Arredondo et al v. Estrada et al

Filing 86

ORDER granting 61 Motion for Sanctions; denying 76 Motion to Strike.(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
RICARDO ARREDONDO, et al,

§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-170
§
§
§
§

Plaintiffs,
VS.
JOEY ESTRADA, et al,
Defendants.

ORDER
Defendant Joey Estrada (Estrada), appearing pro se, has admitted that he lied
under oath during a June 4, 2015 deposition in this matter. His lies involved denying
meeting with Plaintiffs’ counsel, Greggory A. Teeter (Teeter) on June 3, 2015, to prepare
for his deposition. Teeter, who was in attendance at the June 4 deposition failed to
correct the record to disclose the truth.

Defendant Weatherford International, LLC

(Weatherford) seeks sanctions against both Estrada and Teeter.
Before the Court are the following:
• Weatherford’s Motion to Prohibit Use of Certain Evidence and for
Sanctions (D.E. 61), along with Plaintiff’s Response (D.E. 72) and
Weatherford’s Reply (D.E. 74); and
• Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Weatherford’s Motion to Prohibit the Use of
Certain Evidence and for Sanctions (D.E. 76).

1 / 13

For the reasons set out below, the Court GRANTS the motion for sanctions (D.E. 61) and
DENIES the motion to strike (D.E. 76).
Plaintiffs, former employees of Weatherford, filed suit against Weatherford and
their former supervisor, Estrada, for abuse that Estrada meted out to them during their
employment. Estrada’s conduct, which Weatherford has conceded took place, included
assault against the Plaintiffs. Complicating this case is the fact that Estrada, whose
employment with Weatherford was terminated after the allegations came to light, is
representing himself. Counsel on both sides of this dispute, without the prior knowledge
of their opposing counterparts, have sought and obtained Estrada’s cooperation at
different times, resulting in Estrada’s self-contradictory testimony, and allegations of
perjury and sanctionable conduct.
DISCUSSION
A. Gamesmanship and Lies
On October 10, 2014, Estrada filed a general denial, after consulting with
Weatherford’s counsel. D.E. 14; D.E. 61-3, p. 21. On March 2, 2015, Weatherford’s
counsel engaged in a telephone conversation with Estrada in which Estrada discussed the
case in terms allegedly consistent with his previously filed general denial. D.E. 50, p. 2.
Thereafter, on or about March 30, 2015, Weatherford sought and obtained Estrada’s
judicial admissions by way of an email exchange of documents. D.E. 50-2. Those
ostensibly unsigned judicial admissions “admit” that the facts are consistent with
Weatherford’s defense.

2 / 13

Weatherford claims to have given notice of the judicial

admissions to Plaintiffs “between depositions, during a lunch break, on Tuesday, April
28, 2015.” D.E. 61, p. 2.
According to the Court’s Scheduling Order, the discovery deadline was May 4,
2015. D.E. 13. On that date, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to Extend the
Discovery Deadline (D.E. 35), seeking additional corporate representative discovery and
complaining that Weatherford had delayed producing documents relevant to the previous
deposition of its corporate representative until the day before and day of the deposition,
which took place on April 29, 2015. D.E. 35, pp. 2-3.
On May 8, 2015, in the process of resisting Plaintiffs’ request to extend the
discovery deadline, Weatherford filed a response that revealed that it intended to file a
motion for summary judgment. D.E. 43. On that day, attorney Greggory A. Teeter
(Teeter) of the Law Office of Thomas J. Henry met with Estrada and obtained his
signature on an affidavit that admits to the wrongful conduct alleged in Plaintiffs’
complaint, contrary to his previous judicial admissions. D.E. 50-1. The affidavit is
specifically couched in language designed to create disputed issues of material fact on
each of Plaintiffs’ theories of recovery.
At about the same time, Plaintiffs contacted Weatherford’s counsel to obtain a
copy of Estrada’s alleged judicial admissions, which they claim they had not previously
been served with. D.E. 61, p. 2. There is no competent evidence that Estrada’s response
to the request for admissions is signed as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
36(a)(3) or that it was previously (or timely) served on Plaintiffs as required by the rules.
However, Weatherford has not attempted to rely on Estrada’s alleged admissions in its
3 / 13

summary judgment motion (D.E. 57) or any other filing with this Court that seeks
substantive relief.
Counsel appeared for a hearing in this Court on May 13, 2015, regarding
Plaintiffs’ request to extend the discovery deadline for additional corporate representative
discovery from Weatherford.

Knowing that Estrada’s May 8, 2015 affidavit would

trigger Weatherford to request a post-deadline deposition of Estrada to test the
information in the affidavit, attorney Teeter withheld the 8-page affidavit and the fact of
its existence from Weatherford’s counsel and the Court. Attorney Teeter disclosed the
Estrada affidavit only after he had secured an agreement from Weatherford for additional
corporate representative discovery and the hearing was concluded, thereby preventing
Weatherford from contemporaneously seeking any reciprocal relief. D.E. 50, p. 2.
The following day, Weatherford filed its Expedited Motion for Leave to Depose
Estrada (D.E. 50). The motion was heard and granted on May 15, 2015. D.E. 55.
Suspicious of the way Estrada’s affidavit was obtained (its timing, unquestionable proPlaintiff content, and the notary being on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s staff), Weatherford
engaged the services of a private investigation firm to follow Estrada on the day prior to
the deposition. The private investigator documented that, on June 3, 2015, the day before
Estrada’s deposition:
• Estrada arrived at the Law Office of Thomas J. Henry, Plaintiffs’
counsel, at approximately 10:55 a.m.;

4 / 13

• Estrada left the office with attorney Teeter in Teeter’s automobile at
approximately 11:25 a.m. and returned to the office at 1:46 p.m.;
• Estrada left the office with attorney Teeter at approximately 4:50 p.m.,
walking around the corner; and
• Estrada left the office at approximately 6:40 p.m.
D.E. 61-1.
The following day, Estrada testified under oath in his deposition that he had not
met with anyone, spoken with anyone, reviewed any documents, or done anything in
preparation for that deposition. D.E. 61-3. While Plaintiffs contend that the questions
were poorly worded, the questions did address the time period from the date the judge
ordered the deposition until the time of the deposition. D.E. 61-3, pp. 21-22. And
Estrada did specifically deny having engaged in any preparation for the deposition. More
specifically, Estrada denied having met with attorney Teeter at any time other than May
8, 2015, when he “told his story” and signed the affidavit. D.E. 61-3, p. 17. Attorney
Teeter, who attended the Estrada deposition, did not correct the record about his face-toface meeting with Estrada the day before, but rather made objections, such as “asked and
answered” to move away from the subject of Estrada’s preparation. D.E. 61-3.
On June 9, 2015, Weatherford filed its motion for sanctions and later sought to
expedite that motion (D.E. 61, 62), revealing that it had surveillance video and private
investigator evidence that Estrada had lied in his deposition and suggesting that he was
5 / 13

thus colluding with attorney Teeter regarding this case. Weatherford further complained
that attorney Teeter, who failed to correct the record as to his meeting with Estrada, had
violated a duty of candor to the Court. On June 17, 2015, the Court heard the motion to
expedite and ordered both Estrada and attorney Teeter to submit to depositions regarding
the fact that they had met immediately prior to Estrada’s June 4 deposition and failed to
disclose that meeting at the time of Estrada’s June 4, 2015 deposition.
Estrada’s resulting June 19, 2015 deposition confirmed that he had knowingly lied
when he claimed to have not met with attorney Teeter in preparation for his deposition.
While he variously testifies that he was nervous, confused, that the questions were not
clear, or that he misunderstood, Estrada also testified that he understood the questions
and intentionally lied.
A: It’s just my nature.
Q: What do you mean by that? You’re not saying it’s your nature to lie,
are you?
A: I’m going to say whatever I got to say to protect my ass.
D.E. 74-1, p. 7. He admitted that a number of his responses were “lies,” and that he
intended to conceal his meeting with attorney Teeter.
Attorney Teeter admitted in his deposition that he had met with Estrada on June 3,
2015, and that they had gone over Estrada’s affidavit, with attorney Teeter testing
Estrada’s defense of the affidavit and further discussing the type of questioning Estrada
should expect from Weatherford. D.E. 74-2, p. 7. Attorney Teeter testified that he did
not believe that he had any duty to correct Estrada’s deposition testimony about the
6 / 13

meeting. D.E. 74-2, p. 3. He further testified that he was not really paying attention, had
no need to correct a non-client’s testimony, and believed it to be a collateral matter. D.E.
74-2, pp. 4-5, 13-14.
In its motion for sanctions (D.E. 61), Weatherford seeks the following relief in
addition to the depositions ordered on June 17, 2015:
• Sanctions against Estrada (suggesting death penalty sanctions);
• A prohibition against Plaintiffs (but not Weatherford) from using
Estrada’s testimony;
• A prohibition against any additional communications between attorney
Teeter and Estrada unless it takes place in open court or in
Weatherford’s presence;
• An order requiring attorney Teeter and Estrada to disclose their cell
phone, text, and email records;
• An order requiring Estrada to pay Weatherford’s costs and attorney’s
fees associated with the motion for sanctions;
• Removal of attorney Teeter from this case; and
• An order requiring attorney Teeter to pay Weatherford’s costs and
attorney’s fees associated with the motion for sanctions.

7 / 13

The Court agrees that some sanctions are warranted in this instance.
1. The Court Has Authority to Issue Sanctions
As it is often said, harm lies not in the act, but in the cover-up. Plaintiffs had
every right to confer with Estrada as many times as they chose to do so and obtain an
affidavit from him that is favorable to their case. They did not have the right, however, to
withhold knowledge of the existence or content of the affidavit from opposing counsel or
the Court when the Court was evaluating Plaintiffs’ need for additional discovery after
the initial discovery deadline had passed. Plaintiffs thus did not supplement in a “timely
manner” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1)(A), given that the
discovery deadline had passed and extension of the deadline was then under
consideration by the Court.
While the intentional delay of disclosure of the Estrada affidavit may have
constituted sanctionable discovery abuse under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c),
Weatherford has not based its motion on the discovery rules1 and the Court declines to do
so sua sponte. This incident is noted, however, because of attorney Teeter’s intentional
conduct and because that conduct drained judicial resources in this Court, which has been
operating with a longstanding judicial vacancy that already taxes its resources to their
limits.
Just as attorney Teeter had a duty to timely disclose the Estrada affidavit, attorney
Teeter had a duty of candor to the Court to correct the clear misrepresentations made by
1

Rule 37(c) allows sanctions unless the abuse is “harmless.” Because the Court ordered that Weatherford could
take the deposition of Estrada despite the discovery deadline issue, it is arguable that the act was harmless as to
Weatherford for trial purposes. However, that does not nullify the harm caused by additional proceedings in an
overworked court.

8 / 13

Estrada during his deposition regarding their face-to-face meeting on June 3, 2015, and
its relevance to Estrada’s deposition the following day. Attorney Teeter’s failure to
disclose the meeting cannot be excused for inattentiveness, because Estrada was not his
client, or as a collateral matter.
Attorney Teeter’s claim that he was not paying much attention rings hollow. He
was present for the purpose of attending to the testimony Weatherford would elicit from
Estrada’s deposition. No other attorney was present on behalf of Plaintiffs. D.E. 75-6, p.
2. He was further paying enough attention to interject objections to continued questions
about the meeting and Estrada’s preparation for his deposition.
A lawyer, bound by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
(TDRPC), has a duty of candor toward the Court. “A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . (2)
fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act.” TRPC 3.03(a), (made applicable to representation in this
Court by Rules of Discipline of the United States Court, Southern District of Texas
(RDUSC), Rule 1). Nothing about this duty requires that the criminal or fraudulent act
be one perpetrated by the lawyer’s own client. See id. (comments 5 and 6 referring to
testimony of a client or “another person”). In fact, Estrada’s status as a non-client
actually weighs heavily in favor of an expansive duty to disclose.
Estrada’s lies, which were intended to conceal the fact that he met with attorney
Teeter, constitute fraud or perjury.

Estrada’s testimony was clearly false and was

intended to induce the parties and the Court to believe that he acted fully independently
of Plaintiffs’ counsel, thus lending greater credibility to, and reliance upon, his testimony
9 / 13

against Weatherford. These lies were not collateral matters. Estrada’s credibility and his
allegiances are directly relevant to the weight to be given all of his testimony in this case.
As such they are matters that Weatherford was entitled to test in deposition. In fact, it
was the primary reason for the deposition—to test the reliability of Estrada’s
representations in his affidavit.
Importantly, they were not matters about which attorney Teeter had no direct
personal knowledge. At issue was a face-to-face meeting that Estrada had with attorney
Teeter. Attorney Teeter could not help but know that Estrada was failing to tell the truth
while under oath. He had a duty as a lawyer to correct the record for the Court.
The Court has inherent power over lawyers who practice in this Court and over the
conduct of the proceedings. See RDUSC, Rule 10. According to the Supreme Court of
the United States:
It has long been understood that “[c]ertain implied powers
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the
nature of their institution,” powers “which cannot be
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the
exercise of all others.” For this reason, “Courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.” These
powers are “governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Prior cases have outlined the scope of the inherent power of
the federal courts. For example, the Court has held that a
federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and
to discipline attorneys who appear before it. While this
power “ought to be exercised with great caution,” it is
nevertheless “incidental to all Courts.”
10 / 13

...
Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of
that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction
for conduct which abuses the judicial process.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991) (citations omitted).
The Court is aware that the most draconian sanctions should be reserved for use
when lesser sanctions have been tried and have failed to achieve appropriate compliance
with the Court’s authority. Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, 664 F.3d 71, 77 (5th Cir.
2011). The Court is also cognizant that Plaintiffs are not responsible for the particular
offending conduct of their attorney.
2. Sanctions Against Estrada
While Estrada’s offense is egregious, the Court DENIES Weatherford’s request to
issue death penalty sanctions.
3. Estrada’s Testimony
Weatherford has essentially admitted to Estrada’s conduct in this case,
independent of Estrada’s affidavit or other testimony. And as a result of the June 4 and
19, 2015 depositions, Estrada’s credibility is utterly destroyed so it is difficult to imagine
why any party to this case would rely on his testimony.2 Because he has shown that his
answers can change dramatically, the search for the truth would not be served by
allowing Weatherford to use certain portions of Estrada’s testimony and preventing

2

This Court, evaluating Weatherford’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 57), found that its determination did
not depend upon consideration of Estrada’s affidavit, which Plaintiffs had submitted.

11 / 13

Plaintiffs from displaying his lack of credibility. The request to limit Estrada’s testimony
is DENIED.
4. Future Communications Between Teeter and Estrada
Because Estrada and Teeter failed to disclose that they had communicated when
they had a duty to do so and attorney Teeter’s response reflects a belief that he is not
required to make such a disclosure, the Court GRANTS Weatherford’s request to place
limits on attorney Teeter’s communications with Estrada. The Court ORDERS that
Teeter may not communicate with Estrada unless the communication takes place in
Weatherford’s presence.
5. Discovery of Records of Past Communication
Between Teeter and Estrada
Because of the lack of candor of both Estrada and attorney Teeter, the Court
GRANTS Weatherford’s request for discovery and ORDERS Estrada and attorney Teeter
to turn over to Weatherford their cell phone, email, and text records for the period May 1,
2015, through today’s date with respect to any communication between them. Estrada
must disclose all records including those involving communication with any person at the
Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry. Said records shall be provided to Weatherford on or
before the 10th day following the issuance of this Order.
6. Weatherford’s Costs and Attorney’s Fees
The Court FINDS that both Estrada and attorney Teeter have caused the vexatious
multiplication of proceedings in this action.
12 / 13

Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Weatherford’s request for payment of its costs and attorney’s fees and ORDERS
Weatherford to submit to the Court its accounting of costs and attorney’s fees for
preparation and filing of its Expedited Motion for Leave to Depose Jose Estrada, Jr. (D.E.
50), Motion to Prohibit Use of Certain Evidence and for Sanctions (D.E. 61), Motion for
Expedited Consideration and Ruling of [sic] Weatherford’s Motion to Prohibit Use of
Certain Evidence and for Sanctions (D.E. 62), and for preparation and attendance at the
depositions of Estrada and attorney Teeter on June 19, 2015.
7. Removal of Attorney Teeter
The Court DENIES Weatherford’s request to remove attorney Teeter from this
case only because doing so at this time with trial fast approaching, would be unduly
draconian as to Plaintiffs.

ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2015.

___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13 / 13