Edward v. Demyers et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 20 Supplement (Signed by Judge Jeffrey V Brown) Parties notified.(GeorgeCardenas, 4)
Case 3:18-cv-00140 Document 21 Filed on 07/30/20 in TXSD Page 1 of 8
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 30, 2020
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDavid J. Bradley, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
══════════
No. 3:18-cv-140
══════════
NATHANIEL EDWARD, TDCJ #02046770, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MAJOR KENDRICK DEMYERS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
═══════════════════════════════════════
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
═══════════════════════════════════════
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Nathaniel Edward, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
this suit while a prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice—Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”). Edward filed a civil-rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that TDCJ Executive Director Bryan
Collier and certain TDCJ prison employees violated his right to free exercise of his
religion (Rastafarianism) under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”), the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“TRFRA”), and
the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (“TERA”) (Dkts. 1, 7, 8-1).1
Throughout this memorandum opinion, the court’s citations to specific
pages in the record refer to the pagination of docket entries on the court’s
electronic case-filing (“ECF”) system.
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In July 2019, Collier moved to partially dismiss, requesting dismissal of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment, TRFRA, and TERA claims (Dkt. 10). And in
November 2019, Collier moved for summary judgment, requesting that the
RLUIPA claim be dismissed (Dkt. 16). On March 24, 2020, the court granted
Collier’s motion to dismiss Edward’s First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,
TRFRA, and TERA claims (Dkt. 18). In April 2020, Collier filed a supplemental
motion for summary judgment, advising the court that Edward had been released
from prison, thus making the sole relief Edward seeks under RLUIPA—to grow
his hair to shoulder length—moot (Dkt. 20). Edward has not responded to either
motion for summary judgment, and the time to respond has expired. Having
reviewed the motions, the briefing, the applicable law, and all matters of record,
the court concludes that the supplemental motion for summary judgment should
be granted.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Curtis v.
Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013). The initial burden falls on the movant
to identify “those portions of the record it believes demonstrates the absence of a
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genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349
(5th Cir. 2005). To meet its burden, the movant “does not need to negate the
elements of the claims on which the nonmoving parties would bear the burden of
proof at trial,” but instead, need only “point out the absence of evidence
supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655
(5th Cir. 1996) (internal citation marks and quotations omitted).
Once the movant presents a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show with significant probative
evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue
Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must
present specific facts which show “the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning
every essential component of its case.” Firman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d
533, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144
F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)). “Conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated
assertions” do not meet the non-movant’s burden. Delta & Pine Land Co. v.
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2008).
Edward proceeds pro se in this case. Courts construe pleadings filed by pro
se litigants under a less stringent standard of review. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, “[a] document filed pro se is
‘to be liberally construed,’ . . . and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
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lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, pro se litigants are still required to explain
or identify specific facts in support of their claims. See United States v. Stanford,
805 F.3d 557, 572 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 1993)).
As noted above, Edward has not filed a response to either motion for
summary judgment. According to the local rules, any failure to respond to a
motion is taken as a representation of no opposition.
S.D. Tex. R. 7.4.
Notwithstanding Edward’s failure to respond, summary judgment may not be
awarded by default, even if failure to respond violates a local rule. Hibernia Nat’l
Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted); Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3
(5th Cir. 1995). In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, the
district court may accept as undisputed the facts set forth in the unopposed
motion. See Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988).
II.
DISCUSSION
In his supplemental motion for summary judgment, Collier argues that the
sole relief Edward seeks in his remaining claim—to grow his hair to shoulder
length—was rendered moot by his release from prison (Dkt. 20, at 3). Because the
claim is moot, argues Collier, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (id. at 5).
Attached to the supplemental motion for summary judgment is a certified business
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record from TDCJ indicating that Edward’s date for discharge was March 18, 2020
(Dkt. 20-1).2 Publicly available records also show that Edward is no longer
incarcerated within the TDCJ prison system. See Offender Information Search,
Texas
Dep’t
of
Criminal
Justice,
https://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/OffenderSearch/start.action (last visited July 29,
2020). Additionally, the court’s March 24 order granting Collier’s motion for
partial dismissal was returned as undeliverable, along with a notation that Edward
has been discharged from prison (Dkt. 19). Edward has not updated the court with
his most recent address.
The issue of whether a case is moot presents a jurisdictional question
because it implicates the Article III requirement that an actual controversy exist at
all stages of federal-court proceedings. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998); Bailey v. Sutherland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “A
controversy is mooted when there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient
legal interests to maintain the litigation. A moot case presents no Article III case
In the supplemental motion for summary judgment, Collier states that
Edward is no longer housed at the “Skyview Unit” or incarcerated within TDCJ (see
Dkt. 20, at 4–5). It appears that the reference to the Skyview Unit is in error. At
the time Edward filed his complaint and amended complaint, he was housed at the
Stringfellow Unit, which is in Brazoria County, and is within the jurisdiction of this
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(b)(1); (Dkts. 1, at 3; 8-1, at 3). There is no indication
from the record that Edward was transferred to the Skyview Unit, which is a
psychiatric facility located in Rusk County. See Unit Directory -- Skyview, Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/unit_directory/sv.html
(last visited July 29, 2020).
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or controversy, and a court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues
it presents.” Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
Where, as here, an inmate seeks only injunctive relief, his release from
prison moots his claims. See, e.g., Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that inmate’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief became
moot when inmate was transferred out of the complained-of prison facility);
Walters v. Livingston, 642 F. App’x 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal of prisoner’s freedom-of-religion claims as proper because
inmate’s claims became moot upon his release from prison); Busick v. Neal, 380
F. App’x 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s claims
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that he was denied his right
to religious freedom at the jail were rendered moot by his transfer from the jail);
Edward v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of
claims seeking injunctive relief when inmate was no longer housed at complainedof prison facility).
Because Edward is no longer incarcerated in any facility maintained by
TDCJ—and, thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged violation will
recur—Collier has demonstrated that Edward’s request for injunctive relief is
moot. See Herman, 238 F.3d at 665 (holding that inmate’s request for injunctive
relief became moot when inmate was transferred out of prison facility and “[a]ny
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suggestion of relief based on the possibility of transfer back to the [facility] is too
speculative to warrant relief”); Busick, 380 F. App’x at 398 (explaining that since
prisoner was transferred away from jail facility and there was no indication that he
would return to the facility, his claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
were moot).
Thus, because a moot claim “no longer present[s] a case or controversy
under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution[,]” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, mootness
deprives a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Savidge v. Fincannon,
836 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “mootness removes a federal
court’s authority to adjudicate”); Fox v. Bd. of Trs., 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he condition of mootness . . . is a condition that deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, this civil action should be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the court ORDERS as follows:
1.
2.
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Defendant Collier’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Religious Land Use of Institutionalized
Persons Act (Dkt. 20) is GRANTED.
Edward’s claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Case 3:18-cv-00140 Document 21 Filed on 07/30/20 in TXSD Page 8 of 8
3.
Any remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
The clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
30th
Signed on Galveston Island this ____ day of
July
, 2020.
_____________________________
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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