Garza et al v. Chrysler Group LLC et al

Filing 17

ORDER OF REMAND granting 7 Opposed MOTION to Remand (Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
NORMA JEAN GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
FCA US LLC, et al,
Defendants.

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-460
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ORDER REMANDING CASE
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (D.E. 7). Plaintiffs originally
filed this single-vehicle accident case in the 79th Judicial District Court of Jim Wells
County, Texas, stating state law claims for wrongful death and survival damages.
Defendant Chrysler Group, L.L.C. removed the case to this Court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction, claiming that non-diverse Defendants, Tino’s Auto Mart and
Florentino Garza, were fraudulently or improperly joined. For the reasons set out below,
the motion is GRANTED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to remand, “[t]he removing party bears the burden of showing that
federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). “Any ambiguities are construed against
removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand.” Id.
The strict construction rule arises because of “significant federalism concerns.” See
generally, Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). “The
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party seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving that the joinder of the in-state
party was improper.” Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
The removing party proves improper joinder by demonstrating: (1) actual fraud in
the pleading of jurisdictional facts; or (2) the inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause
of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court. See Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646–
47 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2005).
Both methods are at issue here. The motion to remand must be granted unless “there is
absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action
against the non-diverse defendant in state court.” Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d
694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999).
There is no question that Chrysler is diverse and that the amount in controversy for
diversity jurisdiction is met in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The only question is whether
Tino’s Auto Mart and Florentino Garza (jointly TAM),1 the non-diverse defendants, were
improperly joined because the allegations against them are demonstrably false or because
Plaintiffs cannot establish a cause of action against them.
DISCUSSION
This case arises from a one-vehicle accident involving a 2008 Dodge Ram 3500
pickup truck (Dodge). At the time of the incident, Ovidio Villarreal (Villarreal) was
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Plaintiffs alleged that Tino’s Auto Mart is an unincorporated business that may be a sole proprietorship or
partnership, with Florentino Garza its owner. The allegations against them do not distinguish them. They will
therefore be referred to as the singular “TAM” in the discussion of the pending motion.

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driving the Dodge on a trip to Florida and Mark Andrew Guerrero (Guerrero), Arnold
Galvan, III (Galvan), and Steve Manuel Garcia (Garcia) were passengers. The Dodge left
the roadway of Interstate 10 eastbound in Gadsden County, Florida, collided with a tree,
and burned. All of the occupants died in the collision and fire. Plaintiffs have sued
Chrysler Group, LLC (Chrysler n/k/a FCA US LLC) for products liability and
negligence. Chrysler removed the case to this Court.
Plaintiffs also sued TAM, which is non-diverse.

Plaintiffs allege that TAM

employed Villarreal and Guerrero as regular employees and engaged the services of
Galvan and Garcia as independent contractors. Plaintiffs allege that TAM sent them all
on the Florida trip in the Dodge it supplied, pulling a gooseneck flatbed trailer that it also
supplied, to buy and bring back a 4x4 vehicle, referred to as a Mudder. They further
allege that TAM supplied Villarreal with sufficient funds to purchase the Mudder and pay
all expenses for the trip. D.E. 1-2. Hence the trip was a “business trip” for TAM, and
Villarreal and Guerrero, in particular, were acting within the course and scope of their
employment. Plaintiffs allege claims based on an employer’s duties to an employee and
independent contractor in negligence.
While Chrysler does not dispute that TAM employed Villarreal and Guerrero, it
claims that they were not working in the course and scope of their employment for TAM
at the time of the incident. Chrysler relies on affidavits signed by TAM’s owner and his
two sons, Victor Garza and Roy Garza. Those affidavits reflect the following:
• Victor Garza owned the Dodge as his personal vehicle and it was titled
in his name;
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• Victor Garza and Roy Garza are sons of Florentino Garza, who is the
owner of TAM;
• Victor Garza works for TAM as a salesman and as a certified tow truck
operator;
• Roy Garza works for TAM as a mechanic;
• TAM neither owned nor maintained the Dodge;
• Victor Garza, without TAM’s involvement, agreed to let certain of the
decedents use his vehicle to go to Florida on a personal trip as a favor to
his brother, Roy Garza;
• TAM did not instruct any of the decedents to go on the trip;
• The trip was not related to TAM’s business, but rather was to purchase
the Mudder for Roy Garza’s hobby, a transaction that Roy Garza had
negotiated through Craigslist; and
• The money for the purchase and the trip came from Roy Garza’s
personal funds and not from TAM’s money and was tendered to
Guerrero.
This evidence could support a complete defense for TAM. However, the question before
the Court is whether, at this preliminary stage, that evidence is entitled to conclusive
effect, such that Plaintiffs’ allegations are categorically wrong and no claim could survive
trial. Crockett, supra.
Accepting as true that TAM did not own the Dodge, ownership does not preclude
TAM from making arrangements with its owner to borrow the vehicle for business
purposes, particularly when the owner is employed by the business and is the owner’s
son. After all, the affidavits themselves reflect that Roy Garza borrowed the vehicle from
Victor Garza and furnished it to certain decedents for Roy Garza’s purposes. And while
the Garza witnesses corroborate each other in stating that the Florida trip was for Roy
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Garza’s personal purposes and was enabled by Victor Garza to the exclusion of TAM, a
jury would not be required to believe such testimony, particularly given the family’s selfinterest. In re Hinsley, 201 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2000) (a party's self-serving statement
in an affidavit does not trump all other evidence in the case). It is also noteworthy that
the affidavits do not address ownership of the gooseneck trailer that the Dodge was
taking to Florida and on which the Mudder would be transported to Texas.
Plaintiffs responded with affidavits of Villarreal’s mother and brother, reflecting
the following:
• Ovidio Villarreal was employed by TAM at the time of the trip to
Florida;
• TAM is a used car dealership that has displayed pickup trucks,
including mudding trucks, for sale for many years; and
• Victor Garza admitted that he, Villarreal, and Guerrero planned the
Florida trip while on TAM’s premises.
This evidence, based on the affiant’s personal knowledge and observations, throws some
doubt on the Garzas’s denial that Villarreal was retrieving the Mudder for TAM.
Plaintiffs’ affidavits also include the following, challenged as inadmissible hearsay:
• Villarreal told them that his supervisors at TAM were Victor Garza and
Roy Garza, along with Florentino Garza;
• Villarreal told them that his work at TAM included repossessing
vehicles, retrieving vehicles for TAM to sell, attending auto auctions for
TAM, washing cars on TAM’s lot, assisting with repairs of vehicles
offered for sale by TAM, and other odd jobs that his supervisors
required; and
• Villarreal told his mother that TAM was sending him to Florida, paying
him for his time and covering expenses.
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Plaintiffs have not responded to Chrysler’s hearsay objection to this testimony and the
objection is sustained. However, this is not a summary judgment proceeding, but rather a
test of the ability of Plaintiffs to plead and prove a cause of action against TAM. In this
context, the Court treats these statements as supplemental allegations. Certainly the first
two items on this hearsay list are matters that could conceivably be confirmed by
admissible evidence obtained through discovery. The third, the subject of a telephone
call, may not be subject to easy corroboration through admissible evidence. But it is not
essential to Plaintiffs’ claims.
Because Chrysler bears a heavy burden to eliminate Plaintiffs’ claims against
TAM and because the evidence offered by Chrysler does not pretermit the claims, the
Court FINDS that TAM is not improperly or fraudulently joined to defeat diversity.
Because of this holding, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ argument that this matter
is not properly removable as a worker’s compensation claim.
For the reasons set out above, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Remand (D.E. 7)
and remands this action to the 79th Judicial District Court of Jim Wells County, Texas,
the court from which it was removed.

ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2015.

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NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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