Taylor et al v. TESCO Corporation (US)

Filing 332

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 309 MOTION for Summary Judgment, denying 308 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and denying 307 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Signed by Judge Ewing Werlein, Jr) Parties notified.(kcarr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KEITH TAYLOR and BARBARA TAYLOR,
INDIVIDUALLY and ON BEHALF OF
THEIR TWO MINOR CHILDREN, DAVID
A. TAYLOR and DARYEL TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TESCO CORPORATION (US),
TESCO CORPORATION, PRIDE
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and
MEXICO DRILLING LIMITED, LLC,
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-00517

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending is Pride International, Inc.’s and Mexico Drilling,
LLC’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(Document

No.

307),

Tesco

Corporation (US)’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 308),
and Tesco Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document
No. 309).

After carefully considering the motions, responses,

reply, the submissions of the parties regarding choice-of-law, and
the applicable law, the Court concludes as follows.
A.

Legal Standard
Rule 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”

FED . R. CIV . P. 56(a).

Once the movant carries

this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that
summary judgment should not be granted. Morris v. Covan World Wide
Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).

A party opposing

a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegations or denials in a pleading, and unsubstantiated
assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice.

Id.

“[T]he

nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence
of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component of its
case.”

Id.

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”

FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1).

“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.”

Id. 56(c)(3).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district
court must view the evidence “through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2513 (1986). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).

“If the record, viewed in

this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for

2

the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper.

Kelley v. Price-

Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993).

On the other

hand, if “the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant’s]
favor, then summary judgment is improper.”

Id.

Even if the

standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a
motion for summary judgment if it believes that “the better course
would be to proceed to a full trial.”

Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at

2513.
B.

Analysis
The central issue raised by these motions for summary judgment

is whether Tesco (US), which Plaintiffs timely sued in Louisiana,
can be held liable for Mr. Taylor’s accident.

If not, then Tesco

(US) is entitled to summary judgment and, the other Defendants
argue,

they

too

are

entitled

to

summary

Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive statute.

judgment

based

on

Defendants previously

filed choice-of-law briefs that generally argued that Mexican
substantive law applies but, in arguing these motions, no case is
advanced

to

apply

Mexican

law.

Plaintiffs

substantive law applies to their claims.
motions

is

the

Louisiana

one-year

urge

that

Texas

The focal point on these

prescriptive

statute

and,

specifically, whether Plaintiffs’ timely-filed suit in Louisiana
against Tesco (US) survives and, if not, whether without being able
to relate back to the complaint against Tesco (US), the later-filed

3

amended complaint against the other Defendants is barred by the
one-year prescriptive statute.
Plaintiffs allege strict products liability, negligence, and
breach of warranties of fitness against Tesco (US) and/or Tesco.1
The Pride Defendants argue that the evidence shows that “a division
of Tesco Corporation, not Tesco (US), manufactured and sold top
drive unit 154 to a subsidiary of Pride.”2

After careful review of

the summary judgment evidence, the Court finds that the Pride
Defendants have not established as a matter of law that Tesco (US)
or its predecessor was not the seller of the top drive unit.3
Neither Tesco nor Tesco (US) has produced any additional
summary judgment evidence to support their motions and therefore

1

Document No. 185-2 (4th Am. Cmplt.).

2

Document No. 307 at 2.

3

The Pride Defendants produce a Certificate of Origin and
Manufacture from “Tesco Products” stating that: “The Top Drive
System component was manufactured October, 1997 in Calgary,
Alberta, Canada,” and a Proforma Invoice, for top drive unit
154, which identifies Tesco Drilling Technology as the Shipper
and Tesco Drilling Technology Inc. as the Consignee.
Document
No. 307, exs. 1 & 3.
Tesco (US)’s designated Rule 30(b)(6)
corporate representative, Litton Schexnaildre, testified that Tesco
Drilling Technology, Incorporated was the predecessor of Tesco
(US). Document No. 316, ex. 1 at 27. The Pride Defendants also
cite deposition testimony from Schexnaildre confirming that
the above mentioned documents refer to top drive unit 154, and
testimony of Tesco’s designated representative, Jonathan Brian
O’Blenes, who took issue with some of Schexnaildre’s testimony but
fell short of clarifying the Tesco corporate history and corporate
structures. At best, material fact issues remain that preclude
holding as a matter of law that Tesco (US) did not sell the
product. Document No. 307, ex. 2 at 51, 114-15; Document No. 319,
ex. 4 at 20-25.
4

have also failed to establish as a matter of law that Tesco (US)
was not the seller of the top drive unit.

Because Tesco (US) has

not been shown to be entitled to summary judgment, the remaining
Defendants’

arguments

that

there

can

be

no

relation

back

to

Plaintiffs’ claims against them in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
also fail.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Pride International, Inc.’s and Mexico Drilling,
LLC’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(Document

No.

307),

Tesco

Corporation (US)’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 308),
and Tesco Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document
No. 309) are DENIED.
The Clerk will enter this Order and provide a correct copy to
all parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 22nd day of April, 2013.

____________________________________
EWING WERLEIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5