Pemex Exploracion Y Produccion v. Murphy Energy Corporation et al
Filing
200
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 171 Sealed Motion for Summary Judgment, granting 172 MOTION for Summary Judgment, granting 174 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified. (aboyd, 4)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
PEMEX EXPLORACION Y PRODUCCION,
individually and as assignee
AGE REFINING, INC., FLINT
HILLS RESOURCES, L.P., and
VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY
COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MURPHY ENERGY CORPORATION,
HIGH SIERRA CRUDE OIL &
MARKETING, LLC, successor to
PETRO SOURCE PARTNERS, L.P.,
ST. JAMES ENERGY OPERATING,
INC., F&M TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
PLAINS MARKETING L.P.,
SUPERIOR CRUDE GATHERING, INC.,
CONOCOPHILLIPS CO., FR MIDSTREAM
TRANSPORT L.P. f/k/a TEXSTAR
MIDSTREAM TRANSPORT, LLC,
MARATHON PETROLEUM CO., L.P.
f/k/a MARATHON PETROLEUM CO.,
LLC, SHELL CHEMICAL CO., SHELL
TRADING US CO. ("STUSCO"), and
SUNOCO PARTNERS MARKETING &
TERMINALS, L.P.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-1081
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n ("PEP"), has brought
suit against mUltiple defendants for claims arising from sales in
the United States of natural gas condensate allegedly stolen from
PEP in Mexico.
On February 11, 2013, the court issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order (Docket Entry No. 150) dismissing the claims that
plaintiff asserted against the following defendants:
Corporation;
Gathering
High Sierra Crude Oil
Ltd' r
Transportation r
Gathering r Inc.
LLP;
Inc.;
St.
James
Murphy Energy
& Marketing r
Energy
Plains Marketing r
LLC;
Operating r
LP;
Inc.;
F&M
and Superior Crude
Pending before the court are three motions for
summary judgment filed by the remaining defendants:
Shell Trading US CompanYr
CompanYr
Big Star
(1) Defendants
Shell Chemical LP r Marathon Petroleum
LP r and FR Midstream Transport LPrs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket Entry No. 171); (2) Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendant ConocoPhillips Company (Docket Entry No. 172); and (3)
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Sunoco Partners Marketing
& Terminals L.P.
(Docket Entry No. 174).
For the reasons stated
below r the pending motions for summary judgment will be granted r
and the cross-claims that defendants have asserted against one
another will be dismissed as moot.
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that
there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law
entitles it to judgment.
material
facts
are
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
"genuine
ll
if
the
evidence
Disputes about
is
such
that
a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc' r 106 S. Ct. 2505 r 2510 (1986).
The
Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to
mandate the entry of summary judgment "after adequate time for
-2 -
discovery and upon motion,
showing
sufficient
to
against a party who fails to make a
establish
the
existence
of
an
element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial."
S.
Ct.
2548,
"must
2552
(1986).
Celotex Corp.
v.
Catrett,
106
A party moving for summary judgment
'demonstrate the absence of a
genuine
issue of material
fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."
Little v.
(en banc),
Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069,
1075
(5th Cir.
1994)
(quoting Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553).
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the
nonmovant
to go
depositions,
beyond
the
pleadings
and
answers to interrogatories,
other admissible evidence that
460 (5th Cir. 2012)
affidavits,
admissions on file,
or
specific facts exist over which
there is a genuine issue for trial.
S. Ct. at 2553-2554)
show by
Id.
(citing Celotex,
106
See also Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454,
("[T]he evidence proffered by the plaintiff to
satisfy his burden of proof must be competent and admissible at
trial.
It
).
"[T]he nonmoving party's burden is not affected by the
type of case; summary judgment is appropriate in any case where
critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that
it
could
not
support
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
a
judgment
in
favor
of
the
nonmovant."
In reviewing the evidence "the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and
it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
1t
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110
-3-
(2000).
Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the
nonmovant,
"but
only when
both parties
evidence of contradictory facts."
II.
All
defendants
argue
have
submitted
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Analysis
that
they
are
entitled
to
summary
judgment on all of the live claims asserted against them in this
action.
All
defendants
argue
that
conversion and for equitable relief
enrichment,
two-year
claims
(constructive trust,
and money had and received)
statute of
plaintiff's
for
unjust
are barred by the Texas
limitations and/or are
subject
to
summary
judgment because plaintiff cannot present evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.
Regarding the conversion claims,
defendants argue that
plaintiff cannot trace the condensate allegedly purchased by each
defendant to thefts that occurred in Mexico.
Regarding the claims
for equitable relief, defendants argue that plaintiff is unable to
present any evidence capable of establishing entitlement to relief.
Defendants Marathon and ConocoPhillips
additionally argue
that
based on the court's prior rulings they are entitled to summary
judgment
on
the
Mexican
law
claims
asserted
against
them.
plaintiff opposes the motions for summary judgment, but concedes
that under the current parameters of this lawsuit it is unable to
present evidence capable of raising a genuine issue of material
-4 -
fact on any of its claims against the defendants who have moved for
summary judgment.
A.
ConocoPhillips and Marathon Petroleum Are Entitled to Summary
Judgment on Mexican Law Claims
On June 8,
2012,
the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Docket Entry No. 106), granting motions to dismiss claims
based
on
Mexican
law
filed
by
defendants
Sunoco
Marketing & Terminals, LP ("Sunoco"); Shell Chemical Co.
Chemical")
and Shell Trading US Co.
Transport,
LP
("FR Midstream"). 1
Partners
("Shell
("STUSCO"); and FR Midstream
Conoco Phillips and Marathon
Petroleum argue that the claims asserted against them based on
Mexican law are barred by the court's prior rulings on Mexican law
claims.
Although
plaintiff
has
not
responded
directly
to
ConocoPhillips' and Marathon Petroleum'S argument that the Mexican
law claims asserted against them are barred by the court's prior
rulings, plaintiff has conceded that it has no live claims against
these
defendants. 2
Moreover,
Local
Rule
"[f] ailure to respond will be taken as a
7.4
provides
that
representation of no
ISee Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 106
(granting motions to dismiss Mexican law claims asserted against
defendants Sunoco, STUSCO, Shell Chemical, and FR Midstream).
See
also Minute Entry Order, Docket Entry No. 107, p. 2 ("For the
reasons stated in a Memorandum Opinion and Order to be issued later
today, the motions to dismiss claims asserted under Mexican law
urged by Sunoco, the Shell entities, and FR Midstream will be
granted with respect to the claims asserted under Mexican law and
those claims will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.") .
2PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n's Consolidated Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Consolidated
Opposition"), Docket Entry No. 183, p. 2.
-5-
opposition."
For the reasons stated in the court's June 8, 2012,
Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket Entry No. 106) ,3 the motions
for summary judgment on Mexican law claims urged by ConocoPhillips
and Marathon will therefore be granted.
B.
Shell
Chemical,
Marathon
Petroleum,
FR
Midstream,
ConocoPhillips, and Sunoco Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on
Conversion Claims and Claims for Equitable Relief
Defendants Shell Chemical, Marathon Petroleum, FR Midstream,
ConocoPhillips, and Sunoco argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff's claims for conversion and for equitable
relief because these claims are all time barred.
also
argue
that
they
plaintiff's claims
for
are
entitled
to
These defendants
summary
judgment
on
conversion and equitable relief because
plaintiff has failed to cite evidence capable of raising genuine
issues
of
material
fact
for
trial
on
these
claims.
In
its
consolidated response to the pending motions for summary judgment,
plaintiff asserts that
\\ [f] ollowing this Court's
2013, Memorandum Opinion and]
Order,
[plaintiff]
[September 30,
conceded to the
Defendants that it had no live claims against any defendant in this
matter other than STUSCO."4
3S ee also Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 292,
in Civil Action No. H-10-1997, PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n v.
BASF Corp,
et al.
and Civil Action No.
H-11-2019,
PEMEX
Exploraci6n y Producci6n v. Big Star Gathering L.L.P. (concluding
that Mexican law does not apply to claims asserted in related
action and granting motions to dismiss those claims) .
4Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition,
p. 2.
-6-
Docket Entry No.
183,
1.
Plaintiff's Claims Are Time Barred
In plaintiff's consolidated opposition to the pending motions
for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes that "[u]nder the current
parameters of this lawsuit, PEP's claims against Conoco, Sunoco,
Marathon, Shell Chemical and FR Midstream are completely barred by
limitations. 115
supplemental
judgment. 6
Plaintiff reiterates this acknowledgment in the
response
filed
to
STUSCO's
motion
for
summary
Although plaintiff urges the court to reconsider the
limitations rulings made in the September 30,
2013,
Memorandum
Opinion and Order in Civil Action No. H-10-1997, PEMEX Exploraci6n
y Producci6n v. BASF Corporation, et al.,? plaintiff in that case
filed and the court ruled on a motion for partial reconsideration
in
which
rulings. 8
plaintiff
did
not
challenge
the
court's
limitations
Moreover, none of the arguments set forth in plaintiff's
5Id. at 5.
6PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n's Supplemental Response to
Shell
Trading U.S.
Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment
(Plaintiff's Supplemental Response"), Docket Entry No. 189, p. 2
("[I]f this Court applies the same limitations ruling as it did in
the related BASF action, all of PEP's claims against all defendants
are time-barred. ") .
?Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition, Docket Entry No. 183,
pp. 2-5i Plaintiff's Supplemental Response, Docket Entry No. 189,
p. 2
("PEP respectfully disagrees with the Court's strict
application of Texas' statute of limitations to its claims and
reserves its arguments previously raised, including that Mexican
law applies to the conversion of Mexican sovereign property, and
requests that the Court reconsider its limitations ruling.") .
8S ee PEMEX Exploraci6n y Producci6n's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and Opposition to Plains Marketing, L.P.'s Motion
(cont inued ... )
-7-
opposition and supplemental opposition to the pending motions for
summary judgment persuade the court
rulings were incorrect.
that
its prior limitations
Since plaintiff concedes that all of its
pending claims against defendants ConocoPhillips, Sunoco, Marathon,
Shell Chemical,
and FR Midstream are barred by limitations,
the
motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for conversion
and for equitable relief
(constructive trust, unjust enrichment,
and money had and received)
urged by these defendants will be
granted.
2.
Plaintiff Has Failed to Cite Evidence Capable of Raising
Genuine Issues of Material Fact for Trial on Claims for
Conversion or Equitable Relief
Conceding that the live claims asserted against defendants
Shell Chemical, Marathon Petroleum, FR Midstream, ConocoPhillips,
and Sunoco are all time barred, plaintiff argues that defendants'
other arguments for summary judgment based on plaintiff's inability
to present evidence capable of raising a genuine issue of material
fact
for
trial
are
"moot, "
"superfluous,"
and
"unnecessary.,,9
8( ••• continued)
for Certification and Entry of Final Judgment, Docket Entry
No. 620, in Civil Action No. H-10-1997.
See also February 11,
2014, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 636 at
pp. 9-10 entered in Civil Action No. H-10-1197 ("PEP has not asked
for reconsideration of the court's decision that conversion claims
asserted against Plains in the First Amended Complaint relate back
to May 29,
2011,
or that conversion claims arising from
transactions that occurred more than two-years prior to that date
are time barred.") .
9Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition,
p. 5.
-8-
Docket Entry No.
183,
Without citing any authority plaintiff argues that
\\ [t] he Court
should decline the Defendants' invitation to spend time analyzing
many hundreds of pages of evidence that, because of the ruling on
limitations,
litigation.
ulo
are
simply
not
relevant
at
this
point
in
the
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that its
evidence as it stands is sufficient to survive summary
judgment, resting on the supported premise that the
Defendants were purchasing Mexican condensate at a time
when no u.s. company could have legally obtained Mexican
condensate because it was not being legally exported, and
when drug gangs were actively stealing and smuggling the
product.
See Exhibit 5 at 13-17.11
For the reasons set forth below, the court disagrees.
(a)
Claims for Conversion
Defendants Shell Chemical, Marathon Petroleum, FR Midstream,
ConocoPhillips, and Sunoco argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff's conversion claims because plaintiff cannot
trace the condensate allegedly purchased by each of them to thefts
that occurred in Mexico.
In the September 30,
2013, Memorandum
Opinion and Order issued in the related action the court held that
in order to hold [a defendant] liable for conversion, PEP
must trace condensate that was actually stolen from it in
lOId.
l1Id.
at 6
(citing The Opposition of Plaintiff PEMEX
Exploraci6n y Producci6n to the Dispositive Motions of Defendants
Plains Marketing, L.P.
(Dkt. 475), Murphy Energy Corporation
(Dkt.
479),
Superior Crude Gathering,
Inc.
and Jeff Kirby
(Dkt. 486), BASF Corporation and BASF FINA Petrochemicals, LP
(Dkt. 489), RGV Energy Partners, LLC and F&M Transportation, Inc.
(Dkt. 517), Docket Entry Nos. 545-547 in related Civil Action
No. H-10-1997).
-9-
Mexico to [the defendant].
PEP must also present
evidence from which the jury could form a reasonably
certain estimate of the amount of stolen condensate, if
any, that [the defendant] purchased.
. These issues
are not required to be proven with exact certainty, only
wi th reasonable certainty. 12
As evidence that Sunoco and ConocoPhillips purchased stolen
Mexican condensate, plaintiff argues that High Sierra representative David Kehoe testified in his deposition that
"High Sierra
bought Mexican condensate and unloaded it at Ingleside, Texas, into
tanks from which blended crude would then be sold to Sunoco and
Conoco." 13
The Kehoe testimony cited by plaintiff shows only that
High Sierra stored allegedly Mexican condensate at Ingleside and
that Conoco and Sunoco were two of many entities that purchased
product from High Sierra's Ingleside facility.
by plaintiff
material
fact
is
not
as
sufficient
to
to
plaintiff's
create
The evidence cited
a
conversion
genuine
issue
claims
of
against
ConocoPhillips or Sunoco because that evidence would not allow a
reasonable
juror
to
conclude
that
either
of
these
defendants
purchased condensate that was actually stolen from PEP in Mexico.
Nor would plaintiff's
cited evidence
allow a
juror to
form a
12Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 607 in related
Civil Action No. H-10-1997, p. 52.
See also id. at 10-14
(discussing Texas conversion law), 44-54
(analyzing tracing
requirements with respect to conversion claims asserted against
Plains Marketing), 102-08 (analyzing tracing requirements with
respect to conversion claims asserted against BASF and BFLP) , 12630 (analyzing tracing requirements with respect to conversion
claims asserted against Murphy Energy) .
13Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition, Docket Entry No. 183,
p. 6 (citing Exhibit 7 at 112:13-15; 117:17-20).
-10-
reasonably certain estimate of the amount of stolen condensate that
ei ther
defendant
purchased.
Accordingly,
even
if
plaintiff's
conversion claims against ConocoPhillips and Sunoco were not timebarred,
ConocoPhillips
and
Sunoco
would
still
be
entitled
to
summary judgment on those claims.
As evidence that Marathon and FR Midstream purchased stolen
Mexican condensate,
plaintiff cites the deposition testimony of
STUSCO representative Ed Vrana. 14
Plaintiff argues that Vrana's
testimony shows that Marathon and FR Midstream purchased stolen
condensate from STUSCO, which STUSCO had purchased from JAG.
Vrana
testimony
cited
by
plaintiff
shows
only
purchased product that originated from JAG.
that
The
Marathon
The Vrana testimony
does not reference purchases by FR Midstream.
Nor does the Vrana
testimony contain any information that would allow a juror to form
a reasonably certain estimate of the amount of allegedly stolen
condensate
that
either
Marathon
or
FR
Midstream
purchased.
Accordingly, even if plaintiff's conversion claims against Marathon
and FR Midstream were not time-barred, Marathon and FR Midstream
would still be entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
As
evidence
that
Shell
Chemical
purchased
stolen Mexican
condensate! plaintiff cites pages 3 through 8 of Plaintiff PEMEX
Exploraci6n
No.
492,
y
Producci6n's
Dispositive
in related Civil Action No.
l4Id. at 6-7
Motion,
H-10-1997!
(citing Exhibit 13 at 76:6-21).
-11-
Docket
Entry
and Exhibit 15
attached thereto,
the Deposition of Donald P. Schroeder, Jr.
On
May 29, 2009, Schroeder pleaded guilty to knowingly conspiring to
receive and sell stolen condensate. ls
Plaintiff argues that this
evidence shows that "Shell Chemical purchased stolen condensate at
least from SemCrude,
from
Continental
which had purchased its Mexican condensate
Fuels.
ul6
Assuming
without
deciding
that
plaintiff's cited evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Shell Chemical purchased condensate
actually stolen from plaintiff in Mexico, plaintiff's evidence does
not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial on plaintiff's
conversion claims against Shell Chemical because plaintiff's cited
evidence would not
allow a
juror to
form a
reasonably certain
estimate of the amount of stolen condensate that either defendant
purchased.
Accordingly,
even
if
plaintiff's
conversion
claims
against Shell Chemical were not time-barred, Shell Chemical would
still be entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
(b)
Claims for Equitable Relief
Defendants Shell Chemical, Marathon Petroleum, FR Midstream,
ConocoPhillips, and Sunoco argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff's claims for equitable relief (constructive
15See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 607, ln
related Civil Action No. H-I0-1997, p. 151.
16Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition, Docket Entry No. 183,
p. 7.
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trust,
unj ust
enrichment,
and money had and
received)
because
plaintiff has neither pleaded facts nor presented evidence capable
of raising genuine issues of material fact on plaintiff's claims
for equitable relief
(constructive trust, unjust enrichment,
money had and received).
In the September 30,
and
2013, Memorandum
Opinion and Order issued in the related action, the court held that
"[aJ party may recover under the unjust enrichment theory when one
person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the
taking of an undue advantage."
of Corpus Christi,
Heldenfels Brothers, Inc. v. City
832 S.W.2d 39, 41
(Tex. 1992)
(citing Pope v.
Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948), and Austin v. Duval, 735
S.W.2d 647,
649
(Tex.
App. -
Austin 1987,
writ denied)).17
The
court held that to prove a claim for money had and received "a
plaintiff must show that a defendant holds money which in equity
and good conscience belongs to him."
Edwards v.
Mid-Continent
Office Distributors, L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App. - Dallas
2008,
pet.
denied) .18
The court also held that "to establish a
constructive trust the proponent must prove
(1)
the breach of a
special trust or fiduciary relationship or actual or constructive
fraud;
(2) the unjust enrichment of the wrongdoeri and (3) tracing
to an identifiable res.
Swinehart v.
Stubbeman,
McRae,
Sealy,
17Memorandum Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 607 in related
Civil Action No. H-10-1997, p. 15.
18Id. at 17.
-13-
Laughlin & Browder, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Tex. App. - Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)
Plaintiff has not
.,,19
responded to defendants'
arguments that
plaintiff has neither pleaded facts nor presented evidence capable
of raising genuine issues of material fact on plaintiff's claims
for equitable relief
(constructive trust,
money had and received).
unjust enrichment, and
Local Rule 7.4 provides that "[f]ailure
to respond will be taken as a representation of no opposition."
Because plaintiff has not cited evidence capable of proving that
defendant
Shell
ConocoPhillips,
fraud,
duress,
Chemical,
Marathon
Petroleum,
or Sunoco obtained a benefit
FR
Midstream,
from plaintiff by
or taking undue advantage as required to prove a
claim for unjust enrichment, that any of these five defendants hold
money, which in equity and good conscience belongs to plaintiff, as
required to prove a claim for money had and received, or that any
of these five defendants committed actual
fraud or shared with
plaintiff an informal relationship of special trust or confidence
as required to prove a claim for constructive trust,
concludes that even if plaintiff's claims
the court
for equitable relief
against them were not time-barred that these five defendants would
still be entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for
equitable relief.
19Id.
-14-
C.
STUSCO is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Conversion Claims
and Claims for Equitable Relief
In plaintiff/s consolidated opposition to defendants
for summary judgment
l
motions
plaintiff argues that it has asserted claims
1
against STUSCO that are not time barred.
STUSCO does not dispute
that plaintiff has asserted claims against it that are not time
barred but
argues
that
it
is nevertheless
entitled to summary
judgment on all of the claims that plaintiff has asserted against
it because plaintiff is unable to cite evidence capable of raising
genuine issues of material fact for trial.
In PEMEX Exploraci6n y
Producci6n's Supplemental Response to Shell Trading US Company's
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(Docket
Entry No.
189)
plaintiff
concedes that it is unable to cite evidence capable of raising
genuine issues of material fact for trial on any of its conversion
claims against STUSCO.
Plaintiff states:
PEP hereby acknowledges that it has not proffered
admissible evidence as to STUSCO's alleged conversions of
PEP's condensate taking place after May 26 1
2009
sufficient to create a fact question as to those
transactions. PEP has previously conceded that it lacks
evidence to support claims against the other defendants
in this
matter
(Marathon Petroleum Company
LP;
ConocoPhillips Company; Sunoco Partners Marketing &
Terminals, L.P.; FR Midstream Transport; Shell Chemical
Company) for any transactions occurring within two years
of PEP's Original Complaint (filed April 10, 2012)
alleging claims against each.
See Dkt. 183 at 2.20
1
Accordingly, STUSCO is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff/s
non-time barred conversion claims.
2°Plaintiff's
Supplemental Response,
p. 1.
-15-
Docket
Entry No.
189,
Plaintiff has argued in its consolidated response that in the
related Civil Action No. H-10-19971
plaintiff hasl nevertheless
I
presented evidence capable of establishing that STUSCO purchased
from JAG condensate stolen from plaintiff in Mexico.
Assuming
without deciding that the evidence cited by plaintiff is capable of
establishing that STUSCO purchased stolen Mexican condensate l the
court concludes that STUSCO is nevertheless entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiffls conversion claims because plaintiff has
failed to cite any evidence that would allow a
juror to form a
reasonably certain estimate of the amount of stolen condensate that
STUSCO purchased.
Accordingly
I
even if plaintiff s
I
conversion
claims against STUSCO were not time-barred, STUSCO would still be
entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff has not responded to STUSCO's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's claims
reasons stated in
§
for
equitable relief.
For the
II.B.2(b), above, the court concludes that even
if plaintiff's claims against STUSCO for equitable relief were not
time-barred, STUSCO would still be entitled to summary judgment on
those claims.
III.
Conclusions and Order
For the reasons explained above
Company (STUSCO),
LP,
I
Defendants Shell Trading US
Shell Chemical LP, Marathon Petroleum Company,
and FR Midstream Transport LP's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket Entry No.
171)
is GRANTED;
-16-
(2)
the Motion for Summary
Judgment of Defendant ConocoPhillips Company (Docket Entry No. 172)
is GRANTED; and (3)
the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant
Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P.
is GRANTED.
(Docket Entry No. 174)
Since the court has granted the defendants' motions
for summary judgment, the third-party complaints and cross-claims
that
cross-plaintiffs
against
Sunoco
cross-defendants
High
and
ConocoPhillips
Sierra
successor to Petro Source Partners,
Gathering,
LP,
Crude
Oil
have
asserted
& Marketing,
and Superior Crude Oil
Inc. are MOOT because these cross-claims are premised
upon cross-plaintiffs being held liable to plaintiff PEMEX.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 30th day of May, 2014.
7
SIM LAKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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