Wesolek et al v. Layton et al
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION granting 18 MOTION to Dismiss 11 Amended Complaint, 16 MOTION to Dismiss 11 Amended Complaint, DENYING Plaintiffs' requests for Leave to Amend asserted in their responses to defendants' Motions to Dismiss 22 and 23 .(Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified.(chorace)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
JOHN S. WESOLEK, DEBORAH J.
WESOLEK, JOEL T. JOHNSON,
§
RANDY LINSTEDT, DOUGLAS A.
§
LARSON, DR. ENRIQUE REYES-B,
§
MARIA GEORGINA REYES, LEV1
5
LINDEMANN, STEPHANIE LINDEMANN, §
MICHAEL P. WAGNER, DANIEL
§
MILLER, KRISTINA MILLER,
§
ROEL TREVINO, TIM PETERSON,
§
JANICE LAU, MIKE TASZAREK,
§
E. BRENT LUNDGREN, GLORIA
§
GACKLE, PETE HILL, KELCEY HILL, §
KEN ULLMANN, DALE SCHNEIDER,
§
DEBORAH SCHNEIDER, JOHN
5
MCINTOSH, MARGARET MCINTOSH,
§
MERYLE A. WILLERT, JR., JULIE
§
WILLERT, TYLER ROEHL, PAMELA G. §
KLOOS, JEFFREY T. KLOOS, JUDY
§
KVAALE, CLIFF LARSON, JUDY
§
DVORAZK, MONA THORSTAD, ARLYN
§
LAND, STEVE JOHNSON, LORI
§
JOHNSON, JANET SKINNER, and
§
GEORGE SLIGHT, Individually
§
and On Behalf of All Others
§
Similarly Situated and On
§
Behalf of LAYTON ENERGY WHARTON §
FUND, LP and LAYTON ENERGY
§
FUND 2, LP,
§
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12
§
§
5
v.
§
DANIEL LAYTON, J. CLARKE
LEGLER, LAYTON ENERGY TEXAS,
LLC, and LAYTON CORPORATION,
§
§
§
§
§
Defendants.
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and as class
representatives on behalf of all persons who invested in e.ither the
(1) Wharton Energy Fund or the (2) Layton Energy Fund 2.
The
defendants named in this action are Daniel Layton, J. Clarke
Legler,
Layton
Energy
Texas,
LLC,
and
Layton
Corporation.
Plaintiffsf Amended Class Action Complaint (Docket Entry No. 11)
asserts claims for violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act, Tex.
Civ. Prac.
&
Rem. Code
§
134.003(a), and the Texas Securities Act,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 581-33, and common law claims for fraud,
conversion, money had and received, breach of fiduciary duty, and
negligence.
Pending before the court are Defendants Layton Energy
Texas LLC and Layton Corporationfs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Amended
Class
Action
Complaint
(Docket Entry
No.
16),
and
Defendants Daniel Layton and Clarke Legler's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffsf Amended Class Action Complaint and Joinder in Layton
Energy Texas LLC and Layton Corporationfs Motion to Dismiss (Docket
Entry No. 18).
Also pending is plaintiffs' request for leave to
amend if the court decides to grant one or both of the pending
motions to dismiss.
For the reasons stated below, the pending
motions to dismiss will be granted, plaintiffsf request for leave
to amend will be denied, and the claims that plaintiffs have
asserted for common law fraud and violation of the Texas Securities
Act
(arising
from
misrepresentations
made
after
plaintiffs
purchased units in the Funds), conversion, violation of the Texas
Theft Liability Act, money had and received, breach of fiduciary
duty, and negligence will be dismissed without prejudice, and the
claims that plaintiffs have asserted for common law fraud and
violation
of
the
Texas
Securities
Act
arising
from
misrepresentations made before plaintiffs purchased units in the
Funds will be dismissed with prejudice.
I.
A.
Factual and Procedural Backqround
Factual Background
Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2007 they purchased units
of one or both of two Texas limited partnerships:
Layton Energy
Wharton, LP and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP ("the Funds").
The Funds
were run by Daniel Layton ("Layton") and J. Clarke Legler through
Layton Energy Texas, LLC ("Layton Energy"), and plaintiffs allege
that the units meet the definition of "security" under Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Art. 581-4A.
Plaintiffs allege that
[tlhe Funds were organized to "(a) acquire full or
partial working interests in selected oil and gas leases
on which to drill new wells and/or re-enter and re-work
existing wells for the production of oil and/or gas in
commercial quantities, (b) acquire full or partial
working interests in selected oil and gas leases to hold
and/or develop the leases for resale, (c) acquire royalty
interests in producing oil and gas properties and
(d) acquire full or partial working interests in
producing wells and leases which may have proven
undeveloped sites available for future drilling . . .
I(
(Plaintiffsf ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 9
¶
50)l
Plaintiffs
allege that to entice potential investors to invest
Layton personally represented to the investors that they
would get their initial investment back within one year
and make three to five times their investment within
three to five years. At the time these statements were
'plaintiff sf Amended Class Action
ACAC"), Docket Entry No. 11, p. 9 ¶ 50.
Complaint
("Plaintiffs'
made, in 2008, Layton knew these statements to be untrue,
or in light of the circumstances in which they were made,
misleading. Likewise, Legler aided Layton in the sale of
the partnership units (securities) to the investors.
Legler either knew of the falsity of the statements made
or was in reckless disregard for the truth of the
statements made.
Plaintiffs allege that the Layton Energy Wharton Fund LP
raised $10,000,000 (Plaintiffs' ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 10
¶
52), and currently has the following eight wells for which it
incurred the following acquisition costs:
(1) Miller B2 Chambers
County Well, $932,861; (2) HK1 Well, $2,911,544; (3) HK2 Well,
$840,622; (4) Casey Heirs 1 Well, $1,067,988; (5) Saenz Well,
$325,119; (6) B1 Well, $495,128; (7) LW1 Well, $374,428; and
(8) Stovall County Well, $293,250. Plaintiffs also allege that the
fund spent $171,062 acquiring 3D Seismic data.
( d ¶ 51.)
I.
Regarding these wells, plaintiffs allege that defendants "had the
[Miller] B2 Well
'worked over' [ ;
i]n the process of the 'work
over', defendants allowed an 'affiliated partner' to fund the money
for the work over with the fund owing this affiliated partner of
the defendants $1,200,000."
( d ¶ 53.)
I.
"Layton reworked the
wrong well; according to the geologist and the field operations
supervisor it was supposed to have been the B1 well that was worked
over."
( d at 13
I.
¶
64.)
"Defendants refused to produce the HK1
Well due to a dispute between Layton and the operator of the well.
Defendants found a new operator for the HK1 Well at a cost of 50%
of the working interest in that well.
This was done without the
knowledge or consent of the Wharton Fund investors."
¶
54.)
( d at 11
I.
"Defendants allowed the HK2 Well lease to expire due to
non-production, thereby losing the well for the Wharton Fund and
its investors, as a result of personality differences between
Layton and the well's operator."
( d ¶ 55.)
I ,
"[Tlhe Wharton Fund
monies that were used to 'drill the Saenz wellr were in actuality
taken by Defendants for other non-Wharton Fund purposes.
question remains:
Where is the well?"
( d ¶ 57. )
I.
. .
[Tlhe
"Defendants
did not drill either the LW1 well or the Stovall well, although the
Wharton Fund was charged for the drilling of these wells.
It is
believed that the Wharton Fund monies 'used' to drill these wells
were in actuality used by Defendants for other non-Wharton Fund
purposes."
( d at 11-12
I.
¶
58.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Layton Energy Fund 2 raised about
$3,500,000, and that $375,000 of that money was used to acquire the
following three wells:
Well
205-1, Well
205-3, Well 206-1.
(Plaintiffsr ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 12
¶
59)
Plaintiffs
allege that "[tlhe remaining $2,974,625 of the Layton Energy Fund
2 monies is unaccounted for and, on information and belief, has
been
absconded
purposes. "
by
Defendants
for
non-Layton
Energy
Fund
2
(d)
I.
Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that "Layton and
Legler took monies from the Wharton Fund and the Layton Energy
Fund 2 to put in other projects Layton and Legler were running"
(Plaintiffsf ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 12
¶
60); "Defendants
used the Funds wells as collateral and allowed liens to be placed
on the wells
. . .
. . .
[and that] the general counsel of Layton Energy
is now giving the investors wells away or letting the leases
expire with no concern towards the investors."
( d ¶ 61.)
I.
Plaintiffs allege that
[o]n numerous occasions, Layton personally met with
investors and investors-to-be promising that investors
would see a return of their principle within one year
from the date of the fundsf inception with a 300 to 500
percent return on their investment within three to five
Layton specifically made these promises to
years.
plaintiffs and investors Levi Lindemann, Nahum Daniels
and A1 Vanderlaan, among others. Initially, Layton would
respond to investorsf inquiries regarding the status of
the funds and provide period letters to the investors
regarding their funds. Beginning in the summer of 2010,
Layton discontinued responding to investorsf inquiries.
Prior to discontinuing responding to investorsf requests
for information, Layton told Levi Lindemann that the
funds owed Layton money. Additionally, Layton personally
told plaintiffs and investors Levi Lindemann, Nahum
Daniels and A1 Vanderlaan, in the Summer of 2010, among
others, that he was working on a fracking company deal
that was soon to go public (nominal defendant Platinum
Energy Solutions, Inc.) and that shares of this company
would be placed into the funds to make the investors
whole.
( d ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs allege that
I.
[slince the existence of the Funds, Layton has allowed
lease interests to expire, failed to pay vendors and
service providers for work done on the leases, failed to
abide by state and federal regulations, failed to acquire
properties as represented and engaged in self-dealing to
the detriment of the Fund.
This despite repeated
representations to the investors and Broker-Dealers that
properties were being acquired and wells drilled for the
Funds with the investor's monies.
(a
at
13-14
¶
65.)
Plaintiffs allege that
[slince inception and throughout the existence of the
Funds, Layton has acted in a fashion that disregards the
corporate entities and structure of Layton Energy, LLC,
Layton Corporation, Platinum Energy Solutions, Inc.,
Layton Energy Wharton, LP and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP,
and treats them as a single business enterprise.
( d at 16
I.
¶
70.)
"Plaintiffs seek recision of the
sale of
their
limited
partnership units, recovery of all sums invested in Wharton Energy
Fund and Layton Energy Fund 2 on behalf of themselves and the
members of the classes."
B.
(Plaintiffsr ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11,
Procedural Background
On December 21, 2011, plaintiffs John S. Wesolek, Deborah J.
Wesolek, Joel T. Johnson, Randy Linstedt, Douglas A. Larson,
Dr.
Enrique
Reyes-B,
Maria
Georgina
Reyes,
Levi
Lindemann,
Stephanie Lindemann, Michael P. Wagner, Daniel Miller, Kristina
Miller, Roe1 Trevino, and Tim Peterson, acting individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, filed Plaintiffs' Original
Class Action Petition in the 129th Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas, against defendants Daniel Layton, J. Clark
Legler, Layton Texas, LLC, Platinum Energy Solutions, Inc., and
Layton Corporation.
The case was captioned Wesolek, et al. v.
Lavton, et al., and given case number 2011-76468.
The plaintiffsr
Original Class Action Petition asserted claims for common law
fraud, conspiracy, conversion,
violation
of
the
Texas
Theft
L i a b i l i t y A c t , a n d money h a d a n d r e c e i v e d . '
P l a i n t i f f ' s prayer for
r e l i e f s o u g h t " r e c o v e r y o f a l l sums i n v e s t e d i n Wharton E n e r g y Fund
a n d L a y t o n E n e r g y Fund 2 on b e h a l f o f t h e m s e l v e s a n d t h e members of
the classes.
"3
On J a n u a r y 6 , 2012, d e f e n d a n t P l a t i n u m E n e r g y S o l u t i o n s , f i l e d
a N o t i c e o f Removal
action
is
Fairness
§
( D o c k e t E n t r y No.
removable
(CAFA),
Act
1 4 5 3 ( b ),"4
under
the
28
provisions
U.S.C.
§
of
the
1332 ( d ) ,
Class
and
28
Action
U.S.C.
and t h a t " [ a l l 1 elements f o r removal of t h e i n s t a n t
a c t i o n u n d e r CAFA a r e m e t . " 5
d i s m i s s were
On J a n u a r y
10,
2012,
motions t o
f i l e d by d e f e n d a n t s Layton C o r p o r a t i o n and Layton
E n e r g y T e x a s , LLC ( D o c k e t E n t r y No.
and Legler
1) a s s e r t i n g t h a t " [ t l h i s
( D o c k e t E n t r y No.
4)
,
a n d b y d e f e n d a n t s Layton
6 ) . On J a n u a r y 11, 2012,
defendant
P l a t i n u m Energy S o l u t i o n s a l s o f i l e d a motion t o dismiss (Docket
E n t r y No. 9 ) .
The d e f e n d a n t s s o u g h t d i s m i s s a l on g r o u n d s t h a t t h e
p l a i n t i f f s l a c k e d s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g t h e i r claims b e c a u s e a l l t h e
i n j u r i e s f o r w h i c h t h e y s o u g h t r e l i e f o c c u r r e d s o l e l y t o t h e Funds.
On J a n u a r y 25,
2011,
,
1 5 ( a ) (1)(B) p l a i n t i f f s
No.
11.
Plaintiffs'
c i t i n g F e d e r a l Rule o f C i v i l Procedure
filed
ACAC
Plaintiffs'
added
a
number
* p l a i n t i f f s ' Original Class Action
N o t i c e o f Removal, Docket E n t r y No. 1.
ACAC,
of
5 da t 3
1 .
¶
V.7.
new
Petition,
4 ~ o t i c e f Removal, Docket E n t r y No. 1, p . 2
o
Docket
individual
Exhibit
¶ V.5.
Entry
A
to
plaintiffs, added new allegations that the claims asserted in this
action are being brought not only on behalf of the plaintiffs
individually and all others similarly situated, but also on behalf
of Layton Energy Wharton Fund, LP and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP,
derivatively. Plaintiffsf ACAC also added new claims for violation
of the Texas Securities Act and for breach of fiduciary duty, and
omitted the claim for c o n ~ p i r a c y . ~
Plaintiffs amended their prayer
for
relief
to
seek
"recision
of
the
sale of
their
limited
partnership units, recovery of all sums invested in Wharton Energy
Fund and Layton Energy Fund 2 on behalf of themselves and the
members of the classes."'
On February 8, 2012, the pending motions
to dismiss the
plaintiffsf ACAC were filed by defendants Layton Energy Texas, LLC
and Layton Corporation (Docket Entry No. 16), and by defendants
Layton and Legler (Docket Entry No. 18).
On February 20, 2012,
defendant Platinum Energy Solutions filed its motion to dismiss the
plaintiffsr ACAC (Docket Entry No. 21), and on March 2, 2012, the
court granted Platinum Energy Solutions motion to dismiss (Docket
Entry No. 25).
motions
to
The plaintiffs have filed responses to the pending
dismiss
(Docket Entry
Nos.
22
and
23),
and
the
defendants have filed replies to the plaintiffsf responses (Docket
Entry Nos. 26 and 27).
On April 6, 2012, the court granted the
6~laintiffsr
ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 20.
'1d.
-
parties' Agreed Motion to Stay Pending Determination of Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 29).
Defendants Layton Energy and Layton Corp. seek dismissal of
the claims asserted in this action for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and for
failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
In addition, Layton Energy and
Layton Corp. join in and adopt the motion to dismiss filed by
Layton and Legler.8
Defendants Layton and Legler seek dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1)' and for failure to comply with procedural
requirements
for bringing
a derivative
class action
suit as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 and applicable
state law.
In addition, Layton and Legler join in and adopt the
motion to dismiss filed by Layton Energy and Layton Corpmg
A.
Rule 12 (b)(1):
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants Layton and Legler argue that the claims alleged
against them in this action should be
dismissed pursuant to
'~efendants Layton Energy Texas LLC and Layton Corporation's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffsf Amended Class Action Complaint
("Layton Energy and Layton Corp.' s Motion to Dismiss") , Docket
Entry No. 16.
'~efendants Daniel Layton and Clarke Legler's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action Complaint and Joinder in
Layton Energy Texas LLC and Layton Corporation's Motion to Dismiss
(Layton's and Legler's Motion to Dismiss), Docket Entry No. 18.
Rule 12 (b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (1) because
the claims asserted in the original petition filed in state court
seek relief for harms suffered by the Funds that plaintiffs have no
standing to assert; (2) because the plaintiffs have no standing to
assert the claims alleged in their original petition, the court
never acquired subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) because the
court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
had no right to file their ACAC, which defendants acknowledge does
allege at least two direct claims that plaintiffs do have standing
to assert (i-e.,claims for common law fraud and for violation of
the Texas Securities Act).
For the reasons explained below, the
court is persuaded that plaintiff sf claims for common law fraud and
for
violation
of
the
Texas
Securities
Act
(arising
from
misrepresentations made after plaintiffs purchased units in the
Funds), and for conversion, violation of the Texas Theft Liability
Act,
money
had
and
received, breach
of
fiduciary duty, and
negligence are subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction tests the courtfs statutory or
constitutional power
to
adjudicate the
case.
Home Builders
Association of Mississippi, Inc. v. Citv of Madison, Miss., 143
F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
"The burden of proof for a
Rule
12(b) (1) motion
to
dismiss
is
on
the
party
asserting
Ramminq v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th
jurisdiction."
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Cloud v. United States, 122 S.Ct.
2665 (2002).
In examining a Rule 12 (b)(1) motion, the district
court can consider matters of fact that may be in dispute.
"Lack
of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three
instances:
(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented
by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the courtfs resolution of
disputed facts."
I . (citing Barrera-Monteneqro v. United States,
d
74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)) .
Dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds alone is not on the merits.
I . (citing Hitt v. Citv of
d
Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam))
.
When a
Rule 12(b)(l) motion is filed together with other Rule 12 motions,
the
court
should
address
the
jurisdictional
addressing any attack on the merits.
2.
attack
before
I.
d
Applicable Law
"[Sltanding is an essential and unchanging part of the caseor-controversy requirement of Article 111." Luian v. Defendants of
Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
minimum, three elements:
"Standing requires, at a
injury in fact, a 'fairly traceablef
causal link between that injury and the defendantfs conduct, and
the likelihood that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision. ' "
Cadle Co. v. Neubauer, 562 F.3d 369, 371 (5th Cir.
-12-
2009)
(quoting Luian,
112
S.Ct.
at
560-61).
"A
defect
in
Article I11 standing is a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction."
Id.
- at 374.
decide.
"Standing is a question of law" for the court to
Friends of St. Francis Xavier Cabrini Church v. Federal
Emercrencv Manacrement Asencv, 658 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2011) .
deciding
questions
of
law
involving
partnerships,
standing, applicable state law governs.
In
including
See Crocker v. Fed.
Deposit Insurance Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1075 (1988).
"The general test for standing in Texas requires that there
'(a)
shall be
(b) will be
sought."'
a real controversy between the parties, which
actually determined by
See Nootsie, Ltd. v.
the
judicial declaration
Williamson
County Appraisal
District, 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Board of Water
Enqineers v. Citv of San Antonio, 283 S.W.2d 722, 724 (1955))
.
Claimants bear the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively
demonstrate a court's
jurisdiction to hear a case.
-See Tex.
Association of Business v. Tex. Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440,
446 (Tex. 1993) ("Because standing is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction, we consider TAB'S standing under the same standard by
which we
review subject matter
jurisdiction generally.
That
standard requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively
demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause.").
See
also Asshauer v. Wells Farso Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tex.
App.
-
Dallas 2008, pet. denied)
-13-
("Standing as a component of
subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be presumed, and the burden of
alleging facts affirmatively showing the trial court's
subject
matter jurisdiction lies squarely with [the plaintiffs] . " )
.
"Only
the person whose primary legal right has been breached may seek
redress for an injury." Asshauer, 263 S.W.3d at 471 (citing Nobles
v. Marcus, 533 S.bJ.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976) ("Without breach of a
legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of action can
accrue to his benefit.")).
Under Texas law a partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners and has the power to sue and be sued in its own name.
Tex. Bus. Org. Code
152.056 ("A partnership is an entity distinct
§
from its partners.").
See also In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P.,
356 S.W.3d 455, 463-65 (Tex. 2011) (recognizing that under Texas
law a partnership is an entity legally distinct from its partners
for most purposes).
Unless there is an agreement to the contrary,
each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the
business of a partnership.
See Tex. Bus. Org. Code
§
152.203.
With respect to limited partnerships, a general partner acting with
authority has the capacity to bring a suit in the name of the
limited partnership, but only when a majority-in-interest of the
partners agree to such action. See Tex. Bus. Org. Code
§
152.209.
A limited partner may bring an action in a court on
behalf of the limited partnership to recover a judgment
in the limited partnership's favor if:
(1) all general partners with authority to bring
the action have refused to bring the action; or
(2) an effort to cause those general partners to
bring the action is not likely to succeed.
Tex. Bus. Org. Code
§
153.401.
In such a situation "the plaintiff
must be a limited partner when the action is brought," Tex. Bus.
Org.
Code
§
153.402,
particularity:
and
"the
complaint
must
contain
with
(1) the effort, if any, of the plaintiff to secure
initiation of the action by a general partner; or (2) the reasons
for not making the effort."
Tex. Bus. Org. Code
§
153.403.
See
also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 (establishing similar
requirements for pleading with particularity any effort to obtain
desired action from appropriate authority, or the reasons for not
obtaining the action or making the effort).
A limited partner in Texas may have standing to pursue two
different types of claims against the general or controlling
partners of a limited partnership:
(1) direct claims brought on
behalf of himself or a class of similarly situated individuals; or
(2) derivative claims brought on behalf of the partnership itself.
See Mallia v. PaineWebber, Inc., 889 F.Supp. 277, 281 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (citing Lenz v. Associated Inns and Restaurants Companv of
America, 833 F.Supp. 362, 378
Briqnoli, Curlev
&
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), and Curlev v.
Roberts Associates, 915 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1430 (1991)).
The nature of a limited
partner's suit is often critical to an analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction because in a derivative action brought by a limited
partner, the limited partnership is an indispensable party, while
in a direct action brought by a limited partner either individually
or as a representative of a class, the limited partnership is not
an indispensable party.
378-79) .
I . at 282 (citing Lenz, 833
d
F.Supp. at
See also Curlev, 915 F.2d at 85-87 (when a plaintiff's
claims are direct or class action-type claims, they do not require
the partnership's joinder).
3.
Application of the Law to the Facts
Asserting that the claims asserted in the plaintiff's original
state court petition seek redress only for harms suffered by the
Funds, defendants argue that "the only persons who would have
standing
to
directly
bring
these
claims
are
the
Funds."l0
Defendants argue that plaintiffs are unable to amend their original
petition to add new claims that they have standing to assert
because "Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not
permit plaintiffs to create standing when none ever existed."11
Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiffs' ACAC fails to
establish standing to assert derivative claims because the ACAC
fails to satisfy the standards for bringing a derivative action
provided by
§
either
Federal Rule
of
Civil
Procedure 23.1 or
153.403 of the Texas Business Organizations Code.
''~ayton's and Leglerrs Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 18,
p. 12 ¶ 16.
(a) Subject Matter Jurisdiction Exists for the Court to
Consider the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
Asserting that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claims
alleged in their original petition because "[pllaintiffs are merely
investors
in
the
Funds,
in
the
form
of
limited partners,"
defendants argue that plaintiffs are unable to amend their pleading
to establish standing either "[bly adding the Funds to the caption
"I
in the Amended ~etition, 2 in an effort to add new claims that
plaintiffs have standing to bring derivatively, or by adding new
claims that the plaintiffs have standing to bring individually,
i.e., claims for common law fraud and violation of the Texas
Securities
Act
arising
from
misrepresentations
that
induced
plaintiffs to purchase their partnership units.13 Citing TXCAT v.
Phoenix Group Metals LLC, No. H-10-0344, 2010 WL 5186824 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 10, 2010), Summit Office Park, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 639 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1981),
Federal Recovery Services,
Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1996), and Aetna
Casualtv
&
Suretv Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1986),
defendants argue that "[tlhe Fifth Circuit has a well-defined body
of law that prohibits plaintiffs to amend a case to maintain an
action when the plaintiff never had standing to begin with."14
12rd.
at 9-10
13see - at 6
- id.
141d.
at 12
¶
12.
¶
¶
2.
16.
In TXCAT an unincorporated business brought suit in state
court for a variety of business torts.
Defendants removed the
action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
Defendants then moved for summary judgment on grounds that the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue the defendants because plaintiff
did not legally exist either when it filed the lawsuit, or when the
I . at "2.
d
actions complained of occurred.
Plaintiff filed a
response stating that it would resolve the standing issue by filing
a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
Attached to the
plaintiff's response was a proposed pleading submitted by Robert
Flores d/b/a TXCAT ("Flores"), which for the first time stated that
the suit was being brought by "Robert Flores Individually and d/b/a
TXCAT, an unincorporated business at the time of the events leading
up to this suit."
I . at *3.
d
Plaintifffs motion to amend was
denied because the deadline for amending pleadings had passed,
plaintiff failed to show good cause for late amendment, and the
amendment would be futile.
agreed
-
I . Defendants argued
d
-
and the court
that a plaintiff who lacks standing may not amend a
complaint to substitute a new plaintiff for the purpose of curing
a lack of jurisdiction.
can
'remedy
inadequate
I . The court explained that "[clourts
d
jurisdictional
but
not
- at *4 (citing inter alia
Id.
defective jurisdictional facts. "'
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a), 28 U.S.C.
allegations,
§
1653, and Whitmire v. Victus
Limited T/A Master Desisn Furniture, 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir.
2000)).
Like TXCAT, each of the other cases on which defendants rely
stands for this well-established principle, i.e., that amendments
to the pleadings can remedy inadequate jurisdictional allegations,
but not defective jurisdictional facts. See Newman-Green, Inc. v.
Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 2222
(1989) (recognizing the
existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts
as they exist when the complaint is filed, and that 28 U.S.C.
1653
allows
courts
to
remedy
inadequate
jurisdictional
allegations, but not defective jurisdictional facts).
Neither TXCAT nor any of the other cases on which defendants
rely involves facts that are analogous to the facts of this case,
and for that reason the court does not find these cases to be
controlling or persuasive.
Because defendants acknowledge that
plaintiffs are limited partners in the Funds,15 because
§
153.401
of the Texas Business Organizations Code allows limited partners to
assert derivative claims to recover a judgment in the limited
partnership's favor for harms caused to the partnership, because
Texas law does not preclude limited partners from asserting direct
claims to recover a judgment in their own favor for harms caused to
them individually, because the plaintiffs filed their ACAC as a
matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule 15(a), and because federal
jurisdiction in this case rests on the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C.
§
1332(d), and 28 U.S.C.
§
1453(b), the court is not
persuaded that plaintiffs' ACAC should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction even if the plaintiffs lacked standing
to seek direct relief for the derivative claims alleged in their
original state court petition.
Whitmire, 212 F.3d at 888.
At issue in Whitmire was whether the district court abused its
discretion
complaint
in
to
refusing to
allege
an
allow the plaintiff
alternate
basis
for
to
amend her
subject
matter
jurisdiction after the court granted summary judgment for defendant
on plaintiff's federal claims.
In holding that the district had
abused its discretion, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between
"technical
or
formal
amendments"
that
remedy
defective
jurisdictional allegations, and more substantive amendments that
attempt to remedy defective jurisdictional facts.
concluded that 28 U.S.C.
latter.
§
The court
1653 permits the former but not the
The Fifth Circuit observed that the plaintiff "did not
propose to add any new causes of action or new parties, nor did she
seek to introduce any new substantive facts to the case."
at 887.
212 F.3d
Although defendants characterize plaintiffs' ACAC as an
improper attempt to establish standing by adding new direct causes
of action and by adding the Funds as new, indispensable parties
needed to support the derivative causes of action alleged in the
original petition, the court is not persuaded that plaintiffs' ACAC
represents an improper attempt to add new causes of action or new
parties
for
the purpose of
previously existed.
establishing
standing where
none
Since defendants argue that the plaintiffs'
-20-
original petition
asserts causes of action that are properly
characterized as derivative, the court is not persuaded that the
derivative claims alleged in plaintiffs' ACAC are new claims, and
since derivative claims are by definition claims that belong to the
Funds, the court is not persuaded that the addition of the Funds to
the caption represents an attempt to add a new party for the
purpose of creating jurisdiction where none previously existed.
See Bankston v. Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is
undisputed that the partnership itself was never named as a party
in this case, either in state or federal court.
control our jurisdictional inquiry, however.
existence
of
complete
diversity
That does not
The inquiry into the
requires
considering
citizenship even of absent indispensable parties.").
the
Accordingly,
the court concludes that the amendments offered in plaintiffs' ACAC
represent
an
attempt
to
remedy
inadequate
jurisdictional
allegations, not defective jurisdictional facts.
(b) Plaintiffs
Claims
Lack
Standing
to
Assert
Derivative
Asserting that "[nlowhere in the Amended Complaint do the
Plaintiffs state which claims they intend to bring directly, nor
which they intend to bring d e r i ~ a t i v e l y , "defendants argue that
~~
all but two of the claims asserted in plaintiffs' ACAC are subject
to dismissal for lack of standing because they are claims that must
be brought derivatively on behalf of the Funds. Defendants explain
that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring derivative claims
because plaintiffs are seeking relief that only the Funds are
entitled to receive, and have failed to allege that they have
satisfied "the preconditions for derivative standing, which are
that they made a demand upon the Funds, or that making such a
demand is excused by futility."17
In response plaintiffs argue that defendantsf contention that
plaintiffs have suffered no "injury in fact" is incorrect because
"[tlhey have invested money in two limited partnerships expecting
a return of and on their investment.
Instead, plaintiffs have
neither received a return of their investment or a return on their
investment.
This is clearly an 'injury in fc."'
at''
Plaintiffs
explain that they
individually lost their investment.
That is an
individual injury. The way the Plaintiffs lost their
investment is detailed in Defendantsf motion to dismiss
in paragraph 13 at pp 10-11.
In addition to individual claims, Plaintiffs seek to
bring suit on behalf of Layton Wharton Energy Fund, LP
171d. at 6 ¶ 2. Defendants argue that the two claims that
plaintiffs have standing to bring directly on their own behalf,
i.e., claims for common law fraud and violation of the Texas
Securities Act, are subject to dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) for failure to plead fraud with
particularity. This argument is addressed in § II.B.3, below.
18~laintiffsf
Response to Defendants Daniel Layton and
Legler' s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffsf Amended Class
Complaint and Joinder in Layton Energy Texas LLC and
Corporationfs Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiffsf Response to
and Legler"), Docket Entry No. 22, p. 3 ¶ 4.
Clarke
Action
Layton
Layton
and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP derivatively. Should the
Court determine Defendants to be correct, Plaintiffs
request an opportunity to amend their complaint to
satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1."
(1)
Plaintiffs' Claims Seeking Relief for Loss of
Investment Value Are Claims that Must Be
Brought Derivatively on Behalf of the Funds
Plaintiffs fail to cite any law or legal authority in support
of their contention that loss of the value of their investment in
the Funds provides them standing to bring claims against the
defendants directly as opposed to derivatively.
Defendants argue
and the court agrees, that Texas law requires plaintiffs to bring
all such claims derivatively.
170 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex. App.
See Nausler v. Coors Brewins Co.,
-
Dallas 2005) (rejecting plain-
tiffs' contention that limited partners are able to bring a direct
action for loss of value in the partnership); Asshauer, 263 S.W.3d
at 471-74 (Tex. App.
-
Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing then existing
Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act in support of decision to
deny
standing
to
class
of partners
alleging
that
they were
fraudulently induced to invest in a sham partnership and that their
investment was fraudulently misappropriated by managing partner).
The dispute in Nauslar involved the disapproval by Coors
Brewing Co. of a proposed consolidation between Willow, a limited
partnership, and Miller.
Nauslar, individually, did not have a
direct ownership interest in Willow. However, Nauslar Investments,
L.L.C., which Nauslar owned entirely, was a limited partner in
Willow.
& at 247.
Nauslar presented a proposed consolidation
for Coorsr approval, but Coors rejected the deal and according to
Nauslar, Coorsr rejection caused losses to Willowrs value.
I.
d
Nauslar and Nauslar Investments, L.L.C. filed suit individually and
on
behalf
of
Willow,
but
sought
Nauslar
"personally
argued
that
aggrieved" by
defendantsr actions.
he
and
only
I . at 248.
d
individually and not for Willow.
here,
recovery
had
standing
Nauslar
Like plaintiffs
because
suffered "direct
I . at 250.
d
for
he
injury"
was
from
Since Willow, as the limited
partnership, was the entity who suffered the direct injury from the
harm to the limited partnership's worth, the court concluded that
Nauslar did not have a separate, individual right of action for
injuries to the limited partnership that diminished the value of
his ownership interest in the limited partnership, and that any
loss to Nauslar was "indirect to and duplicative of" the limited
partnership's right of action.
I . at 251.
d
The court explained
that "[tlhe right of recovery is Willowrs right alone, even though
the economic impact of the alleged wrongdoing may bring about
reduced earnings, salary or bonus."
Id.
Asshauer involved a
similar situation in which the court held that limited partners
have no standing to assert claims seeking personal relief for harms
caused to the limited partnership.
In deciding Nauslar and Asshauer the courts focused on the
injuries suffered directly by the limited partnerships, and the
-24-
courts decided that the limited partnerships were the proper
entities to bring suit.
Here, plaintiffs similarly seek personal
relief for damages properly belonging to the limited partnerships,
i.e., the Funds.
Plaintiffs allege that the Funds overpaid for
services, lost property rights, failed to acquire property and
services, had principal diverted outside the Funds, had property
rights encumbered, and were defrauded.
Plaintiffs contend that
their investments in the limited partnerships were "put into other
projects Layton and Legler were running."'O
These damages, although
cast as personal damages, belong to the limited partnerships. See
Nauslar, 170 S.W.3d at 250.
true,
may
amount
to
an
Although plaintiffsr allegations, if
egregious
tale
of
mismanagement
or
deception, the court declines plaintiffsr invitation to alter the
clear language of either the Texas Business Organizations Code or
analogous Texas cases to afford them
standing to sue.
See
Asshauer, 263 S.W.3d at 474. Accordingly, the court concludes that
claims arising from loss of the value of plaintiffsr investment in
the Funds belong not to the plaintiffs individually, but to the
Funds, and that under Texas law the plaintiffs must assert such
claims derivatively on behalf of the limited partnerships, not
individually on their own behalf or as representatives of a class.
Defendants
contend
that
the
only
claims
asserted
in
plaintiffs' ACAC that the plaintiffs may bring directly on their
20~laintiffs'
ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 12
-25-
§
60.
own behalf as opposed to derivatively on behalf of the Funds are
the claims for common law fraud and violations of the Texas
Securities Act arising from misrepresentations made before the
plaintiffs purchased their units in the Funds.21 Plaintiffs neither
dispute this contention nor explain why any of the other claims
that they have asserted for conversion, violation of the Texas
Theft Liability Act, money had and received, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and for common law fraud and violation of the
Texas Securities Act arising from misrepresentations made after the
plaintiffs had invested in the Funds are claims that seek redress
for harms suffered by the plaintiffs individually as opposed to
harms suffered by the Funds.
717, 719 (Tex. 1990)
("
Winsate v. Haidik, 795 S.W.2d
[a] corporate stockholder cannot recover
damages personally for a wrong done solely to the corporation, even
though he may be injured by that wrong"); Murphy v. Campbell, 964
S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. 1997) (recognizing that under Texas law a
stockholder has standing to bring a direct action if the aggrieved
stockholder has suffered an "individual cause of action" that is
"separate" from the corporation's)
;
and 7547 Corp. v. Parker
&
Parsley Development Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 221-22 (5th Cir.
1994) (acknowledging that Winsate and Murphy involved shareholders
bringing direct actions against corporations, but concluding that
21~ayton's
and Legler's Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 18,
p. 6 ¶ 2 ("new claims, for which investors apparently do have
standing . . . are for violation of the Texas Securities Act and
for common law fraud, both based on misrepresentations allegedly
made before the investors made their investments in the funds").
existence of a Texas statute allowing limited partners to sue other
partners derivatively on behalf of the partnership suggests that
Winsate's rationale applies to limited partnerships as well as to
corporations).
Accordingly, the court concludes that the claims
plaintiffs have asserted for conversion, violation of the Texas
Theft Liability Act, money had and received, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and for common law fraud and violation of the
Texas Securities Act arising from misrepresentations made after the
plaintiffs had invested in the Funds are claims that the plaintiffs
can only bring derivatively on behalf of the Funds.
(2) Plaintiffs Have Not Satisfied Preconditions
for Bringing Derivative Claims and Plaintiffsf
Request for Leave to Amend Lacks Merit
Defendants argue that plaintif fsf ACAC
insufficient
establish plaintiffsf standing to bring any derivative claims
because
Plaintiffs do not comply with the requirement under the
Texas Business Organizations Code that derivative action
plaintiffs must set forth "with particularity" those
efforts requesting that the general partner take suitable
action or why such efforts were not undertaken. Tex.
Bus. Org. Code Ann. § 153.403 (Vernon 2010) . The Amended
Complaint nowhere alleges particular facts showing what
was requested, when, of whom, what response was received,
etc., or why such demand would be futile. Plaintiffs
also do not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1 which requires that derivative complaints be
verified, and allege "that the action is not a collusive
one to confer jurisdiction that the court would otherwise
lack." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (b).22
p. 7
22~aytonfand Legler' s Motion to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 18,
s
§ 5.
Plaintiffs do not dispute defendantsf contention that they
have failed to comply with the requirements of either the Texas
Business Organizations Code or Rule 23.1 for asserting derivative
claims.
Instead, plaintiffs merely assert that
[i]n addition to individual claims, Plaintiffs seek to
bring suit on behalf of Layton Wharton Energy Fund, LP
and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP derivatively. Should the
Court determine Defendants to be correct, Plaintiffs
request an opportunity to amend their complaint to
satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.23
Plaintiffs fail
cite any law or legal authority
support
their request for leave to amend.
Plaintiffs have already filed an original petition and an
amended complaint. Plaintiffsf ACAC purports to assert derivative
claims, but plaintiffs do not dispute that their ACAC fails to
satisfy the
federal and
derivative claims.
state law requirements for pleading
Instead, in the event that the claims asserted
in their ACAC are subject to dismissal, plaintiffs request leave to
amend.
Plaintiffs have not provided the court a proposed second
amended class action complaint, have not explained what, if any,
additional
facts plaintiffs
would
allege
in
such an
amended
complaint, and have not explained why such facts are not alleged in
the ACAC.
Under these circumstances the court is not persuaded
that plaintiffs should receive
second opportunity
replead
their claims. See McKinnev v. Irvinq Independent School Dist., 309
F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1332 (2003)
23~laintiffsf
Response to Layton and Legler, Docket Entry
No. 22, p. 4 ¶ 6.
(finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of
request for leave to amend where the plaintiffs failed to submit a
proposed amended complaint together with a request for leave to
amend and failed to alert the court to the substance of any
proposed amendment) . Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for leave to
amend to satisfy the requirements for pleading derivative claims
will be denied, and the derivative claims that plaintiffs have
asserted
in
their
ACAC
for
common
law
fraud
(arising from
misrepresentations made after they purchased their Fund units),
conversion, violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act, money had
and received, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence will be
dismissed for lack of standing and for failure to satisfy either
the federal or state law preconditions for bringing derivative
actions.
B.
R u l e 12 (b) ( 6 ) :
F a i l u r e to S t a t e a C l a i m
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims for common law fraud
arising from misrepresentations that induced them to purchase Fund
units and for violation of the Texas Securities Act are subject to
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted because
these claims are grounded in fraud, and plaintiffs have failed to
plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) .24 Plaintiffs acknowledge that "[tlhis is a fraud
24~ayton
Energy and Layton Corp.'s Motion to
Entry No. 16.
is miss, Docket
case with a general pattern of conduct by
defendant^,"^' and
respond:
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint specifically states who:
Daniel Layton, J. Clarke Legler, Layton Energy Texas LLC
and Layton Corporation; what: defendants enticed
plaintiffs to invest with them and keep their investment
with them; when: in 2007 and through 2011; where: In
Texas, North and South Dakota, Florida, California and
New York, to name a few; how: in person, through
telephone calls, and the mail; why: to get Plaintiffs
money. Further, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs did
not adequately plead reliance or resulting injury.
Nonsense, Plaintiffs invested their money (reliance) and
have received no return (resulting injury) .26
1.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted tests the
formal sufficiency of the pleadings and is "appropriate when a
defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally
cognizable claim."
Rammins v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom Cloud v. United States,
122 S.Ct.
2665
(2002).
The
court must
accept
the
factual
allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiffrs favor.
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a
complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by
affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a
25~laintiffsf
Response to Defendants Layton Energy Texas LLC
and Layton Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffsf Amended
Class Action Complaint, Docket Entry No. 23, p. 3 ¶ 5.
limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S.Ct. 992, 997 (2002) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974))
.
To avoid dismissal
a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblv,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). This "plausibility standard" requires
"more
than
accusation."
an
unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Ashcroft v. Isbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
"Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent withf
a defendantfs liability, it
'stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"
(quoting Twomblv, 127 S.Ct. at 1966) .
I.
d
Moreover, " [dlismissal is
proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required
element necessary to obtain relief."
Rios v. Citv of Del Rio, 444
F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Campbell v. Citv of San
Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995))
2.
.
Applicable Law
Plaintiffs' claims for common law fraud and violation of the
Texas Securities Act are subject to the pleading requirements of
n
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (b), which provides that " [i] all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
9(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Pleading fraud with particularity in this circuit requires
-31-
"[alt a minimum
. . .
the particulars of time, place and contents
of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person
making
the misrepresentation
thereby."
and what
[that person]
obtained
Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343
F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of rehearins on other
srounds, 355 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Tel-Phonic Services,
Inc. v. TBS International, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir.
1992))
.
"A dismissal for failure to plead fraud with particularity
as required by Rule 9(b) is a dismissal on the pleadings for
failure to state a claim."
Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire
Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Shushanv v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1993)).
3.
Application of the Law to the Facts
For the reasons explained in 5 I1 .A.3 (b)(1), above, the court
has already concluded that the only claims asserted in plaintiffsf
ACAC
that
the
plaintiffs may
bring
directly
as
opposed
to
derivatively are the claims for common law fraud and violations of
the Texas Securities Act arising from misrepresentations made
before the plaintiffs purchased their units in the Funds.
For the
reasons explained below, the court concludes that these claims are
subject to dismissal for failure to plead fraud with particularity
as required by Rule 9 (b).
The plaintiffsf claims for common law fraud are based on
allegations that
48.
Defendants made a representation to Plaintiffs that
they would acquire oil and gas production with
their monies and make them whole through the
issuance of shares of Platinum Energy Solutions,
Inc.
49.
The representation was material.
50.
The representation was false.
51.
When Defendants made the representation, Defendants
(1) knew the representation was false, or (2) made
the representation recklessly, as a positive
assertion, and without knowledge of its truth.
52.
Defendants made the representation with the intent
that Plaintiffs act on it.
53.
Plaintiffs relied on the representation.
54.
The representation caused
members injury .*'
Plaintiffs and
class
Under Texas law the elements of common law fraud are "a
material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either
known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of
its truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied
upon, and which caused injury."
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v.
Presidio Enqineers and Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.
1998) (quoting Sears. Roebuck
&
Co. v. Meadows, 877 S.W.2d 281, 282
(Tex. 1994)) .
The claims for violation of the Texas Securities Act are based
on allegations that
72.
Defendants Layton and Legler offered to sell a
security to Plaintiffs.
27~laintiffs'
ACAC, Docket Entry No. 11, p. 17
-33-
¶¶
47-48.
73.
Plaintiffs purchased the security based on the
representations made by Layton and Legler.
74.
Layton knew these representations to be untrue
and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the
statements not misleading.
75.
Legler aided Layton in selling the securities and
knew of the untrue statements and/or material facts
necessary to make the statements not misleading and
failed to correct the untrue statements and/or to
add material facts necessary to make the statements
not misleading. Thereby making Layton and Legler
jointly and severally liable.
76.
Plaintiffs were damaged thereby and seek recision
under the Texas Securities Act, Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Art. 581-33."
Violation of the Texas Securities Act requires proof of sale
of a security by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, and tender of the securities. See Vernon's
Ann.
Tex.
Civ.
Stat.
art.
581-33(A)(2);
Grotiohn
Precise
Connexiones International, S.A. v. JEM Financial, Inc., 12 S.W.3d
859, 867-68 (Tex. App.
-
Texarkana, 2000, no petition).
The factual allegations underlying the plaintiffsr claims for
common law fraud and violation of the Texas Securities Act are that
[t]o entice potential investors to invest, Layton
personally lead investors on tours of his pre-existing
wells, met with them at various locations, including
New York City, Florida, California, Minnesota, and North
& South Dakota, claimed he owned a home in the River Oaks
section of Houston, and invited them to "stay at his
house in Palm Beach, Florida".
A search of the
Harris County Texas Appraisal District's and Palm Beach
County Floridafs Appraisal District's websites reveals
that Daniel Layton does not own Homes in River Oaks or
Layton merely rents these properties to
Palm Beach.
appear to investors and potential investors that he is a
Additionally, Layton personally
mean of "means."
represented to the investors that they would get their
initial investment back within one year and make three to
five times their investment within three to five years.
At the time these statements were made, in 2008, Layton
knew these statements to be untrue, or in light of the
circumstances in which they were made, misleading.
Likewise, Legler aided Layton in the sale of the
partnership units (securities) to the investors[, and
that] Legler either knew of the falsity of the statements
made or was in reckless disregard for the truth of the
statements made. " 2 9
Plaintiffs also allege that
[o] numerous occasions, Layton personally met with
n
investors and investors-to-be promising that investors
would see a return of their principle within one year
from the date of the funds' inception with a 300 to 500
percent return on their investment within three to five
Layton specifically made these promises to
years.
plaintiffs and investors Levi Lindemann, Nahum Daniels
and A1 Vanderlaan, among others. Initially, Layton would
respond to investorsf inquiries regarding the status of
the funds and provide periodic letters to the investors
regarding their funds. Beginning in the summer of 2010,
Layton discontinued responding to investorsf inquiries.
Prior to discontinuing responding to investors1 requests
for information, Layton told Levi Lindemann that the
funds owed Layton money. Additionally, Layton personally
told plaintiffs and investors Levi Lindemann, Nahum
Daniels and A1 Vanderlaan, in the Summer of 2010, among
others, that he was working on a fracking company deal
that was soon to go public (nominal defendant Platinum
Energy Solutions, Inc.) and that shares of this company
would be placed into the funds to make the investors
whole.3 0
Plaintiffsf allegations that Layton falsely represented that
he owned homes in Houston, Texas, and Palm Beach, Florida, and
falsely told investors that they would get their initial investment
back within one year and that they would earn three to five times
their investment within three to five years, are insufficient to
satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) because plaintiffs
fail
to
allege
facts
showing exactly
when
and
where
these
statements were made, to whom they were made, or why they were
material to any individual's
decision to purchase partnership
units. Nor do plaintiffs allege facts that if true would show that
when these statements were made, Layton knew they were untrue or,
in light of the circumstances in which they were made, misleading.
Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffsf direct claims for
common law fraud arising from misrepresentations that induced them
to purchase their Fund units and for violation of the Texas
Securities Act are subject to dismissal for failure to plead fraud
with particularity as required by Rule 9 ( b ) .
111.
Conclusions and Order
For the reasons explained in
§
II.A, the court concludes that
the claims that the plaintiffs have asserted for common law fraud
and
violation
of
the
Texas
Securities
Act
(arising
from
misrepresentations made after plaintiffs purchased units in the
Funds), conversion, violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act,
money had and received, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence
are claims that plaintiffs can only bring derivatively on behalf of
the Funds, and that these claims are subject to dismissal without
prejudice for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12 (b)(1) because plaintiffs have failed to seek recovery
on behalf of the Funds, and have failed to establish that they have
satisfied either
bringing
§§
the
derivative
federal or
claims.
state law preconditions for
For
the
reasons
explained
in
I1 .A.3 (b)(1)(i) and I1 .B.3, the court concludes that the claims
plaintiffs have asserted for common law fraud and violation of the
Texas Securities Act arising from misrepresentations made before
plaintiffs purchased units in the Funds are claims that plaintiffs
have standing to bring directly, but that these claims are subject
to dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure
12(b) (6) because
these
claims
sound
in
fraud
and
plaintiffs have failed to plead these claims with particularity as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (b).
Accordingly,
Defendants Layton Energy Texas LLC and Layton Corporation's Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action Complaint (Docket Entry
No.
16) is GRANTED, and Defendants Daniel Layton and Clarke
Leglerrs Motion
to
Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Amended
Class Action
Complaint and Joinder in Layton Energy Texas LLC and Layton
Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry No. 18) is GRANTED.
For the reasons explained in
§
II.A.3(b)(2), plaintiffs' requests
for leave to amend asserted in their responses to defendantsr
motions to dismiss (Docket Entry Nos. 22 and 23) are DENIED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 18th day of May, 2012.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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