Mejia v. Ramirez et al

Filing 65

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION re: 52 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 62 Memorandum and Recommendation. Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment (D.E. 57) is DENIED in its entirety.(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
DONALD MEJIA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MARIA D RAMIREZ, et al,
Defendants.

July 11, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-238
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ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 52)
and Plaintiff’s “Motion to Deny Defendant’s Summary judgement [sic] and Grant
Plaintiff Summary Judgement [sic]” (D.E. 57), treated as a response and cross-motion.
On February 11, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington issued a
Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R, D.E. 62), recommending that Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment be granted on the issue of Eleventh Amendment
immunity regarding official capacity claims and denied on all other issues and that
Plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied. Defendants timely filed their objections (D.E. 64) on
February 26, 2016. Plaintiff has not objected to the M&R.
There are no objections to the M&R regarding the recommendation that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants in their respective official capacities be dismissed as barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity or that Plaintiff’s motion be denied. The Court adopts
those recommendations. Instead, Defendants object to the treatment of the individual
capacity claims, re-urging their summary judgment arguments that: (A) Plaintiff has
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failed to show the personal involvement of Defendants Warden Ramirez, Assistant
Warden Curry, and Assistant Region IV Director Chapa; (B) there is insufficient
evidence of a constitutional injury; and (C) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court considers each argument in turn.
A. Personal Involvement
A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires personal involvement and a
supervisor’s liability cannot be predicated solely on vicarious liability. E.g., Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The M&R correctly
observed that supervisors may have sufficient personal involvement when they are
deliberately indifferent to a problem within their supervisory jurisdiction and that
problem causes a violation of the plaintiff’s rights. D.E. 62, p. 11 (citing Smith v.
Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998)). Defendants do not challenge this
legal standard.
Instead, Defendants first object that denial of a grievance does not support § 1983
liability against Defendant Chapa, citing Pittman-Bey v. Clay, C.A. No. V-10-086, 2011
WL 6749027, *5 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (Owsley, Magistrate Judge) (citing Geiger v. Jowers,
404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005)). The Pittman-Bey order, which was not subjected to
district court review and is not precedential, overstates the holding of the Geiger opinion.
Upon close review, Geiger stands for the proposition that, if the plaintiff does not have a
cognizable constitutional claim, the plaintiff cannot turn his grievance into a
constitutional due process claim based upon a prison official’s denial of the grievance.
The grievance process, by itself, does not implicate constitutional due process rights.
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Where, as in Pittman-Bey and this case, there is an underlying constitutional
claim, the grievance process can supply evidence that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent—the problem was brought to their attention and they failed to take reasonable
action to remedy it. Smith, supra. This Court rejects Defendants’ request that this Court
follow Pittman-Bey to apply Geiger where the grievance that was denied stated an
underlying constitutional claim. Plaintiff here is not prosecuting a due process claim but
an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim and the grievance process is
some evidence of Defendants’ knowledge and failure to act to protect Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ first objection and concurs with the M&R
that there is some evidence of Defendant Chapa’s personal involvement resulting from
his denial of Plaintiff’s grievance.
Defendants’ second objection complains that there is no evidence of Defendants
Ramirez and Currie having personal involvement because the grievance process does not
implicate them. As set out above, the denial of Plaintiff’s grievance does evidence
personal involvement on the part of Defendant Ramirez. However there is no evidence
that Defendant Currie reviewed any grievances.
Because

supervisory

liability

may

also

be

predicated

upon

policy

implementation—without overt personal participation—the M&R concluded that Warden
Ramirez and Assistant Warden Currie could be personally liable for Plaintiff’s
complaints. D.E. 62, pp. 11-12 (citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir.
1987)). Plaintiff particularly complained of a policy to cut back on food.
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In support of that allegation, Plaintiff offered as summary judgment evidence his
own logs showing the use of johnny sacks for a large number of meals, the content of the
johnny sacks, the meal policy that was not being followed with respect to johnny sacks,
and evidence of his bowel problems, which the physician attributed in large part to a diet
without sufficient vegetables, fiber, and fluids. He notes that the prison maintains its own
official logs recording the types of meals and the frequency with which they are
provided, giving Defendants Ramirez and Currie an easy reference tool for monitoring
policy compliance, which they allegedly failed to do. Plaintiff has raised sufficient
evidence of a disputed issue regarding material facts to survive Defendants’ summary
judgment motion.
The Court OVERRULES Defendants’ second objection and concurs with the
M&R’s conclusion that there is some evidence of supervisory liability based on policy
implementation.
B. Evidence of Injury Caused by Defendants
Defendants’ third objection challenges the M&R’s conclusion that Plaintiff had
supplied sufficient evidence of injury resulting from the conduct of which he complains.
While Defendants do not discredit Plaintiff’s testimony that he suffered weight loss and
bowel problems from food deprivation, high blood pressure from lack of exercise, and a
rash related to hygiene, they argue that the evidence he supplied is of his condition after
the period of time subject to this lawsuit or otherwise does not correspond to his liability
theories.

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Plaintiff’s medical records documenting his weight demonstrate his condition after
the 2013 period of time at issue here and show an arguably healthy weight two months
after the events of this lawsuit. This does not defeat his claim because his own testimony
constitutes some evidence that, as a result of the johnny sack meals, he lost 40 pounds in
2013. That he is capable of dramatic weight change over small amounts of time is
documented in his medical records and can explain the higher weight a few months after
his complaints ended. There is sufficient evidence of weight loss to raise a disputed issue
of material fact on that claim of injury by food deprivation.
With respect to Plaintiff’s skin rash, Defendants contend that he admitted that the
cause of the rash is soap supplied by TDCJ and from staying in the shower too long.
D.E. 52-1, p. 15. While Plaintiff’s medical records do recite that information supplied by
Plaintiff, nothing in the record demonstrates that Plaintiff is qualified to diagnose medical
causation, such that his observations and suppositions recounted at one time can be said
to defeat causation as a matter of law. Nothing in the record shows that the doctor
concurred with Plaintiff’s diagnosis. Plaintiff now associates his skin rash with sweat
and the inability to get clean in the shower. His current opinion has no less weight than
his prior opinion.

And his own testimony (supported by other prisoners) is some

evidence to support a disputed issue of material fact. D.E. 17-21.
Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s blood pressure issue, related to his lack of
recreation claims. Plaintiff has raised a fact issue with respect to his claims of injury
sufficient to support his liability theories. Defendants’ third objection is OVERRULED.

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C. Eighth Amendment Claims and Qualified Immunity
The M&R discusses in detail both the clearly established law by which claims
such as Plaintiff’s are evaluated under the Eighth Amendment and the facts evidenced in
the record with respect to both the severity of the deprivations Plaintiff has stated and the
deliberate indifference of the Defendants. The M&R concludes that there are disputed
issues of material fact to defeat a finding that qualified immunity protects Defendants as a
matter of law.
In their fourth objection, Defendants challenge the denial of qualified immunity
not by identifying error in the M&R but by minimizing the severity of the risks to which
Plaintiff was subjected. The Court has already overruled their objections to the M&R’s
conclusion that Plaintiff raised disputed issues of material fact regarding injuries from the
risks to which he was exposed. They cannot now escape liability by arguing that those
disputed facts should simply be resolved in their favor.
Significant weight loss and bowel problems caused by insufficient nutrition can
state a constitutional violation. A lack of hygiene that causes skin maladies and a lack of
exercise that causes potentially life-threatening blood pressure readings, both of which
further deprive a prisoner of rare opportunities to leave his cell, can state constitutional
violations. These issues were fully explored in the M&R and the Court finds no error in
that analysis. Defendants’ fourth objection is OVERRULED.
Last, Defendants object, claiming that the M&R should have concluded that their
actions were not objectively unreasonable. First, they minimize the role of the grievance

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process in putting them on notice of the issues. They again argue that the grievance
process cannot support a claim—a contention already rejected, above.
Second, Defendants’ suggestion that staffing shortages and consequent security
issues are sufficient to justify their actions is offered without authority and is contrary to
public policy. A holding to that effect would permit prisons to maintain unconstitutional
conditions of confinement simply because they were underfunded. Defendants’ last
objection is OVERRULED.
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as
Defendants’ objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made
a de novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation

to

which

objections

were

specifically

directed,

the

Court

OVERRULES Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (D.E. 52) is GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
in their official capacities are DISMISSED pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Defendants’ motion (D.E. 52) is DENIED IN PART with respect to all other issues
raised. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment (D.E. 57) is DENIED in its
entirety.
ORDERED this 11th day of July, 2016.
___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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