Scott M Heaton v Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION 18 Motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and the Commissioners 19 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew M Edison) Parties notified.(RubenCastroadi, 4)
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
SCOTT M. HEATON,
Plaintiff.
VS.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
January 07, 2022
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00280
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
Plaintiff Scott M. Heaton (“Heaton”) seeks judicial review of an
administrative decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). See Dkt. 1. Before me are
competing motions for summary judgment filed by Heaton and Defendant Kilolo
Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Administration” or “Commissioner”).1 See Dkts. 18, 19. After reviewing the
briefing, the record, and the applicable law, Heaton’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED
BACKGROUND
Heaton filed an application for supplemental security income under Title II
of the Act on April 19, 2017, alleging disability beginning on July 11, 2014. His
application was denied and denied again upon reconsideration. Subsequently, an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and found that Heaton was not
On July 9, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration and is automatically substituted as a party under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
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disabled. Heaton filed an appeal with the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council
denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final and ripe for judicial review.
APPLICABLE LAW
The standard of judicial review for disability appeals is provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Courts reviewing the Commissioner’s denial of social security disability
applications limit their analysis to (1) whether the Commissioner applied the
proper legal standards, and (2) whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence. See Estate of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744,
745 (5th Cir. 2000). Addressing the evidentiary standard, the Fifth Circuit has
explained:
Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it
must be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance. It
is the role of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts
in the evidence. As a result, [a] court cannot reweigh the evidence, but
may only scrutinize the record to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. A
finding of no substantial evidence is warranted only where there is a
conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical
evidence.
Ramirez v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Judicial
review is limited to the reasons relied on as stated in the ALJ’s decision, and post
hoc rationalizations are not to be considered. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
Under the Act, “a claimant is disabled only if she is incapable of engaging in
any substantial gainful activity.” Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992) (cleaned up). The ALJ uses a five-step approach to determine if a claimant
is disabled, including:
(1) whether the claimant is presently performing substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past
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relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kneeland v.
Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The burden of proof lies with the claimant during the first four steps before
shifting to the Commissioner at Step 5. See id. Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ
considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which serves as an
indicator of the claimant’s capabilities given the physical and mental limitations
detailed in the administrative record. See Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754. The RFC also
helps the ALJ “determine whether the claimant is able to do her past work or other
available work.” Id.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at Step 1 that Heaton had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since April 19, 2017, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.), or the
alleged onset of July 11, 2014.” Dkt. 16-3 at 14.
The ALJ found at Step 2 that Heaton suffered from “the following severe
impairments: hypertension, ventral hernia, degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, morbid obesity, obstructive pulmonary restrictive disease, sleep
apnea, depression, anxiety and alcohol dependence.” Id.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that none of these impairments met any of the
Social Security Administration’s listed impairments.
Prior to consideration of Step 4, the ALJ determined Heaton’s RFC as
follows:
[Heaton] has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary
work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a). [Heaton] cannot climb ladders,
ropes or scaffolds. He is able to bend, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl
only occasionally. [Heaton] should work in a climate control
environment such as air conditioned without pulmonary irritants not
found in the normal controlled environment such as air conditioned.
He is able to walk 30 to 45 minutes at a time but has to use a cane to
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mobilize. Mentally, [Heaton] is limited to simple and detailed work
with frequent interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public.
Id. at 19.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that Heaton is unable to perform any past relevant
work. See id. at 25. At step five, the ALJ considered Heaton’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC in conjunction with the Medical Vocational Guidelines and
the testimony of a vocational expert to determine if there was any other work he
could perform. The ALJ concluded that Heaton “is capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. A finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate.” Id. at 28.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Heaton contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is “erroneous
because it fails to properly accommodate for all of [his] impairments.” Dkt. 18 at 5.
Specifically, Heaton claims that the ALJ’s finding that he can perform sedentary
work is internally inconsistent. His argument on this point is muddled. First, he
notes that an individual working at the sedentary level is required to “occasionally”
stand and walk and “lift[] and carry[] articles like docket files, ledgers, and small
tools.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a)). Next, he explains that in terms of walking
or standing, “occasionally” means that “periods of standing or wal[k]ing should
generally total no more than about 2 hours out of an 8 hour day.” Id. (citing Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5). After pointing out that the
ALJ limited his standing and walking to 30 to 45 minutes at a time and indicated
that he would need to use a cane when walking, Heaton sums up by arguing that
the ALJ erred in not limiting his ability to lift or carry in any way, despite the fact
that at least one of his hands and arms would be occupied by the use of a cane.2 See
id. at 6. In my view, this argument is misguided.
Heaton cites only one case in support of his argument: Villarreal v. Colvin, 221 F. Supp.
3d 835, 851 (W.D. Tex. 2016). However, I find that Villarreal is inapposite. In Villarreal,
the ALJ determined that the claimant could perform a range of “light work” but described
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As stated in SSR 83-10: “‘Occasionally’ means occurring from very little up
to one-third of the time.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5. While the regulation
further limits walking and standing (i.e., a maximum of 2 hours out of an 8-hour
day), no such additional limitation is imposed on an individual’s ability to lift and
carry. This means that the ALJ’s RFC implicitly limited Heaton to lifting and
carrying articles from very little up to one-third of the time. “Very little,” the
descriptor of the low end of the metric, is certainly an amorphous description. But
no matter how I slice it, any additional detail provided by the ALJ would certainly
fall within the range of “from very little up to one-third of the time.” Id. In other
words, the ALJ simply did not err.3
CONCLUSION
For the reason provided above, Heaton’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
SIGNED this __ day of January 2022.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
specific limitations that failed to meet the statutory definition of “light work.” See id. at
851–52. Based on this incongruity, the court reversed the ALJ. See id. This type of
inconsistency is not at issue in this case.
This conclusion is only bolstered by the fact that ultimately the ALJ relied on the
testimony of a vocational expert, who expressly identified jobs that Heaton could perform
notwithstanding his cane usage. See Dkt. 16-3 at 74–78.
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