Nguyen v. Metropolitan Transit Authority Of Harris County, Texas

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 16 Motion for Summary Judgment.(Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(TDR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
HOA T. NGUYEN,
Plaintiff,

§
§
§
v.
§
§
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT
§
AUTHORITY OF HARRIS COUNTY, §
TEXAS,
§
Defendant.
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-2184

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This employment case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. # 15] filed by Defendant Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris
County, Texas (“Metro”), to which Plaintiff Hoa T. Nguyen filed a Response [Doc.
# 19]. Defendant neither filed a Reply nor requested additional time to do so. The
Court has reviewed the full record in this case. Based on this review and the
application of relevant legal authorities, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began her employment with Metro in 1989. Between 2004 and 2009,

Plaintiff worked in the Human Resources Department, ultimately becoming Manager
of Human Resources Department’s Information Systems (“HRIS”).

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In October 2008, she filed a charge of discrimination against Metro with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging she had been
discriminated against on the basis of her national origin (Vietnamese) by the Vice
President of Human Resources, M. Helen Cavazos (Hispanic). Plaintiff alleged that
Cavazos gave substantial pay grade and pay increases to Hispanic employees but not
to her, the only HR manager of Asian national origin. Plaintiff complained also that
Cavazos hired a less qualified African-American as Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor
without posting the position or otherwise giving Plaintiff an opportunity to apply for
the supervisory job.
The parties negotiated a settlement in June 2009. The terms of the settlement
included a salary increase, a lump sum monetary payment, payment of Plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees, and a reclassification from 12 to T13. See Settlement Agreement,
Exh. 2 to Response. The “T” designation indicates as assignment to the Information
Technology (“IT”) Department. Metro promised in the Settlement Agreement not to
retaliate against Plaintiff.
At the time of the settlement, Plaintiff was on short-term medical leave
recovering from knee surgery. She returned to work on June 23, 2009, the day after
Metro signed the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff has presented evidence that during
the first three months after her return to work, she was given a negative performance

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evaluation, was removed from the team assembled to implement a new HR
management software package known as SAP, was removed from her managerial
position, and was transferred to the IT Department. Plaintiff has presented evidence
that Cavazos refused to speak to her or otherwise acknowledge her presence.
After Plaintiff was transferred to the IT Department, Manager David Penninger
assigned her to work on the SAP implementation team. Plaintiff has presented
evidence that Penninger’s supervisor, Erik Oistad, instructed him that Plaintiff could
not work on the SAP team. Plaintiff is currently working for Metro as an Application
Business Analyst IV in the IT Department, a non-managerial position.
Plaintiff filed a charge of retaliation with the EEOC and, on April 25, 2012, the
EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 20, 2012,
alleging that Metro retaliated against her for exercising her rights under Title VII by
filing and pursuing the 2008 EEOC Charge against Metro. After an adequate time to
complete discovery, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion
is now ripe for decision.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits filed in support
of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Puget Plastics Corp., 532 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2008). If the
moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Hines v. Henson,
293 F. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d
272, 278 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Court construes all facts and considers all evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nat’l Union, 532 F.3d at 401.
III.

RETALIATION CLAIM
A.

Applicable Legal Standards

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must
present evidence that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Hernandez v. Yellow
Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2008)). If the plaintiff succeeds in presenting
evidence that establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

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Id. (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304–05 (5th Cir. 1996)). If the
defendant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must present evidence from which the
fact-finder could find “retaliation was the but-for cause for the employer’s action.”
Id. Ultimately, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence that
raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether “her protected activity was
a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” See Univ. of Texas
Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff has presented evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
It is undisputed that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII when she filed her
2008 EEOC Charge against Metro. She has presented evidence that after the
Settlement Agreement was executed and she returned to work, she immediately began
suffering adverse employment actions including being removed from the SAP team,
being relieved of all managerial responsibility, and being transferred in
September 2009 to the IT Department where there was allegedly inadequate work for
her. The close temporal relationship between her returning to work following the
settlement of her EEOC charge and the allegedly retaliatory conduct is sufficient
evidence of a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. See Lemaire v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 390 (5th

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Cir. 2007) (citing Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.
1995)); Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001) (four months
between protected activity and adverse employment action is sufficient to establish
the causal connection element of a prima facie case); Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin.,
110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997).
Defendant does not articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment actions regarding Plaintiff. Instead, Defendant notes that Cavazos was
the only individual named in the 2008 EEOC Charge, and argues that Cavazos was
not the final decision-maker in the challenged adverse employment actions.
Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. The 2008 EEOC Charge was against Metro,
not Cavazos. See 2008 Charge of Discrimination, Exh. 2 to Motion for Summary
Judgment. It was Metro, not Cavazos, who entered into the Settlement Agreement to
increase Plaintiff’s annual gross compensation, to pay her a lump sum, to raise her
grade classification, and to pay her attorney’s fees. Plaintiff has presented credible
evidence that Metro executives and managers retaliated against her for filing the 2008
Charge of Discrimination.
Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in
support of her claim that but for her protected activity, she would not have suffered
the challenged employment actions. She has presented evidence that prior to the 2008

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EEOC Charge, she was “an integral part of the team” that was handling the SAP
installation. It is undisputed that when she returned after the Settlement Agreement
was executed she was removed from the SAP team. She has presented evidence that
David Penninger, an IT Department Manager, believed Plaintiff could be best utilized
as a member of the SAP team and, therefore, returned her to the team. Penninger was
precluded from doing so and reluctantly removed her from the SAP team. Indeed,
Penninger had to be instructed three times to remove Plaintiff from the SAP team
before he did so. Plaintiff has presented evidence that after execution of the
Settlement Agreement, all managerial responsibilities included in her job description
were removed and she was advised that she was henceforth “only HSIS personnel.”
Plaintiff has presented evidence that she was informed by her supervisor in HR that
she would be disciplined if she attempted to assign work to employees who were
previously under her supervision and management. Defendant has provided no
explanation for these decisions.
Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether but for her Charge of Discrimination against Metro, Metro through
its managers would not have retaliated against her by removing her from the SAP
team, relieving her of all managerial responsibilities, and transferring her to the IT
Department. As a result, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is denied.

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in

support of her retaliation claim. As a result, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 15] is
DENIED. The parties’ Joint Pretrial Order is due October 9, 2013, and the case
remains scheduled for docket call on October 22, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 22nd day of August, 2013.

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