Jones et al v. Halliburton Company et al
Filing
359
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 355 Sealed Event, DENYING 354 MOTION for Attorney Fees.(Signed by Judge Keith P Ellison) Parties notified.(sloewe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JAMIE LEIGH JONES,
§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
v.
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:07-cv-2719
§
HALLIBURTON COMPANY D/B/A KBR §
KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT (KBR),
§
ET AL.
§
§
Defendants.
§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are an Application for Costs (Doc. No. 353), a Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 354), and a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees from L. Todd
Kelly and the Kelly Law Firm, P.C. (Doc. No. 355). These motions were filed by
Defendants Halliburton Company d/b/a KBR Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), Kellogg
Brown & Root, Services, Inc., Kellogg Brown & Root International, Inc., Kellogg Brown
& Root, LLC, Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., KBR Technical Services, Inc., and Overseas
Administrative Services, Ltd. (collectively, the “KBR Defendants” or “KBR”). After
reviewing the KBR Defendants’ motions, the responses, and the applicable law, the Court
finds that the Application for Costs must be GRANTED, and that both motions for
attorneys’ fees must be DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arose out of events that allegedly occurred while Plaintiff Jamie
Leigh Jones (“Plaintiff” or “Jones”) was employed by the KBR Defendants. Jones’
1
claims in this case were related to her alleged sexual assault by Defendant Charles Bortz,
and the subsequent retaliation allegedly imposed by the KBR Defendants. As against the
KBR Defendants, Jones asserted claims for negligence, negligent undertaking, sexual
harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII, retaliation under Title VII,
breach of contract, fraud in the inducement to enter an employment contract, fraud in the
inducement to agree to arbitration, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false
imprisonment. (Pl. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 53.) On May 24, 2011, the Court granted
summary judgment to KBR on Jones’ negligence, negligent undertaking, retaliation,
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment
claims. (Doc. No. 212.) On July 6, 2011, the Court granted KBR a directed verdict on
Jones’ claims for fraud in the inducement to agree to arbitrate, fraud in the inducement by
non-disclosure to enter into an employment contract, and respondeat superior liability.
The Court presided over a bench trial which began on June 13, 2011 and ended on
July 7, 2011. On July 8, the jury found in favor of all defendants, including KBR. On
August 3, 2011, the Court signed a judgment for KBR on Jones’ claims of sexual
harassment under Title VII and fraudulent inducement to enter into an employment
contract by misrepresentation. The Court entered judgment on August 5, 2011.
II.
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), “costs—other than attorney’s
fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” The KBR Defendants are the prevailing
party under Rule 54(d)(1). Section 1920 of Title 28 of the United States Code enumerates
a list of specific costs which may be recovered by the prevailing party. These costs
include:
2
(1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in
the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4)
fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case; (5) docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6)
compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, and expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
In the Application for Costs, the KBR Defendants indicate that their total costs
amount to $145,073.19. In support of this figure, the KBR Defendants provide an
affidavit of KBR attorney Susan E. Cates, a summary of the taxable costs, and invoices
documenting the costs. Specifically, the KBR Defendants incurred $59,508.43 in
transcript fees; $13,395.91 in fees for printing; $14,868.85 in witness fees; and $57,300
in fees for the court appointed expert in this case. KBR indicates—and Plaintiff’s
Response does not contest—that the expedited transcripts in this case were “necessary for
meeting court deadlines and for supporting [KBR’s] planned motion for costs” and that
these transcripts were not ordered “for the convenience of [KBR’s] counsel.” (Doc. No.
353, at 4.) Because the KBR Defendants’ costs fall within the recoverable costs
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court finds that KBR’s Application for Costs must
be granted.
III.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The KBR Defendants also move for an award of attorneys’ fees under Title VII,
which authorizes courts to award prevailing parties “a reasonable attorney’s fee
(including expert fees) as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k). A plaintiff may be
liable for a defendant’s attorneys’ fees under Title VII if the court finds that the plaintiff’s
3
claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate
her claim after it clearly became so. Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
422 (1978). A plaintiff’s bad faith in bringing or continuing to pursue a Title
VII claim provides an even stronger basis for awarding attorneys’ fees to a defendant. Id.
A. Title VII Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment
Claims
The jury’s consideration of Jones’ Title VII sexual harassment and hostile work
environment claims was predicated on a finding that Jones was raped by Defendant
Charles Bortz. 1 Because the jury concluded that Jones was not raped by Charles Bortz, it
did not consider the sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims. In its
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, KBR cites Jones’ lack of evidence regarding her alleged rape
and the changes to her story over the past six years as proof that her story was fabricated.
As support, KBR notes that Jones “herself claims that she does not remember what
happened the night of July 27, 2005 or the early morning of July 28, 2005.” (Doc. No.
353, at 8.) For these reasons, the KBR Defendants argue, her discrimination claims are
“not only frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless, but also … brought … in bad faith.”
(Id. at 10.) The Court cannot agree.
The fact that Jones presented prima facie claims of sexual harassment and hostile
work environment highlights the impropriety of an award of attorneys’ fees in this case.
See, e.g., Skinner v. San Felipe Del Rio Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 95 F. App’x 717, 718
(5th Cir. 2004) (not selected for publication) (considering the presentation of a prima
facie case as a relevant factor in determining frivolity). Though this Court did not issue
an opinion denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Plaintiff’s
1
During trial the Court found that, aside from the alleged rape, Jones had not presented sufficient evidence
to meet the Fifth Circuit’s standard on harassment. (July 6, 2011 Tr. 195: 6-16.)
4
sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims (Doc. No. 326), its refusal to
grant this motion reflected its belief that Jones had presented a prima facie case which
should go to the jury. While the flaws in Plaintiffs’ testimony may have strengthened
KBR’s arguments and lent to its ultimate success in this case, they do not indicate
frivolity or bad faith so as to justify the imposition of attorneys’ fees. Indeed, if such
flaws were indicative of frivolity, then many unsuccessful rape victims would be subject
to attorney’s fees in civil cases, regardless of the merits of their claims. 2
B. Title VII Retaliation Claim
As to the Title VII retaliation claim, KBR argues that Jones litigated this claim
“long after the Court…granted summary judgment” in favor of KBR. The Court
disagrees. While Jones’ trial testimony included a discussion of many of the facts which
made up her retaliation claim, the mere mention of those facts in trial does not constitute
improper litigation of the retaliation claim. Rather, the facts which established the basis
for Jones’ retaliation claim were an integral part of Jones’ narrative; they were central to
her case and proper for discussion at trial. As Jones’ retaliation claim was not “litigated”
after the Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of KBR, KBR’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees for litigating Jones’ retaliation claim must be denied.
IV.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES FROM L. TODD KELLY
The KBR Defendants also move for attorneys’ fees from Plaintiff’s attorney, L.
Todd Kelly, and the Kelly Law Firm, P.C., for pursuing Jones’ retaliation claims despite
2
Rape trauma syndrome, a well-recognized pattern of symptoms used to describe the emotional and
psychological responses that a person may experience before, during, or after a rape, includes the inability
to form clear and vivid memories of the event. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape
Myths & The Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1044 & n. 150
(1991). See also Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A review of Behavioral Science Theory and
Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 591, 618-22 (2000).
5
the fact that such claims had not been administratively exhausted, and for pursuing other
claims on behalf of Jones “after it was clear that they were frivolous.” (Doc. No. 355, at
6.) Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes the imposition of
sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs against an attorney who engages in
improper litigation conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Fifth Circuit has explained that
Section 1927 sanctions are penal in nature, and must be strictly construed so as to avoid
“dampen[ing] the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his client.” Travelers Ins.
Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1415 (5th Cir. 1994). Before a
court imposes sanctions under Section 1927, then, it must find that “the offending
attorney’s multiplication of the proceedings was both ‘unreasonable’ and ‘vexations;’
evidence of recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive must be present.” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
The Court does not find that Mr. Kelly’s pursuit of Jones’ retaliation claim
justifies the imposition of sanctions. In determining whether a Title VII plaintiff has
properly exhausted administrative remedies, the Fifth Circuit “interprets what is properly
embraced in review of a Title-VII claim somewhat broadly,” and considers “the scope of
the EEOC investigation which ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.’” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). Further, a court must engage
in a “fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the administrative
charge, and look slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label.”
Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789. Thus, while this Court ultimately found that Jones’ retaliation
claim was not properly exhausted, it cannot agree that pursuing such a claim evidenced
6
recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive on the part of Mr. Kelly. Rather, in light of
the Fifth Circuit’s broad interpretation of administrative exhaustion of Title VII claims,
Mr. Kelly’s pursuit of this claim demonstrated “legitimate zeal” which sanctions under
Section 1927 would improperly dampen.
The KBR Defendants also seek attorneys’ fees for Mr. Kelly’s litigation of other
purportedly frivolous claims. Though Mr. Kelly may have pursued claims for which there
was weak evidence, the Court simply cannot find that Mr. Kelly’s actions rose to the
level of being both unreasonable and vexatious. Ultimately, the Court concludes that
sanctions against Mr. Kelly would have the improper effect of “dampen[ing] the
legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his client.” Travelers, 38 F.3d at 1415.
KBR’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees against Todd Kelly therefore must be denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, The KBR Defendants’ Application for Costs is
GRANTED. The motions for attorneys’ fees and for attorneys’ fees from L. Todd Kelly
and the Kelly Law Firm, P.C. are DENIED. The KBR Defendants shall recover
$145,073.19 in taxable costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 26th day of September, 2011.
KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?