Harris County, Texas vs Union Pacific Railroad Company
Filing
52
OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Opposed MOTION to Reconsider Order Denying Remand, or Alternatively to Certify Issues for § 1292(b) Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay Proceedings, and this case is REMANDED to the County Civil Court at Law Number Two of Harris County, Texas. (Signed by Judge Melinda Harmon) Parties notified.(chorace)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:10-CV-4363
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Harris County’s motion (Doc. 32) to reconsider the
Court’s previous order denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand. In its previous opinion, the Court
applied the Fifth Circuit’s “as applied” preemption standard to determine that Harris County’s
condemnation proceeding was preempted by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (“ICCTA”). Doc. 22. The Court determined that the claim “arose under” federal
law and therefore was removed to this Court properly and, on that basis, denied Harris County’s
motion to remand. Id. Harris County now moves for reconsideration of that order in light of the
recent Fifth Circuit ruling in Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011).
Having considered the motion, the responses thereto, and the relevant law, the Court
determines that Harris County’s motion to remand should be granted.
Standard
Although Plaintiff fails expressly to invoke the provision governing motions for
reconsideration, such motions are generally considered cognizable under either Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), as motions “to alter or amend judgment,” or under Rule 60(b), as motions
for “relief from judgment.” Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th
Cir. 1990). “Under which Rule the motion falls turns on the time at which the motion is served.
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If the motion is served within ten days of the rendition of judgment, the motion falls under Rule
59(e); if it is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b).” Id. (citing Harcon Barge Co. v. D
& G Boat Rentals, 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc). Here, Harris County filed its
motion for reconsideration on October 6, 2011, more than 10 days after August 9, the date this
Court denied Harris County’s motion to remand. See Docs. 22, 24. Because Harris County
brought its motion for reconsideration more than ten days after the entry of judgment, the Court
properly considers the motion under the stricter limitations of Rule 60(b).
Under Rule 60(b), the Court may grant relief from a final judgment when the movant
adequately shows: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . .; (4) [that] the judgment is void; (5) [that] the judgment has
been satisfied, released or discharged . . .; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The district court enjoys considerable discretion when determining whether the
movant has satisfied these standards. Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1991).
Discussion
As the Court stated in its previous order, its federal question jurisdiction is limited to
those cases in which “a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Nevertheless, a limited
“exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists when the state law claims alleged are
completely preempted by federal law.” Doc. 22 at 3 (citing Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200, 207 (2004). The Court went on to apply the Fifth Circuit’s “as applied” preemption test
to the facts of this case and determined that Harris County’s condemnation proceeding would
“’unreasonably burden[] or interfere[]’ with Union Pacific’s current and projected use of its
railroad tracks,” that the proceeding therefore was preempted under ICCTA, and that the Court
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therefore had jurisdiction over the action.
Between the time the parties submitted the motion and responses on the issue of
preemption and the time the Court had an opportunity to rule on the motion, the Fifth Circuit
issued its opinion in Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796. In its opinion, the Fifth
Circuit stated that “[d]efensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction” in the context of
state law claims that may be preempted by the ICCTA. Rather, state law claims must be
completely preempted in order to fall within the narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule and create federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 803. The Court’s previous opinion failed
to acknowledge this distinction. Because the Court previously has found that the condemnation
proceeding at issue in this case is not of a sort that attempts to “manage[e] or govern[]” rail
transportation, and instead only incidentally affects it, there is no doubt that Harris County’s
condemnation proceeding is not completely preempted by the ICCTA. Federal subject matter
jurisdiction therefore is lacking in this case. Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 593
F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2010). See Doc. 22 at 8.
The error in the Court’s previous opinion constitutes a reason justifying relief under Rule
60(b). The Court therefore
ORDERS that Plaintiff Harris County’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.
Further, the Court
ORDERS that this case is remanded to the County Civil Court at Law Number Two of
Harris County, Texas.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 20th day of September, 2012.
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MELINDA HARMON
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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