Chapa v. Dolgencorp of Texas Inc. d/b/a Dollar General Corporation
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 15 Motion to Remand; granting 16 Motion for Leave to File; denying without prejudice 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Parties shall submit a Proposed Scheduling Order within 14 calendar days of the date of this Order.(Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (kmp4)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
CYNTHIA CHAPA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOLGENCORP OF TEXAS, INC. d/b/a
DOLLAR GENERAL,
Defendant.
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March 26, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Civil Action No. 2:23-CV-00001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a slip-and-fall case. On March 20, 2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Chapa was
shopping at a Dollar General in San Diego, Texas, when she tripped and fell on a case of
bottled water, which she alleges was improperly placed in the aisle. As a result of her
fall, Chapa sustained bodily injuries. On December 1, 2022, Chapa filed suit against
Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. (“Dollar General”) in the 229th District Court of Duval County,
Texas, alleging various state-law negligence and premises liability claims. Days later,
Dollar General removed the case to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Remand, (Dkt. No. 15),
Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 16), and
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 23). For the following reasons,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Remand, (Dkt. No. 15), GRANTS
Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 16) and
DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt.
No. 15).
I.
BACKGROUND1
On March 20, 2021, Chapa was shopping at a Dollar General in San Diego, Texas,
when she tripped and fell on a case of bottled water. (Dkt. No. 15 at 1).2 Chapa alleges
that the case of bottled water was improperly placed in the aisle with limited clearance
and visibility. (Id.). Chapa alleges that she suffered various bodily injuries including a
fractured left knee, due to her fall. (Id.). On December 1, 2022, Chapa filed suit against
Dollar General alleging claims for negligence, premises liability, respondeat superior,
and gross negligence. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3–6). A few days later, Dollar General removed
the case to this Court alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Dkt. No. 1).
As to her damages, Chapa alleges in her Original Petition filed in state court (the
“Petition”) that she suffered injuries, and that they “may be permanent in nature” and
“have had an effect on [her] health and well-being.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6). Chapa further
claims that as a consequence of her injuries, she “has suffered and may continue to
suffer . . . physical pain and mental anguish[,]” and incur additional medical expenses.
(Id.). Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapa seeks monetary
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The Court makes the following factual findings for the sole purpose of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
2
Chapa’s Original Petition filed in state court alleged that she slipped on liquid in the
aisle. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2–3). Her Opposed Motion for Remand remarks that this assertion was in
error, and that if allowed to amend, that amendment would correct the error. (Dkt. No. 15 at 1).
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relief in excess of $1 million dollars, including pre- and post-judgment interest. (Id. at 6–
7).
After Dollar General removed the case to this Court, Chapa filed an advisory
stating that her past medical expenses total $18,413.81, and she does not expect to incur
costs for future medical treatment as a result of her fall. (Dkt. No. 13 at 1). Chapa further
states that “[a]t the time of the incident, [she] was retired and not working,” and that she
“is not seeking attorney’s fees as an element of damages in her case.” (Id.). Chapa now
moves to remand this case to state court, (Dkt. No. 15), and requests leave to file an
amended complaint to revise the amount in controversy, (Dkt. No. 16). With briefing
now complete, the Court turns to the merits of both Motions.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
REMOVAL JURISDICTION
A party may remove an action from state court to federal court if the federal court
has subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff’s state court petition at the time of
removal determines whether a federal court has jurisdiction. Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723.
The removing party bears the burden of showing that subject-matter jurisdiction exists,
and that removal was proper. Id. Any doubts are construed against removal because the
removal statute is strictly construed in favor of remand. Id.; see also Afr. Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Lucien, 756 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2014).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
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U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Federal courts may hear a case
if it involves a question of federal law or where there is diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Dollar General only invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See
Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2). Under the diversity jurisdiction statute, a defendant may remove a
case if there is (1) complete diversity of citizenship between the litigants and (2) the
amount in controversy is greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a).
B.
LEAVE TO AMEND
District courts generally should provide the plaintiff at least one chance to amend
the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action. Newell v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l.
Ass’n, No. 4:13-CV-00865, 2013 WL 2422660, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2013) (citing Great
Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). While
denial of leave is generally disfavored, it is warranted under certain circumstances, such
as where amendment would be futile because better pleadings would not change the
reality that the claims fail as a matter of law. United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health,
Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010).
III.
DISCUSSION
Chapa urges the Court to remand her case to state court because the amount in
controversy requirement needed to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction has not been
satisfied. (Dkt. No. 15 at 3–5). She also requests that the Court grant her leave to amend
her Complaint to revise the amount in controversy. (Dkt. No. 16 at 3).
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A.
MOTION TO REMAND
Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions in which the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states.
28 U.S.C. § 1332. There is no dispute that the Parties are diverse. Chapa is a citizen of
Texas, while Dollar General is a citizen of Kentucky and Tennessee. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3);
(Dkt. No. 15 at 3). Thus, the only question before the Court is whether this action involves
the requisite amount in controversy.
In her Motion to Remand, Chapa argues that “[t]he undisputed evidence shows
that the amount in controversy does not meet [the $75,000] threshold.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 3).
Chapa now claims that her past medical bills total less than $20,000, her doctors are not
currently recommending future medical treatment, and she has not brought any claims
for past or future disfigurement. (Id. at 4). Chapa further asserts that because she was
retired at the time of the incident, she is not seeking lost wages or loss of future wageearning capacity. (Id.). Although in her Petition Chapa sought relief of more than
$1 million dollars, she argues that this designation was required under Texas law and is
not dispositive of Section 1332’s amount-in-controversy determination. (Id. at 5).
Dollar General responds that Chapa pleaded $1 million dollars in her Petition in
good faith, and therefore that amount controls. (Dkt. No. 17 at 2–5). Dollar General
argues that even if that amount does not control, it is facially apparent from Chapa’s
Petition that her damages exceed $75,000. (Id. at 3–4). Dollar General asserts that the
medical expenses that Chapa has submitted are incomplete, and do not include any lien
amounts from health insurers. (Id. at 4). Finally, Dollar General argues that Chapa may
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not rely on extrinsic evidence to reduce the amount in controversy. (Id. at 5–7). The Court
agrees with Dollar General.
Generally, “[i]f the plaintiff’s state court petition specifies a dollar amount of
damages, that amount controls if made in good faith.” Guijarro v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 39
F.4th 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2022). If the state court petition does not specify a dollar amount
of damages, “the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Id. The defendant can satisfy this burden:
“(1) by establishing that it is ‘facially apparent’ that the claims are likely to exceed $75,000,
or (2) by setting forth the facts in controversy that support a finding of the requisite
amount.” Id. (quoting Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Moreover, once the district court’s jurisdiction is established, subsequent events that
reduce the amount in controversy to $75,000 or less generally do not divest the court of
diversity jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 58
S.Ct. 586, 590–91, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1335 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that once removal jurisdiction attached, a subsequent
amendment of the complaint reducing the amount in controversy to less than the
required amount cannot divest jurisdiction).
Here, Chapa initially demanded over $1 million dollars in damages in state court.
(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6). This allegation alone is enough to create diversity jurisdiction. See
Torres v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 4:20-CV-01720, 2020 WL 3077932, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
June 10, 2020). The Court is not persuaded by Chapa’s argument that Rule 47 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure required her to allege over $1 million dollars in damages. Rule
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47 provides three other ranges for monetary relief, including one specifically for claims
of $250,000 or less. Tex. R. Civ. P. 47(c); see also Garza v. Palomar Specialty Ins. Co., No.
7:21-CV-00414, 2021 WL 6425093, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (remanding a case to state
court where plaintiff alleged damages would be less than $250,000). Because Chapa’s
Petition clearly seeks damages in excess of $75,000, the Court finds that the amount in
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction has been satisfied.
Further, the Court’s conclusion is not impacted by Chapa’s later-filed advisory
alleging that damages are now less than $75,000. The jurisdictional facts that support
removal are judged at the time of the removal. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335. At the time of removal,
Chapa sought over $1 million dollars in damages. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6). And “[w]hile postremoval affidavits may be considered in determining the amount in controversy at the
time of removal, such affidavits may be considered only if the basis for jurisdiction is
ambiguous at the time of removal.” Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th
Cir. 2000). There is no ambiguity here—Chapa’s Petition plainly alleges damages in
excess of $1 million dollars.3 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6) (“Plaintiff seeks monetary relief more
than one million and 00/100 dollars ($1,000,000.00)”).
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Even if the Court were to ignore the plain text of Chapa’s Petition, which requested over
$1 million dollars in damages, the Court finds that Dollar General has shown that it is facially
apparent that Chapa’s claims are likely to exceed $75,000. See Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883. Chapa has
filed claims for negligence, premises liability, respondeat superior, and gross negligence. (Dkt.
No. 1-1 at 3–6). In her Petition, accounting for both past and future damages for each harm, she
seeks compensation for physical pain, mental anguish, and medical expenses. (Id.). Dollar
General has shown that Chapa’s submitted medical expenses are incomplete and don’t include
the liens from insurers. (Dkt. No. 17 at 4).
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B.
MOTION TO AMEND
Chapa requests permission to file an amended complaint to correct a mistake in
the factual allegations and to reduce the monetary relief sought to an amount under
$75,000. (Dkt. No. 16 at 2–3). Generally, absent a significant reason, “such as undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or undue prejudice to the opposing party, ‘the discretion
of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.’” Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v.
Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Dussouy
v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Therefore, the Court grants
Chapa leave to amend.
The Court reminds Chapa that diversity jurisdiction is
determined at the time of removal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing analysis, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Opposed
Motion for Remand, (Dkt. No. 15), and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Leave
to File Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No 16). The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 15).
Plaintiff is ORDERED to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Parties shall submit a Proposed Scheduling
Order within 14 calendar days of the date of this Order.
It is SO ORDERED.
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Signed on March 25, 2024.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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