Smith v. Tetra Applied Technologies, LLC et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 22 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Gregg Costa) Parties notified.(ccarnew, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
GLYNN SMITH,
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Plaintiff,
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VS.
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TETRA APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES, §
LLC, et al,
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Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-11-487
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment raises the issue of
whether that mainstay of elementary school math—rounding—applies in
determining seaman status under the Jones Act. Having considered the briefing
and applicable law, the Court holds summary judgment is inappropriate because a
reasonable factfinder could round up to the nearest whole number the percentage
of time Smith spent working on a vessel and conclude that Smith is a seaman. The
motion is therefore DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Smith worked for Defendants as a Plug and Abandonment pump operator
from April 25, 2011 until October 6, 2011. A P&A operator works on fixed
offshore platforms and generally is not considered a Jones Act seaman. Smith
spent his first 15 days of employment in training. He then worked on two different
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offshore platforms for a total of 24 days. After being off work for approximately
one month due to a shortage of work for pump operators, Defendants reassigned
Smith to Rig 8, an inland barge rig, as a floorhand, doing work traditionally
associated with a Jones Act seaman. See Docket Entry No. 26-2 at 25:10–21. The
parties dispute whether Smith’s assignment to Rig 8 was temporary or permanent.
Smith worked on Rig 8 for a total of 14 days before being injured after a slip and
fall on the deck.
Smith brought suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, or, in the
alternative, the Longshore and Harborworker’s Compensations Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901–50 (LHWCA). These two compensation regimes are mutually exclusive.
Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 553 (1997) (citation omitted). If
Smith can show he was a seaman at the time he was injured, then the Jones Act
applies. See Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Jones Act claim,
contending that Smith does not qualify as a seaman.
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Summary Judgment
When a party moves for summary judgment, the reviewing court shall grant
the motion “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts on questions
of fact must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See
Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
B.
Jones Act Seaman Status
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining seaman
status. First, the “employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel
or to the accomplishment of its mission.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347,
368 (1995) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Second, “a seaman must
have a connection to a vessel in navigation . . . that is substantial in terms of both
its duration and its nature.” Id. Only the second requirement is contested here.
“The duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel and the nature of the
worker’s activities, taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a
seaman . . . .” Id. at 370. In terms of duration, the Fifth Circuit has established a
general rule that a worker who spends “less than about 30% of his time” in service
of a vessel cannot be a seaman. Nunez v. B&B Dredging, Inc., 288 F.3d 271, 276
(5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
The inquiry regarding the nature of an
employee’s connection to a vessel “must concentrate on whether the employee’s
duties take him to sea.” Papai, 520 U.S. at 555. The duration and nature inquiries
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are distinct but not unrelated, and the Supreme Court has recognized that an
employee injured shortly after being reassigned permanently to a vessel following
years of work on land should not be denied seaman status, just as an employee
working for years on a vessel and then permanently reassigned to a desk job should
not be considered a seaman. See Chartis, 515 U.S. at 372 (“When a maritime
worker’s basic assignment changes, his seaman status may change as well.”
(citations omitted)).
The question whether a maritime employee qualifies as a Jones Act seaman
is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 369. “[I]f reasonable persons, applying
the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether as to whether the employee
was a ‘member of the crew,’ it is a question for the jury.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, to prevail on their motion, Defendants must show that no reasonable
factfinder could conclude that Smith was a Jones Act seaman at the time of his
injury.
III.
ANALYSIS
Smith has shown that his connection to a vessel could be considered
sufficiently substantial to meet the seaman standard. The parties agree that the
particular offshore platforms on which Smith first worked are not vessels, but that
the Rig 8 barge on which he later worked is a vessel. Defendants thus argue out
that of the 53 total days Smith actually worked, he spent only the last 14, when he
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was assigned to Rig 8, on a vessel. This means Smith spent 26.4% of his actual
days worked on a vessel. But Smith argues that the Court should calculate his time
based on hours worked, rather than days. Under this undisputed calculation, Smith
spent 172 hours out of 577 hours, or 29.8%, on a vessel. Defendants argue that the
day calculation should control, and that even under the hour calculation, 29.8% is
below the 30% threshold.
The Court finds a reasonable factfinder could conclude that actual hours
worked, rather than days, is the appropriate measure of time because it more
accurately reflects Smith’s division of work between his land-based duties as a
pump operator and floorhand duties on a vessel. See Mudrick v. Cross Equip. Ltd.,
250 F. App’x 54, 59 (5th Cir. 2007) (indicating that the defendant used number of
hours in calculating percent of time performing maritime work in determining
decedent’s Jones Act seaman status); cf. Coastal Prod. Servs. Inc. v. Hudson, 555
F.3d 426, 440–41 & n.60 (5th Cir. 2009) (approving administrative law judge’s use
of hours worked to determine maritime employment status under LHWCA).
That leaves the question whether 29.8% is a sufficient percentage of work on
a vessel to allow a factfinder to conclude that Smith was a seaman when the injury
occurred. The Court concludes that it is permissible for a factfinder to make third
grade math useful and round 29.8% to 30%. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that
the 30% threshold is an approximation. See Nunez, 288 F.3d at 276 (“[A] worker
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who spends less than about 30% of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation
should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.” (emphasis added) (quoting
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371)). The Supreme Court has also recognized that the 30%
test “serves as no more than a guideline . . . and departure from it will certainly be
justified in appropriate cases.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371. Smith has established
that the work he performed on Rig 8 could be considered substantial enough in
duration to make him a seaman under the proper legal standard.1
IV.
CONCLUSION
Because a reasonable factfinder could differ as to whether Smith was a Jones
Act seaman, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry
No. 22) is DENIED.
SIGNED this 20th day of November, 2012.
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Gregg Costa
United States District Judge
1
Summary judgment is also precluded because the evidence conflicts concerning whether
Smith’s assignment to Rig 8 was temporary or permanent. Defendants argue that it was a
temporary assignment, due to lack of pump operator work, and that they intended for Smith to
return to that work when it became available. Smith stated in deposition, however, that
“[Defendants] told me they wanted to keep me [on Rig 8],” despite Smith’s desire to return to his
earlier duties. Docket Entry No. 26-1 at 112:19–113:2. This conflicting evidence, reviewed at
the summary judgment stage in the light most favorable to Smith, is sufficient to raise a fact
issue concerning whether Smith had been reassigned to a new position, in which case he was
unquestionably a seamen. See Chandris, 515 U.S. at 372.
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