Guillot et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al. DO NOT DOCKET. Case has been remanded.

Filing 26

ORDER OF REMAND granting 18 MOTION to Remand. Case terminated on 6/13/13(Signed by Judge Gregg Costa) Parties notified.(arrivera, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
EVERETT C. GUILLOT, et al,

§
§
§
Plaintiffs,
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-84
VS.
§
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al, §
§
Defendants.
§
ORDER

Plaintiff Everett Guillot brings this home foreclosure case against Defendant
JPMorgan Chase and two law firm Defendants that Chase retained during the
foreclosure process. Guillot originally filed suit in state court, but, because he
asserted claims for alleged violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”), Defendants removed to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction.
After the case was removed, this Court dismissed a number of Guillot’s
claims against Chase, including his FDCPA claims. Subsequently, on May 22,
2013, Guillot filed an amended complaint that dropped his remaining FDCPA
claims against the two law firm Defendants. See Docket Entry No. 19. Guillot
now moves to remand, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
since his amended complaint does not include a federal cause of action. See
Docket Entry No. 18.
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Guillot’s argument that his amended complaint divested this Court of subject
matter jurisdiction is wrong; jurisdiction is based on the state court petition at the
time of removal. See Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264
(5th Cir. 1995). However, that does not end the analysis, for this Court must still
determine whether it should exercise its discretion to retain supplemental
jurisdiction over Guillot’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “When all
federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial,” the
“general rule” is that district courts should “decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
pendent state law claims.” Chavers v. Hall, 488 F. App’x 874, 878 (5th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
The Court concludes that it should follow the Fifth Circuit’s general rule and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Guillot’s state law claims.
Because only state law issues remain and the case has been pending in this Court
for less than three months, the balance of the statutory and common law Carnegie–
Mellon factors weighs heavily in favor of remand.

See Enochs v. Lampasas

County, 641 F.3d 155, 159–60 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the four statutory factors
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the four common law factors of Carnegie–Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988)). Chase’s only argument against remand is
that Guillot is engaging in forum shopping. But the Fifth Circuit has held that a
“motion to amend [a] complaint to delete the federal claims is not a particularly
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egregious form of forum manipulation, if it is manipulation at all.” Id. at 160.
Even if Guillot’s actions can properly be characterized as forum manipulation, that
manipulation is not severe enough to outweigh the balance of factors counseling in
favor of remand.

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Guillot’s state law claims, and Guillot’s motion to remand
(Docket Entry No. 18) is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the 23rd
District Court of Brazoria County, Texas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 13th day of June, 2013.

______________________________
Gregg Costa
United States District Judge

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