Washington v. La Marque Independent School District et al
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER terminating 11 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Brief in Support, Denying in Part and Granting in Part 29 Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment, Granting 10 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, Denying 26 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant La Marque ISD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Signed by Judge Gregg Costa) Parties notified.(ccarnew, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
RUSSEL WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ECOMET BURLEY, et al,
Defendants.
RUSSEL WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
LA MARQUE ISD,
Defendant.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-12-154
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-12-41
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Terminations of public employees often result in litigation. So do
unsuccessful prosecutions.
This case involves both situations: Plaintiff
Russel Washington, the former Chief of Police of La Marque Independent
School District (“LMISD”), was fired after he was indicted on charges that
were later dismissed. The result is this consolidated lawsuit alleging an
assortment of claims under the federal constitution, Texas common law, and
Texas statutory law.
Washington brings the claims against the school
1
district, school district officials, and the former Galveston County District
Attorney involved in his prosecution.
A number of dispositive motions are pending.
Former District
Attorney Kurt Sistrunk seeks dismissal from the case on immunity grounds.
Washington and LMISD have both filed summary judgment motions
seeking judgment as a matter of law on the procedural due process claim
relating to the adequacy of the hearings that led to Washington’s
termination. LMISD also seeks summary judgment on Washington’s Texas
Open Meetings Act claim.
After reviewing the briefing, the pleadings and summary judgment
evidence, and the controlling law, the Court makes the following
determinations.
Former District Attorney Kurt Sistrunk is entitled to
absolute immunity.
With respect to the procedural due process claim
focused on the constitutionally required pretermination hearing, fact issues
exist concerning whether the district afforded Washington an opportunity to
be heard prior to his termination and whether the school board member who
voted on his termination was biased.
LMISD is entitled to summary
judgment, however, on the due process claim related to Washington’s posttermination hearing and on the Texas Open Meetings Act claim.
2
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Conflict Between Washington and LMISD Officials
Washington joined LMISD’s police force in 1992 and became Chief
in 1995, a position he held until his termination in March 2010.1 According
to Washington, all went well until Defendant Ecomet Burley became
Superintendent of LMISD in December 2006.
Washington alleges that
Burley soon developed a “personal vendetta” against him and began looking
for an excuse to have the Board terminate him. Docket Entry No. 3 at 8 n.4.
Washington’s evidence shows that he and Burley clashed over a number of
incidents between December 2006 and March 2010. These incidents ranged
from minor quarrels, such as a disagreement over whether Washington had
to wear his uniform on duty, to serious disputes, such as an incident
regarding an audio recording of Washington accusing several Board
members of accepting kickbacks from a contractor.
Three of the incidents are particularly relevant to the motions
addressed in this Order. The first occurred in late 2007. That September,
Washington forcibly restrained a student during an altercation at La Marque
1
Because this section recounts facts relevant to both the motion to dismiss and the
motions for summary judgment, the Court treats differently the facts that are based on
Washington’s allegations from those that are based on the summary judgment evidence.
Generally, facts relevant to Sistrunk’s Rule 12 motion are based on Washington’s
allegations, taken as true for purposes of ruling on the motion. Facts relevant to the
motions for summary judgment are based on the summary judgment evidence evaluated
under the Rule 56 standard.
3
High School. Docket Entry Nos. 3 at 13 n.16; 3-26 at 2–3. LMISD put
Washington on paid administrative leave, and Washington was referred for
criminal prosecution to Defendant Sistrunk, at that time the Galveston
County District Attorney. Docket Entry No. 3-26 at 2, 4. Washington
alleges that Burley personally referred him for prosecution. See Docket
Entry No. 3 at 13 n.16.
The District Attorney’s Office subsequently
conducted an investigation and, in October 2007, presented criminal charges
to a grand jury, which declined to indict Washington. Docket Entry No. 326 at 2. Washington then returned to his duties.
The second incident occurred in mid-2008.
That April, Byron
Williams, a former LMISD janitor who had been terminated and convicted
of disorderly conduct after threatening the previous LMISD Superintendent,
gave the Galveston Daily News an audio tape of a conversation with
Washington that Williams had recorded in 2007. See Docket Entry No. 3-18
at 12, 16. On the tape, Washington apparently stated his belief that certain
members of the Board, including Defendant Cynthia Bell-Malveaux, had
received kickbacks from a private contractor affiliated with a 2002
construction bond referendum. See id. at 12–16.
In response to the ensuing public controversy, LMISD placed
Washington on paid administrative leave in May 2008, and the Board
4
discussed the issue at a closed meeting. Subsequently, in July 2008, Burley
presented the Board with a formal recommendation to terminate
Washington’s employment. However, “rather than fire Washington, the
board of trustees voted to grant him a termination hearing on Aug. 6, during
which he and school administrators [could] each present evidence. Board
President [Defendant] Joe Cantu said the board wanted to afford Washington
every opportunity for due process.” Docket Entry No. 3-18 at 12. After a
two-day meeting, the Board voted to reject Burley’s recommendation, and
Washington returned to work. Docket Entry No. 3-26 at 4.
The final incident, which ultimately led to Washington’s termination,
occurred in late 2009. In early September of that year, the Galveston County
District Attorney’s Office began investigating Washington for allegedly
providing false information on an application for a mechanic’s lien on a
vehicle. According to Washington, Burley himself reported the alleged
crime to the District Attorney’s Office. See Docket Entry No. 3-12 at 2.
B. Washington Is Placed on Paid Leave
On September 14, Defendant Rollie Ford, LMISD’s Assistant
Superintendent, sent Washington a letter placing him on paid administrative
leave. The letter stated that Washington could “contact either Rollie Ford or
Ecomet Burley if [he had] questions or concerns during this administrative
5
leave.”
Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 9.
On September 29, Ford sent
Washington another letter, this one stating, “Please respond to this letter
with a written statement outlining your understanding of the allegations that
have been made against you, along with your signature. I will need your
written statement by October 4, 2009. Should you have any questions,
please do not hesitate to contact me.” Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 12. On
October 9, after Washington failed to respond, Ford wrote again, stating “I
briefly spoke to you about this letter and the requirement . . . last Friday,
October 2, 2009. . . . Mr. Washington, again I am directing you to state in
your words what you know and understand to be the facts concerning the
allegations and ongoing investigation that led to your placement on
administrative leave.”
Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 14.
On October 13,
Washington responded through his attorney in a letter stating “[n]either Mr.
Washington nor I have any specific knowledge of allegations being made
against Mr. Washington at this time. Generally speaking, we have learned
that the Galveston County Sheriff’s Department is investigating an auto title
incident in which Mr. Washington may or may not be implicated therein.
Mr. Washington categorically denies any involvement in any criminal
activity whatsoever.” Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 16.
6
C. Washington Is Indicted
The District Attorney’s Office, allegedly through Sistrunk himself,
presented evidence to a grand jury in December 2009, which returned an
indictment against Washington for the felony of providing false information
to obtain a vehicle title. This event was widely reported in the local media.
D. The Pretermination Hearing
On February 19, 2010, Ford wrote to Washington “as a professional
courtesy to notify you that at the Board meeting on March 11, 2010, I will be
recommending to the Board of Trustees that your employment contract be
terminated due to your Indictment on criminal charges.” Docket Entry No.
29-3 at 26. The letter, which was signed by Ford alone, went on to state that
“[i]f you want to know what your options are before this recommendation is
officially made to the Board, please discuss those options with your legal
representative. You may also schedule a meeting with Rollie Ford, if you
would prefer. You may bring your representative to that meeting if you
choose to do so.” Id. Ultimately, the recommendation to terminate was
postponed for a Board meeting later in March.
On March 22, 2010, the Board publicly posted a notice and agenda for
a meeting to be held on March 25, 2010. That agenda included a line item
that read “Consider recommendation to propose the termination of the
7
contract and employment of the LMISD Chief of Police.” Docket Entry No.
29-3 at 30. Washington admits that he received notice of the March 25
meeting on March 22, although the record is unclear whether he was
personally informed by someone at LMISD or if he merely saw the public
agenda.
The Board met as scheduled on March 25, 2010 to consider Burley’s
recommendation to terminate Washington’s employment.
Although the
March 25 meeting was open to the public at Washington’s request, no one
except Burley, Ford, and the Board members was allowed to speak or give
input. See Docket Entry No. 31-9 at 6. Burley and Ford presented the
recommendation, and, after some discussion, the Board voted 4–3 in favor
of
accepting
the
recommendation
and
terminating
Washington’s
employment.
E. The Post-termination Hearing
On March 30, 2010, Ford wrote Washington to inform him that he
was “entitled to request a hearing before the Board of Trustees.” Docket
Entry No. 29-3 at 32. Washington promptly requested a hearing, which was
held on April 22, 2010. The relevant agenda line item for the meeting read
“Termination hearing of La Marque ISD Chief of Police.” Docket Entry No.
29-3 at 36. Although one of the Trustees moved to overturn Washington’s
8
termination and reinstate him, that motion failed 3–4, with the voting
breakdown identical to that of the March 25 vote. Washington did not
appeal that decision to the Texas Education Agency’s Commissioner of
Education or to state district court, as he could have done under Texas law.
F. The Indictment Is Dismissed
Although Washington remained under indictment throughout 2010,
the criminal case languished. In February 2011, after Sistrunk had lost his
bid for reelection and a new District Attorney had been sworn in, the District
Attorney’s Office moved for and obtained a dismissal of all charges against
Washington.
G. Washington’s Lawsuits
In February 2012, Washington filed two lawsuits to challenge his
termination, one in state court, and one in this Court. Over the next several
months, Washington filed a number of amended pleadings and Defendants
removed the state court action to this Court, which ultimately consolidated it
with the original federal action. See Washington v. Burley, No. 3-12-154,
2012 WL 5289682, at *1–2, 6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012). Washington’s two
suits have since proceeded in this single, consolidated case.
In his live pleadings, Washington sues LMISD for violating his right
to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and for
9
violating the Texas Open Meetings Act by failing to provide adequate notice
that the Board would consider terminating his employment at the March 25
meeting. He also brings various tort claims against Burley; Ford; LMISD’s
new Chief of Police Timothy Fields; Trustees Bell-Malveaux, Holcomb,
Cantu, and Rac; and former District Attorney Sistrunk.
See generally
Docket Entry No. 3; No. 3:12-cv-41, Docket Entry No. 6. Generally, he
alleges that Burley conspired with Sistrunk and the other Defendants to have
him indicted on false charges as an excuse to have him terminated.
Sistrunk has since moved to dismiss on the ground that he has
absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit. Washington and LMISD have
filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Washington’s procedural due
process claim, and LMISD has moved for summary judgment on
Washington’s Texas Open Meetings Act claim.
II.
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
A.
Standard of Review
The Court first addresses Defendant Sistrunk’s Rule 12 motion to
dismiss. The former District Attorney argues that he is entitled to absolute
immunity because Washington’s claims against him are based on the actions
he took in his role as a prosecutor. Washington only brings state law claims
against Sistrunk, but since the law of prosecutorial immunity in Texas
10
follows federal jurisprudence, see Charleston v. Allen, -- S.W.3d --, 2012
WL 4858195, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 15, 2012, no pet. h.);
Font v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 873, 877–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.), the Court applies federal case law to resolve the
issue.
Courts analyze prosecutors’ claims to immunity using the “functional
approach” set forth in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (citations omitted). This approach entitles
prosecutors to absolute immunity for actions taken in “‘initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,’ . . . insofar as that conduct is
‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Id.
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31). Thus, a prosecutor acting as an
advocate in the judicial process is entitled to absolute immunity, even if, for
example, he knowingly presents false evidence to a court or grand jury. See
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–30 (1997). But prosecutors receive
only qualified immunity for “those investigatory functions that do not relate
to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial
proceedings.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (citation
omitted). Thus, a prosecutor is not fully immunized for any role he may
have played in conspiring to create false evidence because “[w]hen a
11
prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a
detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the
same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” Id. at 272–73
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.
Discussion
The crux of Washington’s claims against Sistrunk is that “Sistrunk
knowingly filed baseless indictments against the Plaintiff after discussions
with Defendants Burley and Malveaux knowing full well that the baseless
indictments would lead to the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with
LMISD for proper cause.” Docket Entry No. 3 at 18–19. Unfortunately for
Washington, Imbler gives Sistrunk absolute immunity for his conduct before
the grand jury. See Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 248 (5th
Cir. 1985) (“[P]resentation of evidence to a grand jury in a manner
calculated to obtain an indictment, even when maliciously, wantonly or
negligently accomplished, is immunized by Imbler.”); see also Moore v.
United States, 213 F.3d 705, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing case law
holding that absolute immunity defeats claims of “concealing exculpatory
evidence from the grand jury” and “manipulating evidence before the grand
jury to create a false impression” (quoting Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189,
194 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). He engaged in
12
that conduct in his role as an advocate, and it falls squarely within the realm
of conduct intimately associated with the judicial process. Sistrunk is thus
entitled to absolute immunity for filing charges against Washington even if,
as Washington alleges and the Court must assume to be true for purposes of
a Rule 12 motion, he acted maliciously and knew that the charges were
baseless.
Perhaps realizing this flaw in his claim, Washington argues for the
first time in his response to the motion to dismiss that Sistrunk had been
involved “in a conspiracy going back to 2007 to manufacture evidence with
the other Defendants.” Docket Entry No. 16 at 4. Prosecutors are not
entitled to absolute immunity for their role in creating evidence, as opposed
to presenting it to a grand jury or court, as the former is an investigative
function. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–76.
However, Washington’s factual allegations, taken as true, show only
that Sistrunk knowingly presented baseless indictments to the grand jury.
The only alleged facts in the complaint regarding Sistrunk appear in two
lengthy footnotes. In those footnotes, Washington alleges that (1) Burley
contacted Sistrunk in October 2007 “about an incident where Plaintiff had to
forcibly restrain a student” and that a grand jury ultimately declined to indict
Washington for that incident; (2) that afterward Washington saw an e-mail
13
from Sistrunk to Burley in which Sistrunk said something to the effect of
“not to worry, we will get him next time”; (3) that in September 2009
“Burley and Sistrunk again manufactured bogus charges” alleging auto theft
and that “Burley and Sistrunk had charges levied that Plaintiff was involved
in, and the master-mind of, an ‘auto theft ring’”; (4) acting on complaints
filed by Burley and Ford, “Sistrunk presented the evidence himself to a
grand jury and got his indictment”; and (5) that Burley and Sistrunk “struck
a bargain” in which Sistrunk would prosecute Washington and in return
Burley would help “deliver” “the black votes” in La Marque and Texas City
for Sistrunk’s reelection campaign. Docket Entry No. 3 at 13–14 nn.16–17.
Of these alleged facts, the first, third, and fourth deal directly with
Sistrunk’s advocacy role in presenting evidence and proposing indictments
to the grand jury. These do not support a claim that Sistrunk was engaged in
the unprotected investigatory function of manufacturing evidence.
The
alleged e-mail from Sistrunk in which he supposedly wrote something to the
effect of “we will get [Washington] next time” might show that Sistrunk had
an improper desire or motive to prosecute Washington; it does not, however,
constitute an allegation that Sistrunk participated in a conspiracy to
manufacture evidence. And the same is true of Washington’s allegations
that Sistrunk agreed to prosecute him as part of a scheme to win reelection.
14
Washington may have adequately alleged that Sistrunk knowingly and
wrongfully presented baseless indictments to the grand jury. But that is the
type of activity that is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See
Torres v. City of Houston, No. H-12-2323, 2012 WL 6554157, at *1–2 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 14, 2012) (immunizing a prosecutor for allegedly failing to
present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury); George v. Harris County., No.
H-10-3235, 2012 WL 2744332, at *15 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2012) (immunizing
a prosecutor for allegedly seeking an indictment for aggravated sexual
assault “despite extensive evidence of . . . innocence”). Washington has not
made any specific allegations showing that Sistrunk was involved in a
conspiracy to manufacture false evidence or in any other investigatory
activity that fell outside Sistrunk’s role as an advocate in the judicial
process. Thus, Sistrunk is entitled to absolute immunity, and Washington’s
claims against him must be dismissed.
III.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A.
Washington’s Due Process Claims
The Court next addresses Washington’s and LMISD’s motions for
summary judgment on the procedural due process claims.
Washington
alleges that LMISD violated his right to procedural due process in three
primary ways. He argues first that LMISD denied him pretermination due
15
process when it failed to notify him of his potential termination or give him
an opportunity to present a defense to Burley’s recommendation that he be
terminated prior to the Board’s vote to terminate on March 25, 2010.
Second, he contends that Defendant Bell-Malveaux’s bias tainted the
Board’s vote to terminate. Third, he contends that the bias of the trustees
also tainted the Board’s April 22 post-termination hearing vote not to
reinstate him. 2
Although Washington has only moved for summary judgment on his
first due process claim, that he was denied pretermination notice and an
opportunity to be heard, LMISD has moved for summary judgment on all of
Washington’s claims. The Court thus examines each issue in turn, mindful
that it should grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All reasonable doubts
on questions of fact must be resolved in favor of the party opposing
2
Washington raises two additional due process claims. First, he argues that LMISD
violated an internal district policy requiring that Washington receive pretermination
notice and a hearing. But whether Washington was entitled to such a notice and hearing
under state law or district policy is irrelevant to whether he received due process under
the federal constitution. See Brown v. Tex. A&M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir.
1986) (citing Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1230 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Second, he argues that Burley engaged in improper ex parte communications with the
Board before the March 25 vote. However, Washington presents no evidence to
substantiate this allegation. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of
LMISD on these two claims.
16
summary judgment. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348 (5th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
B.
Claims Relating to Pre-Termination Hearing
1.
The General Loudermill Requirement
LMISD does not dispute that Washington, whom it employed
pursuant to a two-year contract, had a constitutionally protected property
right to continued employment that it could not deprive him of without due
process. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538
(1985) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972)).
Generally, the level of due process that is required in a given situation is
determined by balancing three factors: “First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
In the specific context of the termination of a tenured employee, the
Supreme Court has ruled that due process ordinarily requires the employer to
give the employee “some kind of a hearing” prior to termination, namely,
17
“oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.”
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542–546 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
LMISD argues, however, that a Loudermill pretermination hearing
was not required because the felony charge against Washington, a law
enforcement officer occupying a position of trust and leadership, required an
immediate response and LMISD promptly afforded Washington an adequate
post-termination hearing. LMISD primarily relies on Gilbert v. Homar, 520
U.S. 924 (1997), which held that “where a State must act quickly, or where
it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation
process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 930.
But Gilbert addressed whether tenured employees were entitled to a
Loudermill hearing before being suspended and distinguished its plaintiff
who “faced only a temporary suspension without pay” from the “employee
in Loudermill, who faced termination.” Id. at 932 (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
The Gilbert court reasoned that the state had a
“significant interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are
filed against them, employees who occupy positions of great public trust and
high public visibility, such as police officers.” Id. at 932.
18
LMISD misinterprets Gilbert to mean that the pretermination hearing
Loudermill normally requires need not occur when an employee in a position
of public trust is indicted on a felony charge, so long as that employee
receives a post-termination hearing. But Gilbert is based on the balancing of
Mathews interests when deciding to suspend an employee, at which time the
need for speedy removal of a potentially dangerous employee from the
workforce is paramount. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315,
324–25 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Gilbert to uphold the suspension of a
dentist working with disabled patients); Patel v. Midland Mem. Hosp., 298
F.3d 333, 339–41 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Gilbert to uphold the suspension
of a cardiologist’s medical privileges); Payne v. Park, No. 3:11-CV-0497-B,
2012 WL 2958624, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2012) (applying Gilbert to
uphold the suspension of a private security guard’s license after the guard
had been charged with a misdemeanor). Once the suspension takes place,
the risk posed by the employee is temporarily removed, the need for further
immediate action dissipates, and the employer has time to provide the
Loudermill pretermination hearing, which need not be lengthy. Cf. Núñez
Colon v. Toledo-Dávila, 648 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting the
importance of the fact that the plaintiff in Gilbert had been suspended and
not terminated); Argyropoulous v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 740–41 (7th
19
Cir. 2008) (noting in dicta that Gilbert “does not displace the nearcategorical guarantee of at least some pre-termination process to tenured
public employees as discussed in [Loudermill]” (emphasis in original));
Kermode v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., No. 3:09CV584-DPJ-FKB, 2011 WL
4351340, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011) (citing Gilbert in noting that
“[s]eparation with pay is not the same as termination”).
Washington’s case underscores this difference.
He has never
contended that he was entitled to a hearing before he was suspended with
pay in September 2009. He argues only that LMISD never afforded him due
process before terminating him in March 2010. The decision to terminate
Washington did not implicate the need for speedy resolution that may apply
to suspensions under Gilbert because the Board waited three months after
the indictment issued to terminate Washington and then postponed the
earlier March hearing date.
Gilbert did not relieve LMISD of its
constitutional obligation to provide Washington with “some kind of a
hearing” prior to his termination. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542
LMISD, however, cites an additional reason why it contends that
Washington cannot challenge the inadequacy of the pretermination process
in federal court: state law provided Washington with the right to appeal the
termination decision to both the State Commissioner of Education and a
20
state district court. See Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836, 839–40 (5th Cir.
1989) (“[N]o denial of procedural due process occurs where a person has
failed to utilize the state procedures available to him.”). But LMISD again
misses the mark and tries to plug a doctrine into a hole it does not fit.
The line of cases LMISD cites is based on the common sense
principle that a plaintiff “cannot skip an available state remedy and then
argue that the deprivation by the state was the inadequacy or lack of the
skipped remedy.” Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d at 840 (quoting Myrick v.
City of Dallas, 810 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1987)). Thus, a plaintiff
obviously cannot bring a Loudermill due process claim when the state
afforded him a constitutionally sufficient pretermination hearing yet he
declined to participate in it. See Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154,
1158 (5th Cir. 1989). Likewise, a plaintiff cannot challenge the procedures
at a post-termination hearing when the state provided ample procedures in
another post-termination setting, such as an administrative or judicial appeal.
See Myrick, 810 F.2d at 1388; Pope v. Miss. Real Estate Comm’n, 872 F.2d
127, 131–32 (5th Cir. 1989). But in arguing that the availability of a posttermination appeal prevents Washington from challenging the adequacy of
pretermination procedures, LMISD mixes the two separate stages at which
the state must generally provide due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
21
546–47 & n.12 (noting that a plaintiff’s challenges to both pre and posttermination denials of due process were distinct from one another and
“separate claim[s] altogether”).
The first Fifth Circuit case applying this doctrine demonstrates that
the availability of a post-termination appeal does not foreclose a due process
challenge to pretermination procedures. See Myrick, 810 F.2d at 1386–88.
In Myrick, the plaintiff, like Washington, challenged the adequacy of her
employer’s pretermination procedures and the alleged bias of the posttermination hearing board even though she failed to appeal the board’s
adverse post-termination decision. See id. But, unlike Washington, Myrick
also challenged the adequacy of the post-termination procedures themselves.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit held that Myrick’s failure to appeal barred this
challenge to the post-termination procedures, id. at 1388, but did not find
barred the challenges to the pretermination procedures or the board’s bias,
both of which it addressed on their merits. Id. at 1386–88. LMISD’s
broader reading of Myrick to bar challenges to both pre and post-termination
procedures when appeals are allowed would eviscerate Loudermill, which
holds that a pretermination opportunity for the employee to present his side
of the story is required even when the state affords the employee full post-
22
termination administrative and judicial review. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
545–46.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected LMISD’s argument
that the availability of post-termination appeals bars a due process challenge
to pretermination procedures:
Because a tenured public employee is entitled to some
predeprivation process, the existence of an adequate
postdeprivation remedy cannot by itself defeat that employee’s
procedural due process claim. . . .
...
[Plaintiff’s] failure to exhaust his postdeprivation state remedies
does not foreclose his claim of lack of predeprivation process.
A dismissed employee cannot dispute the adequacy of
postdeprivation remedies if he fails to utilize them. [Plaintiff’s]
procedural due process claim, however, is based on lack of
predeprivation process. His failure to exhaust his
postdeprivation remedies does not affect his entitlement to
predeprivation process.
Chiles v. Morgan, 53 F.3d 1281, 1995 WL 295931, at *1–2 (5th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam, unpublished opinion) (citing Rathjen, 878 F.2d at 839–40;
Myrick, 810 F.2d at 1388); see also Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 936 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is not necessary for a litigant
to have exhausted available postdeprivation remedies when the litigant
contends that he was entitled to predeprivation process.” (emphasis in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Chiles is binding
23
precedent and thus controls this Court’s decision. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3
(unpublished opinions issued before January 1996 have precedential force).
The availability of post-termination appeals does not preclude Washington’s
claims that he did not receive pretermination due process.
2.
Whether
LMISD
Afforded
Washington
Pretermination Opportunity to Be Heard
a
With these defenses out of the way, the question becomes whether the
process LMISD afforded Washington prior to his March 25 termination
complied with the Due Process Clause. Washington was entitled to “oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 542, 546 (citation omitted).
Washington argues both that he did not receive sufficient notice of the
charges and evidence against him and that he did not have an opportunity to
present his side of the story. While conceding that Washington was not
allowed to address the Board at the March 25 meeting, LMISD argues that it
gave Washington adequate pretermination due process by (1) asking for his
written response to the District Attorney’s investigation in September and
October 2009; (2) informing him in February 2010 that the Board would be
hearing Burley’s recommendation to terminate due to Washington’s
24
indictment; and (3) being willing to accept any statement or argument that
Washington submitted in writing prior to the March 25 vote.
As an initial matter, Washington received adequate notice of the
charges against him. “Due process requires only notice that is both adequate
to apprise a party of the pendency of an action affecting its rights and timely
enough to allow the party to present its objections.” Burns v. Harris Cnty.
Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 521 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Through Assistant Superintendent Ford’s
February 19, 2010 letter, LMISD gave Washington notice that the Board
was planning on voting on the recommendation to terminate on March 11,
and that the recommendation was based on the fact that Washington had
been indicted. See Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 26; cf. Biliski v. Red Clay
Consol. Sch. Dist., 574 F.3d 214, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding notice
sufficient where the plaintiff’s supervisors explained to him why they were
recommending his termination and gave him a letter stating that they would
submit the recommendation to the school board, the final decisionmaker).
While it is true that the vote was delayed two weeks, Washington admits that
he received notice of the impending March 25 hearing on March 22. Docket
Entry No. 32 at 20. Washington received constitutionally adequate notice of
25
the termination vote and the underlying basis of Burley’s recommendation to
terminate.
The tougher question is whether Washington received an adequate
opportunity to present his side of the story. In Loudermill, the Supreme
Court made clear that “the pretermination ‘hearing,’ though necessary, need
not be elaborate.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. The Court noted that
“something less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse
administrative action” and concluded that the “opportunity to present
reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Id. at 545–46 (citation and
internal quotiation marks omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has further explored the question of what constitutes
an adequate pretermination opportunity to be heard. In Coggin v. Longview
Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the Circuit
clarified that it is the “final decision maker” who “must hear and consider
the employee’s story before deciding whether to discharge the employee.”
Id. at 465 (citation omitted). So long as the employee has the right to
respond to the charges before the final decisionmaker, the hearing need not
be elaborate. In Myrick, the Dallas Fire Department terminated Myrick
because of the manner in which she responded to a phone call for emergency
26
medical assistance. Myrick, 810 F.2d at 1384. Before terminating her, the
Fire Department invited Myrick to submit a written response and allowed
her to discuss the incident informally with the Fire Department’s chief, the
final decisionmaker. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that she had received all the
pretermination process Loudermill required. Id. at 1386; see also Browning
v. City of Odessa, 990 F.2d 842, 844–45 (5th Cir. 1993) (informal
pretermination half-hour meeting between the employee and the final
decisionmaker sufficient to satisfy due process).
Thus, Washington’s right to pretermination due process would have
been satisfied had LMISD provided him with even a short, informal
opportunity to present his side of the story to the board members who would
vote on his termination. However, the summary judgment record does not
make clear that Washington had that opportunity. Therefore, neither party is
entitled to summary judgment on the claim that the pretermination hearing
failed to provide procedural due process.
A reasonable jury could conclude that LMISD gave Washington an
opportunity to respond by submitting a written statement to LMISD or the
Board prior to the March 25 meeting. Ford’s October 2009 letter ordered
Washington to state his understanding of the facts, Docket Entry No. 29-3 at
14, while Ford’s February letter informed Washington that he could
27
schedule a meeting with Ford or discuss his options with his own legal
representative. See Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 26. Moreover, LMISD has
submitted an affidavit by Burley in which Burley states that Washington was
allowed to submit any information he wanted to LMISD or to the Board
directly prior to the March 25 meeting. Docket Entry No. 29-2 ¶ 8. A
reasonable jury could conclude that Ford’s correspondence was sufficient to
make Washington, who was represented by legal counsel and had been
through previous disciplinary proceedings, aware that he could submit a full
written statement prior to the March 25 meeting.
On the other hand, given the ambiguity in this correspondence, a
reasonable jury could conclude that LMISD never allowed Washington to
submit a written response or otherwise present his response to the Board,
which was the final decisionmaker.
First, it is undisputed that nobody
except Burley, Ford, and the Board was allowed to speak at the March 25
meeting. With respect to Ford’s letters, the October 2009 preindictment
letter only instructed Washington to “state in your words what you know and
understand to be the facts concerning the allegations and ongoing
investigation that led to your placement on administrative leave.” Docket
Entry No. 29-3 at 14. It did not expressly state that Washington could
respond to the allegations or that any such response would be provided to the
28
Board, and it was sent two months before the indictment issued and four
months before Washington was notified that the Board was meeting to
consider a recommendation to terminate him. This uncertainty concerning
the October 2009 letter prevents the Court from concluding as a matter of
law that the letter provided Washington with a “meaningful opportunity to
invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker.”
Coggin, 337 F.3d at 465
(quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 & n.8).
The one letter Washington received after the indictment but before his
termination, the February 19 letter, offered only a personal meeting with
Ford.
This offer was insufficient because Ford was not the final
decisionmaker. And the letter contained no invitation to submit a written
statement to the Board or notice that Washington could request a meeting
with the Board.
The absence of any such invitation, especially when
contrasted with the express statement in the post-termination letter that “you
are entitled to request a hearing before the Board of Trustees,” Docket Entry
No. 29-3 at 32, would allow a jury to conclude that LMISD denied
Washington his constitutional right to respond to the charges before the vote
on his termination. 3 Finally, while Burley’s affidavit states that Washington
3
The process afforded Washington in March 2010 also contrasts starkly with the two-day
pretermination hearing held when Burley recommended the Board terminate Washington
in August 2008. See Docket Entry No. 3-26 at 4.
29
could have submitted information to the Board prior to the termination vote,
contemporaneous comments he made at the April 2010 post-termination
hearing indicate it presented Washington’s only opportunity to respond to
the charges. See Docket Entry No. 32-5 at 72. (“We’re here tonight because
[Washington] has chosen to exercise his right for a hearing. [Washington’s]
Counsel tried to say that he was not afforded that opportunity. I think
counsel’s confused. This is his opportunity to submit evidence to support
why he should not have been—why the termination should be overturned. I
would disagree with counsel that he has not been given due process. This is
his opportunity for that due process hearing . . . .”).
Thus, there remains a genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether LMISD gave Washington “an opportunity to present his side of the
story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (citations omitted). Although due
process claims are often decided on undisputed facts at the summary
judgment stage, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that fact issues sometimes
exist concerning whether an employee was afforded an opportunity to
respond to the charges. See Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 289–90 (5th
Cir. 1984) (denying summary judgment because a fact issue existed
regarding “whether plaintiffs were given the opportunity to rebut the reasons
given for their termination at a hearing or otherwise”); see also Riggan v.
30
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 2000)
(denying summary judgment because fact issues existed regarding whether
the student had received notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to his
suspension from school); cf. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 562–63 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“The lack of any principled standards in this area means that
these procedural due process cases will recur time and again.
Every
different set of facts will present a new issue on what process was due and
when.”). This is another such case, as there is conflicting evidence that a
jury needs to weigh in determining whether LMISD provided Washington
with an adequate opportunity to respond to the charges before the
termination vote.
3.
Claim Alleging Bias at Pretermination Hearing
Washington alleges a second due process claim relating to the March
25 hearing that focuses not on the procedures provided but on the alleged
bias of Defendant Bell-Malveaux. 4
4
Although LMISD does not cite it, the Supreme Court’s Parratt decision sometimes
prevents challenges to the partiality of decisionmakers at pretermination hearings. See
generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt excuses the state from certain
due process requirements if the deprivation was caused by “a state employee’s random,
unauthorized conduct.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990). The Fifth Circuit
has held that the bias of the person who decides to terminate the plaintiff’s employment is
one of the kinds of “random unauthorized acts” that invoke the Parratt doctrine. See
Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715–16 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the final
decisionmaker at a pretermination hearing need not be impartial, so long as the plaintiff
promptly receives an impartial post-termination hearing); see also McDaniels v. Flick, 59
31
“The basic requirement of constitutional due process is a fair and
impartial tribunal, whether at the hands of a court, an administrative agency
or a government hearing officer.” Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118
F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
569 (1973)). However, to prevail on a claim of bias, a plaintiff must be able
to show not only the appearance of bias, but that the decisionmaker was
actually biased against him. See Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. El Paso, 759 F.2d
1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985).
Actual bias occurs, and the constitutional
guarantee of due process is thus violated, “(1) where the decision maker has
a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
case; (2) where an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or
criticism from the party before him; and (3) when a judicial or quasi-judicial
decision maker has the dual role of investigating and adjudicating disputes
and complaints.”
Valley, 118 F.3d at 1052 (citing Baran v. Port of
Beaumont Navigation Dist., 57 F.3d 436, 444–46 (5th Cir. 1995)).
F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). But Schaper only applies to bar suit if the plaintiff
later receives an impartial post-termination hearing. Since Bell-Malveaux, the allegedly
biased decisionmaker, remained involved in Washington’s post-termination hearing even
after Washington’s counsel raised the conflict issue, Schaper does not bar Washington’s
claim that the March 25 termination vote was unconstitutionally biased.
32
Washington has submitted evidence that would allow a jury to find
that Bell-Malveaux was actually biased against him. 5 In May 2009, BellMalveaux sued Washington in state court for defamation.
That suit
remained pending until the state court nonsuited the case on BellMalveaux’s motion in August 2010. See Docket Entry No. 32-10; Order for
Non Suit, Malveaux v. Washington, No. 09-CV-0678 (212th Dist. Ct.,
Galveston Cnty., Tex. Aug. 2, 2010).
Thus, at the time she voted to
terminate Washington’s employment, Bell-Malveaux was only months away
from asking a jury to award her damages against Washington. Moreover,
the basis of that suit was Washington’s widely reported comments that BellMalveaux and a number of other LMISD trustees had engaged in corruption
by accepting kickbacks from a private contractor. This falls squarely in the
second avenue for finding bias listed in Valley: Bell-Malveaux had been the
target of high profile personal criticism from Washington. The undisputed
fact that Bell-Malveaux was engaged in a defamation lawsuit against
Washington at the time she voted on his termination is sufficient to create a
5
The court reaches this decision without considering two affidavits Washington
submitted that, if admissible, would be probative of Bell-Malveaux’s bias. See Docket
Entry Nos. 32-11; 32-12. The Court thus need not rule on LMISD’s objections to these
affidavits.
33
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bell-Malveaux was actually
biased against Washington. 6
C.
Claim Alleging Bias at Post-Termination Hearing
Bell-Malveaux also participated in the April 22 post-termination
hearing and her defamation suit against Washington was still pending at that
time. Washington thus cites the same evidence to support his allegation that
her participation in the post-termination vote not to reinstate his employment
deprived him of due process.
Additionally, Washington claims that
Defendant Holcomb’s vote should not have been counted at the April 22
ballot because she was no longer a resident of the district.
But this is where LMISD’s argument about the availability of posttermination appeals has force.
Although, the post-termination appeals
process could not cure any pretermination deficiencies, see Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 545–46; Chiles, 53 F.3d 1281, 1995 WL 295931, at *1–2, it did
provide Washington with the impartial fora of both a state administrative
6
LMISD does not challenge causation on this issue. In any event, because the vote to
terminate Washington’s employment was 4–3, Bell-Malveaux cast the deciding vote in
that ballot. And, regardless, cases hold that a single biased member of an adjudicatory
panel may be sufficient to find that the entire panel is tainted. See, e.g., Stivers v. Pierce,
71 F.3d 732, 747 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a single panel member’s bias sufficient to taint
the entire panel even in a unanimous vote and noting that “on a small board . . . a single
person’s bias is likely to have a profound impact on the decisionmaking process”); Hicks
v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 748 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (finding a
single panel member’s bias sufficient to taint the entire panel); Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d
721, 726 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); see also Valley, 118 F.3d at 1053–55 (holding that a
panel that voted 6–3 to suspend a plaintiff was unconstitutionally tainted by the bias of
four panel members).
34
agency and a state district court in which to challenge any deficiencies in the
post-termination proceedings.
These opportunities constituted sufficient
post-termination process before an impartial adjudicator, but Washington
elected not to pursue them. LMISD thus afforded Washington adequate
post-termination due process as a matter of law. Summary judgment is
appropriate on this last claim.
IV.
TEXAS OPEN MEETINGS ACT
The final issue to decide is whether LMISD is entitled to summary
judgment on Washington’s Texas Open Meetings Act claim.
The Act
requires governmental bodies such as LMISD to “give written notice of the
date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 551.041. Washington argues that LMISD violated the requirement to give
adequate notice of the “subject” of the March 25 meeting at which the Board
voted to terminate his employment.
The Board’s agenda for the March 25 meeting, which was publicly
posted on March 22, included the following line item: “Consider
recommendation to propose the termination of the contract and employment
of the LMISD Chief of Police.” Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 30. Washington
contends that, since the line item only mentioned the proposal to terminate
35
rather than the possibility of actual termination, it did not constitute adequate
notice of the fact that the Board might actually vote to terminate him.
Generally, a notice is sufficient under the Act if it informs the reader
that “some action” will be considered with regard to the topic. Lower Colo.
River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1975); see
also City of San Antonio v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 766
(Tex. 1991) (holding that a proposed condemnation posting that only
specified the county blocks in which condemnation was to occur and not the
individual properties to be condemned was sufficient notice because
“readers who did own property in [the] blocks were on notice of some risk
that their land might be condemned”). The required specificity of the notice
is directly related to the level of public interest in the topic to be discussed
and increases as the public’s level of interest increases. Cox Enters., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. 1986).
With respect to termination decisions in particular, one Texas court of
appeals has held that the “public has a special interest in matters relating to
the employment of its police chief.” Mayes v. City of De Leon, 922 S.W.2d
200, 203 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, writ denied). And that is the case here
given public and media interest in Washington’s longstanding feud with
Burley and Bell-Malveaux.
36
Even under this heightened requirement, LMISD provided adequate
notice that it would be discussing the possible termination of Washington’s
employment at the March 25 meeting. The posted agenda was not vague or
deceptive, and it did not merely state that the Board would be considering
general personnel issues as did the notice found inadequate in Mayes, 922
S.W.2d at 203; rather, it specifically stated that the Board would consider a
recommendation relating to the potential termination of Washington’s
employment. Docket Entry No. 29-3 at 30. The distinction that Washington
points to between the proposal to terminate and the actual termination is not
legally relevant, for Texas case law is clear that “although the reader needs
to know the topic of discussion, the notice need not state all of the possible
consequences resulting from consideration of the topic.” Rettberg v. Tex.
Dep’t of Health, 873 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ)
(citing Tex. Turnpike Auth. v. City of Fort Worth, 554 S.W.2d 675, 676
(Tex. 1977)). The notice that the Board would discuss the recommendation
to propose Washington’s termination was not rendered insufficient solely
because it failed to mention an obvious consequence of that discussion: that
the Board might go ahead and actually vote to terminate.
Summary
judgment is appropriate on Washington’s Texas Open Meetings Act claim.
37
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court makes the following rulings.
Washington’s allegations against Defendant Kurt Sistrunk only concern
Sistrunk’s actions as an advocate in the judicial process; thus, Sistrunk is
entitled to absolute immunity, and his Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No.
10) is GRANTED.
Summary judgment on Washington’s first two procedural due process
claims is inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether LMISD gave Washington an opportunity to be heard
prior to the March 25 termination vote and whether the termination vote was
tainted by Defendant Bell-Malveaux’s alleged bias. Washington’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 26) is therefore DENIED,
and LMISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 29) is
DENIED IN PART with respect to these two claims.
However, summary judgment is appropriate on Washington’s claim
that the post-termination hearing was tainted by bias because the posttermination appeals process constituted an adequate remedy to cure any
deficiencies in that hearing. Finally, LMISD provided sufficient notice that
Washington’s termination would be discussed and possibly acted on at the
March 25 meeting. LMISD’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry
38
No. 29) is therefore GRANTED IN PART with respect to Washington’s
claim that the post-termination reinstatement vote was biased and with
respect to his claim that LMISD violated the Texas Open Meetings Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 11th day of March, 2013.
______________________________
Gregg Costa
United States District Judge
39
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