Aguilar v. Colvin

Filing 18

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re: 16 Memorandum and Recommendations. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. Plaintiff's cause of action is DISMISSED. (Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(lcayce, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
ILDA IRENE AGUILAR,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CAROLYN W COLVIN,
Defendant.

August 25, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-87
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ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.E. 1), seeking relief from the
negative disability determination of Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Carolyn W.
Colvin. On August 3, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby issued his
Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R, D.E. 16), recommending that the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) decision be affirmed and that Plaintiff’s cause of
action therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff timely filed her objections (D.E. 17) on August
17, 2016.
First,1 Plaintiff objects to the entirety of the Magistrate Judge’s efforts,
incorporating by reference Plaintiff’s original briefing. Such an objection does not meet
the specificity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 636, by which Plaintiff must point out the
precise error apparent in the M&R. Instead, Plaintiff’s objection complains only of error
in the ALJ’s analysis, with the effect of eliminating the judicial efficiency of the referral
to the Magistrate Judge. The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first, blanket objection.
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Plaintiff sets out a single objection. However, it is compound and the Court has separated out its elements for
appropriate consideration.

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Second, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is erroneous
because “the substantial evidence of record supports a finding that Plaintiff [is disabled].”
(D.E. 17, p. 2). Plaintiff’s argument misapplies the standard of review. The question for
this Court is not whether Plaintiff’s claims are supported by substantial evidence. The
question for this Court is whether the Commissioner’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)(“The decision of an ALJ is not subject to
reversal, even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an
opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by
the ALJ.”). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than
preponderance. Id. (citing Ripley v. Charter, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995)). “The
court does not reweigh the evidence in the record, try the issue de novo, or substitute its
judgment for the Commissioner’s, even if the evidence weighs against the
Commissioner’s decision.” Id. (citing Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir.
1999)).
Plaintiff states that the ALJ’s finding is unsupported because there is evidence of
“undersurface tears of the posterior horns of her lateral and medial meniscuses,
degenerative joint disease, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.”

(D.E. 17, p. 2).

Plaintiff points only at the evidence that favors her cause, and fails to address the ample
evidence that undermines it—discussed at length in the M&R.

Plaintiff altogether

ignores the fact that the Magistrate Judge found the ALJ based his opinion on credible
medical, testimonial, and documentary evidence and was entitled to make credibility
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determinations adverse to Plaintiff. She also ignores the fact that an adverse disability
decision may be rendered even if there is some evidence of pain or injury. The question
is whether Plaintiff is able to work. Plaintiff’s request that this Court re-weigh the
evidence is rejected.

Carey, 230 F.3d at 135.

Plaintiff’s second objection is

OVERRULED.
Third, Plaintiff complains of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the ALJ did
not err by relying on the opinions of non-examining state agency physicians.

The

gravamen of the complaint is that the non-examining physicians formed their opinions in
December 2012 and March 2013, respectively, based on Plaintiff’s medical records.
(D.E. 14, pp. 9-10). Because of their timing, the physicians rendered their opinions
without reference to Plaintiff’s March 2013 knee MRI, which showed an “undersurface
tear of the medial and lateral meniscus with a small joint effusion.” (D.E. 14, p. 10).
Plaintiff overlooks the fact that the ALJ considered evidence that both predated
and postdated the MRI. (D.E. 12-3, p. 17) (“Although the claimant’s MRI of her left
knee from March 14, 2013, showed that she had undersurface tears meniscus with small
joint effusion, her more recent treatment notes show intact knee function.”). As noted by
the Magistrate Judge, the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence—including the
MRI and subsequent medical records, and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
reference to the opinions of the state agency physicians constitutes error. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s third objection is OVERRULED.
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations
set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as
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Plaintiff’s objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a
de novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and
Recommendation

to

which

objections

were

specifically

directed,

the

Court

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff’s cause of action is DISMISSED.
ORDERED this 25th day of August, 2016.
___________________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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