St. Amand v. Spring Independent School District

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTED 36 Opposed MOTION to Dismiss 25 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc.Opposed MOTION to Dismiss 25 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. (Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CLEMMIE ST. AMAND, Individually §
and As Next Friend of R.R., a Minor,
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
v.
§
§
SPRING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
§
DISTRICT,
§
Defendant.
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-1943

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 36] filed by
Defendant Spring Independent School District (“SISD”), to which Plaintiff Clemmie
St. Amand, pro se, filed an Opposition [Doc. # 42], and SISD filed a Reply [Doc.
# 43]. Having carefully reviewed the full record and applied governing legal
authorities, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s child receives special education services in an SISD school.

Plaintiff, pro se, filed a Third Amended Complaint alleging as background that she
complained to SISD that the school staff failed to change her son’s soiled diaper and
the school administration “agreed to administratively change [her son] to another
classroom with ‘new staff.’” Plaintiff alleges that when she attempted to drop her son

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off at school early one morning shortly thereafter, she was informed that she needed
to verify beforehand that someone was at the school early to receive her son. The
encounter escalated, and Plaintiff was charged with and convicted of assault on a
public servant.
In the Third Amended Complaint [Doc. # 25], Plaintiff alleges that SISD
violated her rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and her
rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that SISD violated the
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
II.

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Harrington v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). The complaint must be liberally
construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken
as true. Id. The complaint must, however, contain sufficient factual allegations, as
opposed to legal conclusions, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.”
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should presume they are true, even if doubtful, and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. Additionally,
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regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate
that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1997).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Plaintiff’s Inability to Represent Son

Plaintiff purports to assert claims on behalf of her son. Plaintiff is not an
attorney and, as a result, is not authorized to represent the interests of her son. See
Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978); L.F. b/n/f Marry Ruffin v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 3073926, *13 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2009) (Rosenthal, J.).
Plaintiff may, however, pursue her own individual claims without an attorney.
B.

Fourteenth and First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that SISD violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Plaintiff alleges specifically that SISD “prevented her from engaging
in the common occupation of life by supporting her son’s education [and] ensure her
son was educated in a safe non-hostile environment.” See Third Amended Complaint
[Doc. # 25], p. 7. Plaintiff alleges SISD violated her liberty interest to drop her son
off at school at 8:30 a.m. and to take her son home free from a hostile environment.
See id. Plaintiff alleges that SISD violated her property interest by refusing her
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request to have access to her backpack and by failing “to allow the Plaintiff, her right
to bodily restraint. Prevention from falling and hurting herself after her body/property
was violated.”1 See id.
Plaintiff alleges that SISD violated her rights under the First Amendment “when
staff and administrators were making traveling conversation alleging [she] should not
speak to anyone.” See Third Amended Complaint, p. 10.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint should be
dismissed because she did not assert these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff states in her Opposition that although she did not state specifically that her
claims were asserted pursuant to § 1983, “that does not mean that they were not.” See
Opposition, p. 3. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and her complaint is to be liberally
construed. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Third Amendment Complaint as
asserting her Fourteenth and First Amendment claims pursuant to § 1983.
A § 1983 claim against a municipality “requires proof of three elements: a
policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving
force’ is the policy or custom.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington County Sch. Dist.,

1

Plaintiff alleges also that SISD violated her right to the “pursuit of orderly happiness,”
but there is no recognized right to happiness protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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675 F.3d 849, 866 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567,
578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978))). In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that SISD had an official policy that
was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations. As a result, SISD
is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on alleged violations of the
Fourteenth and First Amendments.
C.

ADA Claim

Title II of the ADA provides that an individual shall not be excluded from
participating in or denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public
entity because of a qualifying disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim for
relief under Title II, the plaintiff must allege “(1) that he has a qualifying disability;
(2) that he is being denied the benefits of services . . . for which the public entity is
responsible . . .; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Hale
v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011).
The regulations provide that a “public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny
equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a
relationship or association.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g). An “associational discrimination
claim ‘requires a separate and distinct denial of a benefit or service to a non-disabled
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person’ and ‘may not be premised on a derivative benefit or harm based on treatment
towards a disabled person.’” Kelly-Fleming v. City of Selma, 2012 WL 1900556, *2
(W.D. Tex. May 24, 2012) (quoting Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2010 WL
4024776, *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010)). In Kelly-Fleming, the plaintiffs alleged that
the City of Selma intentionally delayed hearings on their application to have their
property rezoned so they could open a private school for children with learning
disabilities. The district court found that this adequately alleged a separate and
distinct denial of a benefit or service, and that the plaintiffs stated a claim for
associational discrimination claim under the ADA.
Plaintiff alleges that SISD violated her rights under the ADA by refusing to
allow her to assist her son, refusing to allow her to use the side door to the school, and
by failing to provide her with “necessary drop off information to use the front
entrance.” See Third Amended Complaint, p. 12. Plaintiff does not allege that any
of the alleged conduct by SISD was taken against Plaintiff because she is the mother
of a disabled child. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that she was treated
differently from the parents of non-disabled students who drove their children to
school. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for associational discrimination
in violation of the ADA.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff, a non-attorney
proceeding pro se, may not assert claims on behalf of her son. The Court concludes
also that Plaintiff has failed to allege a factual basis for her Fourteenth Amendment,
First Amendment, and ADA claims. As a result, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 36] is GRANTED
and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court will issue a separate
Final Order.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 6th day of August, 2012.

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