Booth v. Galveston County et al

Filing 360

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATIONS re Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkts. 331 , 333 , 336 , 337 ). Objections to M&R due by 7/19/2023. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew M Edison) Parties notified. (RubenCastro, 3)

Case 3:18-cv-00104 Document 360 Filed on 07/05/23 in TXSD Page 1 of 5
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION

July 05, 2023
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

AARON BOOTH, on behalf of himself §
§
and all others similarly situated,
§
§
Plaintiff.
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-00104
§
V.
§
§
GALVESTON COUNTY, et al.,
§
§
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before me are motions to dismiss filed by the Galveston County
Magistrate Judges, the Galveston County District Court Judges, the Criminal
District Attorney for Galveston County, and Galveston County (collectively,
“Defendants”). See Dkts. 331, 333, 336–337. I recommend that the motions to
dismiss be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aaron Booth (“Booth”) brings this putative class action to challenge
the bail procedures in Galveston County. This Court previously denied motions to
dismiss by each of these defendants. See Dkts. 151, 165. Subsequently, this Court
certified a class consisting of “all people who are or will be detained in Galveston
County jail on felony and state-jail felony charges because they are unable to pay
secured bail set at magistration,” see Dkts. 213, 227, and issued a preliminary
injunction. See Dkts. 267, 279. Both the class certification order and the
preliminary injunction were appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
While those appeals were pending, “some significant events . . . occurred,
including the passage of Texas Senate Bill 6 addressing bail reform and [the Fifth
Circuit’s] en banc opinion in Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022)
(en banc).” Booth v. Galveston County, No. 19-40395, 2022 WL 2702059, at *1
(5th Cir. July 12, 2022). The three-judge panel handling the class certification

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appeal decided that “the jurisdictional questions raised by Daves and the mootness
and potential alteration of the description of the class raised by the Senate Bill
impact this appeal.” Id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated without prejudice
the class certification order and remanded the case back to this Court “for
consideration of the jurisdictional questions (including mootness) in the first
instance and then, if jurisdiction remains, determination in the first instance of
whether an appropriate class remains for certification.” Id.
Following remand, I gave Booth an opportunity to amend his complaint. The
Second Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading. See Dkt. 327.
Defendants each moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, and I heard
oral arguments on February 27, 2023. Following the hearing on Defendants’
motions, I received supplemental briefing from the parties. See Dkts. 354–355. On
March 31, 2023, the Fifth Circuit issued a second en banc decision in Daves, a case
in which a number of plaintiffs challenged Dallas County’s bail procedures. See
Daves v. Dallas County (“Daves II”), 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023). The Fifth Circuit
held in Daves II that plaintiffs’ claims became moot as a result of the passage of
Senate Bill 6 (“S.B. 6”), legislation that went into effect in September 2021,
imposing uniform minimum procedural requirements on bail practices
throughout the Lone Star State. See id. at 633–35. In Daves II, the Fifth Circuit
also addressed the abstention doctrine, holding that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), and its progeny “require[] federal courts to abstain from revising state
bail bond procedures on behalf of those being criminally prosecuted, when state
procedures allow the accused adequate opportunities to raise their federal claims.”
64 F.4th at 620. In light of Daves II, I asked the parties to provide “full briefing on
how the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of mootness and abstention impacts this case.”
Dkt. 356. The parties provided robust briefing on whether and how Daves II
impacts this case. See Dkts. 357–359.
I have now had the opportunity to consider the voluminous briefing in this
case, the parties’ oral arguments, and the law. Defendants advance a number of
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reasons why this action should be dismissed, but only one merits discussion:
mootness. Right, wrong, or otherwise, the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Daves II
forecloses any further consideration of the claims in this matter.
ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit vacated the class certification order in this case and
instructed this Court to consider “jurisdictional questions (including mootness) in
the first instance.” Booth, 2022 WL 2702059, at *1 (emphasis added). Only if
jurisdiction remains am I to consider matters regarding class certification.
Accordingly, questions of standing pertain to one person and one person only:
Booth. See Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 333
(5th Cir. 2002) (“The question of Article III standing must be decided prior to the
prudential standing and class certification issues.”).
Although the end of Booth’s criminal case did not render his claims moot,
see Dkt. 151 at 8–10, the Fifth Circuit has clearly held that the passage of S.B. 6
rendered pre-S.B. 6 bail-practice-challenges moot. See Daves II, 64 F.4th at 635
(“[T]he provisions of S.B. 6 and their implementation are alleged to raise
constitutional issues beyond the scope of this case and the circumstances of the
plaintiffs who filed it. The case is moot.”). Booth attempts to avoid this inevitable
result with two arguments: (1) that he has sufficiently alleged deficient post-S.B. 6
procedures,

and

(2) that

his

Sixth

Amendment

right-to-counsel

claim

distinguishes this case from Daves. Neither argument carries the day.
I agree that Booth has alleged deficient post-S.B. 6 procedures. But Booth
overlooks the fact “[t]hat [he] ha[s] not been subject to bail proceedings since years
before the advent of S.B. 6[, which] calls into question [his] ability to pursue this
litigation for ongoing injunctive relief as [an] injured part[y], much less class
representative[].” Id. at 634. Because Booth was not magistrated after the
implementation of S.B. 6, he “lack[s] a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Id. (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). Without a personal
stake in this controversy, Booth is not entitled to “a fair opportunity to present and
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contest evidence of S.B. 6’s implementation.” Dkt. 358 at 7. Fifth Circuit Judge
Leslie H. Southwick put it best:
The Texas legislature’s adoption of new rules for addressing bail in
trial courts has entirely changed the relevant factual and legal
underpinnings for the dispute. If a federal district court is the proper
venue for a challenge to those procedures, it needs to be based on a
new complaint in a new lawsuit.
Daves II, 64 F.4th at 636 (Southwick, J., concurring).
Booth also tries to distinguish Daves by arguing that “rather than seeking
relief beyond what [the Fifth Circuit] requires as a matter of due process, [Booth’s]
claim is premised on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a different right
altogether.” Dkt. 358 at 7. But the nature of Booth’s claims does not change the fact
that he is challenging a system that no longer exists. It is entirely possible that
Galveston County’s bail practices both before and after S.B. 6 fail to “measure[] up
to [Booth’s] proffered constitutional minima.” Daves II, 64 F.4th at 635. But that
is not the relevant jurisdictional threshold:
The crux of this case is now whether the new state law, if applied
assiduously by [Galveston] County magistrates, measures up
to . . . constitutional minima. S.B. 6 is heavily procedural in nature,
just like [Booth’s] alleged claims . . . . Thus, both the provisions of S.B.
6 and their implementation are alleged to raise constitutional issues
beyond the scope of this case and the circumstances of the
plaintiff[] who filed it. The case is moot.
Id. (emphasis added). The excellent lawyers on both sides of this case have spent
many years arguing these issues. I hate to recommend dismissal of this case after
all this effort, but that is the result that Daves II compels.
Whether I agree with this result is completely irrelevant. I am required to
abide by Fifth Circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit has spoken loudly and
clearly. The proper vehicle to pursue claims that Galveston County’s bail practices
suffer from constitutional deficiencies today is a new lawsuit objecting to post-S.B.
6 bail proceedings by an individual who was subject to post-S.B. 6 practices. See
id. at 654 (Southwick, J., concurring) (“Any future litigation about bail in
[Galveston] County would need to address the new law labeled S.B. 6. . . . Those
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procedures are the ones that now must provide adequate, timely mechanisms for
adjudicating constitutional claims.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that Defendants’ motions to
dismiss (Dkts. 331, 333, 336–337) be GRANTED and this case dismissed as moot.
The Clerk shall provide copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have 14 days from receipt to file written objections
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and General Order 2002–13. Failure
to file written objections within the time period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved
party from attacking the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED this 5th day of July 2023.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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