Briggs v. Davis et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; (DUPLICATE ENTRY WRONG IMAGE ORIGINALLY ATTACHED) Email sent to Manager of Three Strikes List. (Signed by Judge George C Hanks, Jr) Parties notified.(dperez, 3)
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
DEREK BRIGGS,
TDCJ # 01666858
Plaintiff,
VS.
LORIE DAVIS, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, et al,
Defendants.
May 31, 2018
David J. Bradley, Clerk
§
§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-0034
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Derek Briggs, a state inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”), brings this lawsuit complaining of
events at the Darrington Unit in Brazoria County. Briggs alleges in his complaint (Dkt.
1) that he was dispensed medicine that did not belong to him. Because Briggs is a
prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) to scrutinize the pleadings. The Court must dismiss the case, in
whole or in part, if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing
all of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court concludes that this case must be
DISMISSED for the reasons that follow.
1 / 10
I.
BACKGROUND
Briggs brings claims against (1) Defendant Teresa Garces, whom he identifies as a
“charge nurse” at the Darrington Unit; (2) Defendant Betsy Zachariah, a supervisory
nurse at Darrington Unit; (3) Defendant “UTMB Medical President”; and, (4) Defendant
Lorie Davis, the Executive Director of TDCJ (Dkt. 1, at 3). He alleges that at the
Darrington Unit on September 15, 2017, he received a “KOP,” or “keep on person,”
medication pack that had another inmate’s name on it and was not intended for him (id. at
4). Briggs states that a doctor has ordered that he not be dispensed KOP medication
packs because he is a psychiatric patient and previously has attempted suicide by
overdosing (id. at 6). He claims that the KOP pack was given to him by an unnamed
“evening African pill nurse woman,” that she refused to take it back, and that she gave
him his “regular psych medication without asking for identification” (id. at 4). He claims
that Defendant Garces, the “charge nurse,” then took the KOP pack away from him in
“the medical room” (id. at 4, 6). He does not state how long the KOP medication was in
his possession, and does not claim that he consumed medicine that was intended for
another inmate.1 He apparently alleges that Garces failed to adequately correct the
actions of the “pill nurse.”
1
Briggs filed a grievance about the September 15, 2017, incident (Grievance Number
2018008015) and pursued the grievance through both stages of TDCJ’s administrative grievance
system. At Step One, TDCJ responded that Defendant Zachariah had investigated the issue and
would discuss it with “the appropriate discipline leader” (Dkt. 1-1, at 10-11). At Step Two,
Briggs continued to complain that the unnamed nurse had refused to let him return the KOP
medicine and had disregarded his life. TDCJ responded that, after review, documentation did
not support his claims, but rather showed that Briggs had been “escorted to the medical
department by security at which time [he] could not produce the medication [he] claimed to be
given” (id. at 12-13).
2 / 10
Briggs further alleges that, on the evening of January 1, 2018, a KOP blood
pressure pill pack was dropped in his cell “again” (Dkt. 1, at 9).
Although these
medicines had been prescribed to Briggs, he appears to allege that they should not have
been dispensed in a KOP pack because of the previous overdose attempt (id.).
Briggs does not allege any physical harm resulting from the alleged incidents on
September 15, 2017, or January 1, 2018. His complaint seeks $75,000 in damages for
“emotional distress” and a “violation that could have resulted in my death” (id. at 4).
Briggs’ complaint is undated and was docketed in the Eastern District of Texas,
Tyler Divison, on January 18, 2018. On February 8, 2018, the case was transferred to
this Court (Dkt. 5) because the alleged events occurred at the Darrington Unit in Brazoria
County, which is located in the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division. Since the
case was transferred, Briggs has submitted several letters regarding events occurring in
February and March 2018 at the Michael Unit, where Briggs currently is incarcerated
(Dkt. 9, 10, 11 & 13). The Michael Unit is located in the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler
Division.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court screens this case to determine whether the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff
proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction
and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
3 / 10
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff
must allege more than “’labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d
614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
(citation omitted). Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations
may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal
theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); McCormick v. Stalder, 105
F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997).
III.
ANALYSIS
Briggs sues four Defendants affiliated with TDCJ in connection with his receipt of
KOP packs on September 15, 2017, and January 1, 2018. Briggs alleges that he was
endangered by these incidents because of a previous overdose attempt. He does not
claim that he was physically harmed or that he consumed any medication that was not
prescribed to him.
Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a vehicle for a claim against a person
“acting under color of state law,” such as a state prison official, for a constitutional
violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir.
2002).
4 / 10
Because Briggs was, at all relevant times, a convicted felon in state prison, his
claims regarding medical care are governed by the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against “cruel and unusual” conditions of confinement. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 346 (1981); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (the Eighth
Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of
which is ‘reasonable safety’”).
A. Official immunity
Briggs seeks $75,000 in damages. To the extent he sues Defendants in their
official capacities as state employees, Defendants are entitled to immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment from claims for monetary damages. Unless expressly waived, the
Eleventh Amendment bars an action in federal court by a citizen of a state against his or
her own state. See Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630
(5th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir.
2002). The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against TDCJ or UTMB, as state agencies, or against state employees acting in their
official capacity. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2002).
Because Defendants in this case are sued for actions taken during the course of
their employment, any claims against them in their official capacity as state employees
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.
B. Emotional Injury
Briggs’ claim for damages is precluded by statute. He seeks $75,000 in damages
for his “emotional distress” resulting from the dispensation to him of KOP medication
packs. The PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), precludes an action for compensatory damages
5 / 10
“for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title
18).”
Because Briggs has not pleaded any physical injury in connection with the
incidents on September 15, 2017, or January 1, 2018, his claims must be dismissed on
this basis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
C. Eighth Amendment
Moreover, even if Briggs’ claims were not barred by official immunity or Section
1997e(e), they would fail under Eighth Amendment standards. To prevail on an Eighth
Amendment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants exhibited “deliberate
indifference” to his “serious medical needs, constituting an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Deliberate indifference is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.
Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). It requires “more than an allegation of mere
negligence, but less than an allegation of purpose or knowledge.” Hinojosa v. Livingston,
807 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 2015). “The mere delay of medical care can also constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation but only ‘if there has been deliberate indifference [that]
results in substantial harm.’” Easter, 467 F.3d at 463 (quoting Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989
F.2d 191. 193 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The Eighth Amendment standard has both an objective and subjective component.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
First, the prisoner must show
“objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d
6 / 10
339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006). Second, he must show that the defendant acted, or failed to act,
with deliberate indifference to the risk. Id. at 345-46. “A prison official acts with
deliberate indifference ‘only if [(A)] he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious bodily harm and [(B)] he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.’” Id. at 346 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).
Briggs alleges that he possessed a KOP pack that was not intended for him for an
unspecified amount of time on September 15, 2017, and that after he protested,
Defendant Garces took the KOP pack away from him. Taking all of Briggs’ allegations
as true, the unnamed pill nurse who gave him the KOP pack made an error, and the error
was corrected by Defendant Garces. Plaintiff did not consume the medication in the
KOP pack that was intended for another inmate and has not alleged any harm other than
emotional distress.
These allegations are plainly insufficient to state a claim for
“deliberate indifference” by Garces that caused Briggs an “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” See Easter, 467 F.3d at 463. Indeed, even if Briggs had pleaded
sufficient facts to support a claim of negligence by TDCJ staff, such allegations would be
insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard. See Hinojosa, 807 F.3d at 665.2 For the same reason, Briggs’ allegation that
2
To the extent Briggs claims that Defendant Garces should have disciplined the pill nurse,
specific personnel actions taken within TDCJ are irrelevant to his Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Easter, 467 F.3d at 463. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has cautioned against the courts intervening in matters of prison management.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (“the inquiry of federal courts into prison
management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition
of the Constitution”); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[w]hile federal courts
can certainly enter injunctions to prevent Eighth Amendment violations, they are not to
micromanage state prisons”).
7 / 10
his blood pressure medicine was improperly dispensed in a KOP pack on January 1,
2018, also fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
As for the other Defendants in this lawsuit, Briggs alleges that they are liable
because they employed incompetent staff or failed to properly train staff. See Dkt. 1, at 3
(Director Davis “dispense[d] incompetent UTMB nurses, reckless with meds”; the
“UTMB Medical President . . . employ[ed] incompetent medical staff”; Defendant
Zachariah was “in charge of poorly trained nurses”). Supervisory officials can be held
liable under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff demonstrates (1) the supervisor’s personal
involvement in the acts that caused the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient
causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the deprivation. See
Gates v. Texas Dep't of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008); Evett v.
Deep East Tex. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003). “A
supervisor may also be liable for failure to supervise or train if: ‘(1) the supervisor either
failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the
failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to
train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.’” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440,
446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.
2009)). In this case, Briggs alleges no personal involvement of the three supervisory
Defendants in the alleged events.
More fundamentally, as held above regarding
Defendant Garces, his allegations regarding his receipt of KOP meds are insufficient to
state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
8 / 10
His claims against the
supervisory defendants therefore fail. See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446; Gates, 537 F.3d at
435.
D.
Other Allegations
Plaintiff has filed multiple letters (Dkt. 9, 10, 11, & 13) complaining of events that
occurred at the Michael Unit in February and March 2018, after his complaint was filed
and after the case was transferred to this Court. Among other allegations, Briggs states
that TDCJ officials are not processing his grievances; that officials discontinuing his
Benadryl prescription, which he needs to control side effects from his psychiatric
medications; and that he has multiple, unaddressed medical issues.
He alleges that
officials are retaliating against him for various complaints he has lodged.
The events alleged in Briggs’ letters are irrelevant to his claim in this suit
regarding improper dispensation of KOP medicine packs. To the extent Briggs seeks
leave to file supplemental pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), the
Court denies the request. See Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998);
Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Lowrey v. Beach, 708 F.
App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2018). All of Briggs’ original claims have been dismissed, the
supplemental allegations are not germane to Briggs’ original claims, and Briggs could
bring a separate lawsuit to pursue any new claims. Additionally, the Court notes that the
alleged events in February and March occurred at the Michael Unit, which is not located
in this judicial district but rather in the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, and that
Plaintiff states in his letters that he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies
9 / 10
(see, e.g., Dkt. 10 & 11). For all of these reasons, the Court in its discretion denies leave
to file supplemental pleadings.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) for failure to
state a claim.
2.
The dismissal will count as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties and to the Manager
of the Three-Strikes List for the Southern District of Texas.
SIGNED at Galveston, Texas, this 31st day of May, 2018.
___________________________________
George C. Hanks Jr.
United States District Judge
10 / 10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?