Silvas et al v. General Motors, LLC

Filing 55

ORDER denying 7 Motion for Emergency.(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CHARLES SILVAS, et al,

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-89
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Plaintiffs,
VS.
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,
Defendant.

ORDER
Before the Court is “Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Mandatory Injunction and
Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to Compel Defendants to Issue a “Park It Now” Alert
in the Interest of Public Welfare and Safety and Brief in Support” (D.E. 7). For the
reasons set out below, the Motion is DENIED.
THE NATURE OF THIS ACTION
Plaintiffs Charles and Grace Silvas (the Silvas) own a 2006 Chevrolet Cobalt,
manufactured by Defendant General Motors, LLC (GM). This vehicle is subject to a GM
recall regarding a defective ignition switch that can cause the vehicle to lose power
unexpectedly. That loss of power can be the cause of a collision or the effect of forces at
work during a collision. When power is lost, the vehicle is less responsive to steering and
braking. Also, the airbags may not deploy.
The Silvas allege that they have experienced such losses of power, but do not
complain of any collisions. D.E. 31. In response to the GM recall notice, they have
parked their Cobalt and have filed this suit to require GM to repair the ignition switch and
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to extend a warranty for the repair.

They also seek damages for their alternate

transportation expenses and the diminution in the value of their Cobalt. The Silvas have
not filed this case as a class action and do not purport to represent any other owners of
GM vehicles subject to the recall.
The Silvas request that the Court order GM to issue a “park it now” alert to the
owners of over 2.6 million vehicles involved in the ignition switch recall, advising them
that their vehicles are too dangerous to drive. They ask for this extraordinary relief based
on an evidentiary record that is, by its nature as a preliminary proceeding held on an
emergency basis, only partially developed. The Silvas claim that they need GM to issue
the “park it now” alert for two reasons: (1) to maintain the value of their own Cobalt by
avoiding any additional stigma arising out of additional lost-power experiences among
other owners; and (2) they will be safer on the roadways if the other vehicles are
immobilized.
THE CONTEXT IN WHICH INJUNCTIVE RELIEF MAY ISSUE
A preliminary injunction (FED. R. CIV. P. 65) is a discretionary matter for the
Court. Collum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing, inter alia, 11
Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2947-48, 2961 (1973)). The
Court exercises its equitable powers to balance the parties’ respective rights and interests
in order to prevent irreparable harm to one of the parties before the Court and to maintain
the Court’s jurisdiction—its ability to issue meaningful relief at the conclusion of the
trial. Meis v. Sanitas Service Corp., 511 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1975).

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Any such relief should be narrowly tailored to advance the particular interests of
the parties in the case and so as not to proscribe permissible conduct. B.H. Bunn Co. v.
AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1269 (5th Cir. 1971) (criticizing an
injunction because it “lops off a considerable amount of wheat with its chaff”).
Therefore, the Silvas’ request should be granted only if it is necessary to preserve their
rights pending trial. The Court is not persuaded that the relative rights of the parties in
this action depend on how GM conducts its recall with respect to the owners of other
GM-manufactured vehicles.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Our government has largely entrusted the safety of the nation’s roadways—in the
macro sense—to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA),
which is responsible for administering the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 49 U.S.C.
§ 30101 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 501.1, 501.2.

The MVSA and its interpretive

regulations contain numerous provisions that NHTSA is to apply in the context of an
automotive recall—the specific type of injunctive relief the Silvas request from this
Court. E.g., MVSA § 30118-20, 49 C.F.R. § 577.1 et seq.
Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, courts defer to an administrative agency’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the issue brought to court. One of the cases cited by the
Silvas, Kent v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 200 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2002),
describes the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as expressed by the Supreme Court:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with
promoting proper relationships between the courts and
administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory
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duties. Even when common-law rights and remedies survive
and the agency in question lacks the power to confer
immunity from common[-]law liability, it may be appropriate
to refer specific issues to an agency for initial determination
where that procedure would secure (u)niformity and
consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a
particular agency or where the limited functions of review by
the judiciary (would be) more rationally exercised, by
preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are
better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight
gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.
Kent, at 1218 (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303–304 (1976)
(citations omitted)). The Kent court declined to defer to NHTSA because the plaintiff
had not challenged a safety standard or any NHTSA regulation and because there was no
conflict between the action and any on-going NHTSA investigation of the same problem.
Therefore, the need for “uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business” did not
apply. Moreover, that court did not find that the claims raised “issues of fact not within
the conventional experience of judges.”

Kent, supra at 1218-19 (quoting Far East

Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952)).
In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices,
and Products Liability Litigation, 754 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2010), also cited
by the Silvas, declined deference to NHTSA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine “at
this stage,” because there was no conflicting proceeding ongoing at NHTSA.

In

Marsikian v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 08-04876, 2009 WL 8379784, *9 (C.D.
Cal. 2009), primary jurisdiction did not apply because the only asserted basis for it was
the defendant’s “questionable assertion that this case involves a request for a recall.”
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Unlike in Marsikian, there is nothing questionable about the recall-related issue in
this case. The Silvas have put a recall matter directly in issue and, with respect to that
issue only, this Court defers to NHTSA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
As interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, the factors to consider in applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine are “when (a) it will promote even-handed treatment and uniformity
in a highly regulated area, or when sporadic action by federal courts would disrupt an
agency’s delicate regulatory scheme; or (b) the agency possesses expertise in a
specialized area with which the courts are relatively unfamiliar.” Elam v. Kansas City
Southern Railway, 635 F.3d 796, 811 (5th Cir. 2011). The “park it now” alert conflicts
with the existing notices issued in connection with the recall arising from the defective
ignition switches. The Court is of the opinion that NHTSA is far better equipped than
this Court to address the broad and complex issues of automotive safety and the
regulation of automotive companies in connection with a nationwide recall.
Furthermore, NHTSA has proceeded substantially into the recall process with
respect to the defective ignition switches in GM vehicles.

The Silvas have not

demonstrated that they have made any effort to obtain a “park it now” alert through any
proceeding involving NHTSA despite their right to do so. MVSA § 30118(b) (allowing
interested persons to be heard in ongoing recall proceedings), § 30162 (addressing the
right of interested parties to initiate recall proceedings with NHTSA).

Under such

circumstances, the Court defers to NHTSA pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

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See generally, Bussian v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 411 F.Supp.2d 614

(M.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that deference to NHTSA is appropriate where there is an
ongoing investigation and recall regarding the alleged defect).
CONCLUSION
Because of the Court’s ruling on the issue of primary jurisdiction, it does not reach
the additional issues briefed by the parties. The request for an emergency preliminary
injunction in the form of requiring GM to issue a “park it now” alert is DENIED.

ORDERED this 17th day of April, 2014.

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NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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