Simmons v. Food Service Manager Gonzalez et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
JASON D. SIMMONS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
FOOD SERVICE MANAGER
GONZALEZ, et al,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
December 31, 2015
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-347
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This civil rights action was filed by a Texas state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), any prisoner action brought under federal law must be dismissed if the complaint
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. Plaintiff’s action is subject to screening regardless of
whether he prepays the entire filing fee or proceeds as a pauper. Ruiz v. United States,
160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1041 (1999). Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
must be read indulgently, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and his allegations
must be accepted as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
1 / 11
Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Food
Services Manager Gonzalez and Captain Victor Francis are DISMISSED with prejudice
for failure to state a cognizable constitutional violation and/or as frivolous.
I.
JURISDICTION.
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this civil rights action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Upon consent of the Plaintiff (D.E. 18), this case was referred to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings, including
entry of final judgment. (D.E. 19). See 28 U.S.C. 636(c).
II.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS.
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), and he is currently confined at the Gib Lewis Unit in
Woodville, Texas. He is forty years old and is serving a twenty-five year sentence for
arson that was entered in February 2012; he is not eligible for parole.
On August 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed his original complaint alleging that on August
12, 2014, he fell and broke his right ankle while working in the Garza East kitchen. (D.E.
1). Plaintiff alleged that Manager Gonzalez, who was in charge of the kitchen, was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because he failed to obtain medical
attention for Plaintiff after he fell, and he claimed that Captain Francis, who was in
charge of maintenance, had allowed a dangerous condition to exist in the kitchen area.
Id.
On September 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his complaint (D.E. 7), and
also an affidavit in support of his complaint. (D.E. 8).
2 / 11
On November 12, 2015, a Spears1 hearing was conducted.
The following
allegations were made in Plaintiff’s original complaint (D.E. 1), supplement (D.E. 7),
affidavit (D.E. 8), or at the hearing:
Plaintiff arrived at the Garza East Unit in August 2012 and was housed there for
approximately 22 months. When he arrived at Garza East, he was in good health.
Plaintiff is 5’7’ and weighs approximately 230 pounds.
He was housed in general
population and was assigned to work in the kitchen.
On August 25, 2014, at approximately 3 a.m., Plaintiff was working his shift in the
bakery area of the kitchen. Plaintiff was wearing work boots with a rubber sole. The
refrigerator in the bakery area drained onto the open floor resulting in water running
approximately two feet on the ground to a nearby drain. This drainage system had been
in place since Plaintiff began working in the kitchen in August 2012. Plaintiff had seen
other inmates slip on the wet floor before. However, Plaintiff had never filed a grievance
complaining about the drainage system nor had he complained to Captain Francis or
anyone else that it was unsafe.
While carrying a load of food pans, Plaintiff slipped on the wet floor. One foot
flew out from underneath Plaintiff, and he fell, landing on his right leg. Approximately
five or six other inmates were in the area and saw Plaintiff fall. The other inmates made
written statements apparently corroborating Plaintiff’s explanation of the relevant facts.
Plaintiff could not get up off the ground due to the pain in his leg, and after about five
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating that testimony given at a Spears hearing is incorporated into the pleadings).
3 / 11
minutes, Manager Gonzalez walked into the bakery area.
Plaintiff told Manager
Gonzalez that he had fallen and was hurt and could not get up.
Manager Gonzalez
thought Plaintiff was “playing.” Manager Gonzalez told Plaintiff to stop playing around
and to get up and back to work, and he left the area.
Plaintiff remained on the floor. He told the other inmates not to touch him
because he was in so much pain. At times, he would blackout because of the pain. The
inmate emergency alarm system was not operational so no alarms were pulled. Manager
Gonzalez returned a second time and again told Plaintiff to stop playing and to get up.
Again, Plaintiff told Manager Gonzalez that he had fallen and injured himself, and that he
could not get up. Manager Gonzalez did not believe him and left the area again. The
third time Manager Gonzalez returned to the area, Plaintiff was still on the floor. This
time Manager Gonzalez realized that Plaintiff was serious and that he was injured.
Manager Gonzalez called for a supervisor and for a wheelchair to come assist Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was taken to the Garza Unit infirmary. X-rays revealed that Plaintiff had
broken his ankle in three places. Medical personnel placed his leg in a splint.
On August 28, 2014, Plaintiff was seen at John Sealy Hospital in Galveston,
Texas. The splint had caused blisters on his leg and so he could not have surgery at that
time and he was returned to the Garza East Unit.
On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff returned to John Sealy Hospital and a steel plate
was placed in his ankle. Plaintiff has now reached maximum medical recovery, however,
he has to wear a brace on his ankle and he uses a cane. He takes Ibuprofen for pain.
4 / 11
Plaintiff is suing Manager Gonzalez and Captain Francis in both their official and
individual capacities for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and he is
seeking compensatory damages of $250,000 from each defendant, compensatory
damages between $250,000-$500,000, and lifetime medical care.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD.
Regardless of whether a plaintiff has properly exhausted his administrative
remedies, his action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2). “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Biliski v.
Harborth, 55 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1995). An action may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim when it is clear that the prisoner can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim entitling him to relief. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2002). The
complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the prisoner and the truth of all pleaded
facts must be assumed. Id.
IV.
DISCUSSION.
A.
Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims.
Plaintiff has sued Manager Gonzalez and Captain Francis in their official
capacities for monetary damages. The Supreme Court has held that a suit against a state
officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against that state official’s office.
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In turn, the Eleventh
5 / 11
Amendment bars claims for money damages against a state or state agency.
See
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). As such, an action for monetary
damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is one against the state
itself, and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). The Fifth Circuit has extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity
specifically to TDCJ-CID officers and officials acting in their official capacities. See
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment bars prisoner’s
suit for money damages against prison officials in their official capacities).
To the extent Plaintiff is suing Manager Gonzalez or Captain Francis in their
official capacities for money damages, those claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against defendants in their
official capacities are dismissed with prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
B.
Eighth Amendment claims.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to “provide humane
conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal
quotation omitted). A prison official violates this duty when by act or omission he is
deliberately indifferent to prison conditions which pose a substantial risk of serious harm.
Id. at 834.
6 / 11
(1)
Manager Gonzalez.
Plaintiff claims that Manager Gonzalez violated his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment by denying him adequate medical attention for approximately one
hour, from the time he fell and broke his ankle to the time Manager Gonzalez realized
Plaintiff was seriously injured and called for help.
In order to state a § 1983 claim for denial of adequate medical treatment, a
prisoner must allege the official(s) acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
303.(1991); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
Deliberate
indifference encompasses more than mere negligence on the part of prison officials. It
requires that prison officials be both aware of specific facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a serious medical need exists and then the prison official, perceiving
the risk, must deliberately fail to act. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Furthermore, negligent
medical care does not constitute a valid § 1983 claim. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d
191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[i]t is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does
not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim.”).
As long as medical personnel exercise
professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional
rights. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Manager Gonzalez because he
fails to establish that Manager Gonzalez knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff was
suffering from a serious medical need. Plaintiff testified that, on the first two occasions
7 / 11
when Manager Gonzalez walked in, Plaintiff was lying on the ground writhing in pain,
but there were five or six other inmates in the area and Plaintiff would not let any of them
assist him and none of them called for help. Plaintiff does not suggest that Manager
Gonzalez remained for any length of time to observe him but was hurriedly passing in
and out of the kitchen area, taking time only to tell Plaintiff to stop “playing around.”
Manager Gonzalez’ own statements to Plaintiff reveal that he had no idea that Plaintiff
was injured. Moreover, it would have been reasonable for Manager Gonzalez to assume
that any individual who had observed the accident could have called for help, or assisted
Plaintiff, or at least communicated to Manager Gonzalez what had actually occurred, but
apparently no one did. When Manager Gonzalez returned the third time and Plaintiff was
still on the floor, he then immediately called for a supervisor and a wheelchair. That is,
as soon as he became aware of a serious medical need, Manager Gonzalez acted promptly
and appropriately. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to suggest, let alone demonstrate, that
Manager Gonzalez was aware of a serious medical need of Plaintiff’s and then ignored
that need, in deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety.
(2)
Captain Francis.
Plaintiff claims that Captain Francis was in charge of maintenance and failed to
maintain properly the Garza West kitchen property. Plaintiff also appears to hold Captain
Francis responsible for the accident because he is a supervisor and is responsible for the
acts of his subordinates. “Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights
cause of action.” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). There is no
vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section 1983. Thompkins
8 / 11
v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987). See also Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636
F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 2011) (the acts of subordinates do not trigger individual § 1983
liability for supervisory officials). For a supervisor to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff
must show that (1) the supervisor failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2)
a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the constitutional
violation; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir.
2005).
Establishing a supervisor’s deliberate indifference generally requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate “at least a pattern of similar violations.” Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444
F.3d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged Captain
Francis had any personal involvement in the incident other than being in charge of
maintenance and a supervisor. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable claim against
this defendant.
Further, the Fifth Circuit has routinely rejected prisoner slip and fall cases finding
that the claims amount to no more than unreasonableness or negligence, thus failing to
establish the subjective component of Farmer’s deliberate indifference test. See Coleman
v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 764 (5th Cir. 2014). In Coleman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s § 1915A dismissal of the prisoner’s slip and fall claim as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim, noting:
Coleman fails to state a claim as to the first prong of the Farmer test. A
slippery shower floor, although a potential hazard, is “a daily risk faced by
members of the public at large.” Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031
(10th Cir. 2004); see also LeMarie v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.
9 / 11
1993); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (“slippery
prison floors … do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual
punishment”).
Coleman, 745 F.3d at 764.
Moreover, prior to Coleman, slip and fall cases were being rejected for failure to
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See e.g. Atkins v. Sheriff’s Jail Avoyelles
Parish, 278 Fed. Appx. 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s slip
and fall case based on a prison official’s alleged failure to repair leaks that caused water
puddles); Noble v. Grimes, 350 Fed. Appx. 892, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
as frivolous of prisoner § 1983 claim that defendant was deliberately indifferent by
failing to correct slippery shower floor); Beasley v. Anderson, 67 Fed. Appx. 242, 242
(5th Cir. 2003) (same); Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1995) (in non-prisoner
case, finding no Eighth Amendment violation based on defendants’ failure to warn of
leaking or sweating air conditioning unit that made the floor wet). Other district courts
have rejected similar slip and fall cases by prisoners. See Robinson v. Cuyler, 511 F.
Supp. 161, 162-63 (E.D. Pa. 19810 (finding no Eighth Amendment violation based on
slippery floor in prison kitchen); Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13
(W.D. Va. 1979) (no Eighth Amendment violation based on pool of soapy water leaking
from dishwasher in prison kitchen), aff’d, 610 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1980).
In this case, Plaintiff alleged that there was a pipe that ran for two feet to a drain
and that this area was always wet and slippery. However, Plaintiff admitted that the
drainage system had been configured in this manner since he arrived at Garza West in
10 / 11
August 2012, and he was well aware of this condition. Plaintiff offered no evidence that
this is not exactly the manner in which the refrigerator is supposed to drain. Plaintiff was
provided the appropriate shoes for working in the kitchen. He does not claim that he was
ordered to run or forced to carry more trays than he was able. More importantly, Plaintiff
never complained to Captain Francis either directly or by grievances prior to his fall that
the drainage system was dangerous or posed a serious risk of harm. Working in the
kitchen simply had some inherent risks, and unfortunately, Plaintiff fell and was injured.
However, the drainage system did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation for
which Captain Francis can be held liable.
Further, once officials were aware of
Plaintiff’s medical condition, Plaintiff was treated and provided appropriate medical care.
V.
CONCLUSION.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state
cognizable constitutional violations and his claims against Manager Gonzalez and
Captain Francis are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and/or as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).
ORDERED this 31st day of December, 2015.
___________________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
11 / 11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?