Granger et al v. HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT et al
Filing
74
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 72 MOTION for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(arrivera, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LYNDON GRANGER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF HOUSTON,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-2698
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This civil rights case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”) [Doc. # 72] filed by Defendant City of Houston.1 Plaintiffs Lyndon
Granger, Ulysses Granger, Bartholomew Granger, Sr., and Bartholomew Granger, Jr.
filed a response [Doc. # 73] opposing the Motion. Having reviewed the full record
and applied governing legal authorities, the Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 26, 2010. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint [Doc. # 11] on September 7, 2010, another Amended Complaint
[Doc. # 21] on November 9, 2010, another Amended Complaint [Doc. # 24] on
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Plaintiffs’ claims against all other Defendants have been either dismissed or
transferred to the Eastern District of Texas. The City of Houston is the sole remaining
Defendant.
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January 21, 2011, another Amended Complaint [Doc. # 27] on February 22, 2011, and
another Amended Complaint [Doc. # 36] on March 3, 2011. At a hearing on May 16,
2011, the Court required Plaintiffs to state on the record the precise factual allegations
against Defendants, including the City of Houston. The Court deemed the transcript
[Doc. # 67] of that hearing to be Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint. See Hearing
Minutes and Order [Doc. # 52]. Consequently, Lyndon Granger’s claims against the
City of Houston are that the Houston Police Department failed to investigate properly
the allegations against him of sexual misconduct and that they used excessive force
on three occasions. Ulysses Granger’s claim is that the City of Houston provided false
information to Harris County. Bartholomew Granger, Sr.’s claim is that the City of
Houston placed him on a Fugitive Crime watch list as a sex offender. Bartholomew
Granger, Jr.’s claim is that Houston Police Department used excessive force and
coerced him into providing false information against his father.
After an adequate time to complete discovery, the City of Houston moved for
summary judgment. The Motion is now ripe for decision.
II.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the
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party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment “should
be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23; Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).
For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas
essential to the non-movant’s claim in which there is an “absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005).
The moving party may meet its burden by pointing out “‘the absence of evidence
supporting the nonmoving party’s case.’” Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d
308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 913
(5th Cir. 1992)).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the
pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)
(internal citation omitted). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the
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outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” DIRECT
TV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the
court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit &
Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-movant. Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The non-movant’s burden is not
met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant’s pleadings. See
Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 545 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002).
Likewise, “conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions” do not meet the
non-movant’s burden. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co.,
530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific
facts which show “the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential
component of its case.” Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 343
F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the
absence of any proof, the court will not assume that the non-movant could or would
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prove the necessary facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
The Court may make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence, and
must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe. See Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Reaves Brokerage Co., 336 F.3d at 412-413). The Court is not required to
accept the nonmovant’s conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated
assertions which are either entirely unsupported, or supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence. Id. (citing Reaves Brokerage, 336 F.3d at 413).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard for § 1983 Liability Against City of Houston
Municipalities are deemed to be “persons” susceptible to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Municipal
liability, however, cannot be sustained under a theory of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability. Id. at 691; Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A municipality is only liable under § 1983 for acts that are
“directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or imprimatur.’” James v.
Harris County, 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). For liability to attach, “the municipality
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must cause the constitutional tort, which occurs ‘when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’” Bolton v. City of
Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
To hold a municipality liable under this standard, “a plaintiff must show, in
addition to a constitutional violation, that an official policy promulgated by the
municipality’s policymaker was the moving force behind, or actual cause of, the
constitutional injury.” James, 577 F.3d at 617. The plaintiff must establish a “direct
causal link” between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation. Id.
(citations and quotations omitted).
B.
Lyndon Granger’s Claims
Lyndon Granger alleges that the Houston Police Department failed to
investigate properly the allegations against him of sexual misconduct and that they
used excessive force on three occasions. Lyndon Granger has not, however, presented
any evidence of an official policy or practice of the City of Houston or its police
department to conduct inadequate investigations or to use excessive force. As a result,
the City of Houston is entitled to summary judgment on Lyndon Granger’s claims.
C.
Ulysses Granger’s Claim
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Ulysses Granger alleges that the City of Houston provided Harris County with
false information that he molested a young female and issued a warrant for his arrest.
The City of Houston has presented evidence that the Houston Police Department
received a telephone call from a woman alleging that her daughter was sexually
assaulted by Lyndon Granger and by Ulysses Granger. The report was forwarded to
Harris County, which had jurisdiction over the alleged assault by Ulysses Granger in
Crosby, Texas. The forwarding of a complaint to the proper authorities does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation. There is no evidence that the City of Houston
issued an arrest warrant for Ulysses Granger. Accordingly, Ulysses Granger has
failed to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in support of his
claims, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
D.
Bartholomew Granger, Sr.’s Claim
Bartholomew Granger, Sr. alleges that the Houston Police Department placed
him on a Fugitive Crime watch list as a sex offender. The City of Houston has
presented uncontroverted evidence that “no person(s) employed, associated or
affiliated with the City of Houston informed, notified or provided any information
about Bartholomew Granger to Crime Stoppers (the entity that creates the watch list)
at any time.” See Affidavit of Katherine Cabaniss, Executive Director of Crime
Stoppers, Exh. C to Motion. Because there is no evidence that the City of Houston
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or its police department placed or participated in the placement of Bartholomew
Granger, Sr. on a Fugitive Crime watch list, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
E.
Bartholomew Granger, Jr.’s Claim
Bartholomew Granger, Jr. alleges that Houston Police Department officers used
excessive force against him and coerced him to provide false information against his
father. This Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the City of Houston or its
police department has an official policy or practice of engaging in excessive force or
coercing false allegations. As a result, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on this claim is granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence of an official policy or practice of the
City of Houston that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations
in this case. Additionally, Plaintiffs Ulysses Granger and Bartholomew Granger, Sr.
have failed to present evidence that the City of Houston participated in the alleged
violations of their constitutional rights. As a result, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 72] is
GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate Final Judgment.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 2nd day of December, 2011.
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