Hampton v. Brindley et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 16 MOTION for Judgment MOTION is Granted 8 MOTION to Dismiss is Granted, The claims against Dr. Brindley are SEVERED from this case and will be DISMISSED with prejudice. 1 Complaint , 17 MOTI ON for Leave to File Amend complaint is Granted in part. Hampton shall file an amended complaint, limited to the claims against Dr. Hulipas in his individual capacity, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. All other deadlines in this cas e are STAYED pending the plaintiffs compliance with the Courts order granting him leave to amend. The Court will issue a new scheduling order, if necessary, after the plaintiff has filed an amended complaint in compliance with the Courts instructions and the Court has completed the screening required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which governs this case. As a result, the defendants motions requesting a stay of upcoming deadlines (Dkts. 12, 16) are MOOT.(Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(agould, 3)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
JARRETT HAMPTON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DR. PAUL C. BRINDLEY and DR.
EDGAR HULIPAS,
Defendants.
July 27, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-299
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jarrett Hampton (TDCJ #816800) is currently incarcerated in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice – Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”). Hampton
has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. 1), alleging that Dr. Paul C. Brindley
and Dr. Edgar Hulipas denied him adequate medical care in violation of his constitutional
rights. Dr. Brindley has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 8) and Dr.
Hulipas has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) (Dkt. 16).
Hampton has filed a response to both motions (Dkts. 10, 18) and he has requested leave
to file an amended complaint (Dkt. 17). In addition, both defendants ask the Court to
stay all upcoming deadlines pending a ruling on their dispositive motions (Dkts. 12, 16).
After reviewing all of the pleadings, the parties’ briefing, and the applicable law, the
Court will GRANT the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but will allow Hampton to file an
amended complaint regarding his claims against Dr. Hulipas for the reasons that follow.
I.
BACKGROUND
Hampton is presently confined by TDCJ at the Darrington Unit in Rosharon,
Texas (Dkt. 1 at p. 1).1 Dr. Brindley is a physician employed by the University of Texas
Medical Branch (“UTMB”) at the Otolaryngology Department in Galveston (Id. at p. 3).
Dr. Hulipas is a physician employed by UTMB who works at the Darrington Unit (Id.).
Unless otherwise specified, the following summary of Hampton’s claims is taken from an
attachment to his complaint (Dkt. 1-1 at pp. 1-2).
Hampton alleges that he was treated at the UTMB Ear, Nose, and Throat (“ENT”)
Clinic on May 24, 2011, for a “soft tissue anomaly” on the bridge of his nose, which was
expressing pus (Dkt. 1 at p. 4).
The physician he saw initially diagnosed a nasal
obstruction and recommended “‘septorhinoplasty’ surgery” with an “inferior ‘turbinate
reduction.” Hampton was then referred to Dr. Brindley, who is an ENT specialist.
During a telemed video-conference on June 28, 2011, Dr. Brindley confirmed the
initial diagnosis and approved surgical treatment for a deviated septum. Dr. Brindley
stated that he would try to schedule the surgery in July or August of 2011. After
enduring sinus problems and frequent nose bleeds for three and a half years, Hampton
was finally scheduled for surgery on January 12, 2015. 2
The surgery was aborted
because Hampton had an acute sinus infection and a “skin columellar lesion” on his nose
1
For purposes of identification all page numbers reference the pagination imprinted on each
docket entry by the Court’s electronic filing system, CM/ECF.
2
According to Dr. Brindley, the procedure was not scheduled promptly because Hampton
advised providers in August 2011 that his condition had improved such that surgery was
unnecessary (Dkt. 8 at p. 3).
2
that was eventually diagnosed as sarcoidosis in December 2015.3 Hampton blames Dr.
Brindley for delaying his surgery for three and a half years. As a result of the delay,
Hampton reportedly suffered “an acute sinus infection; incurred the loss of smell and
taste; has frequent nose bleeds, drainage of puss, and nasal pain; and has contracted
sarcoidosis,” which has prevented any further surgical treatment for his deviated septum.
Hampton’s claims against Dr. Hulipas concern a delay in treatment for sarcoidosis
by specialists at the UTMB Dermatology Department in Galveston. After Hampton’s
initial diagnosis of sarcoidosis was confirmed in March 2016, Hampton was advised by a
specialist with the UTMB Dermatology Department to notify a doctor at his prison unit if
there were any “new abnormal changes” in his medical condition before his next followup appointment, which was scheduled for September 2016. At some undisclosed point,
Hampton developed a new lesion on the inner roof of his mouth, which reportedly caused
the center column of his nose to begin separating from his face. Hampton sent an inmate
request form to Dr. Hulipas at the Darrington Unit and asked for an immediate referral to
the Dermatology Department concerning his symptoms of sarcoidosis. On May 31,
2016, Dr. Hulipas responded by advising Hampton that a referral had been made,
apparently referencing the appointment already scheduled for September 2016, but Dr.
Hulipas did not inquire further or conduct a physical evaluation of Hampton’s symptoms
to determine whether an earlier referral was needed.
3
Sarcoidosis is a chronic, systemic granulomatous disease of unknown cause, which is
characterized by nodular inflammatory lesions that can affect any organ or tissue. See generally,
STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 831, 832, 1719 (28th ed. 2006); DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1668 (32nd ed. 2012).
3
Hampton contends that Dr. Hulipas was grossly negligent and violated his
constitutional rights by failing to conduct a physical evaluation of his symptoms in May
2016. As a result, Hampton was not seen by a specialist in the Dermatology Department
until September 2016. Hampton contends that the delay caused him “pain and suffering”
while he waited for treatment by a specialist. Hampton seeks compensatory and punitive
damages from both defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his rights under the
Eighth Amendment (Dkt. 1 at p. 4).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is
determined by the same standards applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), which
authorizes dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
Phillips v. City of Dallas, 781 F.3d 772, 775 (5th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[] those
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d
458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If the
complaint has not set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” it must be dismissed. Id. at 570.
4
In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff in this
case proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal
construction and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard a pro se
plaintiff must allege more than “labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action[.]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Claims Against Dr. Brindley Are Untimely
Dr. Brindley moves to dismiss the claims against him because they are barred by
the governing statute of limitations.
Hampton’s civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which borrows the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, are
governed by the two-year statute of limitations provided by Texas law. See Gartrell v.
Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 16.003(a)). This means that Hampton had two years from the time that his claims
accrued to file a civil rights complaint concerning his allegations. See Gonzalez v. Wyatt,
157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). Federal law determines when a cause of action
accrues under § 1983. See Smith v. Regional Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir.
2016). A cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the
5
injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. (citing Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257). In other
words, “the limitations period begins when the plaintiff is in possession of the critical
facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Caudra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 814 n.7
(5th Cir. 2010) (“A general cause of action accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware that
he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured.”).
Hampton claims that Dr. Brindley violated his constitutional rights by delaying
surgery that was approved in 2011, for three and a half years, until January 12, 2015
(Dkt. 1-1 p. 1). Hampton argues that his claim against Dr. Brindley did not accrue until
his diagnosis of sarcoidosis was finally confirmed on March 1, 2016 (Dkt. 10 at pp. 6-7).
It is well established, however, that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows he
has been injured, and not when he later becomes aware of the injury’s full extent. See,
e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (observing that “[a] cause of action
accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable”).
Actual knowledge is not required “if the circumstances would led a reasonable person to
investigate further.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A
plaintiff need not realize that a legal cause of action exists; a plaintiff need only know the
facts that would support a claim.”).
Hampton knew or should have known of his claim for delayed medical care when
his surgical procedure was aborted due to complications on January 12, 2015. Because
Hampton did not execute his complaint against Dr. Brindley until well over two years
6
later on September 28, 2017 (Dkt. 1 at p. 5), his claim against Dr. Brindley for delaying
surgery is untimely and subject to dismissal. See Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. Accordingly,
Dr. Brindley’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
B.
Alternatively, the Claims Against Dr. Brindley Are Unexhausted
Even if timely filed, Dr. Brindley argues further that federal review of the claim
against him is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), because
Hampton did not properly exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit in
federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA prohibits any action by a prisoner in
federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning “prison conditions” until “such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
exhaustion requirement found in § 1997e(a) applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
“whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that § 1997e(a) mandates exhaustion of
all administrative procedures before an inmate can file any suit challenging prison
conditions. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 85 (2006); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007) (confirming that “[t]here
is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims
cannot be brought in court”).
It is well established that TDCJ has a formal two-step administrative grievance
process. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004); Wendell v.
Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998) (outlining the two-step procedure, which at Step
7
1 entails submitting an administrative grievance at the institutional level followed by a
Step 2 appeal if the result is unfavorable). According to the procedure that is outlined in
the TDCJ Offender Orientation Handbook, an inmate has “15 days from the date of the
alleged incident or occurrence of the issue presented” in which to complete a Step 1
grievance form and forward it to the unit grievance investigator (“UGI”). See TDCJ
Offender
Orientation
Handbook,
at
73-74
(Feb.
2017),
available
at
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Offender_Orientation_Handbook (last visited July
23, 2018). If the inmate is not satisfied with the result he received in the Step 1 response,
he may appeal the decision by filing a Step 2 grievance form within 15 days from the
return date shown on the front of the grievance form. See id. at 74.
Hampton, who has attached Step 1 and Step 2 grievance forms to his original
complaint (Dkt. 1-2 at pp. 1-4),4 argues that he has exhausted administrative remedies
where Dr. Brindley is concerned because he mentions the delay in surgery (Dkt. 10 at pp.
8-12). The Step 1 grievance submitted by Hampton is dated May 31, 2016 (Dkt. 1-2 at
pp. 1-2), which is well outside the 15 day time limit to complain about the care provided
by Dr. Brindley in January 2015. Moreover, neither the Step 1 nor the Step 2 grievance
forms submitted by Hampton reference Dr. Brindley or Hampton’s claim that Dr.
Brindley was to blame for delaying his surgery (Dkt. 1-2 at pp. 1-4). Instead, Hampton
complains primarily about Dr. Hulipas failing to make an emergency referral to his
4
Because Hampton has attached these grievances as exhibits to his complaint, they are
considered part of the complaint “for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Thus, the Court may
consider these exhibits for purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See United
States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2004).
8
dermatology doctor in Galveston (Id.). The UGI and the TDCJ Health Services Division
official who responded to these grievances investigated Hampton’s claims about Dr.
Hulipas and advised Hampton on August 26, 2016, that a referral had been made and that
he had upcoming appointments with dermatology in September 2016 and with an ENT
specialist in October 2016 (Id. at pp. 2, 4).
By not filing a grievance against Dr. Brindley within the 15-day time limit,
Hampton failed to comply with prison procedures. Substantial compliance with available
process is not enough to exhaust remedies under the PLRA. See Dillon v. Rogers, 596
F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under our strict approach, we have found that mere
‘substantial compliance’ with administrative remedy procedures does not satisfy
exhaustion.”).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the exhaustion requirement
found in the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), mandates “proper exhaustion,” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), which demands compliance with prison procedural rules.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded
corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal case.”
Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
By requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies, Congress hoped that “corrective action taken in
response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the
inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation.” Id. (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 737). In
addition to filtering out potentially frivolous claims, Congress also believed that internal
review would facilitate adjudication of cases ultimately brought to court by giving prison
9
officials an opportunity to develop an administrative record that clarifies the contours of
the controversy. Id. (citations omitted).
Hampton’s failure to comply with prison procedures by filing a timely grievance
setting forth his claims against Dr. Brindley means that he did not exhaust available
administrative remedies in compliance with prison procedures with respect to those
claims or the PLRA. Noting that exhaustion is mandatory, the Supreme Court has
recently emphasized that “a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take
[special] circumstances into account.” Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 185657 (2016) (citations omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir.
2012) (emphasizing that “pre-filing exhaustion of prior grievance process is mandatory”
and that district courts lack discretion to excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies). Because it is apparent that Hampton failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies regarding his claim against Dr. Brindley before filing suit in
federal court, his complaint against Dr. Brindley must be dismissed for this additional
reason.5 For this additional reason, Dr. Brindley’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
5
In addition, Dr. Brindley argues that the allegations against him fail to state a claim, noting that
surgery was delayed at Hampton’s request after Dr. Brindley was advised that his conditions had
improved (Dkt. 8 at pp. 3, 11). Hampton does not dispute that he told a unit medical provider on
August 29, 2011, that his condition had improved and that surgery may not be needed (Dkt. 10 at
p. 19). Hampton argues that Dr. Brindley violated his rights nevertheless because he did not
follow up to confirm that surgery was actually unnecessary (Id.). Because this argument relies
on facts outside of the pleadings, it is not one that can be considered under the standard of review
that applies to motions under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the Court does not address this
argument further.
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C.
The Claims Against Dr. Hulipas
1.
Official Immunity
Dr. Hulipas argues that he is entitled to official immunity from the claims brought
against him for actions taken while employed by TDCJ. In that regard, the Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit for money damages against TDCJ, as a state agency, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh
Amendment also bars a suit for money damages against TDCJ employees in their official
capacity. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2001); Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t
of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). To the extent that Hampton
sues Dr. Hulipas for monetary damages in his official capacity as a state employee, those
claims must be dismissed.
2.
Qualified Immunity
Dr. Hulipas argues that he is entitled to official immunity from the claims brought
against him in his personal or individual capacity. Public officials acting within the
scope of their authority generally are shielded from a suit for monetary damages by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A
plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must satisfy a two-prong inquiry by
showing: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted). Thus, the defense of qualified immunity
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 355, 341 (1986).
11
Dr. Hulipas argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of the
complaint against him because Hampton does not allege sufficient facts showing that he
was personally involved in making treatment decisions or that a constitutional violation
of the Eighth Amendment occurred. To succeed in stating a claim in this context a
prisoner must demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a “serious medical need” that
poses a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment where delayed access to medical care is
concerned, a prisoner must allege facts showing that he suffered “substantial harm” as the
result of the defendant’s deliberate indifference. See Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F3d 403,
410 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that “delay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results in substantial
harm”) (emphasis in original); Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006)
(same).
The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard is an “extremely high”
one to meet. Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
2001). To establish deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a
prisoner must show that the defendant was both (1) aware of facts from which an
inference of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety could be drawn, and (2)
subjectively drew an inference that such potential for harm existed. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Actions and decisions by officials that are merely
inept, erroneous, ineffective or negligent” do not amount to deliberate indifference. Doe
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998). A showing of deliberate
12
indifference to medical needs requires the prisoner to submit evidence that prison
officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him
incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hampton does not allege facts showing that Dr. Hulipas had any personal
involvement beyond receiving Hampton’s inmate request form, which inquired about a
referral to the UTMB Dermatology Department for symptoms of sarcoidosis (Dkt. 1-1 at
pp. 1-2).
Noting that a referral had been made and that Hampton already had an
appointment set for September 2016, Dr. Hulipas responded on May 31, 2016, by
encouraging Hampton to keep his scheduled appointments (Id. at p. 2). Hampton does
not assert that Dr. Hulipas had any previous personal involvement with his medical care
as a treating physician or that Dr. Hulipas was aware of an excessive risk to Hampton’s
health, but deliberately ignored Hampton’s request for a referral. Likewise, Hampton
does not provide any information about what treatment he received when he finally saw a
specialist in September 2016, and he does not otherwise allege specific facts showing that
he was substantially harmed by having to wait to see a specialist. Therefore, based on the
current state of the pleadings, the Court concludes that Hampton has not demonstrated
that Dr. Hulipas acted with the requisite deliberate indifference and he has not adequately
articulated a violation of the Eighth Amendment where Dr. Hulipas is concerned.
Accordingly, Dr. Hulipas’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted.
13
D.
Hampton’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Hampton has requested leave to file an amended complaint in this case. Because
it would futile to allow an amendment of the claims against Dr. Brindley, which are timebarred and unexhausted for reasons set forth above, those claims will be dismissed with
prejudice. However, in abundance of caution, the Court will allow Hampton to file an
amended complaint setting out with more detail his claim that Dr. Hulipas violated the
Eighth Amendment by delaying his access to medical care for sarcoidosis when he failed
to inquire further by conducting a physical examination in May 2016 or to make a
referral for Hampton to return to the UTMB Dermatology Department before his
scheduled appointment was set to occur in September 2016.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Paul Brindley (Dkt. 8) is GRANTED. The
claims against Dr. Brindley are SEVERED from this case and will be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Dr. Edgar Hulipas (Dkt. 16)
is GRANTED.
3. The motion for leave to amend filed by Plaintiff Jarrett Hampton (Dkt. 17) is
GRANTED, in part. Hampton shall file an amended complaint, limited to the
claims against Dr. Hulipas in his individual capacity, within thirty (30) days
of the date of this order. Plaintiff’s failure to comply as directed within the
14
time allowed will result in the dismissal of this case under Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. All other deadlines in this case are STAYED pending the plaintiff’s
compliance with the Court’s order granting him leave to amend. The Court
will issue a new scheduling order, if necessary, after the plaintiff has filed an
amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s instructions and the Court
has completed the screening required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, which governs this case. As a result, the defendants’ motions
requesting a stay of upcoming deadlines (Dkts. 12, 16) are MOOT.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
the parties of record.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 27th day of July, 2018.
___________________________________
George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge
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