Casey v. Stephens et al

Filing 62

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT re 59 MOTION of Opposition to the District Judge's Ruling on Summary Judgment. Objections to M&R due by 7/14/2016(Signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B Libby) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
WILLIAM CASEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
LORIE DAVIS, et al,
Defendants.

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June 30, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-13

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
This is a civil rights case brought by a Texas inmate of the Native American faith.
On February 9, 2016, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. (D.E. 58). Plaintiff has filed a “Motion of
Opposition” construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. (D.E. 59).
Based on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Davis v. Davis, No. 14-40339, 2016 WL 3269089
(5th Cir. June 14, 2016), the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s motion be GRANTED
in part and the Court vacate its ruling on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
only as to Plaintiff’s kouplock claim and refer the case back to the undersigned for
further proceedings.
I.

JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case has been

referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for case management, ruling

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on non-dispositive motions and furnishing a recommendation on dispositive motions
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appearing pro se, inmate William Casey brought this civil rights action

challenging certain policies and practices of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Plaintiff alleged these policies conflict
with his right to practice his Native American faith in violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and the First
Amendment. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the TDCJ-CID, by
and through Defendant William Stephens in his official capacity only, to allow Plaintiff
to: (1) grow his hair long and/or wear a kouplock; (2) wear his medicine bag at all times;
and (3) possess and smoke a personal prayer pipe. (See D.E. 1, p. 7).
On February 9, 2016, relying on applicable precedent, the District Judge granted
the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. (D.E. 58).
On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed the pending Motion of Opposition to the District
Judge’s Ruling on Summary Judgment, which the undersigned construes as a motion to
alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On March 7, 2016, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion.1

1

Defendant’s response was based in part on Plaintiff’s erroneous argument that the Fifth Circuit had remanded
Davis v. Davis, No. 14-40339, 2016 WL 3269089 (5th Cir. June 14, 2016), a case similar to Plaintiff’s. While
Defendant was correct at the time the response was filed, the Fifth Circuit has since vacated and remanded in part
Davis for further proceedings.

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III.

RULE 59(e)
Effective December 1, 2009, any motion asking the Court to revisit its judgment

filed within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment is considered made
pursuant to Rule 59(e). Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665,
667 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Bass v. Dep’t of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000);
Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the Court granted summary
judgment in Defendant’s favor on February 9, 2016. (D.E. 58). Plaintiff’s Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment was received by the Court on March 3, 2016, well within the
twenty-eight days authorized by Rule 59(e). (D.E. 59). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is
properly considered under Rule 59(e).
A motion to alter or amend judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error
of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence.

Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d

745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion serves the
narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir.
2004). A Rule 59(e) motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of
judgment. Id. Importantly, a Rule 59(e) motion is not proper to re-litigate matters that
have been resolved to the movant’s dissatisfaction and a party cannot attempt to obtain “a
second bite at the apple” on issues that were previously addressed by the parties and the
Court.

N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2010 WL

2245075 at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 2, 2010) (unpublished). Reconsideration of a judgment
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after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Templet, 367
F.3d at 479.
IV.

ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit decided Davis v. Davis, No. 14-40339, 2016 WL 3269089 (5th

Cir. June 14, 2016) after the Court entered summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.
Davis involved a Texas inmate of the Native American faith with claims similar to
Plaintiff Casey. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, medicine-bag
RLUIPA claim, and pipe ceremony RLUIPA claim.

Davis, WL 3269089 at *9.

However, the Court vacated and remanded Plaintiff Davis’ kouplock grooming-policy
RLUIPA claim for a number of reasons2 including failing to consider Plaintiff Davis’
submission of excerpts of George Sullivan’s expert testimony in Odneal v. Pierce, No. C04-454, 2011 WL 2678940 (S.D. Texas July 7, 2011). Id. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
found “genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the legitimacy of TDCJ’s cost
and security concerns created by the wearing of a kouplock by Plaintiffs as low risk
Native American inmates, and further because the district court did not consider
Plaintiff’s grooming-policy claim in light of Plaintiff’s individual circumstances.”
On the present record, there is little to distinguish the claims in the Davis case
from that of Plaintiff William Casey. Both Plaintiffs alleged TDCJ policies infringed on
their right to practice their Native American religion in violation of RLUIPA with regard
2

In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit in Davis relied, in part, on Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) where
the Supreme Court held the Arkansas Department of Corrections’ no-beard policy violated RLUIPA as applied to
Holt.

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to their being denied the right to wear a kouplock, a medicine bag and participate in pipe
smoking ceremonies. Both cases arrive out of the McConnell Unit, a TDCJ facility in
Beeville, Texas. In fact, Plaintiff Casey states that Plaintiff Davis assisted Casey in
preparing and filing this lawsuit, “I mean Davis did litigate this entire lawsuit for William
Casey as his jail house lawyer.” (D.E. 59, p. 6). Further, Plaintiff Casey in his response
to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, like Davis, references the testimony of
witnesses in the Odneal case, including the testimony of expert witnesses George
Sullivan. (D.E. 51, pp. 20-29). The similarities between the instant case and the Davis
case warrant the Court conducting additional proceedings and reconsidering Plaintiff’s
kouplock grooming-policy RLUIPA claim in light of Davis.
V.

CONCLUSION
The undersigned respectfully recommends the Court GRANT in part Plaintiff’s

Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (D.E. 59) and vacate the Memorandum
Opinion on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 58) only as to Plaintiff’s
kouplock grooming-policy RLUIPA claim. The undersigned further recommends the
case be referred back to the undersigned for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2016.
___________________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy
of the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on
the United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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