Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company v. Andy House and Lloyd Gillespie
Filing
69
OPINION AND ORDER denying 34 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 42 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying as moot 54 Motion to Strike; denying as moot 59 Motion to Strike; denying as moot 61 Motion to Strike.(Signed by Magistrate Judge John R Froeschner) Parties notified.(sanderson, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY
INSURANCE COMPANY
V.
ANDY HOUSE, ET AL.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. G-10-243
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court, with the consent of the Parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), are two
competing motions: the“Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Coverage” of Defendant,
Lloyd Gillespie and the “Partial Motion for Summary Judgment” of Plaintiff, Philadelphia
Indemnity Insurance Company. Having now exhaustively considered the Motions, all relevant
submissions and the arguments of counsel made during a lengthy Hearing on November 10, 2011,
the Court issues this admittedly abstentious Opinion and Order.
Despite the mandatory language of Rule 56(a), this Court has discretion not to enter
summary judgment when special circumstances are present and there is reason to believe that the
better course would be to proceed with a full trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986)
Even where a movant otherwise carries its burden of proof, if the trial judge
has doubts as to the wisdom of terminating a case before a full trial, he has the discretion to deny
a motion for summary judgment. Veillon v. Exploration Services, Inc., 876 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th
Cir. 1989) (applying abuse of discretion standard to district court’s decision to deny motion for
summary judgment.)
In the humble opinion of this Court, this case involves quizzical factual circumstances that
compel credibility determinations which this Court may not make at the summary judgment stage,
Dibidale of Louisiana, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“Credibility assessments are not fit grist for the summary judgment mill.”); that function is for
the Jury that both Gillespie and Philadelphia have demanded.
It is, therefore, the ORDER of this Court that both “Defendant Lloyd Gillespie’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Coverage” (Instrument no. 34) and “Plaintiff Philadelphia
Indemnity Insurance Company’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment” (Instrument no. 42) are
DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the “Motion to Strike Certain of Philadelphia Indemnity
Insurance Company’s Summary Judgment Evidence” and “Motion to Strike Philadelphia
Indemnity Insurance Company’s Sur-Reply to Defendant Lloyd Gillespie’s Motion for Summary
Judgment” (Instrument nos. 54 and 59) of Defendant, Lloyd Gillespie, and the “Motion to Strike
Defendant Lloyd Gillespie’s Motion to Strike Certain of Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence”
(Instrument no. 61) of Plaintiff, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, are DENIED as
moot.
DONE at Galveston, Texas, this
22nd
2
day of November, 2011.
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