VALENTINE v. Chase Home Finance LLC

Filing 33

ORDER denying 32 Motion for Reconsideration.(Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) Parties notified.(ccarnew, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
DAWNA VALENTINE
V.
CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC

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CIVIL ACTION NO. G-11-402

OPINION AND ORDER
On February 10, 2012, Plaintiff, Dawna Valentine, still acting pro se, filed a “Request for
Reversal of Dismissal on this Case” which the Court will treat as a Motion, under Rule 60(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for relief from the Final Judgment entered in this cause in
favor of Defendant, Chase Home Finance, LLC, on January 31, 2012. In her request, Valentine
states, “Based upon the 6th Amendment Rights, I am entitled to be represented by legal counsel.
Therefore, this case cannot be finalized without the opportunity to have competent legal
representation” which “I am requesting this Court to assist me in obtaining.” Valentine also seeks
to have the Bill of Costs, approved by the Clerk on February 2, 2012, vacated. Valentine requests
will be denied.
This Court assumes that Valentine is, at this late date, requesting the appointment of counsel,
but the appointment of counsel in a civil case is a privilege and not a constitutional right. It should
be allowed in civil actions only in exceptional cases. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982)
This case does not present exceptional circumstances. Cf. Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th
Cir. 1982)

The gravamen of Valentine’s numerous claims was her belief that receipt of a Quit

Claim Deed from the owner of mortgaged property that was in default at the time and which she then
possessed as her home, terminated the Defendant mortgagee’s right to foreclose its lien on the

property pursuant to the Deed of Trust. As the Magistrate Judge pointed out in his Report and
Recommendation that Valentine’s request for preliminary injunction be denied, Valentine’s legal
hypothesis was erroneous; consequently, there can be no showing in this case that the appointment
of counsel is necessary to present meritorious issues to the Court. See Knighton v. Watkins, 616
F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1980)

Accordingly, the absence of counsel to represent Valentine in this

case was no impediment to this Court’s entry of Final Judgment and the Clerk’s subsequent approval
of the Bill of Costs.
It is, therefore, the ORDER of this Court that Plaintiff Dawna Valentine’s “Request for
Reversal of Dismissal on this Case” (Instrument no. 32), now construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) Motion,
is DENIED.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this

27th

day of February, 2012.

Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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