Okonkwo v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation
Filing
42
ORDER granting 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Signed by Judge Ewing Werlein, Jr) Parties notified.(kcarr, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHIDIEBELE "CHIDI" OKONKWO,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
v.
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-2678
ORDER
Pending in this Title VII discrimination case is Defendant
Schlumberger Technology Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Document No. 28).
Plaintiff Chidiebele "Chidi" Okonkwo ("Plain-
tiff"), a black Nigerian male, worked as a drilling engineer for
Defendant Schlumberger Technology Corporation
over a decade. 1
In July,
2009,
Plaintiff was
counts of forgery in Fort Bend County,
("Defendant" )
indicted on two
Texas for attempting to
purchase money orders with counterfeit bills.2
Plaintiff alleges
that he informed Defendant of the charges against him,
allowed to continue working as usual. 3
1
for
and was
Plaintiff was brought to
Document No. 33 at 5; Document No. 30, ex. A at 49:14-51:17.
Document No. 30 at 4; id., ex. A at 69:10-70:12; Document
No. 30-5 at 17 of 19 (indictment).
2
3
Document No. 33 at 5-6.
trial before a jury, and was found guilty of forgery on July 16,
2010. 4
Approximately two weeks later, Defendant terminated Plain-
tiff's
employment. 5
At
that
time,
Defendant
offered
to
pay
Plaintiff $3,846.15 in exchange for a release of any claims he had
against Defendant,
including Title VII claims. 6
Plaintiff was
given 21 days to consider the offer, but accepted Defendant's offer
and signed the Waiver and Release that same day.?
Plaintiff now brings suit alleging that Defendant violated
Title VII
because
by terminating him following
\\ [0] ther,
non-minority
and
his
white
forgery
employees
criminal convictions have not been terminated."8
for summary judgment,
conviction
that
have
Defendant moves
arguing that the Waiver and Release bars
Plaintiff's claims, and that, even if Plaintiff could bring such
claims,
they fail on the merits because Plaintiff can produce no
evidence of discrimination. 9
4 Document No.
verdict) .
30 at 4; Document No.
Document No. 30
(termination letter) .
at
5
4·
,
6
Document No. 30 at 5;
(Waiver and Release)
Document
30-7 at 9 of 29
30-7
No.
Document No.
9
~
8
(Orig. Cmplt.).
Document No. 30.
2
22
of
29
30-7 at 24-28 of 29
? Document No. 30-7 at 24 of 29, 28 of 29.
8 Document No. 1
at
(jury
Rule 56 (a)
provides that
"[t] he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."
this
burden,
FED. R. Crv. P.
the
56 (a).
to
burden shifts
Once the movant carries
nonmovant
the
summary judgment should not be granted.
to
show that
Morris v. Covan World Wide
Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
"[T]he nonmoving
party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a
'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case."
Id.
All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.
Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
"If the record, viewed in this light, could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the nonmovant, then
summary judgment is proper.
Kelley v.
Price-Macemon,
Inc.,
992
ordinarily does
not
F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993).
A release
of
claims
under
Title
VII
violate public policy and can be enforced if it is made knowingly
and voluntarily.
Cir. 2002).
its
Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 441 (5th
The employer bears the burden of demonstrating that
former employee
signed a
release addressing the claims at
issue, received adequate consideration, and subsequently breached
the release.
F.3d 930,
935
Id.
(citing Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23
(5th Cir.
1994)).
The burden then shifts to the
3
employee to show that the release was invalid due to fraud, duress,
material mistake, or some other defense.
The
Waiver and Release
Smith, 298 F.3d at 441.
unambiguously releases
Title VII claims against Defendant. 10
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff does not dispute
that he received the full amount of the consideration promised by
Defendant.11
Plaintiff breached the Waiver and Release by filing
10 Document No. 30-7 at 25 of 29 ("Employee . . . knowingly and
voluntarily releases and forever discharges Employer.
. of and
from any and all claims, known and unknown, which the Employee has
or may have against Employer as of the date of execution of this
Waiver and Release, including, but not limited to, any alleged
violation of:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
.").
Plaintiff argues that the Waiver and Release is ambiguous
because it also states:
Nothing herein is intended to or shall preclude Employee
from
filing
a
complaint and/or charge with any
appropriate federal, state, or local government agency
and/or cooperating with said agency in its investigation.
The releases contained in this paragraph will remain in
full force and effect. To the extent permitted by law,
Employee agrees that if such an administrative claim is
made, Employee shall not be entitled to recover any
individual monetary relief or other individual remedies.
Document No. 33 at 14 (citing Document No. 30-7 at 26 of 29). This
paragraph is not in conflict with Plaintiff's general release of
his own claims for monetary relief and other individual remedies
against Employer based on Title VII claims.
It merely clarifies
that Plaintiff remains able to file a complaint with a government
agency, and to cooperate with the agency in any investigation it
may conduct.
But as for any claims for monetary relief for
himself, Plaintiff's release of Defendant is a bar.
Plaintiff's
Complaint seeks only damages and monetary relief for himself, which
claims he unambiguously released.
11 See Document No. 33 at 15 n.4 ("The funds paid along with
the release were wire transferred directly into Chidi's account
that [Defendant] had on file.") .
4
this suit alleging claims for monetary relief for himself under
Title VII.
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that the Waiver
and Release was invalid at the time he signed it. 12
Plaintiff
is
barred
from
bringing
this
Title
VII
Accordingly,
action,
and
summary judgment for Defendant is appropriate. 13
Plaintiff does assert that the Waiver and Release was not
a fully consummated contract until signed by Defendant on August
18, 2010, and that Plaintiff attempted to retract it prior to that
date.
Document No. 33 at 14-15.
However, Plaintiff does not
dispute that Defendant offered him valuable consideration in
exchange for the Waiver and Release, that he accepted that offer by
signing the Waiver and Release, and that he received the promised
consideration from Defendant. When Defendant paid to Plaintiff the
agreed consideration, it fully performed its only obligation under
the Waiver and Release. Accordingly, a valid contract was formed
and fully performed by Defendant prior to Plaintiff's attempted
retraction.
12
13
Even if Plaintiff had not waived his Title VII monetary
claims against Defendant, Defendant still would be entitled to
summary judgment on the merits.
Plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination, which
required him to show, inter alia, that he "was replaced by someone
outside the protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment
that other similarly situated employees were treated more
favorably." See Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360
(5th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff points to no evidence that he was
replaced by a non-black or non-Nigerian, or that similarly situated
employees were treated more favorably.
Plaintiff moves to reopen discovery, objecting that Defendant
improperly limited its discovery responses by providing information
only about
discharged
employees
in positions
similar
to
Plaintiff's.
Document No. 33 at 9-11 (objecting to Defendant's
answer to Interrogatory No.9, which states "there are no
individuals employed by Defendant in the Drilling Engineer position
for D&M HQ (Plaintiff's position at the time of his conviction), or
in another position similarly situated to the Plaintiff, who have
been convicted of a felony or plead guilty to a felony in the past
ten years.").
" [E]mployees with different supervisors, who work
for different divisions of a company" and those "who have different
work responsibilities or who are subjected to adverse employment
5
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Defendant Schlumberger Technology Corporation's
Motion for
Summary Judgment
(Document No.
28)
is GRANTED,
and
Plaintiff Chidiebele "Chidi" Okonkwo's claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Clerk will enter this Order and provide a correct copy to
~
all parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this ____ day of December, 2013.
~'- JC'l.A:.
ERLEIN, JR.
S DISTRICT JUDGE
action for dissimilar violations" are not similarly situated. Lee
v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259-60 (5th Cir.
2009). Accordingly, Defendant appropriately limited its response
to relevant comparators and Plaintiff's request to reopen discovery
is denied.
6
'
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