Vaughn v. Massie, Asst. Regional Director et al
Filing
59
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Dkt. 47 MOTION Not to Accept Defendant D'Aundrea Starling's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, Dkt. 45 MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. 53 MOTION to Seal Defendant Starling's Amended Brief in Support of Defendant Starling's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED as MOOT.(Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(ltrevino, 3)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
WILLIAM KELLY VAUGHN,
TDCJ # 01859690,
Plaintiff,
VS.
STEVE MASSIE, ASST. REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, et al,
Defendants.
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September 06, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-0021
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil rights suit, Plaintiff William Kelly Vaughn, an inmate in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”), proceeds
pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant D’Aundrea Starling forced
him to perform kitchen work in violation of his medical restrictions. Starling has filed a
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 45) and two briefs in support (Dkt. 46, Dkt. 54).
Plaintiff has filed multiple briefs and other responsive documents (Dkt. 49, Dkt. 50, Dkt.
55, Dkt. 57, Dkt. 58). The motion is ripe for consideration. Having reviewed the
evidence submitted, the parties’ briefing, the applicable law, and all matters of record, the
Court concludes that the motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED and that
all of Plaintiff’s claims must be DISMISSED for the reasons that follow.
In addition, Defendant’s motion to seal (Dkt. 53) is GRANTED and Docket
Entries 45 & 46 will be SEALED because they contain information about Plaintiff’s
medical condition and history.
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I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vaughn alleges that Defendants forced him to work in the kitchen of
TDCJ’s Ramsey I Unit and that the work assignment violated his medical restrictions.
Vaughn’s complaint (Dkt. 1) named four Defendants:
Steve Massie, identified by
Plaintiff as an “Assistant Regional Director” of TDCJ, who was dismissed at the
screening stage (Dkt. 9); Assistant Warden Jacqueline Jones and Sergeant Augustine
Osadolor, who were dismissed on summary judgment on February 7, 2018 (Dkt. 40); and
D’Aundrea Starling, a food service manager at the Ramsey I Unit.
Plaintiff’s claims
against Starling are the only remaining claims in this lawsuit.
Vaughn alleges that on October 17, 2015, he arrived to work in the Ramsey I Unit
kitchen as ordered by Osadolor, and presented Starling with his medical restrictions.1 He
describes his restrictions as “no repetitive squatting, no bending at the waist, no walking
on wet/uneven surfaces and no lifting over twenty five pounds” (Dkt. 1, at 6). 2
He
alleges that Starling nevertheless assigned him work including scrubbing shelves, walls,
floors, and industrial kitchen equipment, all of which violated his restrictions and
jeopardized his health, because Warden Jones had ordered her to have the utility squad,
1
As noted by the Court in its previous opinion, Vaughn had serious injuries before his
incarceration, including a gunshot wound, multiple broken bones, and a neck injury from a
motorcycle accident (Dkt. 40, at 2 (citing record)). During his incarceration, he has received
medical attention including pain medication, physical therapy, and medical devices (id.).
2
Throughout this Memorandum, the Court’s citations to specific pages in the record refer
to the pagination on the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”) system.
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which included Vaughn, clean the kitchen (id.; see Dkt. 55, at 1-2; Dkt. 57). Plaintiff
maintains that two other inmates witnessed his exchange with Starling (Dkt. 55, at 2).
Vaughn states that, because Starling threatened to initiate a disciplinary case
against him if he refused the work assignment, he joined the utility squad and performed
the work (Dkt. 1, at 6; Dkt. 55, at 1-2). Although he claims that he suffered pain as a
result of the assignment, he cites to no record evidence supporting his allegation.3
This Court previously determined that, “[a]t the time of the kitchen cleaning
assignment [on October 17, 2015], Vaughn’s work restrictions did not limit him to
sedentary work and did not limit the amount of time for which he could stand” (Dkt. 40,
at 4).4
Starling has submitted an affidavit stating that Warden Jones had ordered
Vaughn’s work squad to clean the Ramsey I Unit kitchen, where Starling worked, and
that inmates’ medical restrictions are “carefully checked” before the inmates are ordered
to report to work (Dkt. 45-6, at 3). Starling avers that Plaintiff did not present her with
3
As noted in the Court’s previous order granting summary judgment to Defendants Jones
and Osadolor, Plaintiff provided no detail about the nature or duration of the pain he allegedly
suffered as a result of the work assignment, and did not cite the Court to medical evidence in the
record supporting his allegation (Dkt. 40, at 4). Starling’s motion attaches excerpts from
Vaughn’s TDCJ medical records, which indicate that, in the period following the incident,
Vaughn sought a medical referral on November 4, 2015, due to “shoulder instability” attributable
to a past gunshot wound (Dkt. 45-3, at 24); was evaluated for a back brace on November 13,
2015 (id. at 35); received physical therapy for his shoulder on November 18, 2015 (id. at 26, 32);
had cardiac testing on November 24, 2015 (id. at 30); and was evaluated for “rib/sternal pain” on
December 17, 2015 (id. at 29). None of these records reflect complaints of pain or an injury
resulting from the events of October 17, 2015.
4
Medical records from TDCJ demonstrate that Plaintiff requested in September 2015 that
medical staff “medically unassign” him from work assignments because of pain but that, after
review, clinic staff concluded that there was “[n]o medical indication to medically unassign at
this time,” and counseled him that activity was encouraged (Dkt. 45-3, at 17-19).
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written evidence of his restrictions but that, based on his oral representation, she assigned
him less onerous tasks:
When Vaughn reported to the kitchen for work, I had no reason to believe
that Vaughn was prohibited from working in the kitchen. Contrary to his
allegations, Vaughn never showed me any medical restrictions.
Nevertheless, I took his word for it, and I only assigned him to wipe down
the top shelves in the kitchen, and there was no bending or lifting required.
(Id.). She further states that, if she had been informed that his medical restrictions had
prevented this work, she would have followed those instructions:
If one of my superiors, or the administration, had informed me that Vaughn
should not have been ordered to work in the kitchen, or to do the work that
I assigned, then I would have had him stop such work, relieved him form
that duty, and awaited further instructions from my superiors or
administration. . . . I have not, and would not, order an offender, including
Vaughn, to work at a job in the kitchen that his medical restrictions
prohibited.
(id. at 4). She states that she does not have any knowledge that Vaughn suffered “any
injury or damage from working in the kitchen on that day” (id.).
TDCJ records attached to Starling’s motion contain Vaughn’s health summary as
of September 21, 2015, just before the incident in question, which reflects work
restrictions as follows: “no lifting > 25 lbs.,” “no bending at waist,” “no repetitive
squatting,” and “no walk wet/uneven surfaces” (Dkt. 45-3, at 28). Vaughn’s health
summary from shortly after the incident, dated November 12, 2015, continued the same
restrictions and added a restriction for “no reaching over shoulder” (id. at 27). Both
documents further reflect that Vaughn was not “medically unassigned,” was not restricted
to sedentary work, and was not restricted in walking, standing, or repetitive use of his
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hands. Plaintiff has submitted an older health summary that reflects essentially the same
restrictions. See Dkt. 49, at 3 (health summary dated June 18, 2013).
After the incident, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance, which was denied at
both stages of TDCJ’s administrative grievance procedure (Dkt. 1, at 10-11; Dkt. 45-2).
As part of the grievance investigation, Starling gave a statement in which she stated that
she only assigned Vaughn to wipe top shelves, that he never showed her his medical
restrictions, and that she accommodated his request for lighter tasks (Dkt. 45-2, at 9).
TDCJ officials concluded that Vaughn’s allegations were unsubstantiated because “you
have no restrictions preventing you from your assigned job” and, on that basis, denied his
grievance (id. at 4).5
Vaughn argues in supplemental briefing that officials at the Ramsey I Unit are
“corrupt,” attaching recent news articles reporting that officials from the unit have
resigned in connection with a disciplinary quota system (Dkt. 57, Dkt. 58).6
Plaintiff requests $15 million in damages “for pain and suffering” associated with
the alleged violation of his medical restrictions and $1 billion in damages “for his time
and debt that was accrued in this matter” (Dkt. 55, at 2; see Dkt. 57, Dkt. 58). He also
5
Plaintiff also has submitted records from Grievance 2018049219, pursued through both
stages of the administrative grievance process, in which he complained that in November 2017
he was forced to walk on a wet and slippery floor in the Ramsey I kitchen (Dkt. 50). The records
submitted by Plaintiff indicate that he was allowed to change to a different work assignment, as
he had requested in his Step One grievance (id. at 3). This grievance concerns alleged events
that took place after this suit was filed, and is not directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims before the
Court.
6
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Plaintiff also states that he received a disciplinary case on April 28, 2018 (Dkt. 58).
has filed a motion for polygraph examination of Defendants (Dkt. 41); a motion for jury
trial (Dkt. 42); a motion not to accept Starling’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 47);
and a motion for default judgment (Dkt. 48).
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Pro Se Pleadings
In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff proceeds
pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction and,
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff
must allege more than “’labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation
omitted).
B.
Summary Judgment—Rule 56
Defendant Starling has moved for summary judgment. Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013). Once the
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movant presents a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to
the nonmovant to show with significant probative evidence the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir.
2000). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Id. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence
is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must “construe all
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dillon v.
Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
However, the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by
presenting “conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation.” Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678
F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citation, alteration and quotation marks omitted);
see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Likewise,
Rule 56 does not impose upon the Court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment. Evidence not referred to
in the response to the motion for summary judgment is not properly before the Court,
even if it exists in the summary judgment record. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
405 (5th Cir. 2003).
Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “the notice afforded by the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the local rules” is considered “sufficient” to advise a pro se party of his
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burden in opposing a summary judgment motion. Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975
F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992). Even a pro se plaintiff must specifically refer to evidence
in the summary judgment record in order to place that evidence properly before the court.
Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 217 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2016); E.E.O.C. v.
Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Despite our general willingness to
construe pro se filings liberally, we still require pro se parties to fundamentally abide by
the rules that govern the federal courts. Pro se litigants must properly . . . present
summary judgment evidence”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has filed a motion “not to accept” Starling’s
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 47). Plaintiff asserts that Starling “has been in
contempt for over two years” and that she “sudden[ly] disappear[ed] over two years ago”
but has now “mysteriously” reappeared in “an attempt to manipulate the courts” (Dkt. 47,
at 1-2). However, the court record reflects that the Office of the Attorney General made
diligent attempts to locate Starling after she left employment with TDCJ (Dkt. 12, Dkt.
15), and that the attempts ultimately were successful. Starling has appeared and made
appropriate filings with the Court, including an answer (Dkt. 39) and a summary
judgment motion (Dkt. 45). Plaintiff’s motion therefore will be denied.
A.
Official Immunity
A claim against an official employed by TDCJ in his or her official capacity is a
claim against the agency, and thus a claim against the State of Texas. See Mayfield v.
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Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2008). Because the Eleventh
Amendment protects the states’ sovereign immunity, federal courts lack jurisdiction over
suits against a state for money damages unless the state has waived its immunity or
Congress has clearly abrogated that immunity. NiGen Biotech, L.L.C., v. Paxton, 804
F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015); Moore v. La. Bd. of Elem. and Secondary Educ., 743
F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014). Texas has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,
and Congress did not abrogate that immunity when enacting Section 1983. NiGen, 804
F.3d at 394.
To the extent Plaintiff sues Starling in her official capacity as a state employee,
Starling is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from claims for monetary
damages. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
B.
Qualified Immunity
Defendant Starling has invoked qualified immunity, and Plaintiff bears the burden
to negate the defense. See Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017).
Determination of qualified immunity requires a bifurcated analysis: first, the court must
decide “whether the undisputed facts and the disputed facts, accepting the plaintiffs’
version of the disputed facts as true, constitute a violation of a constitutional right”; and
second, the court must determine “whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively
reasonable in light of clearly established law.” Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169
(5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Thompson v. Mercer,
762 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822
F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “If officers
of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s rights were
violated, the officer’s qualified immunity remains intact.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 744
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A reviewing court may address the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in any sequence, depending on the
circumstances of the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009); Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017).
C.
Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Starling violated his Eighth Amendment rights when she
forced him to work in violation of his medical restrictions. Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, provides a vehicle for a claim against a person “acting under color of state law,”
such as a state prison official, for a constitutional violation. See Pratt., 822 F.3d at 180;
Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff was, at all
relevant times, a convicted felon in state prison, his claims regarding denial of adequate
medical care are governed by the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and
unusual” conditions of confinement. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (the Eighth Amendment “requires that
inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety’”).
In certain circumstances, prison work conditions imposed on an inmate with
medical limitations can violate the Eighth Amendment. “If prison officials knowingly
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put [an inmate] on a work detail which they knew would significantly aggravate his
serious physical ailment such a decision would constitute deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir. 1989). See
Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 622 n.18 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Prison work conditions
may . . . amount to cruel and unusual punishment”); Douglas v. McCasland, 194 F.
App’x 192 (5th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Wooten, 119 F. App’x 625, 626 (5th Cir. 2004).
Deliberate indifference is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.
Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). It requires “more than an allegation of mere
negligence, but less than an allegation of purpose or knowledge.” Hinojosa v. Livingston,
807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015).
The record evidence indicates that Vaughn’s work assignment was not decided by
Starling, but instead was set before he reported to work. See Dkt. 45-6, at 3 (Starling
avers in affidavit that Warden Jones had ordered Vaughn’s work squad to clean the
kitchen that day, and that inmates’ “medical restrictions . . . are carefully checked before
they are ordered to report to work”). The evidence in the record also shows without
contradiction that Vaughn’s work assignment accommodated all of his medical
restrictions. See Dkt. 45-3, at 28 (TDCJ health summary dated September 21, 2015,
reflects that Vaughn had work restrictions regarding lifting, bending, repetitive squatting,
and working on wet or uneven surfaces, but no other restrictions); Dkt. 45-2, at 4
(decision on Vaughn’s grievance regarding his work assignment on October 17, 2015,
concluded that Vaughn’s allegations were unsubstantiated because he “ha[d] no
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restrictions preventing [him] from [his] assigned job”). Vaughn’s Eighth Amendment
claim fails on this basis. See Mendoza v. Lynhaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1993)
(affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim as frivolous because “prison officials
had placed [the plaintiff] in an appropriate work classification that took into account his
physical ailments”).
Additionally, although Vaughn argues that the “deliberate indifference” standard
is satisfied in this case,7 he points to no evidence that supports his position that Starling
acted with deliberate indifference, a high standard requiring more than “mere
negligence.” See Hinojosa, 807 F.3d at 665; Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1246.
Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations are insufficient to prevent summary judgment. See Jones, 678
F.3d at 348.
Because Vaughn has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to his
Eighth Amendment claim, summary judgment is granted for Starling. For essentially the
same reasons, Starling is entitled to qualified immunity. See Carroll, 800 F.3d at 169
(qualified immunity analysis requires determination of whether facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, constitute a violation of a constitutional right).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the Court ORDERS that:
1.
7
Plaintiff’s motion not to accept Defendant’s summary judgment motion
(Dkt. 47) is DENIED.
See Dkt. 55 (Plaintiff’s brief cites authority on the deliberate indifference standard,
including Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), and
Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
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2.
Defendant’s motion to seal (Dkt. 53) is GRANTED. The Clerk is
INSTRUCTED to place Docket Entries 45 & 46 under seal.
3.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 45) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Starling are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
4.
All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
A separate final judgment will issue.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 6th day of September, 2018.
___________________________________
George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge
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