in his official capacity are viable and
clearly not subject to dismissal for “lack of case and controversy” as argued by Defendant
Morris.
Similarly unpersuasive is Defendant Morris’ argument that claims against him in
his official capacity should be dismissed because “his official capacity is limited to the
authorities and responsibilities of a Program Analyst assigned to the TDCJ Rehabilitation
Division.” (D.E. 17, p. 4). In this lawsuit as well as in Davis, Case No. 2:12-cv-166, the
prisoner-plaintiffs each testified that Morris was responsible for developing the policies
and procedures that governed the Native American religious programs at the McConnell
Unit; that he failed to use his position to assist inmates in the practice of their faith; and
his failure to develop and implement appropriate policies amounted to a denial of the
plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their religion. (See Case No. 2:12-cv-166, D.E. 65, p 2, 7).
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Indeed in his own affidavit, Morris testifies that his job responsibilities include: (1) the
monitoring and evaluation of Native American and Jewish programs at designated units;
(2) the recruitment of volunteers and contract chaplains for Native American and Jewish
programs; and (3) the development and drafting of policies and procedures under the
direction of the RPD Manager III-Services. (See D.E. 17-1, p. 1). As in the pending
Davis case also before this Court, Plaintiff Cox has alleged sufficient facts that, if true,
state a First Amendment claim for denial of his right to practice his Native American
religion against Defendant Morris in his official capacity for declaratory and prospective
relief, as well as against Defendant in his individual capacity for monetary damages.
The Court notes that, in the Davis case, Case No. 2:12-cv-166, Defendant Morris
moved to dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity, and his motion was
denied. (Id. D.E. 51, 80). However, as to the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against Morris in his official capacity, Morris argued, as he does here
that he had no authority to provide the relief requested by the plaintiffs, and that such
relief could be provided by the co-defendant, then Rick Thaler, (and now, William
Stephens in both actions), such that dismissal was appropriate. Because both Stephens
and Morris necessarily remain in the action, the Court need not determine whether one or
both defendants are best able to fashion and enforce injunctive relief should plaintiff
prevail.
Moreover, the ambiguity of Morris’ motion to dismiss does not provide
sufficient grounds for dismissing Morris in his official capacity.
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V.
Conclusion.
For the reasons stated herein, defendant Morris’ motion to dismiss (D.E. 17) is
DENIED.
ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2014.
___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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