Granville et al v. Livingston et al
Filing
64
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 41 defendants' motion for summary judgment; Any additional motions for summary judgment deemed appropriate by defendants must be filed by 6/11/2012. Plaintiffs objections to defendants exhibits attached to the motion for summary judgment are DENIED. THIS IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.(Signed by Judge Gray H. Miller) Parties notified.(rkonieczny)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
R OBERT K. G RANVILLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
N ATHANIEL Q UARTERMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
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C IVIL A CTION H-07-0849
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this section
1983 lawsuit against prison officials Nathaniel Quarterman, Tim Morgan, and Kevin Wheat
for violations of the free exercise clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, et seq. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 41), to which plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry
No. 48).
Based on consideration of the pleadings, the motion and response, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for
summary judgment, and ORDERS as follows.
Background and Claims
Plaintiff complains that the following prison policies and practices violate RLUIPA
and his First Amendment free exercise rights:
(a)
prison prohibition against inmates attending religious services while on
disciplinary cell restriction;
(b)
prison policy that requires inmates walk unclothed in the hallway to the
showers in view of female employees and other males; and
(c)
prison prohibition against inmates wearing boxer shorts while
showering.
He seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.1
Defendants move for summary judgment and contend that plaintiff’s claims regarding
the religious services cell restriction policy are moot because TDCJ amended AD-03.70 (rev.
5) to allow inmates on cell restriction to attend religious services, that plaintiff suffered no
violation of RLUIPA by being disallowed from showering in boxer shorts or being required
to walk unclothed to the showers, and that he failed to exhaust his First Amendment claims.
Summary Judgment Standards
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must examine the evidence and
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; summary
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1994).
To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must adduce admissible evidence
which creates a fact issue concerning existence of every essential component of that party’s
case; unsubstantiated assertions of actual dispute will not suffice. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Thomas v. Price, 975 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth
Circuit has stated that once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must direct
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By separate order pursuant to section 1915A, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for
compensatory and punitive damages and his claims regarding prison storage policies (Docket Entry
No. 21). Further, plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief under RLUIPA as to any of his claims.
See Sossamon v. Texas, ___U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011).
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the court’s attention to admissible evidence in the record which demonstrates that it can
satisfy a fair-minded jury that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor. ContiCommodity
Services, Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1995).
Summary judgment should be granted when the moving party presents evidence which
negates any essential element of the opposing party’s claim, including a showing that an
essential element of the opposing party’s claim is without factual support. First American
Bank & Trust of Louisiana v. Texas Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1994). The
granting of summary judgment is proper if the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Caldas
& Sons v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1994). Once the movant makes this
showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant to come forward with evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id., 17 F.3d at 126–27.
Although the Court must draw all inferences in favor of the party opposing the
motion, an opposing party cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact by resting on the
mere allegations of the pleadings. Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.
1991). Similarly, a bald allegation of a factual dispute is insufficient, in itself, to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Recile, 10 F.3d at 1097. In short, a properly supported motion
for summary judgment should be granted unless the opposing party produces sufficient
probative evidence to show that a genuine factual issue exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Hulsey, 929 F.2d at 170.
Religious Services Cell Restriction Policy
A threshold question in this case is whether plaintiff’s constitutional and RLUIPA
claims regarding the prison’s religious services cell restriction policy presents a justiciable
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controversy under the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement. See U.S. C ONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims are moot because, under the
amended policy, inmates on cell restriction may now attend religious services. The mootness
doctrine requires that any controversy posed by a plaintiff in his complaint be “live” not only
at the time the complaint is filed but also throughout the litigation process. Rocky v. King,
900 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s claims against the religious services cell restriction policy are moot under
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sossamon v. Texas, ___U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.
1651 (2011), and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions in DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d
145, 150 (5th Cir. 2011). In Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 324 (5th
Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit held that the prison system’s cessation of the religious services
cell restriction policy had the effect of mooting an inmate’s request for injunctive and
declaratory relief. 560 F.3d at 326. This holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Sossamon v. Texas. The Fifth Circuit recently cited Sossamon in holding that a challenge to
the prison’s policy that inmates confined in their cells for disciplinary infractions were
prohibited from attending religious services became moot for purposes of injunctive and
declaratory relief due to the prison’s voluntary abandonment of the policy. DeMoss v. Crain,
636 F.3d 145, 150–51 (5th Cir. 2011). These cases govern the summary disposition of
plaintiff’s instant challenges to the now defunct religious services cell restriction policy.
Further, because he presents no probative summary judgment evidence that the policy
change was intended as a temporary resolution of the claims raised in this lawsuit or that
prison officials presently intend to restore the prior policy, plaintiff fails to show grounds for
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not holding his claims moot. Additionally, plaintiff’s request for costs of court should he
prevail in this lawsuit does not prevent the dismissal of his underlying claims as moot.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff’s
challenges to the religious services cell restriction policy are DISMISSED.
Religious Freedom Claims
Plaintiff claims that his constitutional right to religious freedom was violated by
prison policies prohibiting inmates from wearing boxer shorts while showering and requiring
them to walk unclothed to the showers in view of female employees and other males. He
states that his religious faith requires him to maintain modesty. He seeks a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief under these claims.
Defendants do not seek summary judgment on the merits of these claims; instead, they
contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust the claims through the prison grievance system prior
to filing suit. The Court notes, however, that plaintiff attached copies of what would appear
to be the relevant step 1 and step 2 grievances to his original complaint. (Docket Entry No.
1-1, pp. 4–7.) Consequently, defendants have not met their burden of proof as to exhaustion,
and their motion for summary judgment on these claims is DENIED.
RLUIPA Claims
Plaintiff also claims that these same two policies – prohibiting inmates from wearing
boxer shorts while showering and requiring them to walk unclothed down the hall to the
showers – violate protections afforded him by RLUIPA. He seeks a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief.
Under RLUIPA, a government is prohibited from imposing a substantial burden on
a prisoner’s exercise of religious freedom unless there is a compelling governmental interest
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and the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc–1. Therefore, in order to make a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must initially
show that the prison’s regulations imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of religious
activity. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2004). A governmental action
or regulation creates a “substantial burden” on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the
offender significantly to modify his religious behavior and significantly violates his religious
beliefs. Id. at 569–70. If a plaintiff meets his burden of proof, the burden shifts to the
government to “demonstrate that its action was supported by a compelling interest and that
the regulation is the least restrictive means of carrying out that interest.” Mayfield v. Tex.
Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 2008). Although RLUIPA imposes
strict scrutiny of prison regulations, courts are to apply the RLUIPA test “with due deference
to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary
regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with
consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–23
(2005). Thus, RLUIPA does not elevate accommodation of religious observances over a
prison’s need to maintain order, security, and safety, consistent with consideration of costs
and limited resources. A prison is free to resist requests for religious accommodations that
either impose unjustified burdens on other prisoners, or jeopardize the effective functioning
of a prison. Id. at 725–26.
Plaintiff alleges that being required to walk down the prison hall unclothed and to
shower without wearing boxing shorts imposes a substantial burden on his exercise of
religious activity, in that his faith requires he not appear unclothed before any female other
than his wife, or before any male not within his own family. The Court finds that this
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allegation is sufficient to shift the burden to the State and require it to show that its actions
were supported by a compelling interest and that the subject policies are the least restrictive
means of carrying out that interest.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants submit the affidavit of
Charles Bell, Assistant Director of Prison Security, who testifies as follows:
The mission of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) is to provide
safe and appropriate confinement, supervision, rehabilitation and reintegration
of adult felons, and to effectively manage or administer correctional facilities
based on constitutional and statutory standards. The Correctional Institutions
Division is responsible for the confinement of adult felony offenders who are
sentenced to prison. As part of our public trust, we must operate safe and
secure facilities in as fiscally sound a manner as possible.
Plaintiff complains about the TDCJ policy that requires inmates to be naked
in the shower. Due to the design of the shower rooms at the older units, such
as Wynne and Clemens Units, the offenders are routinely escorted nude in
groups into the shower room.2 After they finish their shower and dry off they
proceed to a ‘necessity line’ where they are issued clean clothes and get
dressed. Only in extraordinary situations are female correctional officers
assigned to the shower. However, there is always the possibility that a female
could pass by on her way to an assignment or other duty in that area.
In the newer units, such as Michael and Connally, it is less likely that a female
will view an inmate in the shower area. There is a door that covers the
mid-torso area of the showering/dressing males. However, there are female
officers assigned to positions as rovers, who while working in the cellblocks
may at times be in a position to observe males entering/exiting the showers.
Although, as noted above, TDCJ makes every attempt to reduce the likelihood
that a male inmate will be viewed naked, there are few alternatives which
would completely eliminate the possibility that female officers may at times
view offenders during the shower process. Women account for about 38.1%
of the TDCJ security workforce. At any male-populated unit, the female
officers are typically assigned to any duty station that a male officer would
work except for the shower areas. These duty stations would include desk
assignments, library, education, rover, picket and field force. Unless a critical
or emergency situation arose, only male officers are assigned to certain jobs
2
Plaintiff is assigned to the Estelle Unit.
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such as the shower area. Females are assigned to the shower area only in
extraordinary circumstances and when no reasonable alternative exists.
Additionally, allowing all offenders to wear boxer shorts in the shower area
would pose a tremendous security problem, allowing more chances for
contraband to be exchanged, or weapons to be concealed, in this small,
enclosed space.
(Docket Entry No. 41, Exhibit C.)
Defendants contend that this affidavit testimony establishes that plaintiff suffered no
violation of RLUIPA because the challenged policies are both in furtherance of a substantial
government interest and the least restrictive means of fulfilling that interest. However, the
affidavit testimony misses the mark. Plaintiff does not limit his complaints to being seen
naked in the shower by female prison employees; to the contrary, he complains that he must
travel down the prison hall unclothed in view of other inmates and prison employees, male
and female alike, and that he must shower completely unclothed, again in view of other
inmates and prison employees. Moreover, the affidavit wholly fails to discuss the essential
RLUIPA factors: that the prison’s actions were supported by a compelling interest and that
the subject policies are the least restrictive means of carrying out that interest. Accordingly,
defendants present no probative summary judgment evidence in support of their position that
the subject policies did not violate plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA.
The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to plaintiff’s claims brought
pursuant to RLUIPA.
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Conclusion
The Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 41) is
GRANTED IN PART, and plaintiff’s claims regarding the religious services
cell restriction policy are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
2.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 41) is DENIED
IN PART, and plaintiff’s First Amendment religious freedom claims regarding
prison policies prohibiting the wearing of boxer shorts in showers and
requiring inmates to walk to the showers unclothed are RETAINED.
3.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 41) is DENIED
IN PART, and plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA are RETAINED.
4.
Any additional motion for summary judgment deemed appropriate by
defendants must be filed by JUNE 11, 2012.
5.
Plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ exhibits attached to the motion for
summary judgment are DENIED.
THIS IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
Signed at Houston, Texas on April 16, 2012.
__________________________________
Gray H. Miller
United States District Judge
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