Chu v. Texas Southern University
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Signed by Judge Ewing Werlein, Jr) Parties notified.(kcarr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RAMBIS CHU,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-2582
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending is Defendant Texas Southern University’s Motion for
Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56(b) (Document No. 19), to which
Plaintiff Rambis Chu has filed no response and which is therefore
deemed unopposed pursuant to Local Rule 7.4.
reviewing
the
complaint,
motion,
the
After carefully
uncontroverted
record
evidence, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the
motion should be granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiff Rambis Chu (“Plaintiff”), a Chinese-American male,
was
a
professor
in
the
Physics
Department
of
Texas
Southern
University from September 1995 to December 1997 and again from
January 2003 through his termination on March 5, 2009.1
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Texas Southern University (“Defendant”) has
1
Document No. 1 at 3 (Orig. Complt.); Document No. 19, ex. N
¶ 9 (Ohia Aff. showing date of termination).
accused, terminated, slandered, and unfairly treated him because of
his race and national origin.2
Plaintiff’s problems at Texas Southern allegedly began in
2005, when Carlos Handy (“Handy”) became Chair of the Physics
Department.3
Handy allegedly “continuously mocked Plaintiff’s
accent and pretended he did not understand Plaintiff,” yelled at
Plaintiff, harassed Plaintiff by calling his home, instructed
students to boycott Plaintiff’s classes and file a complaint
against Plaintiff, questioned the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s work,
interfered with Plaintiff’s business and professional relationship
with
Defendant,
application,
attempted
assigned
to
Plaintiff
sabotage
the
Plaintiff’s
worst
teaching
tenure
schedule,
“sabotaged Plaintiff’s summer employment . . . by refusing to sign
Plaintiff’s
personal
action
form,”
filed
a
false
scientific
misconduct charge against Plaintiff, and “referred to Plaintiff as
a ‘Lazy Chink.’”4
Plaintiff also alleges that through Handy’s
actions, he was denied a promotion, was paid less than white
colleagues with less experience, and was eventually terminated.5
Defendant counters that (1) Plaintiff’s failure to promote claim is
barred
by
the
statute
of
2
Document No. 1 at 6.
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id. at 3-6.
5
limitations;
Id.
2
(2)
any
hostile
work
environment claim does not meet the threshold for discrimination;
and (3) Plaintiff’s termination had nothing to do with his race or
ethnicity but instead was due to Plaintiff allegedly plagiarizing
a
grant
proposal
in
contravention
of
Defendant’s
Scientific
Misconduct Policy and Faculty Manual.6
Plaintiff brings common law negligence and slander claims in
addition to claims for discrimination on the basis of race under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.,
discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985, and a whistleblower claim.7
Defendant now moves
for summary judgment on all claims, contending that (1) Plaintiff’s
state tort claims and his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are barred
by sovereign immunity, (2) his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985 are inapplicable to Defendant because Defendant is not a
“person”
6
for
purposes
of
those
statutes,
and
(3)
most
of
Document No. 19, ex. N ¶ 7.
7
Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim under §§ 1981, 1983,
and 1985, but does not assert a retaliation claim under Title VII.
See Document No. 1 at 9. Further, Plaintiff appears to assert a
federal whistleblower claim as part of his claims under §§ 1981,
1983, and 1985. See id. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s claim under 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b) fails as a matter of law because, among other
things, Plaintiff is not a federal employee. See Grisham v. United
States, 103 F.3d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The Whistleblower
Protection Act was enacted in 1989 to increase protections for
whistleblowers by prohibiting adverse employment actions taken
because a federal employee discloses information . . . .”)
(emphasis added); see also Jackson v. Signh, No. H-06-2920, 2007 WL
2818322, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007) (Rosenthal, J.) (holding
that plaintiff did not have a cause of action under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b) because he was not a federal employee).
3
Plaintiff’s alleged instances of discriminatory conduct occurred
well
before
Plaintiff’s
the
Title
applicable
VII
claim
limitations
for
periods.8
discriminatory
Regarding
termination,
Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not produce any evidence to
raise a fact issue either to establish a prima facie case or to
rebut Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his
termination.
II.
A.
Legal Standards
Summary Judgment
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be rendered
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
FED . R. CIV. P. 56(a).
The moving party must “demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).
Once the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted.
Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th
Cir. 1998).
A party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in
a pleading, and unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists
8
Document No. 19 at 1-2.
4
will not suffice.
specific
facts
Id.
showing
“[T]he nonmoving party must set forth
the
existence
of
a
‘genuine’
concerning every essential component of its case.”
Id.
issue
“A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support
the
assertion
by:
(A)
citing
to
particular
parts
of
materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute,
or
that
an
adverse
party
evidence to support that fact.”
cannot
produce
admissible
FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1).
“The
court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider
other materials in the record.”
Id. 56(c)(3).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district
court must view the evidence “through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2513 (1986). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
“If the record, viewed in
this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for
the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper.
Kelley v. Price-
Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993).
On the other
hand, if “the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant’s]
favor, then summary judgment is improper.”
Id.
Even if the
standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a
5
motion for summary judgment if it believes that “the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial.”
Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at
2513.
B.
Sovereign Immunity
“Because
sovereign
immunity
deprives
the
court
of
jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity can be
dismissed
only
under
Rule
12(b)(1)
and
not
with
prejudice.”
Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a
court may consider (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or
(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d
158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
III.
A.
Discussion
Sections 1981, 1983, Negligence, and Slander Claims
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides to states sovereign immunity from suit except in limited
circumstances, such as when the state consents to be sued or when
Congress abrogates a state’s immunity pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122-23 (1996).
6
Eleventh
Amendment immunity encompasses suits by private citizens against
the state in federal court.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001).
As part of the State of
Texas’s university system, Defendant is an arm of the state to
which sovereign immunity extends.
See Chavez v. Arte Publico
Press, 204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000); Bisong v. The Univ. of
Houston, Civil Act. No. H-06-1815, 2006 WL 2414410, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 18, 2006) (Lake, J.) (citing Chavez).
“Congress has not chosen to abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity for suits under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(c).”
Hines v.
Miss. Dept. of Corrections, 239 F.3d 366, 2000 WL 1741624, at *3
(5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000) (table) (citing Sessions v. Rusk State
Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Baldwin v.
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1030
(S.D. Tex. 1996).
Further, there is no indication that Defendant
has waived its sovereign immunity; it is therefore entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claims both
for damages and for injunctive relief.
See Aguilar v. Tex. Dept.
of Crim. Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998); Sessions,
648 F.2d at 1069 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974));
see also Chacko v. Tex. A&M Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1180, 1198 (S.D.
Tex. 1997) (holding that Texas A&M University, as an alter ego of
the State of Texas, is accorded Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
7
plaintiff cannot maintain §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against it),
aff’d, 149 F.3d 1175 (5th Cir. 1998).9
Regarding
Plaintiff’s
state
tort
claims,
“the
Eleventh
Amendment [also] bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims
against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court.”
Raygor
v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 122 S. Ct. 999, 1004 (2002).
Although the Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity for certain
negligence claims, Plaintiff’s negligence claim does not fall
within the scope of the Act.
The Tort Claims Act waives immunity
for claims in part due to:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death
proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the
negligence of an employee acting within his scope of
employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death
arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven
vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the
claimant according to Texas law; and
9
Although Defendant did not argue that sovereign immunity
bars the §§ 1983, 1985, and any state whistleblower claim, the
Court may consider this issue sua sponte because it bears on the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Burge v. Parish of St.
Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999). Likewise, to the
extent that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim under the Texas
Whistleblower Protection Act against a state entity in federal
court, that claim also is barred by sovereign immunity. See Perez
v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Texas did not waive its immunity to suit under the
Act in federal court, even though it waived its immunity in state
court).
8
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or
use of tangible personal or real property if the
governmental unit would, were it a private person, be
liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
TEX. CIV. PRAC . & REM . CODE § 101.021 (West 2011).
To support his
negligence claim, Plaintiff alleges that: “Defendant TSU owed a
legal duty of providing a work environment free from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin.”10
Plaintiff does
not allege any property damage, personal injury, or death arising
from the use of motor-driven equipment, nor does he allege that any
personal injury or death was caused by an unsafe condition of
state-owned premises such that Defendant would have waived its
immunity to suit.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is
barred by sovereign immunity.
Furthermore,
the
Texas
Tort
Claims
Act
does
not
waive
Defendant’s sovereign immunity for intentional torts. See TEX . CIV .
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057(2) (West 2011); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001); see also Ganther v.
Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas has “explicitly
refused to waive its sovereign immunity” to claims arising out of
intentional torts).
Slander is an intentional tort such that
Defendant is immune from liability for that claim.
See Perry v.
City of Houston, No. 01-01-00077-CV, 2005 WL 995441 at *4 (Tex.
App.-–Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2005, no pet.) (holding that the
10
Document No. 1 ¶ 45.
9
City of Houston was immune to a slander suit); Luengas v. Univ. of
N. Tex., No. 2-06-036-CV, 2006 WL 2854374, at *2 (Tex. App.-–Fort
Worth Oct. 5, 2006, no pet.) (holding that the state of Texas has
not waived immunity to liability for slander).
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s slander claim is also barred by sovereign immunity.
B.
Title VII Discrimination Claims
1.
Statute of Limitations
Defendant argues that, with the exception of Plaintiff’s
termination claim, all other alleged instances of discrimination
occurred outside the limitations period and are subject to summary
judgment on that basis.
In Texas, a Title VII plaintiff must file
a discrimination charge with the EEOC within three hundred days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Henderson
v. AT&T Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (S.D. Tex. 1996); see also
42
U.S.C.
§
2000e-5(e)(1).
Plaintiff
filed
discrimination with the EEOC on December 9, 2008.11
his
charge
of
Therefore, any
discrete acts of discrimination which occurred prior to February
13, 2008, are barred by the statute of limitations.
A careful
review of Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s interrogatories
reveals that the only discrete act of discrimination that is
alleged
11
to
have
occurred
within
See Document No. 19, ex. L.
10
the
limitations
period
was
Plaintiff’s termination.12
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2073 (2002) (“[D]iscrete discriminatory
acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related
to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”).
a
case
alleging
discrete
violations,
However, “[u]nlike in
a
hostile
environment
plaintiff is not limited to filing suit on events that fall within
this statutory time period because her claim is comprised of a
series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful
employment practice.’”
Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d
321, 328 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 122
S. Ct. at 2073).
Therefore, the only remaining Title VII claims
are the hostile work environment and discriminatory termination
claims; all others are barred by the statute of limitations.
2.
Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff mentions “hostile work environment” as a part of his
retaliation claim under Sections 1981, 1983, and 1985.
this
amounts
to
a
separate--even
if
Assuming
oblique--hostile
work
environment allegation, he has not presented summary judgment
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was
subjected to a hostile work environment when he worked in the
12
For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to
promote Plaintiff to Director of Computational Research Core
Facility of Research Centers in Minority Institutions in the summer
of 2007, which falls outside the applicable limitations period.
See id., ex. O at Interrogatory No. 9(1)-9(6).
11
Physics Department at Texas Southern University.13
To establish a
hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) he is a
member of a protected group; (2) he was a victim of harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment affected
a “term, condition, or privilege” of Plaintiff’s employment; and
(5) Defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take prompt remedial action.
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286
F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). For race-based harassment to affect
a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment, as required to
support a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, it
must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of
the
victim’s
environment.”
employment
and
create
an
abusive
working
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370
(1993), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Ind., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
Courts look to the totality of
the circumstances including “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating,
or
a
mere
offensive
utterance;
and
whether
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
it
Id.
at 371.
As discussed above, most if not all of the alleged offending
comments and acts occurred outside the limitations period.14
13
See Document No. 1 at 3.
14
See Document No. 19, ex. O at Interrogatory No. 9.
12
To
show that the alleged acts constitute a “continuing violation,” a
plaintiff must show “that the ‘separate acts’ are related, or else
there is no single violation that encompasses the earlier acts.”
Stewart, 586 F.3d at 328.
Plaintiff wholly fails to present any
summary judgment evidence to show either that any of these alleged
acts occurred or that the alleged “separate acts” are related.
Plaintiff therefore does not meet his burden to raise a fact issue
that a continuing violation occurred in this case, see id., or that
he was subjected to a hostile work environment.15
Accordingly,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claim.
3.
Termination
Title VII proscribes an employer from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against any individual because of that individual’s
race or national origin.
inquiry
is
“whether
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
the
against the plaintiff.”
defendant
intentionally
The Title VII
discriminated
Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d
15
The sole allegation that possibly could be construed as a
continuing violation would be Plaintiff’s allegation that starting
in 2005, Handy “continuously mocked Plaintiff’s accent and
pretended he did not understand Plaintiff,” which Plaintiff alleges
“continues to persist.” Document No. 19, ex. O at Interrogatory
No. 9(1).
This allegation--unsupported by any summary judgment
evidence--is wholly insufficient to give rise to an actionable
hostile work environment claim. See Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591
F.3d 761, 771 (5th Cir. 2009) (“simple teasing, offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” do not generally
not affect a “term, condition, or privilege of employment”).
13
647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004).
established
through
either
Intentional discrimination can be
direct
or
circumstantial
evidence.
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001).
Because Plaintiff presents no direct evidence of discrimination,
his claims must be analyzed using the framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
Id.
Under this framework, a plaintiff must first create a presumption
of intentional discrimination by establishing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination.
Id.
To
establish a prima facie case for a discriminatory discharge under
Title VII, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was
discharged; and either (4a) he was replaced by someone outside the
protected class, or (4b) others outside the protected class who
were similarly situated were not terminated or otherwise were
treated more favorably.
See Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d
962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999);
Martin v. Kroger Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d
516, 543 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (explaining that with respect to the
fourth element, the plaintiff must show that employees outside his
protected
class
were
retained
or
treated
differently
under
circumstances nearly identical to plaintiff’s).
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination.
14
Lee v.
Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009).
To meet
this burden, the employer must “clearly set forth, through the
introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons” for its conduct.
Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094
(1981).
If
the
employer
can
articulate
such
a
reason,
the
inference of discrimination falls away, and the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to establish either: (1) that the employer’s
proffered
reason
is
not
true,
but
is
instead
a
pretext
for
discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) the employer’s reason,
while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another
“motivating factor” is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic
(mixed-motive alternative).16
Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376
F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff produces no summary judgment evidence to raise a
fact issue either that Defendant replaced him with a non-Chinese
professor or that it treated a non-Chinese professor more favorably
than Plaintiff under nearly identical circumstances.
16
Therefore,
Because Plaintiff has not invoked a mixed-motive theory, his
claim will be analyzed only for evidence of pretext. See McCoyEddington v. Brazos County, No. H-05-0395, 2007 WL 1217989, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2007) (confining analysis to pretext when
plaintiff neither pled nor argued for mixed-motive); Johnson v.
Saks Fifth Ave. Tex., L.P., Civ. A. No. H-05-1237, 2007 WL 781946,
at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2007) (same); see also Nasti v. CIBA
Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that the plaintiff waived consideration on appeal of a
mixed-motive argument by failing “to present her mixed-motives
claim to the district court in the first instance”).
15
Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VII.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie
case, Defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for discharge: Plaintiff allegedly plagiarized a scientific grant
proposal.17
According to the Texas Southern University Faculty
Manual, “Good Causes” for termination include “[m]isappropriating
and publishing as one’s own the ideas or words of another.”18
Moreover, in his affidavit, Dr. Sunny Ohia, Provost and Vice
President of Academic Affairs and Research at Texas Southern
University, states that Plaintiff was terminated because “there was
sufficient evidence of a serious violation of the American Physical
Society Ethics and Values Guidelines, the Scientific Misconduct
Policy, and the Faculty Manual.”19
Indeed, Defendant produced
evidence to indicate that the Scientific Misconduct Investigation
Committee had concluded that Plaintiff had “committed plagiarism
when he submitted the proposal under discussion.”20
In sum,
Defendant has met its burden of production to show a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff.
In contrast,
17
See Document No. 19, ex. F (side-by-side comparison of Dr.
Miller’s earlier proposal with Plaintiff’s proposal).
18
Document No. 19, ex. J ¶ 7.1(D).
19
Id., ex. N ¶ 7.
20
Id., ex. I at 3 of 8 (Investigation Committee Summary
Report).
16
Plaintiff does not produce any evidence to show that this reason
was a pretext for discrimination, nor does Plaintiff controvert the
allegations against him.
Therefore, because Plaintiff neither
established a prima facie case nor raised a fact issue that
Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination
was a pretext for discrimination, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim.
IV.
Accordingly,
as
a
Order
matter
of
law
and
based
on
the
uncontroverted summary judgment evidence, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Texas Southern University’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Document No. 19) is in all things GRANTED, and
Plaintiff Rambis Chu shall take nothing on his claims. It is
further
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff’s
negligence,
slander,
42
U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and whistleblower claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims are DISMISSED on the merits.
The Clerk will enter this Order and provide a correct copy
to all parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 27th day of January, 2012.
____________________________________
EWING WERLEIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
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