Nalco Company v. Baker Hughes Incorporated

Filing 214

ORDER denying 160 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.(Signed by Judge Kenneth M Hoyt) Parties notified.(chorace)

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
NALCO COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED, et al,
Defendants.

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December 20, 2016
David J. Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:09-cv-01885

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending before the Court is the defendants’, Baker Hughes, Inc. and Baker Petrolite
Corporation (the “defendants”), motion to dismiss.

(Dkt. No. 160).

The plaintiff, Nalco

Company (the “plaintiff”), has filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss (Dkt. No. 161) and the defendants have filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 162). After having
carefully considered the motion, response, reply, the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court
determines that the defendants’ motion to dismiss should be DENIED.
In making this determination, the Court is guided by the pleadings and the applicable law
which dictate that, under the demanding strictures applicable on a motion to dismiss brought
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the plaintiff’s allegations as stated in its Complaint are
entitled to the presumption of truthfulness. Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189,
194 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991)). As such,
when taken as true, the Court cannot say that the plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007) (reasoning that a dismissal is appropriate
only if, the “[f]actual allegations [are not] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

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fact).” Nor does this Court find the plaintiff’s allegations, at this stage of the proceedings, to be
insufficient to satisfy the particularity requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

The Court

determines that the plaintiff has alleged adequate facts sufficient to put the defendants on notice
of its claims against them. Moreover, supplemental factual support is likely in the defendants’
possession and/or inaccessible until discovery is well underway and a reasonable expectation
exist that discovery will reveal other evidence and/or elements as may be implicated by the
plaintiff’s claim. Thus, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on this 20th day of December, 2016.
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Kenneth M. Hoyt
United States District Judge

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