Hester v. Mamukuyomi et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying 16 Motion for Reconsideration.(Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(dperez, 3)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
CALVIN JARROD HESTER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ANGELA MAMUKUYOMI, et al,
Defendants.

January 05, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk

§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-340
§
§
§
§
ORDER

Pending is a “motion for reconsideration” filed by the plaintiff, which the Court
construes as a motion to alter or amend the Court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) (Dkt. 16). For the reasons given below, the motion is DENIED.
The plaintiff, Calvin Jarrod Hester (TDCJ #01472075), an inmate in the custody of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”),
has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has been granted
permission to proceed in forma pauperis, and has provided a supplemental memorandum.
Hester asserts that the defendants violated his right to procedural due process during the
course of a prison disciplinary proceeding (Dkt. 5 at p. 5). The Court dismissed his
complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim (Dkt. 15). Hester then filed this
Rule 59(e) motion.
Generally, “Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and brackets

1/3

omitted). However, a Rule 59(e) motion challenging a judgment entered on the pleadings
should typically be analyzed under the standard applicable to motions for leave to amend
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332
F.3d 854, 863–64 (5th Cir. 2003). Under that standard, leave should be freely given, but
it may be denied based on “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and]
futility of the amendment . . . .” Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))
(brackets in Rosenzweig). Where the pleadings, viewed under the individual
circumstances of the case, “demonstrate that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case[,]”
dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate if the pleadings do not adequately state a cause
of action. Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Bazrowx v.
Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss
for failure to state a claim “as long as the procedure employed is fair”) (quotation marks
omitted).
Hester’s Rule 59(e) motion does not present any new allegations or evidence.
Regardless, any attempt to do so would be futile because the disciplinary action that
Hester challenges did not result in a sanction that infringed upon a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–87 (1995). Even though
Hester lost 90 days of good-time credit as a result of the disciplinary conviction, he does
not have a protected liberty interest in his good-time credit because he is not eligible for
release on mandatory supervision. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768–69 (5th Cir.
2/3

1997). And the other sanctions imposed on Hester—a custodial demotion and a 45-day
restriction on his commissary and telephone privileges—did not affect the duration or
fact of Hester’s confinement and did not constitute atypical, significant hardships going
beyond the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id.; Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958–59
(5th Cir. 2000). As the Court stated before, the sanctions, as a result, were simply not
Constitutionally actionable. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483–87.1
Hester’s Rule 59(e) motion (Dkt. 16) is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 5th day of January, 2018.
___________________________________
George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge

As the Court also stated before, it is also likely that at least some of Hester’s claims are barred
by the doctrine set out by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
See Mahogany v. Stalder, 242 Fed. App’x 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2007); White v. Fox, 294 Fed.
App’x 955, 960–61 (5th Cir. 2008).
1

3/3