Oubre v. Schlumberger Limited et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The plaintiff's 26 Objections are Sustained, in part, and Overruled, in part. Further the Court Adopts, in part, Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and the Court Rejects in part, 25 the Report and Recommendation. The Court Grants 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(ltrevino, 3)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
TODD J. OUBRE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SCHLUMBERGER LIMITED, et al,
Defendants.
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September 23, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-111
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a personal injury lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, Todd J. Oubre. Oubre is a
citizen of Louisiana. Defendants Schlumberger Limited, Schlumberger Well Services,
and Schlumberger Technology Corporation (collectively, “Schlumberger”) have their
principal places of business in Texas.
Oubre’s Complaint alleges that, on “May 15, 2014,” he “was a trucking contractor
performing services for [Schlumberger],” and he was injured at Schlumberger’s Houma,
Louisiana facility when “an employee of [Schlumberger] rammed a forklift [into] his
vehicle.” Dkt. 1. Oubre asserts claims for negligence and gross negligence, and he alleges
that Schlumberger is directly and vicariously responsible for the acts of its employee. Id.
Oubre filed his Complaint in this Court on May 15, 2015.
Schlumberger’s First Amended Answer denied many of the allegations in Oubre’s
Complaint, including his allegation that the collision took place on May 15, 2014.
Schlumberger did admit that, “at relevant times, Plaintiff was employed with or through a
trucking contractor performing services for Schlumberger Technology Corporation.” Dkt.
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13, ¶ 9. Further, Schlumberger’s First Amended Answer raised the affirmative defense of
limitations—contending that Oubre’s suit was time-barred by the Louisiana Civil Code.
Schlumberger has now filed a motion for summary judgment on its affirmative
defense of limitations. Dkt. 14. Oubre has responded, and the motion has been fully
briefed. Dkt. 17, Dkt. 18, Dkt. 23. On May 10, 2016, this Court referred the case to
United States Magistrate Judge John R. Froeschner. Dkt. 24. On May 18, 2016, Judge
Froeschner issued his Report and Recommendation, recommending that Schlumberger’s
motion for summary judgment be granted. Dkt. 25. Oubre filed Objections to Judge
Froeschner’s Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 26.
This Court is required to make a de novo determination of those portions of the
magistrate judge’s report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an
objection has been made. In this regard, the Court is permitted to “accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). The Court need not,
however, consider objections that are conclusive, general in nature, or frivolous. See
Battle v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc) (overruled
on other grounds); Mosley v. Quarterman, 306 F. App’x 40, 42 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008). After
careful consideration of the Objections, the motion, the responses, the pleadings, and the
arguments of the parties, the Court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, in part, and REJECTS the Recommendation, in part, as follows.
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ANALYSIS
Schlumberger’s motion for summary judgment asserts that the collision at its
Houma facility occurred on May 14, 2014, not May 15, 2014. Accordingly, it contends
that Oubre’s suit is time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, the one-year
time limit of Article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Schlumberger first argues that this Court, sitting in diversity, must apply the
choice-of-law rules of Texas and that Texas follows the “most significant relationship
test” set out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Schlumberger asserts that
Louisiana, where the collision took place, is the state with the most significant
relationship here. Accordingly, Schlumberger asks this Court to find that Louisiana’s
one-year statute of limitations bars Oubre’s lawsuit because it is untimely. Schlumberger
points out that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.031 also supports this
conclusion. Schlumberger’s motion attaches a single piece of summary judgment
evidence—the affidavit of Scott Thibodaux, a Schlumberger employee who affirms that
he participated in the investigation of a May 14, 2014, accident involving “a parked truck
which was operated through United Vision Logistics and which was parked in the yard
area of the [Houma, Louisiana] facility.” Dkt. 14-1.
In his response, Oubre concedes that the accident did indeed occur on May 14,
2014—not May 15, 2014. Dkt. 17. But he argues the proper statute of limitations is the
two-year limit found in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.004. Oubre asserts two reasons that the one-year Louisiana
statute of limitations does not apply in this case. First, Oubre presents a Master Services
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Agreement (“MSA”) between Schlumberger and Dynasty Transportation, LLC, asserting
that this MSA is the contract “under which [he] was working for Schlumberger at the
time he was injured.” Oubre argues that Schlumberger is therefore “estopped” from
relying on Louisiana’s statute of limitations in this case because the MSA provides that
“[the] Agreement shall be construed in accordance with, and governed by, the laws of the
State of Texas.” Dkt. 17-1, ¶ 11.
Second, Oubre contends that Schlumberger misapplies Texas law. Schlumberger’s
motion is premised on its assertion that Louisiana is the state where the “negligent act”
took place. Oubre now contends this is not entirely true. Instead, he argues that much of
Schlumberger’s “management decisions and corporate governance are undertaken from
Schlumberger headquarters [in Houston, Texas].” Accordingly, he posits that some part
of his negligence suit will touch upon Schlumberger’s management decisions made in
Houston, i.e., “the creation of company policy and Schlumberger’s failure to train and
supervise its employees pursuant to this policy.” Dkt. 17. Therefore, he concludes that
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.031 mandates the application of
Texas’s, not Louisiana’s, statute of limitations.
In their reply, the Schlumberger Defendants take issue with Oubre’s claim that he
was an “employee” of the trucking company that executed the MSA with Schlumberger.
Instead, Schlumberger’s reply presents evidence that Oubre was an “independent
trucking contractor” and was “self-employed” at the time of the incident. Schlumberger
also argues that Oubre cannot rely upon the MSA because he is not an intended thirdparty beneficiary to that contract.
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With the permission of the Court, Oubre filed a sur-reply. In his sur-reply, Oubre
contends that “the precise nature of his role . . . is not significant.” Dkt. 23. Instead, he
holds on to the doctrine of estoppel by contract, and asserts that he is among the “class of
persons” discussed in the MSA and is therefore a beneficiary to the MSA.
In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Froeschner recommended
that Schlumberger’s motion be granted on the grounds that (1) Oubre was a “selfemployed independent contractor,” not an intended beneficiary of the MSA, and he could
not “take advantage of the forum selection clause;” (2) Texas law required an analysis of
which state had the “most significant relationship” to the case; and (3) Louisiana was the
state with the most significant relationship. Magistrate Judge Froeschner therefore
concluded that Louisiana law applied, including Louisiana’s one-year statute of
limitations, and Oubre’s suit was time-barred. In finding Louisiana was the state with the
most significant relationship to this case, Magistrate Judge Froeschner also found:
In this case the injury occurred in Louisiana; the conduct which caused the
injury occurred in Louisiana; Oubre’s residence and place of business were
in Louisiana, and the place where the relationship, if any, between the
Parties was centered was solely on Schlumberger’s Houma, Louisiana,
property.
Oubre filed Objections to Magistrate Judge Froeschner’s Report and
Recommendation. Those Objections focused on whether Oubre may benefit from the
MSA’s choice-of-law provision. Notably, Oubre does not complain of Judge
Froeschner’s finding that “[i]n this case the injury occurred in Louisiana; [and] the
conduct which caused the injury occurred in Louisiana . . . .”
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Schlumberger’s motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, a reviewing court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). A fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“When seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those issues
on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial.” Serna v. Law Office of Joseph
Onwuteaka, P.C., 614 Fed. App’x. 146, 152 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1160, 194 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2016) (citing Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715,
718 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). The movant discharges this burden by making out “a
prima facie case that would entitle [it] to judgment as a matter of law if uncontroverted at
trial.” Id. (internal citations omitted). If the movant succeeds, “the nonmovant must go
beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Id. (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). “‘If the moving party fails to meet [its]
initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the
nonmovant’s response.’” United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504,
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507 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (per curiam)). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing
court must “construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
The Court is mindful that a non-movant’s burden is not satisfied with “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated
assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1074 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district
court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s
opposition to summary judgment.” Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374,
378–80 (5th Cir. 2010). Instead, “[a] district court’s decision on summary judgment is
largely controlled by what the parties present[].” Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670
F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012). Therefore, “[i]f somewhere in a record there is evidence
that might show a dispute of material fact, the district court needs to be pointed to that
evidence as opposed to having to engaging in an extensive search.” Id.
Further, when reviewing the evidence, this Court “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Factual controversies are to
be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when there is an actual controversy, that
is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at
1075.
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DISCUSSION
The Court’s analysis here must adhere to the summary judgment principles set out
in the above paragraphs. Accordingly, the Court begins with the motion for summary
judgment itself and then turns to the response, evaluating each under the standards set out
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A. Schlumberger’s motion presents uncontroverted evidence that the
collision occurred in Houma, Louisiana, on May, 14, 2014.
Schlumberger moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of
limitations. As Schlumberger correctly contends, “[a] federal court sitting in diversity
follows the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.” Crawford Prof’l Drugs, Inc.
v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 258 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). This Court will therefore apply Texas
choice-of-law rules.
Schlumberger is also correct in its next contention, that Texas courts answer
choice-of-law questions by determining which state has the “most significant
relationship” to the parties and the allegations, using the test provided by Sections 6 and
145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46
S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979).
Under the Restatement, the court must consider: “(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and; (d) the place
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where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145. Further, according to the Restatement, “the applicable law
will usually be the local law of the state where the injury occurred.” Id. at § 156(2). Thus,
according to Schlumberger, Thibodeaux’s affidavit is sufficient summary judgment
evidence to show that the collision happened in Houma, Louisiana on March 14, 2014,
and this Court should easily conclude that Louisiana law, including Louisiana’s one-year
statute of limitations, applies.
Schlumberger’s analysis is correct but incomplete. In addition to the
Restatement’s choice-of-law rules, Texas has an additional choice-of-law rule that it
applies in personal injury cases—section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, which contains what “is essentially a codified choice-of-law rule that
borrows the statute of limitations of the foreign state where an injury occurred when the
claimant is not a resident of Texas.” Malone v. Sewell, 168 S.W.3d 243, 253 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). It reads, in relevant part:
An action for damages for ... personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the
United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this
state, although the wrongful act, neglect or default causing the ... injury
takes place in a foreign state ... if: …
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of
this state for beginning the action; [and]
(3) for a resident of a foreign state or country, the action is begun in this
state within the time provided by the laws of the foreign state or country in
which the wrongful act, neglect or default took place …
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a). Both the Supreme Court of Texas and
the United States Fifth Circuit have confirmed that this provision applies to suits filed in
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state and federal courts in Texas for personal injury or death caused by an act that
occurred outside the state. See Hyde v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 511-13
(5th Cir. 2007); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 573 (Tex. 1999). So long as
the plaintiff is a Texas resident, then Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury suits applies, even though the injury or act occurred outside of Texas. In contrast,
if a plaintiff is not a Texas resident, then the court must apply both Texas’s two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury suits and any statutes of limitations from the
location in which the injury or act occurred. This provision ensures that the more
restrictive of the two limitations periods controls. See, e.g., Burdett v. Remington Arms
Co., LLC, 3:15-CV-4038-B, 2016 WL 3745682, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2016) (“If
Burdett is a Texas resident . . . the Court would need only apply Texas law. If Burdett is a
Georgia resident . . . the Court would need to apply both Texas and New York law.”);
Tullis v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 45 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.)
(“ [The Texas] legislature sought to remedy the problem that Texas had become a popular
forum for plaintiffs whose claims were time-barred by shorter statutes of limitations in
the states where those claims arose.”) (citing Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at 574).
The Court notes that this case is strikingly similar to a recent case from the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas. In Ferguson v. Sevin, Judge
Pitman granted summary judgment after finding that the Louisiana statute of limitations
barred a personal injury suit filed by a Mississippi resident who had been injured in
Louisiana by a Texas resident. No. 1-15-CV-462 RP, 2016 WL 164640, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 13, 2016) (“Plaintiff is a resident of Mississippi and the collision underlying this
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action occurred in Louisiana. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are subject to the statutes of
limitations of both Texas and Louisiana.”). Likewise, the personal injury claim of
Plaintiff Oubre, who is not a Texas resident, and who was injured in an accident
occurring in Louisiana, is, on its face, subject to the statutes of limitations of both Texas
and Louisiana.
B. Oubre’s response does not challenge Schlumberger’s evidence, and it
instead deflects attention to the MSA and to the Complaint.
Oubre does not dispute that he is a Louisiana resident, nor does he dispute that the
collision occurred in Houma, Louisiana, on May 14, 2014. Instead, his response raises
two novel arguments. First, he asserts that Schlumberger is “estopped” from relying on
Louisiana’s statute of limitations by the language of the MSA, which he contends is a
contract between Schlumberger and his employer at the time. Second, Oubre contends
that Louisiana is not the only location where a negligent act occurred in this case because
his claims implicate management decisions made in Houston, i.e., “the creation of
company policy and Schlumberger’s failure to train and supervise its employees pursuant
to this policy.”
Magistrate Judge Froeschner’s Report and Recommendation focused on the first
argument—that the MSA somehow benefitted Oubre or estopped Schlumberger from
arguing Oubre’s suit was governed by the Louisiana statute of limitations. Judge
Froeschner found that Oubre was not entitled to rely on the MSA, and Oubre’s
Objections contend that he is. However, this discussion somewhat misses the mark.
Assuming, arguendo, that Oubre could rely on the MSA, the MSA calls for the
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application of “the laws of the State of Texas.” Section 71.031(a), which mandates that
his suit is time-barred, clearly falls within the category of “laws of the State of Texas.”
Oubre’s second point is also unsuccessful. Oubre’s Complaint alleges,
“Defendants are liable for the subject accident and Plaintiff’s injuries and damages by
reason of their negligence, gross negligence, and conditions attributable to it, directly
and/or vicariously, by and through their agents, representatives and/or employees.” He
describes this allegation as broad enough to encompass decisions made in
Schlumberger’s offices in Texas because the forklift driver “was self-evidently poorly
trained and poorly managed.” Thus, he argues that Section 71.031 does not apply because
acts contributing to his injury may have been committed in Texas rather than Louisiana.
Instead of directly attacking Schlumberger’s evidence that the collision happened in
Houma, Louisiana on May 14, 2014, Oubre seeks to expand the scope of his negligence
claims, much like Lucy moving the football.
There are several problems here. First, the single case Oubre cites on this point is
wholly inapplicable. See, e.g., Vinson v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 318 S.W.3d 34, 38
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (upholding plaintiff’s challenge to
trial court’s forum non conveniens dismissal of lawsuit for personal injuries suffered in
Singapore against Texas-based designer of allegedly defective derrick). Second, and
more fatally, Oubre failed to object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “[his] injury
occurred in Louisiana; the conduct which caused the injury occurred in Louisiana; . . .
and the place where the relationship, if any, between the Parties was centered was solely
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on Schlumberger’s Houma, Louisiana, property.” Because Oubre declined to object to
these findings, the Court declines to disturb them.1
C. Schlumberger is entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense
of limitations.
After reviewing the motion for summary judgment, the response, the briefing by
counsel, and the summary judgment evidence presented by the parties—as well as the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and Oubre’s Objections thereto—the
Court finds that there is no genuine dispute that the collision took place on May 14, 2014,
in Houma, Louisiana, and that Oubre is a resident of Louisiana who filed his personal
injury lawsuit in Texas on May 15, 2015. Further, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge
Froeschner’s finding that the injury at issue—as well as the conduct that caused the
injury—occurred in Louisiana. Accordingly, the Court finds that Oubre’s suit is barred by
the one-year time limit set out in Louisiana Civil Code art. 3492.
1
Further, there are serious deficits in the summary judgment evidence that Oubre uses to support
his contention that the forklift driver in Houma must have been trained, managed, employed, or
supervised in some way from one of Schlumberger’s Texas offices. Oubre’s response presented
only minimal evidence, such as choppy excerpts from the deposition of Scott Thibodaux. In
those excerpts, Thibodaux stated that he is a “QHSE” manager for Schlumberger with an office
in Houma, Louisiana, and he reports to “George Fournier,” who is the “North Gulf Coast QHSE
manager” in Lafayette, Louisiana. In turn, Fournier reports to “Eric Inglehart,” the “North
America Offshore QHSE manager” located in Houston, Texas. Thibodaux also confirmed that he
produced a report of his investigation of the incident, and he stated that “everyone has access to
that report; everyone within the organization, . . . includ[ing] people in Sugarland, Texas.”
Thibodaux did confirm that the forklift driver was an employee of Schlumberger Techonology
Corporation, the same company that employed him, Fournier, and Inglehart. Oubre attached the
“Light Accident/Non-conformance Report” created by Thibodaux, which gave cursory details of
the incident, such as that “Forklift Commentary Drive Retraining” was completed on September
19, 2014. But none of this evidence contains anything approaching an assertion of fact as to
where the forklift driver was trained, supervised, hired, or managed prior to the collision, or by
whom.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Oubre’s Objections are SUSTAINED, in part,
and OVERRULED, in part. Further, as discussed above, the Court ADOPTS, in part,
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the Court REJECTS, in part,
the Report and Recommendation.
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Oubre’s suit is time-barred. Accordingly, Schlumberger’s motion for summary judgment
on its affirmative defense of limitations is GRANTED.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 23rd day of September, 2016.
___________________________________
George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge
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