Williams v. Texas Department Of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division

Filing 175

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 167 Plaintiffs' MOTION for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support and granting in part and denying in part 169 Defendants' MOTION for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support. Plaintiffs Jerold Williams (No. 3:11-cv-00313), Alejandro Avila (No. 3:11-cv-00316), Joshua Mazique Burton (No. 3:11-cv-00317), Xavier Cooper (No. 3:11-cv-00318), Benjamin Martin (No. 3:11-cv-00320), Benjamin Vallie, Jr. (No. 3:11-cv-00322), Billy Wayne Morgan (No. 3:11-cv-00327), Jerome Degree (No. 3:11-cv-00342), Leon Harper (No. 3:11-cv-00346), and Eliazar M. Rincon (No. 3:11-cv-00348), and defendant Santos Montez, are hereby dismissed from this action. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) Parties notified.(chorace)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
JEROLD WILLIAMS,

§
§
Plaintiff,
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VS.
§
§
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
§
JUSTICE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS §
DIVISION, et al,
§
§
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-313

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This case involves 16 consolidated civil actions against the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice – Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”) and Officers Santos Montez and
Angel Davila for alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“TRFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In 2011, the
defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims asserted in the complaint (ECF No.
20). The Court issued an opinion and order on January 24, 2012, granting the motion with
respect to any statutory claim for damages as well as the Eighth Amendment claim against
Officer Montez, but denied the motion with respect to all (remaining) claims for injunctive relief
(ECF No. 52).1
Pending before the Court are the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ cross-motions for summary
judgment which raise many of the same arguments from 2011 (ECF Nos. 167 and 169). The

1

The only claim filed against Officer Montez is the Eighth Amendment claim that the Court dismissed on summary
judgment in 2012. Officer Montez is therefore dismissed from this litigation for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
January, 2012 order.

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defendants raise additional arguments based on standing and mootness. Having reviewed the
parties’ submissions, the record and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs’ motion
and determines that the defendants’ motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Court’s January 24, 2012 decision and reprinted

here for convenience:
[O]n December 10, 2010, the Muslim plaintiffs – all of whom were imprisoned in
the TDCJ’s Terrell Unit – were participating in a religious Jumah service from
12:30 to 3:00 p.m. in the prison gymnasium when Officer Davila allegedly
interrupted the service for an unscheduled or “special” head count and strip
search.
Before the Jumah service began, Officer Davila recorded each Muslim
participant’s name, housing assignment and identification card, pursuant to
standard TDCJ practice. Later, while the service was still ongoing, Davila
allegedly entered the gym with two new employees (Song and Garcia), and
verbally disrupted the service, and instructed the Muslim participants to exit the
gymnasium to be counted and strip searched with others of the general
population. At that time, plaintiff Burton was standing near the door as the
interceder or greeter for the religious service.
III.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The plaintiffs essentially assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because they

have established a prima facie case for each of their claims.2 First, they contend that “they have
satisfied their burden to initially show” that, under RLUIPA and the TRFRA, the head count was
not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s so-called “compelling” interest in
public safety and prison security. Second, they contend that “[they] have shown that the count . .
. failed to further a legitimate governmental interest without unduly burdening [their] free
exercise rights, in violation of the First Amendment.”
2

To prevail as the movants on summary judgment, however, the plaintiffs must do more than simply establish their
prima facie case; they bear the burden of demonstrating that material issues of fact do not exist concerning every
claim for which they seek a favorable judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

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Finally, they argue that the count constitutes a violation of equal protection because it
was conducted in a manner that treated them differently from prisoners of other religious faiths.
In their cross-motion, the defendants first challenge the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. They claim that TDCJ, to the extent that it is being sued, is not a “person” as
defined by § 1983 and thus cannot be sued under that statue for First and Fourteenth Amendment
violations. They also claim that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue Officer Davila because he
lacks authority to establish or enact TDCJ policy that controls the counting of prisoners while
they participate in religious services. Without this authority, they contend, he cannot redress the
plaintiffs’ injuries. Additionally, the defendants argue that all claims brought by a plaintiff who
has either been released or transferred from TDCJ’s Terrell Unit have been mooted by that
plaintiff’s departure.
On the merits, the defendants move for judgment on the plaintiffs’ RLUIPA and TRFRA
claims because, in their view, the plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence demonstrating
that either TDCJ’s policy or Officer Davila’s application of that policy substantially burdened
their religious practice. Alternatively, they argue that they have substantiated their proffer of a
“compelling” reason for TDCJ’s head count policy—i.e., to promote public safety and ensure
prison security—and have demonstrated that the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. The defendants further contend that since this interest is a “compelling” one under
RLUIPA, it necessarily constitutes a “legitimate” governmental interest for purposes of
disproving the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. Finally, they argue that the evidence proffered
to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment fails to satisfy an essential element of an
equal protection claim: proof of differential treatment.

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IV.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
With the exception of standing and mootness, all of the arguments presently raised by the

parties were raised in 2011. At that time, the plaintiffs established that material fact issues
existed that could only be resolved at trial.

On this showing, the Court denied summary

judgment vis-à-vis claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA, the TRFRA and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

Since then, the parties had an opportunity to conduct additional

discovery, the deadline of which expired on December 15, 2012. The parties cite no new
evidence that resolves any fact issue identified by the Court in its January, 2012 decision,
however.3 Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to reconsider its original rulings.
At this stage, the only summary judgment arguments that warrant the Court’s
consideration are the defendants’ arguments based on standing and mootness. The Court will
address each issue in turn.
A. Article III Standing
The defendants contend that Officer Davila cannot be sued because he lacks the capacity
to redress the alleged injuries given his rank at TDCJ. They support this argument with an
affidavit from Deputy Director of Prison and Jail Operations Robert Eason and a citation to
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 427 (5th Cir. 2001), which states that “a state official cannot
be enjoined to act in any way that is beyond his authority to act in the first place.”
The argument arises from Article III of the Constitution. Article III limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “‘One element
of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have standing
to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd,
3

Without new summary judgment evidence, it is no doubt ironic that the plaintiffs now claim that material issues of
fact do not exist having previously argued that material fact issues existed vis-à-vis the very same claims. Similarly,
the defendants previously argued that disputed facts did not exist but now insist that fact issues do exist.

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521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). “The doctrine of standing asks ‘whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.’” Cibolo Waste, Inc. v.
City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). Every party that comes before a federal court bears the burden
of establishing the existence of an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Clapper, 133 S.
Ct. at 1147 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Cibolo Waste, 718 F.3d at 473.
The defendants urge the Court to dismiss the claims against Officer Davila based on only
one of the multiple grounds for injunctive relief requested in the complaint. According to
paragraph 7.7 of the complaint, the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief includes a request that
“the individual correctional officers are instructed as to the policy and procedure regarding
religious services.” Officer Davila is being sued for executing a TDCJ policy in a way that has
allegedly burdened the plaintiffs’ free exercise and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs have
supplied a TDCJ Security Memorandum, dated September 17, 2010, that states that officers are
required to comply with TDCJ’s existing policies and that sets forth, as part of those policies, the
inmate counting procedures. The memorandum demonstrates that Officer Davila has capacity to
apply TDCJ procedures in a way that does not run afoul of the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in the event that the plaintiffs prevail at trial. The Court therefore determines
that the plaintiffs’ claims against Officer Davila are redressable and that standing exists to sue
him.
B. Statutory Standing under § 1983

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The defendants additionally contend that standing is lacking to sue TDCJ under § 1983,
the statute through which the plaintiffs bring their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
According to paragraph 7.2 of the complaint, however, these claims “[are] not brought against
the Defendant governmental entity, TDCJ-CID but against the individual named Defendant
Angel Davila.” Because the plaintiffs have not brought constitutional claims against TDCJ, the
Court finds that the defendants’ statutory standing argument to be a moot point that requires no
further consideration.4
C. Mootness
The defendants contend that all claims brought by a plaintiff who has either been
released/paroled or transferred from TDCJ’s Terrell Unit have been rendered moot by their
departure. Moreover, they assert, there is no indication that these plaintiffs will return to the unit
or face Officer Davila’s alleged application of TDCJ’s inmate counting procedures. Absent a
showing that an inmate’s parole status brings his claim under the “narrow ‘capable of repetition,
yet evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine,” an inmate’s parole from an offending
institution “render[s] . . . claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot.” Herman v. Holiday,
238 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2001); McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999).
Unless there is a “concrete indication” that parole will be revoked or the inmate will be subjected
once again to the conditions of confinement, the claim does not fall within the “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. See Hunter v. Owens, 460
Fed. Appx. 421 (5th. Cir. 2012). Here, the paroled or transferred plaintiffs have not rebutted the
defendants’ documentary evidence of release or transfer with evidence showing that their claims
4

To the extent that the plaintiffs now claim that TDCJ, as a governmental entity, took part in violating their rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the assertion will not be considered because it does not appear in the
(pro se) complaint even under the most liberal reading of it. Cf. Sama v. Hannigan, 669 F.3d 585, 599 (5th. Cir.
2012) (“[A]llegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”).

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survive their departure from the Terrell Unit. Because these plaintiffs have not met their burden,
the Court determines that their claims have been mooted.
V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 167) is DENIED and

the defendants’ motion (ECF No. 169) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs
Jerold Williams (No. 3:11-cv-00313), Alejandro Avila (No. 3:11-cv-00316), Joshua Mazique
Burton (No. 3:11-cv-00317), Xavier Cooper (No. 3:11-cv-00318), Benjamin Martin (No. 3:11cv-00320), Benjamin Vallie, Jr. (No. 3:11-cv-00322), Billy Wayne Morgan (No. 3:11-cv-00327),
Jerome Degree (No. 3:11-cv-00342), Leon Harper (No. 3:11-cv-00346), and Eliazar M. Rincon
(No. 3:11-cv-00348), and defendant Santos Montez, are hereby dismissed from this action.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on this 22nd day of April, 2015.

___________________________________
Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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