OneBeacon Insurance Company v. T. Wade Welch & Associates et al
Filing
65
ORDER GRANTING 17 MOTION to Substitute Attorney Barry G. Flynn in place of Alissa Kirksey Christopher DENYING 24 Opposed MOTION to Disqualify William Murray. Attorney Veronica Martinsen Bates and Alissa Kirksey Christopher terminated.(Signed by Judge Gray H. Miller) Parties notified.(rkonieczny)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ONE BEACON INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
T. WADE WELCH & ASSOCIATES,
ROSS W. WOOTEN , T. WADE WELCH ,
AND JOSEPH BOYLE ,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION H-11-3061
O RDER
Pending before the court are (1) plaintiff OneBeacon Insurance Company’s (“OneBeacon”)
motion to substitute counsel (Dkt. 17); and (2) defendants T. Wade Welch & Associates and T.
Wade Welch’s (the “Welch Defendants”) motion to disqualify (Dkt. 24). The court held a hearing
on these motions on January 24, 2012. Dkt. 59. After considering the motions, related filings,
arguments of counsel, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion to substitute
(Dkt. 17) should be GRANTED and the motion to disqualify (Dkt. 24) should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a declaratory action matter in which OneBeacon requests that the court enter a
declaration (1) that an insurance policy that it issued to the T. Wade Welch & Associates firm (the
“Welch Firm”) in 2007 is void, does not provide coverage for, or OneBeacon has no obligation for
a claim made by EchoStar Communication Corporation n/k/a DISH Network Corporation (“DISH”)
and Kelly Broadcasting Systems, Inc. arising from the Welch Firm’s representation of them in
Russian Media Group, LLC v. EchoStar Communications Corporation and Kelly Broadcasting
Systems, Inc., a Connecticut case; and (2) that an insurance policy that OneBeacon issued in 2008
is void, does not provide coverage for, or OneBeacon has no obligation for any claim that may arise
out of the Welch Firm’s representation of DISH in Air Communication & Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar
Satellite Corporation, a Colorado case. Dkt. 52. OneBeacon alleges that the Welch Firm made
representations on its 2007 and 2008 insurance applications that neither the firm nor any member
of the firm had ever been sanctioned by a court when, in fact, a Colorado court had ordered personal
sanctions in excess of $62,000.00 against two members of the firm, Welch and defendant Ross W.
Wooten, in Dominion Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. OneBeacon further alleges that Wooten had a reasonable basis to know he had committed a
wrongful act, violated a disciplinary rule, or engaged in professional misconduct with respect to the
Russian Media Group case and could foresee that a claim would be made against him at the time the
application was completed, but failed to inform OneBeacon. Id. As such, OneBeacon asserts that
the exclusions in the 2007 policy preclude coverage for a claim DISH has asserted against the Welch
Firm and Wooten with regard to the handling of that case. Id. Similarly, OneBeacon alleges that
the exclusions in the 2008 policy preclude coverage for potential claims that may be brought in
relation to the Air Communication & Satellite case. Id.
OneBeacon was originally represented by Alissa Kirksey Christopher and Veronica M. Bates
of Hermes Sergent Bates, LLP. Dkt. 17. On October 18, 2011, OneBeacon filed a motion to
substitute counsel in which it requested “that the law firm of Gordon & Rees LLP, and specifically
attorneys Barry G. Flynn, Christopher Raney and Heidi Gumienny be allowed to substitute in and
assume further representation of OneBeacon.” Id. (emphasis added). The Welch Defendants
objected to the substitution and filed a motion to disqualify Gordon & Rees, arguing that Christopher
Raney has confidential information about DISH and the litigation at issue in this lawsuit that is
irrebuttably imputed to the other attorneys at Gordon & Rees because Raney was a law clerk at the
2
Welch Firm during the summer of 2004 and worked on the Dominion and Air Communication cases.
Dkts. 22, 24. DISH was one of the Welch Firm’s main clients when Raney worked there as a law
student, and Raney billed over 90 hours on the Dominion and Air Communication cases. Id.
OneBeacon argues that Gordon & Rees is not disqualified because the Welch Defendants, who never
an attorney-client relationship with Raney, have no standing to bring a motion to disqualify, and,
even if they did, there are no grounds for disqualification because this matter is not substantially
related to any matter Raney worked on while employed by the Welch Firm. Furthermore,
OneBeacon asserts that Raney has no recollection of any matter that he worked on while employed
at the Welch Firm, and has been instructed not to discuss the substance of the claims and defenses
in this matter with anybody at Gordon & Rees.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A “‘[d]istrict [c]ourt is obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in
connection with any proceeding before it.’” In re ProEducation Int’l, Inc., 587 F.3d 296, 299-300
(5thCir. 2009) (quoting In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992)). However,
“‘[d]epriving a party of the right to be represented by the attorney of his or her choice is a penalty
that must not be imposed without careful consideration.’” Id. at 300 (quoting FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins.,
50 F.3d 1304, 1313 (5th Cir. 1995)). When considering motions to disqualify, courts should first
look to ‘the local rule promulgated by the local court itself.’” In re ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at
299. Under the Local Rules of the Southern District of Texas, “the minimum standard of practice
shall be the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct” (the “Texas Rules”). S.D. Tex. Loc.
R. App. A, R.1A (emphasis added). The Local Rules indicate, in fact, that the court is not limited
by the Texas Rules. Id. R. 1B. The court thus may consider other rules, and the Fifth Circuit has
instructed that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the “national standard[] to
3
consider in reviewing motions to disqualify.” In re ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at 299. The court’s
analysis is therefore guided by both the Texas Rules and the ABA Rules.
Texas Rule 1.05 deals with confidential information. Under Rule 1.05, lawyers may not
knowingly
Reveal confidential information of a client or a former client, . . . [u]se confidential
information of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents
after consultations, . . . use confidential information of a former client to the
disadvantage of the former client after the representation is concluded unless the
former client consents after consultation or the confidential information has become
generally known, . . . [or] [u]se privileged information of a client for the advantage
of the lawyer or of a third person, unless the client consents after consultation.
Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.05. Texas Rule 1.09 discusses conflicts of interest
relating to former clients. Under Rule 1.09:
(a) Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client
in a matter shall not thereafter represent another persons in a matter adverse to the
former client:
(1) in which such other person questions the validity of the lawyer’s services
or work product for the former client;
(2) if the representation in reasonable probability will involve a violation of
Rule 1.05; or
(3) if it is the same or a substantially related matter.
(b) Except to the extent authorized by Rule 1.10, when lawyers are or have become
members of or associated with a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client if any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by
paragraph (a).
(c) When the association of a lawyer with a firm has terminated, the lawyers who
were then associated with that lawyer shall not knowingly represent a client if the
lawyer whose association with that firm has terminated would be prohibited from
doing so by paragraph (a)(1) or if the representation in reasonable probability will
involve a violation of Rule 1.05.
Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.09.
The American Bar Association’s rule regarding conflicts of interest relating to former clients
is similar:
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(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had
previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to
a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules
would permit or require with respect to a client.
ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9.
In the Fifth Circuit, courts “do not mechanically apply the rules of disqualification.”
Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1569 (5th Cir. 1989). Instead, they
“scrutinize the ‘precise nature of the relationship between the present and former representations.’”
Id. (quoting Duncan v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020, 1029 (5th Cir.
1981)). The party seeking disqualification must establish: “1.) an actual attorney-client relationship
between the moving party and the attorney he seeks to disqualify and 2.) a substantial relationship
between the subject matter of the former and present representations.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
The Welch Defendants argue that Raney, and consequently Gordon & Rees, cannot represent
OneBeacon, because Raney worked on matters central to OneBeacon’s complaint in this matter
when he worked at the Welch Firm. Moreover, the Welch Defendants assert that erecting a “Chinese
Wall” around Raney will not remedy the problem because there is an irrebuttable presumption that
5
Raney obtained confidential information while working at the Welch Firm and a second irrebuttable
presumption that he shared it with the attorneys at Gordon & Rees. Dkt. 22. OneBeacon argues that
Gordon & Rees should not be disqualified because (1) the Welch Firm cannot move to disqualify
Raney because it did not have an attorney-client relationship with Raney; and (2) there is not a
substantial relationship between the matters on which Raney worked as a law student at the Welch
Firm and the issues in this case. Dkt. 28.
A.
Attorney-Client Relationship
The rule allowing a former client to seek disqualification of an attorney who appears on
behalf of an adversary “rests upon the presumption that confidences potentially damaging to the
client have been disclosed to the attorney during the former period of representation.” In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976). Usually, courts may only
disqualify attorneys for a conflict of interest if the former client moves for disqualification. Id. at
88. However, there are a few “narrow exceptions,” such as if there is an “unethical change in sides
that [is] manifest and glaring.” Id. at 89.
Here, it is Raney’s former employer, the Welch Firm, rather than his former client, DISH,
that moves for disqualification. Raney’s relationship with the Welch Firm is an employee-employer
relationship, not an attorney-client relationship. Thus, the court would normally need to determine
whether one of the “narrow exceptions” to the rule requiring the movant to have had an attorneyclient relationship exists. However, as acknowledged by OneBeacon during the hearing, DISH,
though a non-party, has joined in the Welch Firm’s motion to disqualify.1 See Dkt. 47 at 9 n.4.
1
DISH has moved to intervene in this action, but its motion is not yet ripe. Dkt 47. In its
motion, DISH notes that it “seeks to register its objection to Gordon & Rees’s representation of
OneBeacon directly with the Court . . . and joins in the arguments previously advanced by the Welch
Defendants.” Dkt. 47 at 9 n.4.
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Thus, the client has raised the issue. OneBeacon’s argument that the Welch Defendants cannot raise
this issue because they did not have an attorney-client relationship with Raney is no longer valid.
In connection with its argument that the Welch Firm cannot raise this issue because it did not
have an attorney-client relationship with Raney, OneBeacon argues that the conflict of interest rules
only apply when an attorney seeks to represent a new client against a former client, and that here the
new client—OneBeacon—is not adverse to the former client—DISH. Dkt. 28. In fact, OneBeacon
argues that DISH is adverse to the Welch Firm because it has made a claim against the Welch Firm
and has thus waived the attorney-client privilege as it relates to matters in the claim. Dkt. 28.
First, while OneBeacon did not file a claim in this court against DISH, it is still pursuing a
claim that is adverse to DISH’s interests. DISH has moved to intervene in this action, arguing that
it “actually has more to gain or lose in this action than the current parties.” Dkt. 47. In this lawsuit,
OneBeacon seeks to invalidate insurance policies that may provide coverage for the claims DISH
asserts in the malpractice case. Dkt. 52. DISH, of course, if it proves malpractice against the Welch
Defendants, would like to be able to recover under the OneBeacon policies, so DISH’s and
OneBeacon’s interests are adverse.
Second, with regard to the waiver argument, OneBeacon is correct that if a litigant “places
information protected by [the attorney-client privilege] in issue through some affirmative act for his
own benefit,” the attorney-client privilege is waived. Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 435 (5th
Cir. 1989). However, it is waived only as to the topics placed at issue. See Apex Mun. Fund v. NGrp. Secs., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1431 (S.D. Tex. 1993). Here, while DISH has potentially placed
privileged information at issue by making a claim relating to the sanctions ordered against DISH
while the Welch Firm represented DISH in the Russian Media case and requiring the defendants to
execute tolling agreements, any potential waiver of the privilege applies only to the information put
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at issue—not to every privileged communication DISH had with the Welch Firm during the years
in which the Welch Firm represented DISH. Thus, even if the claim and tolling agreements result
in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to some communications between DISH and the Welch
Firm, not all claims to privilege are waived. Moreover, OneBeacon has not provided the court with
any authority suggesting that a waiver of privilege deprives a party of standing to request
disqualification due to an alleged conflict of interest.2
B.
Substantial Relationship
OneBeacon argues that Gordon & Rees should not be disqualified because this case, which
is really about whether the Welch Firm made misrepresentations on its 2007 and 2008 insurance
applications, is not substantially related to the matters that Raney worked on as a law student for the
Welch Firm, and that, regardless, Raney does not remember anything about the matters he worked
on at the Welch Firm and has been instructed not to work on this case at Gordon & Rees. The Welch
Firm asserts that Raney did work on matters that were substantially related to this case while
employed by the Welch Firm, as he billed a significant number of hours to the very cases put at issue
in the complaint. The Welch Firm argues that screening Raney is insufficient because, under Texas
law, Raney is irrebuttably presumed to have obtained confidential information while working for the
Welch Firm and is irrebuttably presumed to have shared that information with the attorneys at his
new firm. OneBeacon argues that the Texas presumptions do not apply in federal court.
2
Information does not have to be privileged to be considered “confidential.” See Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.05(a) (“Confidential information includes both privileged
and unprivileged client information.”). The Texas confidentiality rule “reinforces the principles of
evidence law relating to the attorney-client privilege,” but it also “furnishes considerable protection
to other information falling outside the scope of the privilege.” Id. cmt. 4.
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1.
Presumptions.
Texas courts presume that individuals who have worked for a particular case at one firm
gained confidential information relating to that client and that, if the individual goes to work for a
firm representing a party that is adverse to that client, the individual has shared confidential
information with attorneys at his or her new firm. Texas courts apply these rules differently when
a nonlawyer, as opposed to a lawyer, is the source of a potential conflict, making a distinction
between the difference in the “likelihood of contact with confidential information.” In re Guaranty
Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex. 2011). If a lawyer previously worked on the same or
a substantially related matter, “there is an irrebuttable presumption that the lawyer obtained
confidential information during the representation.” Id. at 134. When the lawyer moves to a firm
representing a party opposing the lawyer’s former client, “a second irrebuttable presumption
arises—that the lawyer has shared the client’s confidences with members of the second firm.” Id.
If, on the other hand, a nonlawyer worked on a matter at a prior firm, while there is still a “conclusive
presumption that confidences were obtained, but “the second presumption—that confidences were
shared with members of the second law firm—may be rebutted where nonlawyers are concerned.”
Id. The new firm may rebut that presumption by (1) instructing the nonlawyer not to work on any
matter on which he or she worked during his or her prior employment or about which he or she has
information relating to the former employer’s representation; and (2) taking reasonable steps to
ensure that the nonlawyer does not work “in connection with matters” on which the nonlawyer
worked during the prior employment. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “In most cases
involving nonlawyers, “disqualification is not required provided ‘the practical effect of formal
screening has been achieved.’” Id. (quoting Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831,
836 (Tex. 1994)).
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Here, Raney was a nonlawyer while he worked at the Welch Firm. The parties have cited
no cases, and the court has found none, concerning how the presumptions would work with regard
to a law student who works for a firm while attending law school and then goes to work for a
different firm after becoming a lawyer. However, since there is really only a distinction in the
presumptions relating to sharing confidences with the second firm, and Raney was already a lawyer
by the time he started working for the second firm, it makes sense to apply the rules relating to
lawyers rather than nonlawyers. Thus, it is irrebuttably presumed, if one is applying Texas law, that
Raney obtained confidences when he worked at the Welch Firm and that he shared them with
members of Gordon & Rees.
OneBeacon asserts that these presumptions do not apply in federal court. In American
Airlines, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it is irrebuttably presumed that confidential information was
disclosed during the prior representation and that these confidences will be shared with lawyers at
the new firm. Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d at 614 & n.1. However, in ProEducation International, the
Fifth Circuit pointed out that the American Airlines court did not actually apply the presumption,
so it is merely dicta, and the cases upon which the American Airlines court relied for the
presumption were applying an old version of the Texas Rules. ProEducation Int’l, 587 F.3d at 30304. The Fifth Circuit determined that an attorney should have an opportunity to demonstrate that
he or she did not obtain confidential information while working at his or her previous firm under
both the ABA Rules and the current version of the Texas Rules. Id. at 304.
While the court in ProEducation International questioned the continued applicability of the
irrebuttable presumptions, it did so in the context of considering whether an attorney who did not
work on a particular matter at his previous firm was irrebuttably presumed to have obtained
confidential about the matter because other attorneys at the old firm worked on the case. Here, the
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Welch Defendants have submitted evidence demonstrating that Raney did receive confidential
information about the cases at issue while working at the Welch Firm, so there is no need to rely
on the presumption that he received confidential information. It is clear that the presumption that
Raney has shared confidences with other members of his firm still applies, as the Texas Supreme
Court, which promulgates the rules, has recently reiterated the applicability of the irrebuttable
presumptions under the current version of the Texas Rules in Guaranty Insurance Services.
Guaranty Ins. Servs., 343 S.W.3d at 134. Thus, if Raney worked on matters that are substantially
related to the issues in the current lawsuit, screening him from this case is not sufficient.
2.
Relationship Between Raney’s Work and This Lawsuit.
The key question here is whether this matter is the same as or substantially related to the
matters Raney worked on while employed by the Welch Firm. See ABA R. 1.9(b) (may not
represent “in the same or a substantially related matter”); Tex. R. 1.09(a)(3) (may not represent if
“it is the same or [a] substantially related matter”). If so, then the presumptions noted above require
disqualification. Under Texas law, the severity of this remedy “requires the movant to establish by
a preponderance of the facts indicating a substantial relation between the two representations.”
NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989). Under both Texas law and
Fifth Circuit precedent, the moving party bears the burden of showing a substantial relationship.
Id.; see Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d at 614.
According to the Fifth Circuit, “[d]isqualification rules not only preserve the purity of
particular trials but also unavoidably affect relationships among attorneys and clients in general,”
and that the “court bars attorneys from appearing in substantially related matters not only to protect
individual parties against the adverse use of information but also ‘to aid the frank exchange between
attorney and client.’” Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d at 619. “The substantial relationship test [thus] aims
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to protect the adversary process but also, or as part of this concern, seeks to provide conditions for
the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 620. A “substantial relationship may be found only after
the moving party delineates with specificity the subject matters, issues and causes of action common
to prior and current representations and the court engages in a painstaking analysis of the facts and
precise application of precedent.” Id. at 614 (quotations and citations omitted).
Under Texas law, the “moving party must prove the existence of a prior attorney-client
relationship in which the factual matters involved were so related to the facts in the pending
litigation that it creates a genuine threat that confidences revealed to his former counsel will be
divulged to his present adversary. Sustaining this burden requires evidence of specific similarities
capable of being recited in the disqualification order.” NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
“[S]uperficial resemblances among issues do not rise to the level of a substantial relationship.” In
re Drake, 195 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, mandamus denied).
Raney claims that he has “absolutely no recollection of any of the work [he] performed
while [he] was employed with the Welch Firm, including the issues, topics, or substance of any
such work.” He does, however, “recall that DISH . . . was a client of the Welch Firm . . . , [but he
has] absolutely no recollection of performing any work for DISH specifically, and [he does] not
recall any information that may have been imparted to [him] concerning DISH during [his]
employment with the Welch Firm.” Dkt. 28-8. Thus, he claims that he has “not shared and could
not have shared any such information with any other employee, member, partner, or associate of
Gordon & Rees, LLP.” Id. Additionally, he notes that, “[o]ther than relaying information necessary
to prepare [his] declaration and to respond to a certain cease and desist letter . . . , [he has] not
performed any work on” this lawsuit, and he has “been instructed not to discuss the substance of
the claims and defenses in this matter with anybody at Gordon & Rees.” Id.
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Despite Raney’s current inability to remember the work he performed while working at the
Welch Firm, his timesheets indicate that he worked 206.5 hours on DISH cases while he was
working for the Welch Firm. Dkt. 22, Exh. 10. He worked 79.75 hours on the Air Communication
& Satellite matter and 11.5 hours on the Dominion matter. Id. His work on these cases, however,
was not substantially related to the issues in this lawsuit.3
Here, the Air Communication & Satellite case is at issue because the Welch Firm allegedly
failed to disclose certain information during discovery. Raney’s work on the Air Communication
& Satellite case involved discrete issues that are wholly distinct from the discovery problems at
issue in this case, and, more importantly, has nothing to do with Welch’s alleged misrepresentation
on the OneBeacon insurance application.
The Dominion case is at issue in this lawsuit because the court in that case ordered sanctions
against Welch and Wooten in excess of $62,000.00, and then Welch represented on the 2007
Application for insurance that neither he nor the Welch Firm had not
ever been disbarred, refused admission to practice law, suspended, reprimanded,
sanctioned, fined, placed on probation, held in contempt or the subject of any
complaint, grievance or action by any court, administrative agency or regulatory
body.
Dkt. 52. The district court ordered sanctions in the Dominion case because “the behavior of
EchoStar’s [n/k/a/ DISH] attorneys was both ‘unreasonable and vexatious’”; “the arguments
presented on behalf of EchoStar were completely meritless and therefore the course of the
proceedings was unwarranted, [and the] attorneys need not have filed lengthy briefs at every stage
3
The court requested that the Welch Firm provide it with unredacted copies, for in camera
review, of the exhibits it had submitted demonstrating that Raney worked on and wrote legal
memoranda for the DISH cases at issue in this lawsuit. The court has reviewed these documents and
is satisfied that the work Raney performed was not substantially related to the issues presented in this
case.
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of the arbitration and court proceedings in order to preserve EchoStar’s arguments for appeal.”
Dominion Video Satellite, Inc., 430 F.3d at 1279. Raney’s work on the Dominion matter related
to a specific discovery issue that has absolutely nothing to do with the behavior for which Welch
and Wooten were sanctioned or Welch’s alleged misrepresentation on the OneBeacon insurance
application.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Raney’s work for DISH while he was employed by the Welch Firm is not
substantially related to the issues in this case, the Welch Defendants’ motion to disqualify (Dkt. 24)
is DENIED. OneBeacon’s motion to substitute (Dkt. 17) is GRANTED. Attorneys Barry G. Flynn
and William E. Murray of Gordon & Rees LLP, shall be substituted as counsel for OneBeacon in
place of Veronica Bates and Alissa Christopher of Hermes Sargent Bates, LLP.4 Alissa Christopher
and Veronica Bates are hereby allowed to withdraw as counsel.
It is so ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas on February 6, 2012.
___________________________________
Gray H. Miller
United States District Judge
4
Originally, OneBeacon requested that Flynn, Raney, and Heidi Gumienny be substituted
for its current lead counsel and that Murray remain on the record as counsel of record. Dkt. 17.
However, OneBeacon represented in its response to the motion to disqualify that Murray is now its
lead counsel of choice. Dkt. 28.
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