Sellers v. Nueces County, Texas et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss; granting 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.(Signed by Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) Parties notified.(srussell, 2)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
BRIAN SELLERS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, et al,
Defendants.

December 20, 2017
David J. Bradley, Clerk

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-291
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Brian Sellers (Sellers) filed this action against the Honorable David Stith,
Judge of the 319th Judicial District Court, Nueces County, Texas (Judge Stith), the
Nueces County Community Supervision & Corrections Department (CSCD), and the
Nueces County District Attorney’s Office (DA). Sellers, who is under indictment on
felony charges, complains of the alleged violation of his civil rights in connection with
the imposition of pre-trial conditions of release from jail. Defendants have filed motions
to dismiss (D.E. 11, 12, 21) on the basis that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or
Younger abstention doctrine, this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims.
CSCD and the DA also claim that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity requires
dismissal. Last, the DA claims that it is not a proper party.
This action was called for an initial pre-trial conference on December 8, 2017,
with each party appearing by counsel. Plaintiff had filed his responses to the motions
filed by Judge Stith and CSCD. D.E. 17, 18. And those Defendants had filed replies.
D.E. 19, 20.
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The DA’s motion, filed on December 7, 2017, was not yet ripe for

submission. Local Rule 7. Plaintiff asked that his other responses be applied to the DA’s
motion and waived the right to file an independent response to that motion. The Court
granted that request such that Plaintiff is not considered to have defaulted on the DA’s
motion. For the reasons set out below, the Court GRANTS the motions on their merits
and DISMISSES this action.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction if the Court lacks statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th
Cir. 1998). Even in the absence of a jurisdictional challenge, the Court must question its
jurisdiction sua sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
The burden of proof is on the party asserting jurisdiction—Sellers, here. Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied sub nom., Cloud v. United
States, 536 U.S. 960 (2002).
According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal district courts do not have
jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). See
also, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). The
Fifth Circuit has often described the judgments to which Rooker-Feldman applies as
orders subject to res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses, and not to interlocutory
orders. E.g., Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2017).
See generally, Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending The Doctrine To State
Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 373 (Spring 2009). However, the Fifth
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Circuit has also stated that the type of state court judgment to which the doctrine applies
is an order that is final for appeal purposes and entitled to full faith and credit. Union
Planters Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004).
Under Texas law, any order setting Sellers’ pre-trial conditions of release from jail
is such an order and may be challenged by writ of habeas corpus without the necessity of
additional motion practice. See generally, Tex. Crim. Proc. Code § 11.16; Ex Parte
Victorick, 453 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. ref’d).

See also,

Coronado v. United States Bd. of Parole, 540 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir. 1976) (challenges
to conditions of release should be adjudicated as habeas corpus matters). Thus RookerFeldman applies and this Court lacks jurisdiction to the extent that Sellers is subject to
any final order.
Sellers complains that the conditions of release are being imposed by CSCD
without a court order. Even if the conditions of release are not deemed a judgment
entitled to full faith and credit, Sellers’ action is still subject to dismissal. He seeks to
enjoin proceedings associated with an ongoing state court criminal prosecution. Such
relief is precluded by the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). See also, 28 U.S.C.§ 2283 (anti-injunction statute). In the interest of comity, a
federal court cannot enjoin a pending criminal trial in state court or enter declaratory
relief contrary to the state court proceedings, absent exceedingly rare and extraordinary
circumstances. Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1569–70 (5th Cir. 1988). No such
circumstances have been demonstrated here. Instead, Sellers must prosecute his rights
through motions or writs available through the state court system. See generally, Tex. R.
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App. P. 52 (providing for original appellate proceedings seeking extraordinary relief,
such as a writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, injunction, or quo warranto).
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss (D.E. 11, 12, 21),
and DISMISSES this action in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court need not, and does not, reach Defendants’ alternative arguments of sovereign
immunity or improper joinder.
ORDERED this 20th day of December, 2017.
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NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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