Sierra v. Farrell et al

Filing 34

ORDER denying 31 Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B Libby) Parties notified.(jalvarez, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CORY SIERRA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TRENTIN D FARRELL, et al,
Defendants.

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May 18, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-459

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Proceeding pro
se, he filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. 2, 6).1 Pending is his
motion for appointment of counsel. (D.E. 31). No constitutional right to appointment of
counsel exists in civil rights cases. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir.
2007); Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). A district
court is not required to appoint counsel unless “exceptional circumstances” exist. Cupit
v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811
F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). The Fifth Circuit has enunciated several
factors that the Court should consider in determining whether to appoint counsel:
(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the
indigent is capable of adequately presenting his case; (3)
whether the indigent is in a position to investigate adequately
1

Plaintiff now states the instant case is a habeas action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Plaintiff’s
characterization for the first time that this case is a habeas action is inconsistent with all of his previous pleadings
and the undersigned will not construe his case as such at this stage.

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the case; and (4) whether the evidence will consist in large
part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the
presentation of evidence. The court should also consider
whether appointed counsel would aid in the efficient and
equitable disposition of the case.
Jackson, 811 F.2d at 262 (citing Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982));
accord Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 1997). Upon careful
consideration of the factors set forth in Jackson, the Court finds that appointment of
counsel is not warranted at this time. In this action, Plaintiff attempted to raise claims
against the state prosecutor, trial judge and his criminal defense lawyers. On December
30, 2016, Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed on screening for failure to state a claim and/or
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). (D.E. 28).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for appointed counsel (D.E. 31) is
DENIED without prejudice.
ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2017.

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Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge

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