Pinckney v. American Overseas Corporation, LLC et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. (Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
LAMAR PINCKNEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
AMERICAN OVERSEAS MARINE
CORPORATION, LLC, et al,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-30
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Lamar Pinckney (Pinckney) filed this suit against Defendants American
Overseas Marine Corporation, LLC (Amsea), General Dynamics Corporation (GDC), and
United States of America (United States) under the general maritime law of the United
States as modified by the Jones Act, Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), and Public Vessels
Act (PVA).
Pinckney seeks damages for injuries suffered during his employment
onboard the vessel, USNS BENAVIDEZ, along with punitive damages for the willful and
arbitrary delay or refusal in paying compensation.
The vessel USNS BENAVIDEZ is a public vessel owned by the United States. It
is undisputed that, where applicable, this action is governed by the exclusivity provision
of the SAA, 46 U.S.C. § 30904,1 consistent with the PVA, 46 U.S.C. § 31103,2 which
makes the exclusive remedy a claim against the United States. Before the Court is
Defendant Amsea and GDC’s Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 19), arguing that the exclusivity
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2
Formerly cited as 46 U.S.C. § 745.
Formerly cited as 46 U.S.C. § 782.
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provision relieves them of all liability for Pinckney’s claims and seeking dismissal from
this action. Pinckney has responded (D.E. 22), agreeing that the exclusivity provision
protects these Defendants from liability for compensatory damages but arguing that the
claim against them for punitive damages survives. For the reasons set out below, the
Court GRANTS the motion (D.E. 19) and DISMISSES Pinckney’s claims against Amsea
and GDC.
Under Count III of his Complaint, Pinckney seeks punitive damages and
attorney’s fees for Defendants’ alleged willful, wanton, arbitrary, and capricious failure
to pay maintenance and cure. D.E. 2, p. 5. The question for this Court is whether that
particular claim is precluded by the exclusivity provision, which states:
If a remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be exclusive
of any other action arising out of the same subject matter
against the officer, employee, or agent of the United States or
the federally-owned corporation whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim.
46 U.S.C. § 30904 (emphasis added). Because punitive damages are not recoverable
against the United States, Pinckney argues that his “remedy” is not provided by the SAA
or PVA. Characterizing the action for punitive damages as a different claim based upon
administrative conduct other than that which produced the personal injury, Pinckney
argues that it does not involve the “same subject matter” as the claims for compensatory
damages. Thus Pinckney seeks the right to prosecute his claim against Amsea and GDC.
The parties acknowledge that there is a split in authority regarding whether claims
of this type may be brought in addition to the claims against the United States. Two
cases out of the Eastern District of Louisiana reached opposite results, both of which
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were affirmed without opinion by the Fifth Circuit. In Farnsworth v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc., 1989 WL 20544, *5 (E.D. La. March 7, 1989), aff’d, 896 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1990),
the trial court held, “While plaintiff’s maintenance and cure claims may not arise out of
the same act or omission as his claims for negligence and unseaworthiness, they certainly
are ‘by reason of the same subject matter.’”
Six months later, in Henderson v. Int’l Marine Carriers, 1990 A.M.C. 400 (E.D.
La. September 12, 1989), aff’d, 921 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990), the trial court agreed with
the Middle District of Florida court and reached the opposite result. The Henderson
court stated:
In the present case, the plaintiff seeks recovery from SeaLand not for the wrongful acts of its master or crew in the
management of a United States vessel, but for the arbitrary
and willful conduct of its insurance department in handling
benefits claims. The Court finds that such arbitrary claims
handling is an entirely different subject matter from the
negligent conduct for which the SAA provides a remedy. The
Court further finds that the SAA was not designed to preclude
recovery for arbitrary claims handling.
Id. (quoting Shields v. United States, 1988 A.M.C. 21, 662 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Fla.
1987)).
Several courts have written on the issue since that time.
advocate following three federal appellate court opinions:
Amsea and GDC
O’Connell v. Interocean
Management Corp., 90 F.3d 82 (3rd Cir. 1996); Kasprik v. United States, 87 F.3d 462
(11th Cir. 1996); and Manuel v. United States, 50 F.3d 1253 (4th Cir. 1995). Each of
those opinions holds that the exclusivity provision bars all claims for maintenance and
cure against anyone other than the United States, including claims based on egregious
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conduct in delaying or failing to pay benefits.
They reason that all of the claims
regarding maintenance and cure involve the “same subject matter.” In particular, the
Manuel opinion faults the Shields court for “in effect, turn[ing] the punitive damages
remedy into a separate cause of action.” Manuel, 50 F.3d at 1260.
Contemporaneously, however, a carefully reasoned opinion was issued in this
District: Abogado v. Int’l Marine Carriers, 890 F.Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1995). The
Abogado opinion reviewed case law leading up to the amendment that added the
exclusivity provision of the SAA as well as the legislative history for that amendment. It
concludes that, because the SAA does not create a “remedy” for willful and arbitrary
denial of maintenance and cure, the claim never triggers the exclusivity provision. Id. at
632. In the alternative, the Abogado opinion agrees with Shields’ analysis that the claims
do not involve the “same subject matter.” Id. The Abogado opinion also draws on a
policy that the SAA was intended to, and should be construed to, expand the rights of
seamen.
The conclusions reached in Abogado and Henderson are in the minority. But the
driving consideration for most courts, regardless of the ultimate decision, appears to be
centered on the question of whether a punitive damages claim involves the “same subject
matter” as a claim for compensatory damages arising from the maintenance and cure
obligation. In its en banc opinion in Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496
(5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit traced the history of such punitive damages claims to
determine whether they were still viable in maintenance and cure actions. In so doing,
the Fifth Circuit agreed with Manuel in holding that “the willful refusal to pay
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maintenance and cure is not a cause of action separate from the negligent failure to pay
maintenance and cure.” Id. at 1512.
In the end, the Guevara opinion held that the remedy of punitive damages was no
longer viable in maintenance and cure actions.
Id.
The Supreme Court has since
disagreed and has determined that such punitive damage claims are alive and well where
maintenance and cure actions may be brought. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557
U.S. 404 (2009) (abrogating Guevara). Common to both courts’ analyses of the origin of
punitive damages is the finding that they are part-and-parcel of a claim for compensatory
damages and attorney’s fees rather than a separate “subject matter.”
For these reasons, the Court finds that the majority view espoused by the trio of
federal appellate court cases cited above provides better guidance, consistent with the
Fifth Circuit’s view of punitive damage claims being the “same subject matter” as claims
for compensatory damages and attorney’s fees arising from maintenance and cure
obligations. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss (D.E. 19) and DISMISSES all
claims against Amsea and GDC.
ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2015.
___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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