Jones v. Taylor et al
Filing
66
OPINION AND ORDER granting 44 Motion for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
FRANKLIN JONES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
BUCK TAYLOR, et al,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-428
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OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this prisoner civil rights action, Plaintiff Franklin Jones complains that on
October 17, 2013, Defendant Captain Buck Taylor used excessive force against Plaintiff
when he applied handcuffs to tight, injuring Plaintiff’s wrists. (D.E. 1). Defendant
Taylor has filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss this action on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (D.E. 44). In
the alternative, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because
Plaintiff suffered no more than a de minimis injury and that Defendant’s actions
were objectively reasonable. Id. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition. (D.E.
64).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
granted, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.
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I.
JURISDICTION.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this civil action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Upon consent of the parties (D.E. 9, 58), this case was referred to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge to conduct all further proceedings, including
entry of final judgment. (D.E. 59). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), and is currently confined at the Wayne Scott Unit in
Angleton, Texas, although his complaint concerns events that occurred while he was
incarcerated at the McConnell Unit (MCU) in Beeville, Texas. Plaintiff filed his original
complaint on October 20, 2014, alleging that Captain Taylor used excessive force against
him on October 17, 2013, injuring his wrists. (D.E. 1). He also named as Defendants
Assistant Warden Maria Ramirez and Grievance Investigator Joe Hernandez alleging that
these individuals failed to investigate properly his use of force claim against Defendant.
Id.
A Spears1 hearing was conducted on December 4, 2014, following which
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Captain Taylor in his individual capacity was
retained, and his remaining claims against the remaining Defendants, as well as any
claims against Captain Taylor in his official capacity, were dismissed. (D.E. 12).
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating that testimony given at a Spears hearing is incorporated into the pleadings).
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On December 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) (D.E. 13), and his request was denied. (D.E. 15).
On January 30, 2015, Defendant filed his Answer and raised the defense of
qualified immunity. (D.E. 20).
On February 10, 2015, Defendant filed his First Supplement to his Answer. (D.E.
26).
On June 12, 2015, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
(D.E. 44).
Following an extension of time, on July 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed his summary
judgment response. (D.E. 64).
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant offers the following:
Ex. A:
Ex. B:
Relevant portions of Plaintiff’s grievance records
(D.E. 44-2, pp. 3-7);
Ex. C:
Affidavit of No Use of Force report for October 17,
2013 (D.E. 44-3, p. 2);
Ex. D:
Relevant portions of Plaintiff’s medical records, filed
under seal (D.E. 45-1, pp. 2-20); and
Ex. E:
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Copy of Administrative Directive (AD)-03.82,
Management of Offender Grievances (D.E. 44-1, pp.
2-9);
Spears hearing transcript (D.E. 44-4, pp. 2-28).
In his summary judgment response, Plaintiff offers Exhibit 1 which is a copy of a
radiology report dated January 17, 2014 from the University of Texas Medical Branch,
Correctional Managed Care (UTMB-CMC).
The summary judgment establishes the following:
Plaintiff has been in TDCJ custody since 2004 serving a 50-year sentence for
aggravated robbery.
On October 17, 2013, he had been housed at the MCU for
approximately eleven to twelve years. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., p. 4).
The October 17, 2013 Use of Force (UOF).
In October 2013, Plaintiff was living in a single-man cell. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., p.
4). On October 17, 2013, a female sergeant came to Plaintiff’s cell and told him that he
was going to be moved to a two-man cell and to pack his property. Id. Plaintiff objected
to the move stating that his proposed new cellmate was a racist who had caused problems
for his cellmates in the past. Id. The female sergeant “got mad” and advised Plaintiff not
to protest the move or he would be disciplined. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., pp. 4-5). Captain
Taylor and the female sergeant verbally threatened Plaintiff stating that, if he did not
voluntarily move to the two-man cell, they would use chemical agents and physically
remove him from the single-man cell. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., p. 5). A second female officer
did not want to see Plaintiff get hurt and she pleaded with him to give the new living
arrangement a try for a couple of days. Id.
As he was packing his property to move, an officer came to escort Plaintiff to
medical for his insulin shot. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., pp. 5, 7-8). On his way to get insulin,
Plaintiff talked to Defendant and asked him why prison officials would put a Black
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prisoner in the same cell with a known racist. Id. at p. 5. Defendant replied, “Are you
going to move? Or I’m going to lock you up and I’m going to store all your property.”
Id. Plaintiff admits that he and Defendant “got to talking loud,” and Defendant asked,
“Are you threatening me?” Id., p. 8. Plaintiff did not reply, but just turned around and
submitted to restraints, which Defendant applied. Id. The restraints were metal, and
Defendant put them on Plaintiff too tightly. Id., p. 9. Plaintiff told Defendant that the
restraints were too tight, but at that time, a lieutenant and another officer arrived to
continue escorting Plaintiff to medical. Id. As Defendant left, he said “Jones, don’t give
nobody no problems.” Id. In response, Jones agreed to the move. Id.
Plaintiff then went to medical and received his insulin shot. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., p.
10). The restraints were removed in the infirmary, but Plaintiff did not seek medical
attention for his sore wrists at the time. Id. He was then escorted back to his old cell
where he gathered his belongings and then moved to the new cell. Id. As it turns out, the
offender in the cell to which Plaintiff was moved was not a racist, but Plaintiff still
objected to the move because it was an accommodation to the other prisoner, the one that
got Plaintiff’s single-man cell, at the expense of Plaintiff’s comfort. (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr.,
pp. 6-7).
Plaintiff did not receive a disciplinary case regarding the October 17, 2013 events,
nor was an official UOF report prepared concerning Defendant’s use of the hand
restraints.
(See D.E. 44-3, p. 2, Affidavit of Evelyn Jenkins, TDCJ Administrative
Monitor for Use of Force, testifying that there is no UOF report for the October 17, 2013
incident that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Defendant).
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The next morning, Plaintiff did not have any feeling in his fingers. (D.E. 44-4, Sp.
Tr., p. 12).
Plaintiff’s Medical History and Records.
At the Spears hearing, Plaintiff testified that he has a history of carpel tunnel
syndrome in his left forearm, along with a piece of glass near the main artery, from when
he was in the military.2 (D.E. 44-4, Sp. Tr., p. 11). However, he claims that, when
Defendant applied the restraints, “he tore the ligaments up in there.” Id. The restraints
were on for five to ten minutes. Id.
On October 19, 2013, Plaintiff reported to the MCU emergency room complaining
about shortness of breath, chest pain, and excessive perspiration caused by being moved
to another cell and the confiscation of his radio. (D.E. 45-1, pp. 3-5). Plaintiff’s vital
signs were within normal limits. Id., p. 4. Nurse Munoz noted that Plaintiff was alert,
coherent, and in no acute physical distress. Id., p. 5. His heart tones were audible and
she could differentiate systole and diastole functions. Id. There were no murmurs or
gallops. Id. Plaintiff’s lungs were aerating equally and were essentially clear. Id. His
skin was warm and dry and his lips pink. Id. A 12-lead EKG was performed and there
2
Carpal tunnel syndrome occurs when the median nerve, which runs from the forearm into the
palm of the hand, and is housed in the carpal tunnel– a narrow, rigid passageway of ligament and
bones at the base of the hand – becomes pressed or squeezed at the wrist. The result may be
pain, weakness, or numbness in the hand and wrist, radiating up the arm. Carpal tunnel
syndrome is often caused by a combination of factors that increase pressure on the median nerve
and tendons. In most cases, the disorder is due to a congenital predisposition: the carpal tunnel is
simply smaller in some people than others. Other contributing factors include trauma or injury to
the wrist that cause swelling, such as a sprain or fracture; over activity of the pituitary gland;
hypothyroidism; rheumatoid arthritis; mechanical problems in the wrist joint; work stress;
repeated use of vibrating hand tools, or the development of a cyst or tumor in the canal. See
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/carpal_tunnel/detail_carpal_tunnel.htm#282153049.
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were no changes. Id. Plaintiff was released to his cell and advised to return should he
become concerned again. Id.
On October 22, 2013, Plaintiff reported to the MCU infirmary complaining that he
was involved in a UOF on October 17, 2013, and that the restraints had been applied too
tightly, causing his old military injury to be aggravated, and that the skin on his wrists
had been bruised and slightly cut. (D.E. 45-1, pp. 6-8). Upon examination, Physician’s
Assistant (PA) Erick Echavarry noted no abnormalities detected (NAD), but he did
observe a small 5 mm scar on Plaintiff’ left ulnar aspect of his lower arm suggesting a
past carpal tunnel surgery to the left forearm. Id. at 7. Plaintiff had good strength
bilaterally and his deep tendon reflexes (DTRs) were +2 bilaterally. Id. PA Echavarry’s
diagnosis was bilateral wrist pain secondary to a UOF, and he prescribed Plaintiff
Tylenol, 325 mg, twice a day, for three days. Id. The plan was for Plaintiff to follow up
as needed if the pain got worse. Id.
On November 12, 2013, Plaintiff returned to the MCU infirmary complaining of
right wrist pain with tingling in his fingers, extending up his entire arm. (D.E. 45-1, pp.
9-11). Plaintiff reiterated that he was injured in the military in 1982 and that he still had
a piece of glass in his left forearm near an artery. Id., p. 10. Plaintiff reported that he had
a history of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome that was aggravated by the UOF, and he
requested a referral to Brace & Limb for a hand brace. Id. Upon examination, PA
Susanna Corbett found that Plaintiff had a positive Tinel’s sign and Phalen’s maneuver,
two tests employed to diagnosis carpal tunnel syndrome, of the right wrist. Id. PA
Corbett’s plan was to order Plaintiff a soft wrist brace for support. Id.
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On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff was placed on the medical chain to Hospital
Galveston to be seen by Brace & Limb for a wrist brace. (D.E. 45-1, pp. 12-14).
On January 10, 2014, Plaintiff reported to the infirmary complaining of pain in
both wrists and requesting that his wrists be x-rayed to help with the diagnosis. (D.E. 451, pp. 15-18). Plaintiff also complained of diarrhea, a runny nose, and needing his TED
hose pass renewed. Id., p. 16. PA Echavarry noted pain to both wrists with palpation and
flexion. Id.,p. 17. PA Echavarry’s diagnosis was carpal tunnel syndrome and extremity
pain, and he ordered x-rays of both wrists. Id.
On January 24, 2014, Plaintiff’s reported to the infirmary for his x-ray results.
(D.E. 45-1, pp. 19-20). (See also Plaintiff’s SJ Response, D.E. 64-1, pp. 2-3). The right
wrist x-ray showed widening of the scapholunate space consistent with scapholunate
ligament disruption with mild inferior migration of the capitate.3 Id., p. 19. There was
no acute fraction or dislocation. Id. The rest of the bony structures and soft tissue
appeared unremarkable. Id. His left wrist revealed no fracture or dislocation, and the
soft tissues were unremarkable. Id. The radiologist’s impression was SLAC of the right
wrist, and the plan was to refer Plaintiff to Brace & Limb. Id.
3
The scapholunate ligament is a ligament in the wrist that joins two adjacent wrist bones, the
scaphoid and the lunate, together. When the ligament is torn, the bones separate in different
directions, resulting in pain and a loss of grip strength. It is the most common of all wrist
injuries. If left untreated, a scapholunate ligament tear can lead to scapholunate advanced
collapse
(SLAC)
and
arthritis.
See
http://occupationaltherapy.advanceweb.com/Archives/Article-Archives/Scaphoid-and-Scapholunate-LigamentInjuries.aspx.
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At the Spears hearing, Plaintiff testified that he received a wrist brace. (D.E. 44-4,
pp. 19). However, he continues to have problems writing, and so physical therapy was
ordered. Id. He is scheduled to go to Hospital Galveston for a needle puncture test to
evaluate the severity of his carpal tunnel syndrome in the right wrist. Id.
IV.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court must examine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. In making this determination, the Court must consider the
record as a whole by reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on
file, and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court may not
weigh the evidence, or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. Furthermore, “affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration
& Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (refusing to consider
affidavits that relied on hearsay statements); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc.,
819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that courts cannot consider
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hearsay evidence in affidavits and depositions).
Unauthenticated and unverified
documents do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence. King v. Dogan, 31
F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving
party demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case, then
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing
that a genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party cannot
rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. “After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual
issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be
granted.” Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of
the evidence ... a verdict should not be directed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
The evidence must be evaluated under the summary judgment standard to
determine whether the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
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V.
DISCUSSION.
A.
Exhaustion.
Defendant moves for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (See D.E. 44,
pp. 5-6). The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S. C. § 1997e(a).
The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
involving general circumstances or specific incidents. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002); Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, a prisoner is
required to exhaust his administrative remedies even if damages are unavailable through
the grievance process.
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001); Wright v.
Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).
A prisoner must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with all procedural rules, including
deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 83 (2006). Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, inmates are not required to
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215
(2006).
The TDCJ provides a two-step procedure for presenting administrative grievances.
Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Step 1 requires the
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inmate to present an administrative grievance at his unit within fifteen days from the date
of the complained-of incident. (See D.E. 44-1, pp. 2-9, AD-03.82, Management of
Offender Grievances (rev. Jan. 4, 2012)). The inmate should then receive a response
from the unit official, and if unsatisfied with the response, the inmate has fifteen calendar
days to appeal by filing a Step 2 grievance, which is handled at the state level. Id., p. 7.
The Fifth Circuit requires that both steps be completed in order to file suit in federal
court. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515-16 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[A] prisoner must
pursue a grievance through both steps for it to be considered exhausted.”). See also
Dillion v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (“under our strict approach, we have
found that mere ‘substantial compliance’ with administrative remedy procedures does not
satisfy exhaustion; instead, we have required prisoners to exhaust available remedies
properly.”).
On October 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Step 1 grievance, Grievance No.
2014033387, complaining that on October 17, 2013, Defendant placed him in hand
restraints because he refused to move. (D.E. 44-2, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff continues:
…The restraints (handcuffs) were placed on extremely tight, cutting off
blood circulation to my hands and leaving a very bad bruise on my wrist.
Capt. Taylor removed the restraints only after I told him I would move.
Capt. Taylor did not take me to the infirmary even though I complained to
him about my wrist being in pain from the tightness of the restraints.
Note: I am still having numbness and pain in both of my hands from Capt.
Taylor having placed the restraints on me extremely tight.
(D.E. 44-2, p. 3).
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For relief, Plaintiff requested that “corrective action be taken” and that he not be
retaliated against for filing the grievance. (D.E. 44-2, p. 4).
On January 13, 2014, Warden Ramirez denied Plaintiff’s Step 1 grievance stating
that his claims were investigated but there was no evidence to substantiate his allegations.
(D.E. 44-2, p. 4).
On January 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Step 2 appeal of Grievance No.
2014033387.4 (D.E. 44-2, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff complained that a grievance investigator
had not reviewed his medical records and that no one from the Grievance Department or
the Safe Prisons Program had come to talk to him or to observe the bruises on his wrist
from the handcuffs being too tight. Id., p. 5. By response dated February 25, 2014,
Plaintiff was advised that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted an
investigation and found insufficient evidence to open an OIG case. Id., p. 6. In addition,
the Central Grievance Office conducted an investigation and found it necessary to advise
Plaintiff that he could not ask for any form of disciplinary action to be taken against staff
members as asking for such relief would be justification to return the grievance
unprocessed. Id., p. 6.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal was filed untimely. (D.E. 44, p.
10). He points out that the Step 1 response was returned to Plaintiff on January 14, 2014,
and under AD-03.82, Plaintiff had fifteen days, or until January 29, 2014 to timely file
his Step 2 appeal. Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal was not submitted to
4
Plaintiff dated the grievance January 24, 2014, but it is file-stamped as received by the MCU
grievance officer on February 13, 2014. (D.E. 44-2, pp. 5-6).
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the MCU grievance investigator until February 13, 2014. Defendant contends that the
untimeliness of Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal should result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant for failure to exhaust.
Defendant fails to establish that there is no genuine issue of a material fact
regarding exhaustion. First, Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal was executed on January 24, 2014,
that is, within fifteen days of his receipt of the Step 1 response, and therefore timely
under AD 03.82. (See D.E. 44-2, p. 6). Under the prison mailbox rule, pro se prisoner
filings are deemed filed as soon as they are deposited into the prison mail system. See
Medley v. Thaler, 660 F.3d 833, 835 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.
266 (1988). Defendant offers no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff failed to deposit his
grievance into the mail system on the date it was executed. Defendant does not offer the
affidavit of the MCU grievance investigator swearing that the Step 2 appeal did not arrive
before the date it was file stamped, nor does he offer the mailroom logs or internal mail
ledgers to document that Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal was submitted at a later date than when
he signed it.
Second, Plaintiff’s Step 2 appeal was not rejected as untimely at the state level, but
to the contrary, it was evaluated by both the OIG and the Central Grievance Office, and
ruled on. (D.E. 44-2, p. 6). Indeed, Plaintiff could argue that he relied on the rejection of
his Step 2 appeal in bringing this lawsuit and that Defendant is estopped from invoking
the exhaustion defense since other prison officials previously waived it by processing his
Step 2 appeal. See Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that
misleading statements by prison officials could impact whether remedies are available to
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an inmate under § 1997e(a) and that estoppel excuses a prisoner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies).
Plaintiff’s Step 1 and Step 2 grievances placed Captain Taylor on notice of his
claims against him, thus satisfying the purpose of the exhaustion requirement. See
Johnson, 385 F.3d at 517 (noting that one of the purposes of the exhaustion requirement
is to give officials “time and opportunity to address complaints internally” and is
sufficient if it provides officials with a fair opportunity to address the problem that will
later form the basis of the lawsuit). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
denied.
B.
Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant used excessive force against him on October 17,
2013, when he applied the hand restraints too tightly and failed to loosen them when
Plaintiff informed them they were too tight. Plaintiff claims that the five to ten minutes
during which the restraints were on aggravated his preexisting carpal tunnel syndrome on
both wrists, and that Defendant’s conduct has caused him continuing pain thereafter.
Plaintiff has no complaints about the medical care he received and is continuing to
receive to treat his carpal tunnel syndrome. (D.E. 64, p. 5).
Qualified immunity defense.
Defendant claims he is entitled to qualified immunity to defeat Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim against him. The United States Supreme Court has held that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
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liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held
that “objective reasonableness in a qualified immunity context is a question of law for the
court to decide, not an issue of fact. Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 256
(5th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699. 703 (5th Cir. 1999); Mangieri v.
Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994). A two-prong analysis is employed in
determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. First, the district court
looks to “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged”
and second, “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
200 (2001). The district court is permitted to exercise its discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first. See Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that while the sequence in Saucier “is
often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory”).
Once the defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305
F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). “The defendant official must initially plead his good faith
and establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Salas v.
Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). Because defendant has raised the defense
of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff “can no longer rest on
the pleadings … and the court looks to the evidence before it (in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff) when conducting the [qualified immunity analysis].” McClendon, 305
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F.3d at 232 (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)). Accordingly, the
Court must determine whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that
Defendant’s conduct violated an actual constitutional violation, and also, whether
Defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
McClendon, 305 F.3d at 232.
Excessive force.
Inmates have a constitutional right to be free from the use of excessive force. See
Anthony v. Martinez, 185 Fed. Appx. 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2006). To state an excessive
force claim, a plaintiff must show that the force was not applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, but was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,
and that the injury he suffered was more than de minimis but not necessarily significant.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 10, (1992). That is, a prison official’s
“excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment
when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 4; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559
U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (reversing district court’s dismissal of prisoner’s excessive force claim
based entirely on its determination that his injuries were “de minimis,” reasoning that it
was “at odds with Hudson’s direction to decide excessive force claims based on the
nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury.”). Additional relevant objective
factors in the inquiry of the application of excessive force include (1) the extent of the
injury suffered; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
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officials; and (5) any effort made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Gomez v.
Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1999).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “the amount of force used must be judged by
the context in which the force was deployed.” Ikerd v. Blair, 1010 F.3d 430, 434 (5th
Cir. 1996). Prison guards and officials are afforded broad latitude to maintain order in
the prison systems.
Courts have “long recognized the need for prison officials to
maintain order and discipline, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986), and “broad
deference is given to such decisions.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. See also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“prison administrators … should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and executions of policies and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”). Furthermore, prison guards work under circumstances where they “may
[need] to act quickly and decisively.” Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir.
1993.
Plaintiff admits that, as he walked to medical to get his insulin shot, he questioned
Captain Taylor about the decision to move him out of his single-man cell and to place
him in a cell with an inmate who, at the time, Plaintiff believed to be a racist. (D.E. 44-4,
Sp. Tr., pp. 8-9). Plaintiff admits further that he and Defendant “got to talking loud,” and
Defendant asked Plaintiff if he was threatening him, which Plaintiff denied doing. Id.. p.
9. However, in response to this question, Plaintiff “just turned around” and Defendant
put the restraints on. Id. Captain Taylor put the restraints on too tight, but Plaintiff
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concedes that, by the time he told him the restraints were too tight, “we were headed to
Medical to get an evaluation…”. (D.E. 44-4, p. 10). As they were walking, a lieutenant
and another officer arrived and they escorted Plaintiff to medical while Defendant left.
Id. The restraints were removed at medical.5 Id.,p. 20.
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that simply placing handcuffs on an offender too
tightly alone does not amount to excessive force. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307,
314 (5th Cir. 2001). “Minor, incidental injuries that occur in connection with the use of
handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive
force.” Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007). In Glenn, the pretrial
detainee alleged that the arresting officer put the handcuffs on her too tightly causing her
right wrist too swell. Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314. She did not allege that the officer had
acted with malice or intent to cause harm. Id. In contrast, long-term nerve damage
resulting from handcuffing can support an excessive force claim. Deville v. Marcantel,
567 F.3d 156, 168 (5th Cir. 2009). For example, in Fennell v. Quintela, 393 Fed. Appx.
150 (5th Cir. 2010), the plaintiff complained that a defendant had ordered him to place
his hands through the food slot so she could remove his handcuffs. Id. at 152. However,
that defendant grabbed the plaintiff’s wrists and twisted them, which resulted in an injury
to Fennel’s wrist and shoulder. Id. at 152. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, if proven,
the plaintiff’s version of events “would allow a reasonable jury to find that [the
defendant] used excessive force in violation of the Constitution. Id. at 156.
5
Contrary to Plaintiff’s Step 1 grievance, the restraints were removed at the infirmary and not by
Captain Taylor after Plaintiff agreed to move.
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The facts of this case are more similar to those in Glenn. Plaintiff and Defendant
were walking to medical for Plaintiff to get his insulin shot. Plaintiff was agitated about
the proposed move, and Captain Taylor needed to maintain order, so he ordered Plaintiff
to submit to hand restraints. Plaintiff submitted to the restraints without hesitation or
argument.
Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that Captain Taylor was acting
maliciously or sadistically when he applied the handcuffs: there was no twisting, pulling
or jerking of Plaintiff’s arms. Plaintiff did complain that the restraints were on too tight,
however at that time, Captain Taylor was leaving the area, and the other escorting
officers had arrived, and they did not remove the restraints until Plaintiff got to medical.
Plaintiff testified that he wore the tight restraints between five to ten minutes. As he was
getting his insulin shot, Plaintiff told the nursing staff that his wrists hurt from the
restraints. He was told to submit an emergency Sick Call Request (SCR). (D.E. 44-4, Sp
Tr., p. 12). However, according to his medical records, Plaintiff did not submit a SCR
that day about his wrists, nor did he do so on October 18 or 19, although he did report to
the MCU emergency room on October 19th complaining of shortness of breath and chest
pain. (D.E. 45-1, pp. 3-5). It was not until October 22, 2015 that he sought medical
assistance for his wrist pain. (D.E. 45-1, pp. 6-8). Moreover, when he was seen on
October 22, 2015, PA Echavarry noted no bruising, swelling or redness to Plaintiff’s
wrists, but only a scar on his left forearm from his past carpal tunnel surgery. (D.E. 45-1,
p. 7).
The uncontroverted medical evidence shows that Plaintiff does suffer from SLAC,
(scapholunate advanced collapse) meaning the ligament between two of his carpal bones
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in his right hand is completely torn, and based on the timing of the use of the handcuffs
and when the symptoms arose, it seems reasonable that the application of the hand
restraints on October 17, 2013 could have caused Plaintiff’s injury, but there is no
medical evidence stating as such. However, the fact that Plaintiff has suffered a serious
injury does not equate with a finding that Captain Taylor acted maliciously or
sadistically. At most, the evidence suggest that he was negligent when he applied the
restraints too tightly and did not loosen them immediately, knowing they would be
removed as soon as Plaintiff arrived at medical. Although Plaintiff suffered more than a
de minimis injury, the fact that he was accidently placed in tight hand restraints for five to
ten minutes is not the type of egregious punishment that shocks the conscience of
mankind or otherwise invokes the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
That is.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable excessive force claim.
Further, Captain Taylor’s actions were objectively reasonable. Plaintiff admits
that he was objecting to the move and arguing with Defendant as they walked to medical.
To keep the matter from escalating, Defendant placed Plaintiff in restraints. Plaintiff
does not suggest that Defendant acted out of anger or handled him roughly; his only
complaint is that the restraints were too tight. However, he did not submit a SCR the
next day, nor did he complain about his wrist when he went to the infirmary on October
19, 2013. Indeed, he did not complain about his wrists until October 22, 2013, and at that
medical visit, there was no bruising, swelling, or redness to his wrists. Finally, the fact
that only Plaintiff’s right wrist has been diagnosed with SLAC suggests that it is a
combination of factors, and not the 5 to 10 minutes that he was placed in too-tight
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restraints, that caused his current injury. Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence to suggest
that Captain Taylor’s actions were objectively unreasonable.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies, and therefore,
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that basis is denied. However, there is no
genuine issue of a material fact that Captain Taylor did not act maliciously or sadistically
when he applied hand restraints to Plaintiff on October 17, 2013, and despite Plaintiff’s
Injuries, Defendant’s actions were objectively reasonably. Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment (D.E. 44) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim against Defendant is dismissed with prejudice.
ORDERED this 1st day of October, 2015.
___________________________________
B. JANICE ELLINGTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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