Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF Corporation et al
Filing
689
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 643 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Three of the Six Remaining Condensate Transactions Under The One Satisfaction Rule, but denying Murphy Energy Corporation's request for Final Judgment dismissing it as a defendant in this action. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
PEMEX EXPLORACION Y PRODUCCION,
Plaintiff,
v.
BASF CORPORATION; BASF FINA
PETROCHEMICALS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; MURPHY ENERGY
CORPORATION; BIO-NU SOUTHWEST,
INC. d/b/a VALLEY FUELS; US
PETROLEUM DEPOT, INC.; ARNOLDO
MALDONADO; JONATHAN DAPPEN;
STEPHEN PECHENIK; TIMOTHY L.
BRINK; CONTINENTAL FUELS, INC.;
and HIGH SIERRA CRUDE OIL &
MARKETING, LLC, Successor to
PETRO SOURCE PARTNERS, LP,
Defendants.
PEMEX EXPLORACI6N Y PRODUCCI6N,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIG STAR GATHERING LTD L.L.P.;
F&M TRANSPORTATION, INC.;
JAMES JENSEN; JOPLIN ENERGY,
LLC f/k/a HUTCHISON HAYES
ENERGY, LLC; JEFF KIRBY;
PLAINS ALL-AMERICAN PIPELINE,
L.P.; SAINT JAMES OIL, INC.;
SUPERIOR CRUDE GATHERING, INC.;
TRANSMONTAIGNE PARTNERS, L.P.;
and WESTERN REFINING COMPANY,
L.P. ,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-1997
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court
is Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss
Three of the Six Remaining Condensate Transactions Under the One
Satisfaction Rule ("Defendants' Motion to Dismiss")
No.
("BASF"),
and
In
643).
the
pending motion defendants
(Docket Entry
BASF
Corporation
BASF FINA Petrochemicals Limited Partnership
Murphy
Energy
Corporation
("Murphy
Energy")
("BFLP"),
(collectively
"defendants")
move the court to dismiss claims asserted against
them arising
from
three
condensate
between January and March of 2009.
transactions
that
occurred
At the scheduling conference
held on April 29, 2014, the court stated its intention to grant the
motion. 1
The court also raised the issue as to whether granting
the motion would resolve all claims against Murphy Energy,
and
directed the parties to submit additional briefing addressing that
issue. 2
On May I, 2014, plaintiff, Pemex Exploraci6n y Producci6n
("PEP") filed PEP's Brief in Support of Retaining Murphy Energy in
This Lawsuit (Docket Entry No. 664)
i
on May 2, 2014, Murphy Energy
filed its Response to PEP's Brief in Support of Retaining Murphy
Energy in This Lawsuit as Requested by the Court Re:
Entry Order (Docket Entry No. 669)
i
661 Minute
on May 4, 2014, plaintiff filed
PEP's Reply Brief in Support of Retaining Murphy Energy in This
Lawsuit (Docket Entry No. 673)
i
and on May 5, 2014, Murphy Energy
filed its Surreply to PEP's Brief in Support of Retaining Murphy
lHearing Minutes and Order, Docket Entry No. 661.
2Id.
-2 -
Energy in This Lawsuit
(Exhibit A to Murphy Energy's Motion for
Leave to File Surreply, Docket Entry No. 674-1).3
I.
Standard of Review
Defendants have not identified the procedural basis on which
they seek dismissal of claims arising from three transactions in
which
Murphy
Energy
sold
allegedly
between January and March of 2009.
stolen
condensate
to
BASF
Nevertheless, their assertion
that "since PEP fully recovered for these three transactions,
it
cannot seek damages from defendants,"4 indicates that defendants
seek dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12 (b) (6) .
A
Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss tests the formal sufficiency of the
pleadings
and
is
"appropriate
when
a
defendant
attacks
the
complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim."
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied sub nom Cloud v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2665 (2002)
The
court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true,
view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Id.
Also,
the
30 n
May 2,
2014, BASF and BFLP filed Defendants BASF
Corporation and BASF FINA Petrochemicals Limited Partnership's
Motion to Dismiss the Three Remaining Transactions (Docket Entry
No. 667); and on May 6, 2014, BASF and BFLP filed BASF's and BFLP's
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Remaining Transactions (Docket Entry
No. 681)
PEP has not yet responded to these latest motions to
dismiss, and they will not be ripe for resolution before trial.
4Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 643, p. 2.
-3-
court may not look beyond the pleadings in ruling on the motion.
See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th
Cir.
2000)
motion,
a
(recognizing that when considering a
district
court
contents of the pleadings,
generally
"must
limit
Rule
12 (b) (6)
itself
to
including attachments thereto").
the
If,
however, on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)
(5th Cir.
2010).
2011)
i
See Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667,
Dillon v.
Rogers,
596 F.3d 260,
265
677
(5th Cir.
A party is on notice of the possibility that a court may
convert a Rule 12(b) (6) motion into a motion for summary judgment
ten days after a party submits evidence outside of the pleadings,
and that evidence is not excluded by the court.
Allstate Insurance Co.,
901 F.2d 1281, 1284
See Washington v.
(5th Cir. 1990).
In
Washington the Fifth Circuit explained that
[u]nder Rule 56 it is not necessary that the district
court give ten days' notice after it decides to treat a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion as one for summary judgment, but
rather after the parties receive notice that the court
could properly treat such a motion as one for summary
judgment because it has accepted for consideration on the
motion matters outside the pleadings, the parties must
have at least ten days before judgment is rendered in
which to submit additional evidence.
901 F.2d at 1284 (quoting Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d
736, 746 (5th Cir. 1986)).
S.
Ct.
2548,
2554
(1986)
See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106
(district courts possess the power to
-4-
enter summary judgment sua sponte as long as the losing party was
on notice that he had to come forward with all of his evidence) .
filed
Defendants
February
28,
exhibits
that
March
19,
2014.
pending
Attached
evidence
2014,
defendants'
their
to
matters
plaintiff
motion to dismiss
to
defendants'
outside
filed
motion
a
of
motion
on
are
four
pleadings.
the
response
dismiss
On
in
opposition
to
in which PEP not only referenced
matters outside the pleadings but also failed to obj ect to the
court's consideration of the exhibits that defendants attached to
their motion to dismiss. 5
On March 27, 2014, defendants filed a
reply in support of their motion to dismiss in which they again
referenced matters outside the pleadings. 6
have
either
submitted
or
referenced
Because both parties
matters
outside
of
the
pleadings, because PEP has not objected to the court's consideration of the defendants'
exhibits,
and because the court has not
excluded those exhibits from consideration, Rule 12(d) directs the
court to treat the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as one for summary
judgment and to dispose of it under Rule 56.
12 (d) .
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
See also Washington, 901 F.2d at 1283-1284.
5PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n's Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Transactions Under the One Satisfaction Rule
("PEP's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss"), Docket Entry
No. 648.
6Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Three of
the
Six Remaining
Condensate
Transactions
Under
the
One
Satisfaction Rule ("Defendants' Reply"), Docket Entry No. 652.
-5-
Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that
there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law
entitles it to judgment.
106 S.
Ct.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See also Celotex,
An issue of material fact is genuine if a
at 2552.
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.
v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510
(1986).
Anderson
In reviewing the
evidence, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the
nonmoving
party,
and
weighing of the evidence.
avoid
credibility determinations
and
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000)
The court must also disregard
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not
required to believe.
Id.
II.
Defendants
argue
that
Analysis
the
claims
arising
from
three
transactions that occurred between January and March of 2009 in
which Trammo Petroleum, Inc. ("Trammo") sold to BASF petrochemicals
acquired from Murphy Energy are barred by the one satisfaction rule
because PEP has admitted that it has been fully compensated for
losses suffered in these three transactions by former defendant
Trammo.7
A.
Applicable Law
The one satisfaction rule prevents PEP from obtaining more
than one recovery for the same injury.
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P.
7Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 643, p. 1.
-6-
v. Chapa,
212 S.W.3d 299,303
(Tex.
2006)
(citing Stewart Title
Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d I, 7 (Tex. 1991)).
The one
satisfaction rule "applies when multiple defendants commit the same
act and when defendants commit technically different acts that
result in a single injury."
Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel,
22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000)
at 7).
(quoting Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d
See also Christus Health v. Dorriety, 345 S.W.3d 104, 114
(Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)
Oyster Creek
i
Financial Corp. v. Richwood Investments II, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 307,
326-27
(Tex.
App.
-
Houston
[1st
Dist.]
2004,
pet.
denied).
Whether the one satisfaction rule applies is determined not by the
causes
of
action asserted,
but
by the
injury
sustained.
AMX
Enterprises, Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 196 S.W.3d 202,206 (Tex. App.
- Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)
S. W.
(citing Stewart Title, 822
2d at 8)).
Under the one satisfaction rule a nonsettling defendant may
claim a credit based on the damages for which all tortfeasors are
jointly liable.
Crown Life, 22 S.W.3d at 391 (citing First Title
Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. 1993)
Peevey,
denied))
813
S.W.2d
710,
712
(Tex.
App.
-
i
Austin
Paschall v.
1991,
writ
"[A] plaintiff must only give credit to a non-settling
defendant for that part of the damages which he receive[d]
settling defendants that are applicable to all equally."
from
Hill v.
Budget Financial & Thrift Co., 383 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1964, no writ).
"A nonsettling defendant cannot receive
-7-
credit
for
settlement
amounts
representing
punitive
damages.
/I
Crown Life, 22 S.W.3d at 391 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender,
968 S.W.2d 917, 927 (Tex. 1998) and Hill, 383 S.W.2d at 81).
Thus,
a nonsettling defendant is entitled to offset any liability for
joint and several damages by the amount of common damages paid by
the settling defendant,
but not
for any amount of
punitive damages paid by the settling defendant.
"A nonsettling party seeking a
settlement
burden to prove its right to such credit."
separate or
Id. at 392.
credit has
the
Oyster Creek,
176
S.W.3d at 327 (citing Ellender, 968 S.W.2d at 927)
"This burden
includes proving the settlement credit amount./I
settling party can meet
"The non-
this burden by placing the
settlement
agreement or some evidence of the settlement amount in the record.
Id.
/I
"If the nonsettling party meets this burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to tender a valid settlement agreement allocating
the settlement between
(1)
damages
for which the
settling and
nonsettling defendant are jointly liable, and (2) damages for which
only the settling party
S.W.3d at 392).
was liable./I
Id.
(citing Crown Life, 22
"If the plaintiff cannot satisfy this burden, then
the nonsettling party is entitled to a credit equaling the entire
settlement amount./I
B.
Id.
Application of the Law to the Facts
PEP alleges that multiple defendants - Murphy Energy, Trammo,
BASF, and BFLP - committed the same or technically different acts
-8-
---------------.----------------
that
resulted
involving
in a
inter
single alleged injury to
alia
three
transactions
that
conversion
PEP:
occurred between
January and March of 2009 in which Trammo sold condensate to BASF
valued at approximately $2.4 million.
Amended Complaint alleges in
~
SpecificallYI PEp/s Third
160(i):
On or about January-March 2009 Donald Schroeder Jr. and
[Trammo] and their co-conspirators knowingly arranged for
[Trammo/s] sale of at least $2.4 million worth of stolen
PEP condensate to Defendant [s] BASF Corpation [and BFLP]
knowing the condensate in question to have been stolen
from PEP in Mexico. 8
I
I
I
PEp/s Third Amended Complaint also alleges that Trammo originally
obtained the condensate sold to BASF from Murphy Energy.9
During discovery BASF asked PEP to admit that
it
received
restitution for the condensate that Trammo sold to BASF in the
three transactions alleged to have taken place between January and
March of 2009:
8PEp / s Third Amended Complaint
I
Docket Entry No. 220
1
~
160(i).
9Id. ~ 63 (identifying Murphy Energy as Trammo/s source for
stolen condensate with respect to three 2009 transactions)
PEp/s
Second Amended Complaint contained the same allegations:
H.
On or about January-March 2009 Donald Schroederl
Jr. and [Trammo] and their co-conspirators knowingly
arranged for [Trammo/s] sale of at least $2.4 million
worth of stolen PEP condensate to Defendant [s] BASF
Corporation [and BFLP]
knowing the condensate in
question to have been stolen from PEP in Mexico.
PEP
does not allege that Defendant BASF knew that the
condensate in question was stolen.
1
I
(Docket Entry No. 108 ~ 94(H))
Paragraph 94(G) of PEp/s Second
Amended Complaint also made clear that the transactions referenced
in ~ 94(H) involved Murphy Energy as Trammo/s supply source.
1
-9-
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35:
Admit that you received $2.4 million in restitution for
the $2.4 mill ion of stolen condensate referenced in
~ 94(H) of the Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35:
. , this
Subject to
Objections
admission is ADMITTED. 10
Defendants
argue
that
PEP's
response
to
request for
BASF's
Request
for
Admission No. 35 constitutes a judicial admission that PEP received
~
full restitution for the amount PEP claims in
160(i) of the Third
~
94(H) of the Second Amended Complaint
for the three transactions.
Defendants argue that "[t]o allow PEP
Amended Complaint and in
to
continue
compensated
to
seek
injury
recovery
would
from
Defendants
contravene
the
for
essence
this
of
fully
the
one
satisfaction rule-it would permit PEP to seek double recovery for
the same injuries.
ff11
PEP does not dispute that it has been fully compensated for
the three January-March 2009 transactions that involved condensate
sold
by
Murphy
Energy
to
Trammo
and
then
to
BASF
and
BFLP.
Nevertheless, citing Crown Life Insurance, 22 S.W.3d at 391, and
United States v.
Sheinbaum,
136 F.3d 443,
448
(5th Cir.
1998),
l°Plaintiff PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n's Responses to BASF
Corporation's Requests for Admission, Exhibit 4 to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 643-3, p. 19.
See also
Defendants' Reply, Docket Entry No. 652, p. 4 n.1
(citing
transcript from Donald Schroeder's sentencing where the Assistant
United States Attorney not only described the compensatory and
voluntary nature of the restitution that Trammo paid to PEP, but
also stated that the payment fully compensated PEP for its losses) .
llDefendants' Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 643, p. 4.
-10-
cert.
denied,
119
S.
Ct.
1808
(1999),
PEP
argues
that
the
defendants are not entitled to a credit for any portion of Trammo's
$2.4 million restitution payment to PEP because that payment was
punitive not compensatory in nature. 12
S.W.3d 736,
741
Citing Nowak v. Pellis, 248
(Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, no pet.),
and Harrington v. Texaco, Inc., 339 F.2d 814, 820 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied,
85 S. Ct. 1538
(1965),
PEP argues that Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss should be denied because settlement credits, if
any,
must be applied after the verdict because PEP has not been
made whole.
1.
Defendants Are Entitled to Credit for Restitution Trammo
Paid to PEP for Losses Suffered as a Result of the Three
Transactions that Occurred Between January and March of
2009
In Crown Life Insurance, 22 S.W.3d at 391, the Texas Supreme
Court
stated
that
"[u]nder
the
one
satisfaction
rule,
the
nonsettling defendant may only claim a credit based on the damage
for which all tortfeasors are jointly liable.
A nonsettling
defendant cannot receive credit for settlement amounts representing
punitive damages.
II
PEP's
reliance on Crown Life
Insurance
is
misplaced because Trammo's payment of restitution is not comparable
to punitive damages but,
agreement.
instead,
is comparable to a settlement
As PEP recognizes:
In August 2009, Trammo, through the U.S. Department of
Justice, paid to PEP $2.4 million in restitution in
12PEP's Opposition to Defendants'
Entry No. 648, pp. 2-3.
Motion to Dismiss,
Docket
-11-
~---,--------------
connection with Trammo's involvement in trafficking
stolen Mexican condensate . . . . Trammo made this payment
in order to avoid further criminal prosecution. 13
The fact that Trammo voluntarily paid restitution as part of an
agreement with the United States to avoid prosecution, and the fact
that the amount Trammo paid was the amount that PEP alleges it lost
due to the three transactions at issue, persuades the court that
Trammo's payment was more akin to a settlement payment than to
punitive damages.
In Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d at 444, two defendants were convicted
of conspiracy to defraud a bank and to commit bankruptcy fraud.
The issue before the court was whether the defendants' prior civil
settlement
with
the
bank victim of
their
fraud
precluded
the
district court from ordering them to pay restitution to the bank
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA").
48.
Id. at 447-
The Fifth Circuit concluded that since the defendants failed
to present any evidence showing what, if any, amount the defendants
had paid the bank pursuant to their prior civil settlement with the
bank,
the criminal restitution order was not precluded.
448.
Significantly, however, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[o]f
Id.
at
course, to avoid double-counting, a district court must reduce the
size of its restitution order by any amount received by the victim
as part of a
§
3664 (j)
13Id.
civil
(2)).
settlement."
Id.
at
44 9
( cit i ng
Sheinbaum thus establishes that,
at 2.
-12-
18
U. S . C .
unlike punitive
damages,
restitution awarded
compensate
the
victims
of
in criminal
cases
crime.
See
(6th Cir.
2005)
the
555
is
intended to
United
States
McDaniel,
398 F.3d 540,
[federal]
restitution statutes do not permit victims to obtain
multiple recoveries for the same loss")
v.
Frick Transfer,
("The
2014)
Court
Inc.,
"the
Fishman Organization, Inc.
i
2014 WL 1673746,
properly
(noting that
v.
determined
*2
that
(3d Cir. April 29,
Fishman
could
not
receive both restitution and damages because that would be a double
recovery.")
i
United States v.
(S.D. Ohio 2007),
2009)
Bogart,
490 F.
Supp.
2d 885,
aff'd 576 F.3d 565 and 577 F.3d 713
901
(6th Cir.
("The VWPA contemplates setting off amounts already paid
under a restitution order against amounts later recovered in civil
See also United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367
proceedings.")
F.3d 409, 413
(5th Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing between restitution
ordered "simply to punish the defendant" and restitution "designed
to make his victims whole") .
2.
Court Need Not Wait Until After the Verdict to Apply
Credit for Restitution Trammo Paid to PEP
Citing Nowak, 248 S.W.3d at 741, PEP asserts that
[t] he one satisfaction rule is grounds for summary
judgment in cases in which (1) the one satisfaction rule
applies, (2) the settlement credit entirely sets-off the
maximum amount of liability claimed by the plaintiff, and
(3) punitive damages are not an issue. 14
PEP argues that even if Trammo's $2.4 million restitution payment
to PEP can be considered a settlement entitled to credit under
l4Id. at 3.
-13-
---_._--_..
---_.
Texas
law,
that
credit does not
entitle defendants
to summary
judgment regarding the three transactions for which PEP has been
compensated because the court has already concluded that
the amount PEP claims it is owed as a result of Trammo's
sales of stolen condensate to BASF and BFLP is
substantially more than $2.4 million. Because Trammo's
payment of $2.4 million to PEP does not entirely offset
the maximum amount of liability claimed by PEP, BASF and
BFLP are not entitled to summary judgment on any
individual transactions. 15
PEP argues
authority
own'-the
that
for
"[d] efendants
assuming
theory
that
on which
offer no
'each
it
compelling argument
transaction
attempts
to
stands
distinguish
on
or
its
Nowak.
1116
Quoting Harrington, 339 F.2d 814, 820 (5th Cir. 1964), PEP argues
that "the one-satisfaction rule 'does not require that the injured
party give
the
benefit
judgment-torfeasor.,"17
of
any
statute
of
limitations
to
the
PEP argues that
[a]t trial, PEP will show that between 2006 and 2009 it
was harmed by the loss of over $300 million of
condensate, of which BASF /BFLP bought more than $40
million worth and Murphy bought and sold at least $14
million worth (Docket Entry No. 220 at ~ 62).
PEP has
not been made whole for that loss. Accordingly, the onerecovery rule would not reduce PEP's recovery.lS
PEP's reliance on Nowak and Harrington is misplaced because
neither case involved facts analogous to those at issue here, where
15Id. at 4 (quoting Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry
No. 607, p. 111).
l6Id.
(quoting Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss,
No. 643).
l7Id.
(quoting Harrington, 339 F.2d at 820).
-14-
Docket Entry
PEP
admits
that
it
has
been
fully
compensated
for
the
three
In Harrington
transactions for which defendants seek dismissal.
the court specifically found that the defendant failed to offer
proof that the amount received in settlement was allocable to the
two-year period
for
which
the
defendant
was
being
sued.
In
contrast, defendants here have presented conclusive evidence that
Trammo's $2.4 million payment was made specifically to compensate
PEP for the three transactions that occurred between January and
March of 2009, and PEP has admitted that it has been fully paid for
the losses
suffered as a
contention
that
the
is
belied
individually
result of those transactions.
transactions
by
the
fact
should
that
not
be
PEP's
PEP's
evaluated
Third
Amended
Complaint not only lists these transactions individually but also
characterizes each transaction as a separate conversion. 19
Because
PEP does not dispute that it has been fully compensated for the
three transactions that occurred between January and March of 2009,
and because PEP has failed to show that the restitution Trammo paid
to PEP is either analogous to punitive damages or allocable to
losses
suffered as
a
result
of
other
transactions,
the
court
19PEP's Third Amended Complaint, Docket Entry No. 220, ~ 63
(setting forth 25 individual transactions which PEP alleges form
the basis of its claims against BASF and BFLP).
See also PEP's
Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Docket
Entry No. 545, p. 23 (asserting that "each unlawful transaction of
PEP's property is a separate conversion") i PEP's Opposition to
BASF & BFLP's Motions for Leave to Designate Responsible Third
Parties, Docket Entry No. 266, pp. 4-5 (asserting that "each new
wrongful possession by a subsequent converter is a new conversion
because it represents another offense to the plaintiff's right of
possession") .
-15-
~-
..
_-----_._------------
concludes that Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the claims arising
from the three transactions that occurred between January and March
of 2009 obtained from Murphy Energy should be granted.
C.
Murphy Energy Remains A Defendant in This Action
Footnote 3 to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss states:
Murphy Energy notes that the one satisfaction rule
applies not only to double recovery form mUltiple
defendants, but also to double recovery from a single
defendant under multiple theories of recovery.
Myriad
Dev., Inc. v. Alltech, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 946, 982-83
(W.D. Tex. 2011).
As all of the remaining causes of
action against Murphy Energy are based on this same
single injury, full restitution bars each of PEP's
lingering theories of recovery against it. Accordingly,
the Court should render final judgment for all of the
claims asserted against Murphy Energy.2o
In light of Murphy Energy's request for final
footnote
3
to
the
Defendants'
Motion
to
judgment made ln
Dismiss,
requested additional briefing from the parties.
the
court
For the reasons
stated in PEP's Brief in Support of Retaining Murphy Energy in This
Lawsuit (Docket Entry No. 664) and PEP's Reply Brief in Support of
Retaining Murphy Energy in This Lawsuit (Docket Entry No. 673), the
court concludes that Murphy Energy remains a defendant in this
action because PEP has not been fully compensated for all of the
stolen condensate that PEP alleges Murphy Energy possessed.
III.
Conclusions and Order
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Three of the Six Remaining Condensate Transactions Under the One
2°Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 643, p. 4 n.3.
-16-
Satisfaction Rule
(Docket Entry No.
643)
is GRANTED,
but Murphy
Energy's request for final judgment dismissing it as a defendant in
this action is DENIED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 7th day of May, 2014.
SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-17-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?