Rodriguez v. Bright et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. (Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(ltrevino, 3)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
FREDDIE RODRIGUEZ,
TDCJ #01892352,
Plaintiff,
VS.
OSIGWE BRIGHT, et al,
Defendants.
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July 16, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-0254
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Freddie Rodriguez, an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claiming the right to be housed in a faith-based dormitory.
He proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 13), to which
Plaintiff has filed “objections” (Dkt. 16). The motion is now ripe for decision. After
reviewing the pleadings, the briefing, the applicable law, and all matters of record, the
Court concludes that this case must be DISMISSED for the reasons that follow.
I.
BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this suit, Rodriguez has been housed at TDCJ’s Darrington
Unit in Brazoria County. In his complaint, dated July 26, 2017, he brings suit against
Osigwe Bright, a chaplain at the Darrington Unit, alleging that Bright denied him access
to a faith-based program because Rodriguez is a “sex felon” (Dkt. 1, at 4). 1 Plaintiff
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On June 5, 2018, Rodriguez filed a separate civil rights complaint, initiating Rodriguez v.
Osigwe, Civil Action No. 3:18-0171. Because the complaint in the second case made allegations
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states that he spoke with Bright on February 10, 2017, and that “[Bright] told me
according to rules and policy I am not allowed in the faith program or to live in 6 tank”
(id.). Plaintiff also sues Bryan Collier, executive director of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, and Lorie Davis, director of the Correctional Institutions Division, for
the “rules” that allow officials to block access to rehabilitation and religious programs
(id. at 3). He alleges that TDCJ is “allowing the hindrance of rehabilitation and salvation
of lost souls” (id. at 4), and requests that the Court “change the rules and policy in the
Darrington faith based program [to] stop discrimination and partiality and allow sex
felons to practice [Christianity]” (id.).
Defendants’ summary judgment motion represents to the Court that, as of May 22,
2018, Rodriguez is assigned to the faith-based housing program he had requested.
Defendants attach an affidavit from Myra Montez, Chief of Unit Classification for the
Darrington Unit, who states that she is “responsible for overseeing unit classifications
. . . for the Darrington Unit” (Dkt. 13-1, at 2). Regarding Rodriguez, Montez states as
follows:
As of May 22, 2018 offender Freddie Rodri[g]uez # 1892352 is housed in a
Faith Based Dorm on the Darrington Unit. This housing assignment is
appropriate and authorized for his classification level.
Offender
Rodri[g]uez’ underlying conviction for a sexual offense does not preclude
him from being housed in a Faith Based Dorm under current TDCJ
policies.
(id.). Based on this affidavit, Defendants represent that “[n]o TDCJ policy exists at this
time which prohibits Plaintiff from residing in faith based housing” (Dkt. 13, at 2) and
nearly identical to those in the case at bar, the Court consolidated the cases (Dkt. 15) and
administratively closed Civil Action No. 3:18-0171.
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that “[t]here is no issue remaining to be resolved at trial” (id. at 3).
Defendants seek
dismissal of all claims with prejudice.
Plaintiff agrees with Defendants that his complaint in his pleadings has been
remedied: “Plaintiff confirms that he has been placed in the faith based housing as a
direct result of this Court’s demand for the [D]efendant[s] to answer Plaintiff’s
allegations” (Dkt. 16, at 1). He further agrees “that there is no written policy which
prevents the participation of sex offenders in the TDCJ programs” (id.). However, he
argues that the controversy between the parties has not been resolved merely because the
Defendants “finally respond[ed] under the pressure of this Court’s order” (id.). He
maintains that “there is a practice of barring sex offenders from programs, housing and
job positions within TDCJ,” and “seeks relief in the form of the Court’s ordering [TDCJ]
from the ongoing practice of discrimination against sex offenders” (id.). Rodriguez also
urges the Court to “provide injunctive relief in the form of ordering TDCJ to develop and
distribute to all personnel and inmates an administrative directive clarifying TDCJ policy
regarding any and all limitations that may be placed on offenders with sex-related
charges” (id. at 1-2).2
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
The PLRA and Pro Se Pleadings
Because Plaintiff is an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to scrutinize the claims and dismiss the
2
Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend his complaint (Dkt. 14). His motion does not attach a
proposed amendment and Plaintiff gives no information about the amendments he seeks to make
or reasons that might support his request for leave to amend. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
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complaint, in whole or in part, if it determines that the complaint “is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b),
1915(e)(2)(B); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (providing that the court “shall on its own
motion or on the motion of a party dismiss an action brought with respect to prison
conditions” if it is satisfied that the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief”).
In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff proceeds
pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction and,
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff
must allege more than “’labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation
omitted). Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be,
they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059,
1061 (5th Cir. 1997).
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B.
Summary Judgment—Rule 56
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587,
594 (5th Cir. 2013).
Once the movant presents a properly supported motion
for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show with significant
probative evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue
Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in
favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Id. “An
issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id.
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must “construe all
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dillon v.
Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
However, the non-movant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by
presenting “conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation.” Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678
F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citation, alteration and quotation marks omitted);
see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Likewise,
Rule 56 does not impose upon the Court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment. Evidence not referred to
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in the response to the motion for summary judgment is not properly before the Court,
even if it exists in the summary judgment record. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405
(5th Cir. 2003).
Although the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “the notice afforded by the Rules of
Civil Procedure and the local rules” is considered “sufficient” to advise a pro se party of
his burden in opposing a summary judgment motion. Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975
F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992). Even a pro se plaintiff must specifically refer to evidence
in the summary judgment record in order to place that evidence properly before the court.
Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 217 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2016); E.E.O.C. v.
Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Despite our general willingness to
construe pro se filings liberally, we still require pro se parties to fundamentally abide by
the rules that govern the federal courts. Pro se litigants must properly . . . present
summary judgment evidence”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants have presented an affidavit stating that, as of May 22, 2018, Rodriguez
has been assigned to faith-based housing and, furthermore, that TDCJ policy does not
preclude such a housing assignment based on Rodriguez’s underlying conviction (Dkt.
13-1, at 2). Plaintiff confirms that his complaint in this lawsuit has been remedied:
“Plaintiff confirms that he has been placed in the faith based housing” (Dkt. 16, at 1).
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction only over “actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Dailey v. Vought
Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. Const., art. III, sect. 2; Lewis
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v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). Under the doctrine of mootness,
“although a justiciable controversy may have existed at the time litigation was
commenced, the action must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the controversy
ceases to exist at some point in the litigation.” Id.
As a general rule, any set of circumstances that eliminates actual
controversy after the commencement of a lawsuit renders that action moot.
. . . [A] case will become moot where there are no longer adverse parties
with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation or when the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation. As the
Supreme Court has noted, it is not enough that a dispute was very much
alive when the suit was filed; the parties must continue to have a personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.
Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). One way that a case may become
moot is if “an intervening factual event . . . causes the plaintiff to no longer have a
present right to be vindicated or a stake or interest in the outcome.” Dailey, 141 F.3d at
227. A federal court “is obligated to raise the issue, sua sponte, if the facts suggest
mootness.” Id.
Because Plaintiff agrees that he has been admitted to the faith-based program, the
Court concludes that his claim regarding wrongful denial of access to the faith-based
program is moot. His complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis. See Dailey, 141
F.3d at 227.
Plaintiff urges that a controversy between the parties remains because “there is a
practice of barring sex offenders from programs, housing and job positions within TDCJ”
(Dkt. 16, at 1) (emphasis added). However, his complaint (Dkt. 1) did not seek relief on
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the basis of a TDCJ practice. Rather, Rodriguez sought relief for the denial of his
February 10, 2017, application for faith-based housing, which he now agrees has been
fully remedied (Dkt. 16, at 1). His complaint also sought relief from “rules and policy in
the Darrington faith based program” that prevented “sex felons” from participating (Dkt.
1, at 4), and Plaintiff now agrees that no TDCJ policy prevents sex offenders from
participating in faith based housing programs (Dkt. 16, at 1). In any event, Rodriguez
identifies no continuing harm to him from TDCJ’s alleged “practice” of barring sex
offenders from participation. See Dailey, 141 F.3d at 227.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The complaint filed by Plaintiff Freddie Rodriguez is DISMISSED for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the controversy between the parties is
now moot.
2.
All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 16th day of July, 2018.
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George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge
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