Garrett v. Stephens et al

Filing 19

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND MOTION FOR SUPPLIES denying without prejudice 17 Motion to Appoint ; denying without prejudice 18 Motion.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby) Parties notified.(mserpa, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
MICHAEL GARRETT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
WILLIAM STEPHENS, et al,
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

February 09, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-403

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND MOTION FOR SUPPLIES
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Proceeding pro
se, he filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. 1). The undersigned
has recommended to the District Judge that that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims be dismissed for
failure to state a cognizable § 1983 claim and/or frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). (D.E. 10).
Pending are Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (D.E. 17) and his
motion for supplies (D.E. 18). No constitutional right to appointment of counsel exists
in civil rights cases. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2007); Akasike
v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). A district court is not
required to appoint counsel unless “‘exceptional circumstances’” exist. Cupit v. Jones,
835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811 F.2d 260,
261 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). The Fifth Circuit has enunciated several factors that the
Court should consider in determining whether to appoint counsel:
1/2

(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the
indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case; (3)
whether the indigent is in a position to investigate adequately
the case; and (4) whether the evidence will consist in large
part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the
presentation of evidence. The court should also consider
whether appointed counsel would aid in the efficient and
equitable disposition of the case.
Jackson, 811 F.2d at 262 (citing Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982));
accord Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 1997). Upon careful
consideration of the factors set forth in Jackson, and having recommended the case be
dismissed as frivolous, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at
this time.
Regarding Plaintiff’s motion for supplies (D.E. 18), the undersigned finds that
Plaintiff has been able to effectively communicate with the Court, file motions and
objections and otherwise represent himself and present his case. The undersigned is not
inclined, at this point based on these facts, to interfere with the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice practices and procedures for supplying legal supplies to indigent pro se
inmate litigants.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for appointed counsel (D.E. 17) and
motion for supplies (D.E. 18) are DENIED without prejudice.
ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2016.
___________________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge

2/2