Reyna v. Stephens
Filing
52
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re: granting 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support, adopting 40 Memorandum and Recommendations. This action is DISMISSED. In the event that Petitioner seeks a Certificate of Appealability, the request is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ REYNA,
Petitioner,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS,
Respondent.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-54
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ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Respondent William Stephens’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (D.E. 30), seeking dismissal of Petitioner Samuel Rodriguez Reyna’s Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 (D.E. 1). On December 3, 2014,
United States Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington issued her Memorandum and
Recommendation (“M&R”) (D.E. 40), recommending that Respondent’s motion be
granted and that a Certificate of Appealability be denied.
This Court received
Petitioner’s timely-filed objections (D.E. 46) on January 5, 2015.1
Petitioner’s
objections, in large part, reiterate his habeas petition arguments without identifying any
particular claimed error in the M&R. The Court has construed the objections liberally,
and to the extent the Court was able to discern specific objections, those objections are
addressed below.
First, Petitioner objects that having to proceed pro se is a violation of his Fifth
Amendment “privilege to remain silent and not be a witness against [himself]” because
1
Petitioner stated under penalty of perjury that he placed his petition in the prison mail system on December 18,
2014, and it is considered filed as of that date. See Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1998) and Rule 3,
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
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he is being “compelled to self-incrimination by [being] den[ied] . . . adequate
representation of counsel . . . .” D.E. 46, pp. 1-2. It is well-settled that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. Johnson v. Hargett, 978
F.2d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 1992). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate how he will
incriminate himself by proceeding pro se. Consequently, Petitioner’s first objection is
OVERRULED.
Second, Petitioner appears to object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he
failed to timely file his response to the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
D.E. 46, p. 2. The M&R did not make any such finding. Thus, Petitioner’s second
objection is OVERRULED.
Third, Petitioner “objects to all the testimonial statements of all officers” that said
or implied: (1) that Kimberly Powell was not intoxicated; (2) that Debra Oscar and
Ricardo Reyes were intoxicated; and (3) that Powell, Oscar, and Reyes did not have the
victim’s blood on them. D.E. 46, pp. 2-3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that these
statements violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment2 because the officers “only
assumed and didn’t take any physical tests . . . .” Id. This argument is wholly without
merit. Therefore, Petitioner’s third objection is OVERRULED.
Fourth, Petitioner objects to evidence “that the knife taken from him . . . had the
victim’s blood on it” because the State’s expert witness “testified that she only
2
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 4.
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examine[d] a swab, indicating that she never tested the knife . . . .” D.E. 46, p. 3.
Petitioner’s argument is unavailing because Petitioner did not demonstrate any error in
the chain of custody or scientific testing procedures that would call into question the test
results. Petitioner’s fourth objection is OVERRULED.
Fifth, Petitioner objects, without providing any reasoning, to “the fact that the
[State’s] expert witness . . . found a mixture of blood of the victim[,] and unknown
person, on a t-shirt found at the crime scene . . . and on the victim’s belt;” and “to the fact
that the crime scene technician . . . testified that all the latent prints found at the crime
scene on the night of the murder were unrelated to this case, [and] that the only one
related to this case was the one of Ricardo Reyes . . . .” Id. Petitioner appears to
complain of the evidence against him, without articulating a legal objection. He failed to
show that this evidence was inadmissible or that the state habeas court made an
unreasonable factual determination.
As a result, Petitioner’s fifth objection is
OVERRULED.
Sixth, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his petition was
barred by the statute of limitations (D.E. 40, pp. 7-10) because he “was only continuing
his first federal habeas corpus petition case . . . that was dismissed without prejudice back
on December 29th, 2006 . . . .” D.E. 46, p. 4 (citing Reyna v. 319th Dist. Ct. of Nueces
Cnty., Tex., 2006 WL 3841781, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2006)). Petitioner’s reliance on
Alexander v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 906 (5th Cir. 1998), is unpersuasive because that case
merely held that a federal court dismissal of his claim without prejudice would not bar
him from renewing his claim in the future as being successive. Id. at 909. Being
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successive is not the issue. Respondent “concedes that the petition is not second or
successive.” D.E. 40, p. 7. While a dismissal without prejudice allows the action to be
filed again, it does not protect the claim from being barred by limitations. See Carbajal
v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 4539626, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2008) (“Petitioner is advised
that dismissal without prejudice does not . . . guarantee application of any ‘relation back’
theory, but merely allows any subsequent filed petition not to be considered as a second
or successive petition.”); Harris v. Stephens, 2014 WL 292053, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27,
2014) (holding that petitioner’s “current federal petition, filed after he exhausted his state
court remedies, commenced a new habeas proceeding and, thus, the rule that pleading
amendments related back to the filing date of the original pleading under FED. RULE
CIV. PROC. 15(C)(2) is inapplicable”) (emphasis in original). This Court finds no error
in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion.
Consequently, Petitioner’s sixth objection is
OVERRULED.
In his seventh objection, Petitioner challenges the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that any request for a Certificate of Appealability be denied because
“any jurists could conclude that the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” D.E. 46, pp. 7-8. Finding no error in the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation, Petitioner’s seventh objection is OVERRULED.
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s M&R (D.E. 40), as well as Petitioner’s objections, and
all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo disposition of the
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s M&R to which the objections were specifically
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directed, this Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and ADOPTS as its own the
findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss (D.E. 30) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED. In the event that
Petitioner seeks a Certificate of Appealability, the request is DENIED.
ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2015.
___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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