Casey v. Stephens et al

Filing 35

ORDER DENYING PENDING NONDISPOSITIVE MOTIONS; denying 24 Motion to Amend; denying 27 Motion for Extension of Time; denying 31 Motion; denying 32 Motion to Stay.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
WILLIAM CASEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS, et al,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-13

ORDER DENYING PENDING NONDISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a
practitioner of the Native American faith. He brings this action pro se against certain
prison officials alleging violations of his right to practice his faith under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., as
well as the First Amendment.

This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge for case management and to rule on all non-dispositive motions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636.1 Pending are Plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint (D.E. 24), motion for
extension of time to reply (D.E. 27), motion to take judicial notice (D.E. 31), and motion
to stay (D.E. 32). Having considered the motions, responses, applicable law and for the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED.
Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to allege a breach of contract claim. (D.E.
24). Plaintiff’s theory is that TDCJ officials breached a contract with him and other

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See Special Order No. C-2013-01.

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Native American practitioners in TDCJ’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to participate in
ceremonial pipe smoking services.

His theory is based on a prior case where TDCJ

officials reached a settlement agreement with an inmate named Yellowquill who filed a
similar lawsuit. (D.E. 24). See Yellowquill v. Scott, No. 4:95-cv-1080 (S.D. Tex. filed
Apr. 13, 1995). Plaintiff was not a party to the Yellowquill case or settlement. Further,
the current TDCJ policy prohibiting communal pipe sharing ceremonies resulted from
subsequent litigation involving health risks to inmates sharing communal pipes. See
Chance v. TDCJ, No. 6:11-cv-435 (E.D. Tex. filed June 16, 2011).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a district court “should freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]he language of
this rule evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Jones v. Robinson Prop.
Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although leave to amend should not be automatically granted, “[a] district court must
possess a substantial reason to deny a request for leave to amend[.]” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 15(a), “[d]enial of leave to amend may be
warranted for undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of a
proposed amendment.” United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d
262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff’s proposed amendment alleges a claim wholly without merit. Allowing
the amendment would be futile. Plaintiff simply has no viable cause of action for breach
of contract. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to amend (D.E. 24) is DENIED. Further,
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granting Plaintiff additional time to respond or staying the case to allow Plaintiff an
opportunity to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the breach of contract
claim would also be futile. Therefore, it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for
extension (D.E. 27) and motion to stay (D.E. 32) are DENIED.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks the Court to take judicial notice of the “Yellowquill
Settlement Agreement.” (D.E. 31).
A court has the discretion to take judicial notice of an “adjudicative fact” at any
stage of a proceeding. Fed. R. Evid. 201; accord Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d
827, 829 (5th Cir. 1998). In Taylor, the Fifth Circuit explained that
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a
court may take judicial notice of an “adjudicative fact” if the
fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to resources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.”
162 F.3d at 829 (emphasis in original). “Care should be taken by the court to identify the
fact it is noticing, and its justification for doing so. This is particularly necessary when a
document ... from which any number of distinct facts might be drawn is the object of the
notice.” Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Grp. Int’l, 762 F.2d 454, 459 (5th Cir.
1985). The Court is aware of the procedural history of the Yellowquill case and, when
appropriate, will consider the prior dispositions of Yellowquill and related cases when
seeking to understand the procedural history of this case and related litigation. Taking
judicial notice of a piece of evidence at this stage of the proceedings is premature.

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Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to take judicial notice of the Yellowquill settlement
agreement (D.E. 31) is DENIED without prejudice.
ORDERED this 24th day of March, 2015.

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Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge

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