Heidmar Trading LLC v. Emirates Trading Agency LLC et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION granting 24 Amended MOTION to Vacate.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy K. Johnson) Parties notified.(sbutler, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
HEIDMAR TRADING LLC,

§
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§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Plaintiff,
v.
EMIRATES TRADING AGENCY, LLC,
EMIRATES STAR PTE., LTD. and
STAR MARITIME PTE., LTD.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-11-3847

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court is Emirates Star’s Amended Motion to
Vacate

(Doc.

24)

and

the

responses

filed

thereto.

Having

considered the motion, response, arguments of counsel and evidence,
the motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated below.
I.

Procedural Background

On

November

1,

2011,

Plaintiff

Heidmar

Trading,

LLC,

(“Heidmar”) filed a verified complaint against Emirates Trading
Agency, LLC, (“ETA”), Emirates Star Pte., Ltd. (“Emirates Star”)
and

Star Maritime Pte, Ltd., (“Star Maritime”).

According to the

complaint, ETA operates a fleet of ocean-going dry bulk cargo
vessels that transports goods through contracts of affreightment or
charter parties.1

In 2008, Heidmar and ETA entered into a series

of contracts for vessel fuel oil for the purpose of hedging market
risks

of

fluctuating

fuel

costs

(“Bunker

1

Doc. 1, V. Original Compl., pp. 2-3.

2

Id.

Swap

Contracts”).2

Heidmar alleges that the acquisition and cost containment of
bunkers

is

an

essential

component

of

the

maritime

industry.3

The verified complaint alleges that ETA failed to make its
payments as agreed in the Bunker Swap Contracts and that as of
February 2009, it owed Plaintiff in excess of $24,000,000.4

As a

result of the arrearage, on February 1, 2009, Heidmar and ETA
agreed that ETA would pay a minimum of $500,000 per month on its
obligation under the Bunker Swap Contracts.5

This agreement was

memorialized in the Special Payment Schedule Agreement.6
According to the complaint, ETA failed to make its payments
for bunkers under either the Bunker Swap Contracts or the Special
Payment Schedule Agreement and, as of October 31, 2011, owed
Heidmar $7,755,003.88 in principal and accrued interest.7
On November 1, 2011, pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Supplemental Rules”), Plaintiff filed a
Motion

for

Garnishment,

Issuance
seeking

of
the

Process

of

attachment

Maritime
of

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at p. 5.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

See Doc. 2, Mot. for Iss. of Process.

2

M/T

Attachment
EMIRATES

and

STAR.8

According to Plaintiff, ETA is the true owner of the M/T EMIRATES
STAR, and the vessel’s registered owner, Emirates Star is merely an
alter

ego

of

ETA.9

On November 1, 2011, the court granted

Plaintiff’s motion and ordered M/T EMIRATES STAR arrested.10
On November 4, 2011, Emirates Star moved to vacate the
attachment of M/T EMIRATES STAR on the grounds that it is not the
alter ego of ETA.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on

November 10, 2011, and makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
II.
1.

Findings of Fact
ETA is a business entity organized under the laws of the

United Arab Emirates, with a principal place of business at Ascon
House, P.O. Box 5239, Salahuddin Road, Dubai, U.A.E.

Relevant to

the present dispute, ETA owns or manages a fleet of ocean-going dry
bulk vessels that operate in international waters.
2. Emirates Star is a business entity organized under the laws
of Singapore, with a registered address of 21, Raffles Place, #1800 Clifford Centre, Singapore (048621) and is the registered owner
of the M/T EMIRATES STAR.
3.

Star Maritime is a business entity organized under the

laws of Singapore, with a registered address of 21, Raffles Place,
#18-00 Clifford Centre, Singapore (048621).

9

See Doc. 1, V. Original Compl., pp.

10

See Doc. 5, Order.

3

5-9.

Star Maritime owns

Emirates Star.

According to one of its directors, Star Maritime

convenes regular director meetings, keeps its accounts and records
and conducts its affairs in accordance with the Singapore Companies
Act.11
4.

Star Maritime was originally owned by ETA Star Holdings,

Ltd., Ascon House, P. O. Box 5239, Salahuddin Road, Dubai, U.A.E.
In 2009, the ownership of Star Maritime was transferred to Star
Maritime Holding Co., Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company.12
Star Maritime Holding Co., Ltd., is owned by Essa Abdullah Ahmad Al
Ghurair,

Abdulla

Ahmed

Al

Ghurair,

Ibrahim

Abdulla

Ahmed

Al

Ghurair, Syed Mohamed Salahuddin and Arif Buhary Rahman.
5.

ETA does not have an ownership interest in either Star

Maritime or Emirates Star.13

Conversely, neither Star Maritime nor

Emirates Star has an ownership interest in ETA.14
6.

During 2008, Heidmar and ETA entered into three contracts

relating to the price of vessel fuel oil, commonly known as
bunkers.15 Bunkers are an essential component of maritime commerce.
The contracts were designed to hedge the market risks of purchasing
bunkers on the spot market by setting a fixed price on fuel during

11

Doc. 11, Emirates Star’s Mot. to Vacate, Decl. of Ahamed Harris,

Ex. 1, ¶ 10.
12

Id. at ¶ 14.

13

Id. at ¶ 20.

14

Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23.

15

See Doc. 28, Bunker Swap Contracts, Pl.’s Exs. 1-3.

4

set time periods.

The fixed price and quantity were set with

reference to ETA’s fleet’s fuel needs and used the “Singapore HSFO
380 cst” as the reference price.

For example, if the spot market

price was lower than the fixed price, ETA would owe Heidmar the
price difference, based on the quantity of fuel purchased.

If the

reference price was higher than the fixed price, Heidmar owed ETA
the difference. The amounts owing were settled at the end of every
month.
7. The Bunker Swap Contracts were signed by Gary W. Lawson on
behalf of Heidmar and by Mohamed Azhar (a/k/a/ Mohamed Azhar Idris)
on behalf of ETA.16

Mohamed Azhar, an executive of ETA, is also a

director of Emirates Star and Star Maritime.17
8.

The Bunker Swap Contracts provide that New York law

governs.18 Each contract also states, “Each party expressly submits
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts
located in the State of New York and waives any right it may have
to a trial by jury in respect to any proceeding relating to this
Confirmation or the Transaction.”19
9.

16

ETA failed to make its monthly payments to Heidmar under

Id.

17

Id. (Azhar signing as “Management Executive”); see also Star
Maritime’s 2009 Annual Report, Pl.’s Ex. 4, p. 1 (Azhar listed as one of two
directors); Emirates Star’s 2009 Annual Return, Pl.’s Ex. 6, p. 3(Azhar listed
as a director).
18

Id. at ¶ 8 “Governing Law,” p. 6.

19

Id.

5

the Bunker Swap Contracts, and as of February 20, 2009, owed
Heidmar $24,224,659.
10.

On February 1, 2009, Heidmar and ETA entered into a

Special Payment Schedule Agreement whereby ETA promised to pay
Heidmar a minimum of $500,000 per month until its obligations under
the Bunker Swap Contracts were satisfied.20

This contract was

executed on behalf of ETA by Noohu Mohamed Ameer Fizel (a/k/a
Faisal), an ETA executive.21

Fizel is a director of Emirates Star

and Star Maritime.22
11.

ETA has failed to pay Heidmar under the Bunker Swap

Contracts or the Special Payment Schedule Agreement and, as of
October 31, 2011, owes Heidmar $7,755,003.88.
12. ETA entered into a time charter for the M/T EMIRATES STAR
in 2007 for a daily charter hire rate of $21,000.23

In 2009, the

market prices dropped and ETA fell behind on its payments to
Emirates Star.24

On January 10, 2010, ETA and Emirates Star agreed

that Aquabella Shipping would be substituted for ETA on the time
charter and that the vessel would be sub-chartered to Heidmar’s

20

See Doc. 28, Special Payment Schedule Agreement, Pl.’s Ex. 11.

21

Id. at p. 4.

22

See Doc. 28, 2009 Annual Return of Emirates Star, Pl.’s Ex. 6, p.
3 (listing Fizel as a director); 2009 Annual Return of Star Maritime, Pl.’s
Ex. 7, p. 3 (listing Fizel as director).
23

See Doc. 11, Claimant’s Mot. to Vacate, Decl. of Ahamed Harris, ¶

24

Id.

35.

6

Dorado Pool.25
13.

Aquabella agreed to immediately pay Emirates Star any

charter hires received for the M/T EMIRATES STAR.26

Emirates Star

released ETA from the terms of the time charter and leased the
vessel to Aquabella on a less-favorable voyage charter basis.27
14.

Ahamed Harris explained that the decisions not to pursue

ETA for money owing under their time charter and to lease the M/T
EMIRATES STAR on a going-forward basis to Aquabella on a voyage
charter basis were based on business expediency and not because
either Emirates Star or Star Maritime was an alter ego of ETA.
III.

Conclusions of Law

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) incorporate the
Supplemental Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h)(1). The Supplemental
Rules expressly apply to “admiralty and maritime claims within the
meaning of Rule 9(h) with respect to . . . maritime attachment and
garnishment.”

Supplemental R. A(1).

Supplemental Rule B provides for attachment in connection with
in personam actions: “If a defendant is not found within the
district when a verified complaint praying for attachment and the
[supporting] affidavit . . . are filed, a verified complaint may
contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant’s tangible or

25

Id. at ¶¶ 33, 34.

26

Id. at ¶ 35.

27

Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36, 40.

7

intangible personal property . . . .”

Supplemental R. B(1)(a).

When property is attached, “any person claiming an interest in it
shall be entitled to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff shall
be required to show why the arrest or attachment should not be
vacated or other relief granted consistent with these rules.”
Supplemental R. E(4)(f).
in rem proceeding.

Supplemental Rule B provides for a quasi

See Sembawang Shipyard, Ltd. v. Charger, Inc.,

955 F.2d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1992).

The claim is against the named

person, but, when that person cannot be found in the district, the
plaintiff

may

proceed

against

the

thing.

Id.;

see

also

Supplemental R. B(1).
a.

Admiralty Jurisdiction

Emirates Star argues that the underlying dispute between
Heidmar and ETA is not maritime in nature.

The argument has two

parts: 1) the controlling contract for determining the court’s
jurisdiction is the Special Payment Schedule Agreement, which is a
non-maritime settlement agreement; 2) the Bunker Swap Contracts
themselves are not maritime contracts.
The court easily disposes of the first argument.

Heidmar’s

Verified Original Complaint clearly alleges that ETA breached its
obligations under the Special Payment Schedule Agreement and the
Bunker Swap Contracts.28

Moreover, the Special Payment Schedule

Agreement explicitly stated that it was not a settlement of the

28

See Doc. 1, V. Original Compl., p. 5.

8

obligations under the Bunker Swap Contracts.29

Therefore, the

Special Payment Schedule Agreement is not controlling.

The court

finds that it need not make a determination regarding the Special
Payment Schedule Agreement if it can exercise jurisdiction over
Heidmar’s contract claim based on the Bunker Swap Contracts.

That

question warrants a bit more discussion.
To proceed under Supplemental Rule B, the claim must fall
within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(h)(1); Supplemental R. A; Alphamate Commodity GMBH v. CHS Eur.
SA, 627 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 2010).

A breach of contract claim

is an admiralty claim if the contract on which the suit is based is
a maritime contract.

Gulf Coast Shell & Aggregate LP v. Newlin,

623 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2010)(finding that an oral agreement to
transfer title of a vessel to a third party was not a maritime
contract).

“A maritime contract is one relating to a ship in its

use as such, or to commerce or navigation on navigable waters, or
to transportation by sea or to maritime employment.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (quoting J.A.R., Inc. v. M/V
LADY LUCILLE, 963 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1992)).
protection of maritime commerce.

The focus is on the

Alphamate Commodity GMBH, 627

F.3d at 186 n.4 (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S.
668, 674 (1982)); see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S.
29
See Doc. 28, Special Payment Schedule Agreement, Heidmar’s Ex. 11,
¶ 6 (“Except as expressly provided herein, Heidmar does not waive any of its
rights or remedies under the [Bunker Swap Contracts] or otherwise connected
therewith. Any such rights and remedies remain in full force.”).

9

14, 24 (2004)(finding a contract to be maritime because it had as
its primary objective “to accomplish the transportation of goods by
sea”).
In determining whether the underlying dispute arises under the
court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the court must consider “the nature
and character of the contract, and the true criterion is whether it
has

reference

Norfolk

S.

to

Ry.

maritime
Co.,

543

service
U.S.

or

at

maritime
24

transactions.”

(internal

quotations

omitted)(quoting N. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. &
Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 125 (1919)); see also Gulf Coast
Shell & Aggregate LP, 623 F.3d at 240 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Cent.
Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 611, 612 (1991), and instructing
courts to consider whether the “nature of the transaction was
maritime and whether the services performed under the contract
[were] maritime in nature”); Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791
F.2d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1986)(stating that a contract is
maritime if there is “a direct and proximate juridic[al] link
between the contract and the operation of the ship, its navigation
or its management afloat”).
It is well-established that fuel for vessels is a necessary
giving rise to a maritime lien pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 971.

Gulf

Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Caribe Mar, 757 F.2d 743, 747 (5th Cir.
1985).

It is also well-settled that bunker supply contracts are

maritime in nature.

See Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 612.

10

This is

true even when one party to the contract purchases the fuel from a
third party and the third party delivers the fuel to the vessel.
Id. at 612-13.
The court has no difficulty in concluding that Bunker Swap
Contracts are maritime in nature.

According to Heidmar’s Verified

Complaint, the purpose of the contracts was “to hedge the market
risks associated with the need to supply bunkers to its fleet of
ocean-going dry bulk cargo vessels.”30

While Emirates Star argues

that the contracts are not maritime contracts because they do not
reference any specific vessel, vessel route or maritime commerce,
the actual nature of the relationship between the parties directly
involves the management of vessels in Heidmar’s Dorado pool and the
necessary supply of fuel to those vessels time chartered to the
Dorado pool.

As such, the court finds that the contracts are

directly linked to the operation of vessels in maritime commerce.
b. Forum Selection Clause
Having

found

admiralty

jurisdiction,

the

court

turns

to

Emirates Star’s argument that it should not exercise jurisdiction
because the Bunker Swap Contracts contain exclusive forum selection
clauses requiring Heidmar to bring claims related to the contracts
in federal or state court in the State of New York.
When a court interprets maritime contracts, it applies general
principles of contract law recognized by admiralty law rather than

30

Doc. 1, V. Original Compl., p. 3.

11

those adopted by state law.

One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine

Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011).

Admiralty law

instructs that contracts be interpreted such that all of the terms
in a contract are given meaning and none are rendered superfluous.
Chembulk Trading LLC v. Chemex Ltd., 393 F.3d 550, 555 (5th Cir.
2004).
Forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid.”

M/S BREMEN

v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972)(reversing the
presumption against forum selection clauses).

A forum selection

clause is viewed as mandatory when “it clearly limits actions to
the

courts

of

a

specific

demonstrates

consent

to

exclusivity.

BP Marine Americas, a Div. of BP Exploration & Oil

a

locale”

and

particular

permissive

forum

without

when

it

stating

Corp. v. Geostar Shipping Co. N.V., Civ. A. No. 94-2118, 1995 WL
131056, *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 1995)(unpublished)(citing M/S BREMEN,
407 U.S. at *2; Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
The United States Supreme Court (“Court”) confirmed that forum
selection clauses should be enforced under admiralty law unless
enforcement is unreasonable or unjust under the circumstances. M/S
BREMEN, 407 U.S. at 10, 15. There, the court answered the question
whether the district court “should have exercised its jurisdiction
to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the
parties,

manifested

in

their

freely

12

negotiated

agreement,

by

specifically enforcing the forum clause.”

Id. at 12.

The case

concerned a clause stating that “[a]ny dispute arising must be
treated before the London Court of Justice.”

Id. at 3.

The Court

pointed out that including a forum selection clause eliminates
uncertainties and inconveniences and that the parties likely factor
the inclusion of such a clause into their negotiations. Id. at 1314. A contractual forum selection clause should control, the Court
concluded, “absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.”
Id. at 15.
Despite its clarity on the treatment of forum selection
clauses, the M/S BREMEN case did not involve attachment pursuant to
Supplemental Rule B.
issue a decade later.

See id. at 2.

The Ninth Circuit faced that

Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping

Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982). The precise question was:
“[w]hether, in an admiralty and maritime action where there is an
enforceable foreign court selection clause, the district court,
instead of unconditionally dismissing the action, may ensure the
availability of security pending a determination of the merits in
the contractually selected forum.”

Id. at 631.

Relying on M/S

BREMEN, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a valid forum selection
clause generally warrants dismissal of the action.

Polar Shipping

Ltd., 680 F.2d at 631. However, the court concluded that dismissal
was not required in every action and that Supplemental Rule B may
be used in certain cases to ensure the availability of security in

13

case of a favorable judgment.

Id. at 632.

The key to a court’s decision whether to exercise jurisdiction
over a Supplemental Rule B attachment is the language of the
particular forum selection clause.

Id. at 632.

The clause at

issue in the Polar Shipping Ltd. case stated that “(a)ny dispute
arising under the charter shall be decided by the English Courts.”
Id.

The Ninth Circuit found that the wording did not encompass

security proceedings because they did not fit precisely within the
word “dispute.”

Id.

Upon that foundation, the court provided the following, oftquoted guidelines:
We hold that in an admiralty action, absent express
intent to the contrary, a forum selection clause
providing that all disputes under the charter will be
determined by a selected foreign court neither precludes
a plaintiff from commencing an action in the district
court to obtain security by maritime attachment, nor
prohibits the district court from ensuring the
availability of security adequate to satisfy a favorable
judgment by the selected forum.
Id. at 633.

The court further suggested that a court limit its

jurisdiction

to

that

which

is

necessary

to

provide

adequate

security and use its discretion in deciding whether a plaintiff
would be prejudiced by vacating the attachment.

Id.

Turning the language of the forum selection clause in this
case, the court notes that, unlike the contracts considered in M/S
BREMEN and Polar Shipping Ltd., nowhere in the forum selection
clauses of the Bunker Swap Contracts is the word “dispute.”

14

Instead, the forum selection clauses refer to “the exclusive
jurisdiction” of courts in the State of New York.

The court,

therefore, finds that the specific holding of Polar Shipping Ltd.
is inapposite.

On the other hand, the reasoning of that case,

which focused on giving effect to the intentions of the contracting
parties, is relevant.

However, it leads to a contrary result.

Here, the parties did not limit their selection of a forum solely
to “disputes” but, rather, created an all-encompassing provision by
choosing an “exclusive jurisdiction.” See Polar Shipping Ltd., 680
F.2d at 632 (observing that the parties could have worded the
clause to convey the intention for all proceedings to be before the
chosen forum).
The cases cited by the parties applying M/S BREMEN and Polar
Shipping Ltd. are consistent with this court’s interpretation. The
language of the contract at issue drives each court’s decision.
For example, in the case Teyseer Cement Co. v. Halla Mar. Corp.,
583 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 1984), the court confirmed on
reconsideration its decision to dismiss the attachment and posted
security based on its interpretation of the forum selection clause.
The court particularly noted that the provision stated that all
disputes were to be decided in Korea “to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the courts of any other country.”

Id.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida agreed with the Western District of Washington that the

15

forum selection clause in the Washington case “evinc[ed] the kind
of express intent” required by Polar Shipping Ltd.

Liverpool &

London S.S Prot. & Indem. Ass’n, Ltd. v. Islas Galapagos Turismo &
Vapores, No. 97-1837-CIV-MARCUS, 1997 WL 900841, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 15, 1997).

In contrast, the Southern District of Florida

found that the contract before it incorporated rules dictating only
where the merits were to be adjudicated.

Id.

Finding that

language more restrictive than that in Polar Shipping Ltd., the
court refused to vacate attachment.

Id. at *3, *5.

Finally, the facts of the case that Heidmar submits the court
should follow, Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 543
F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Shipping
Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d
Cir. 2009), do not coincide with those sub judice.

In that case,

the parties entered into a novation agreement by which Consub
Delaware LLC (“Consub”) assumed the obligations of a party to a
prior agreement and thereby became bound by the terms of the
original contract.

Id. at 106.

The original agreement contained

a clause that stated it was to be considered executed in England
and “subject to English law under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of England and Wales.”

Id.

The novation agreement, on the

other hand, contained a clause reading, “[e]ach of the parties
hereby submit [sic] to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English
Courts in relation to any dispute or claim arising out of or in

16

connection with this Novation Agreement.”
original).

Both

agreements

provided

Id. (alterations in the
for

arbitration

as

an

alternative to litigation, and the original agreement explicitly
allowed any court with jurisdiction to enter judgment upon an
arbitration

award

and

for

the

enforcement

of

an

arbitration

decision against the parties or their assets “wherever they may be
found.”

Id.

Reading these provisions as a whole, the court determined that
the parties’ intent was not to preclude Supplemental Rule B
attachments. Id. at 113. The court’s reasoning is consistent with
Polar Shipping Ltd. in that it focused on several relevant contract
provisions and, leaving none without meaning, reached a rational
interpretation

of

the

parties’

intent.

See

id.

at

113-14.

Although one provision was a seemingly all-encompassing selection
of the courts of England and Wales, other provisions of the same
contract allowed for arbitration and the involvement of other
courts for enforcement of an arbitration award.

See id. at 106.

Additionally, a provision of the novation agreement, which was the
only contract directly executed by the parties in suit, selected
English Courts for the resolution of “any dispute or claim,” a
narrower forum selection clause as in Polar Shipping Ltd.

See id.

As explained above, the court finds that the forum selection
clause at issue here is mandatory and requires dismissal of this

17

case in favor of the courts of the State of New York.31

The

Supplemental Rule B attachment should be vacated.
As the court finds that Plaintiff’s attachment of the M/T
EMIRATES STAR should be vacated because the underlying contracts
require that suit be brought only in the State of New York, the
court does not reach Plaintiff’s alter ego allegations.
IV.

Conclusion

Claimant’s Amended Motion to Vacate is therefore GRANTED.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas, this 18th

31

day of November, 2011.

The court notes that Heidmar has filed a nearly identical case
against ETA in the Southern District of New York. See Heidmar Trading LLC v.
Emirates Trading Agency LLC, No. 1:11-cv-004489-MGC (S.D.N.Y.).

18